A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF FACTORS INFLUENCING THE LANGUAGE POLICIES IN INDIA AND THE U.S.S.R.

by

Gulistan J. Karunalla

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ABSTRACT

The aim of this study has been two-fold: (a) to intellectualise certain political changes in India and the U.S.S.R. which have given rise to problems, the solutions to which are manifested in their respective language policies; and (b) to make a comparative study of the language problems and politics in India and the U.S.S.R. to see how similar problems are dealt with by the two countries, and with what success. Such a comparative study should help to provide lessons for India in the light of Soviet experience.

The method of inquiry adopted for this study is that of the Problem Approach in Comparative Education. Accordingly, the study is divided into four main parts, each dealing with one of the four main aspects of the Problem Approach.

The 'Preface' states the aims, assumptions, method of inquiry, scope and limitations of the thesis.

Part I, 'The Problem', dealing with problem selection and analysis, contains two chapters. In Chapter I the language 'problem' is identified and intellectualised in general terms. Some conceptual models of political control and linguistic diversity are also described in this chapter. Chapter II identifies and compares the specific features of the problem in the selected contexts of India and the U.S.S.R. Such an examination could show the differences, both of kind and degree, in the national characteristics of the 'same problem'.

Part II, 'The Policy Solutions', deals with the policy proposals, as expressed in legislation, to meet the particular language problems of India and the U.S.S.R. Chapter III examines the official language policy at both the national and the regional levels. Chapter IV considers the language policy in education, covering two main aspects: (a) language as a medium of instruction, and (b) language as a subject of study. Chapter V deals with the policy

proposals for developing the various languages and scripts of the two countries.

Part III, 'The Contextual Variables', describes the specific circumstances in which the policy solutions outlined in Part II are to be introduced. Consequently, the relevant factors, both normative and institutional, are identified and described in Sections A and B respectively. Section A, 'Normative Patterns' consists of an analysis of the theories on the nature of man, society and knowledge in India (Chapter VI) and the U.S.S.R. (Chapter VII), and their implications for language planning. Section B, 'Institutional Patterns' is a comparative study of the political structures of India and the U.S.S.R. (Chapter VIII) and of the decision-making process in education for the two countries (Chapter IX).

Part IV, 'The Future', brings together the main findings of this study, makes reference to the problems of language planning in India, and by careful deductions from the hypotheses (policy solutions) against the background of specified initial conditions, arrives at conclusions regarding the future trends in language policy making in India. This chapter also offers some suggestions regarding the manner in which some of the language problems of India could be tackled.

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I take this opportunity to thank the librarians of the Institute of Education library and am specially grateful to Mrs. Thelma Bristow and her colleagues in the Comparative Education section for their ready help and guidance. Apart from the Institute library, which has been the centre of this research, various institutes and colleges have given me permission to use their library facilities, and for this I am extremely grateful. Most of the material on India has been obtained from the National Institute of Education library, and the Central Institute of Education library, both at New Delhi; from the Parliament House library, New Delhi; and from India House, London. The libraries of the House of Soviet Culture; the Information Department of the U.S.S.R. Embassy in India; the Centre of Russian Studies, Nehru University, New Delhi; and the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, London, provided me with the opportunity to collect information on the U.S.S.R. The Senate House library has also been a source of valuable information. I am therefore indebted to these libraries and institutions for their assistance and cooperation.

Finally, I must express my thanks to my family and friends for their patience, love and moral support; and to Miss Najoo Dungore for typing this thesis.

CONTENTS

PREFACE

The linguistic diversity of India has been the subject of several lively and highly polemical discussions both within the country and outside. However, this obvious diversity and its consequencies have been perceived differently by different writers. Whereas some identify, with Selig Harrison[1], certain problems arising out of this diversity which may give rise to separatist movements and the eventual balkanization of the nation; more optimistic observers like W.H. Morris-Jones insist that it is both unnecessary as well as impossible to speak of 'dealing with' the problem of language in the case of India. Rather, he would emphasise, it is more a question of "containing or limiting a difficulty and learning to live with it."[2] Linguistic diversity in India, according to this school of thought, does not necessarily create a 'problem' which can be 'solved'. Instead, it is claimed, the present diversity is a manifestation of the mixed cultural heritage of India - a diversity out of which, in view of India's eclectic traditions and its capacity for sustaining the incompatibles, a united India can be born.

Before accepting or rejecting either view it is desirable to see whether language problems in India have been identified sufficiently clearly. The original contribution of this study lies in its identification of a problem from the point of view of political change and cultural stability. The aim of this research is first to identify and intellectualise a problem, and then examine proposed solutions in the particular context of India, some attention being paid to the factors which influence them.

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1. See, Harrison, S.S.: India: The Most Dangerous Decades (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1960) for a forceful presentation of the dangers of a 'balkanization' of India.

2. Morris-Jones, W.H.: "Language and Region within the Indian Union" in Mason, P. (ed.) India and Ceylon: Unity and Diversity (London, Oxford University Press, 1967) p.51.

It might be stated here that this thesis does not attempt to propose solutions to India's language problems. It aims to identify Indian problems in their specific context and to compare them with those arising in the Soviet Union in order to see whether Soviet solutions could be used as a basis for future policy-making in India.

This emphasises the comparative approach of the study. While the focus of this study is mainly, though not exclusively on India, for comparative purposes the case of the U.S.S.R. is also examined. Why the Soviet Union? In the first place, it may be questioned whether language problems in the U.S.S.R. are similar to those of India. In both cases a linguistically diverse society has undergone significant political changes in the present century. To that extent then an apparently similar problem may have arisen in both countries. However, even if in general, common problems exist, the obvious ideological and institutional differences between the two countries are bound to affect the nature of their specific problems as well as their particular policy solutions. An unconditional adoption of Soviet policies to solve India's language problems, without considering the initial conditions in which they are proposed would, therefore, be unwise. Consequently, in comparing India's language problems and policies with those of the Soviet Union, the latter is not viewed as an 'ideal' society to be emulated by India. No society can be considered perfect for the purpose of imitation since its particular institutions and their related value systems normally grow out of indigenous needs. An imposition or imitation of foreign ideas or practices is unlikely to take root unless the appropriate climate exists in the borrowing country.

But these considerations should not dissuade Comparative Educationists from studying the experiences of other countries. Selective cultural borrowing may still be possible. In the course of their work language planners in India have looked outside for inspiration, and one of the countries which appears to have attracted their attention most is the Soviet Union. Not only does

linguistic diversity in the U.S.S.R. more or less match that of India, but the language dilemma in the former country appears to have been resolved. Therefore reference to the U.S.S.R. should help to highlight important features of the Indian situation and identify some of the obstacles to successful language planning in India.

The question of prime interest to the investigator concerns language policies in education. The time devoted to language study in Indian schools appears to be excessive in the light of observed results. In a previous study[1] the author showed that one explanation might be that language policies in education are the result of other than purely educational considerations. Hence the present study seeks to identify factors which bear on language policies in education. It is, however, apparent that the latter cannot be usefully examined without studying the official language policy in relation to national unity. Consequently the present study will examine two related issues - official language policy and language policy in education.

With regard to the method of inquiry, "The Problem Approach" proposed by Brian Holmes in Problems in Education[2] is employed, in a comparative perspective, as the major framework of study. The four main aspects of the approach are: (a) problem analysis; (b) policy formulation; (c) the identification, description and weighting of relevant factors within a given context; and (d) the anticipation or prediction of the outcomes of policies. A brief description of the main features of this approach seems necessary.

Before identifying and analysing the problem selected for study, it is desirable to clarify what constitutes a 'problem'. Two basic assumptions underlie the identification of a problem. In the first place, various aspects

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1. See, Karunalla, G.J.: A Comparative Study of Policies Designed to Meet Some Educational Problems Arising in the Multilingual Societies of India and the U.S.S.R. (Unpublished M.A. dissertation, University of London, 1969).
2. Holmes, B: Problems in Education, A Comparative Approach. (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965) pp. 25-94.

of any social system are closely interrelated either logically or functionally. Secondly, changes are asynchronous in society. Holmes argues that asynchronous change gives rise to inconsistencies which are the source of problems[1]. According to Holmes, if all essential parts of a social order, i.e. norms, values, attitudes on the one hand, and social institutions on the other change, and at the same time and the same rate, then no problems arise. But in actual practice this is not so. In some cases laws, regulations or attitudes may lag behind freshly emerging institutions. Or, in other cases, legislation may precede new institutions. Such inconsistencies between and/or within the normative and the institutional patterns give rise to 'problems'.

Following the Problem Approach, language problems in India and the U.S.S.R. can be identified by examining asynchronous change within their respective institutional patterns. During this century in both countries new political systems were introduced within existing cultural patterns. The term 'political system' is used here to cover the two related areas of political institutions and political norms. In 1917 and 1947 political institutions were changed in the U.S.S.R. and India. At the same time the political norms of each country may not have changed. On the other hand, their traditional cultural diversity definitely did not change. Language as an aspect of cultural diversity would, in the event of the persistence and even encouragement of cultural diversity perpetuate certain political norms which may be inconsistent with the working of the new political institutions. It is the purpose of this study to examine whether there has been an attempt to reallocate new values through language. The policy of the two governments, appears to be the retention of cultural diversity and at the same time an attempt to create a national system of political values through the adoption of a single national language. This policy of creating a national political unity through the adoption of a common national language appears to have

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1: Holmes, B. : Problems in Education: A Comparative Approach. Op.cit. pp.75-85.

succeeded in the U.S.S.R., but not in India. The question then arises as to what specific conditions prevail in the two countries which make for the success of a similar policy in one country, but not in the other.

Various policies have been designed by the two countries to achieve the overall aim of creating national unity within an atmosphere of cultural diversity. These policies are viewed here in the light of two different contexts. Certain policies, successful within one particular context, may not achieve the same success when adopted in a different context. The different policy solutions therefore are not treated as universally or unconditionally valid but are regarded, for the purpose of this study, as hypotheses from which future events may be deductively inferred.

to say that successful prediction of policy outcomes calls for a knowledge of the specific circumstances in which the solution is to be introduced.

Consequently, the contextual factors or initial conditions are identified and analysed. For the purpose of this study two main patterns are constructed: (a) the normative pattern, consisting of the norms, values or attitudes; and (b) the institutional pattern, made up of the organisations and practices within the societal context. While some aspects of the value system and of the institutional pattern may influence the formulation of policies, these policies may not be necessarily accepted and adopted by all; and it is assumed that what really determines their outcome are the initial conditions.

Consequently first, the value systems of India and the U.S.S.R. which have a bearing on their language policies are examined. Through the analysis of the value systems it is hoped to clarify how certain types of

norms, values and attitudes held by members of a society explain their response to particular language policies. Moreover, there may be differences within a country's value system which may find expression in conflicts between policies designed say on the lines of traditional values and those drawn from modern or foreign values.

Secondly, the policy solutions have to operate within an institutional framework. The existing institutions may or may not be conducive to the success of a policy. Since questions of the official language are largely debated within the political system, and of language in education within the educational system, these two patterns are studied in order to understand why policy solutions appear to have succeeded in the Soviet Union but not in India. The question to be examined therefore is whether the political and educational structures of India inhibit successful language planning. This does not in any way imply a value judgement on the Indian or Soviet institutions. The aim is to see whether India possesses an institutional pattern which would ensure the success of its language policies.

Finally, emphasis on the value systems and the political and educational structures does not mean that these are the only factors which bear on language policy-making. Other related and important factors may be psycho-social and even economic. Within the scope of the present study, however, these factors are not considered. This study is based on the assumption that the most important considerations behind the language policies of India and the U.S.S.R. are their respective values, goals and attitudes, and the accompanying political and educational institutions.

It is hoped that this comparative analysis of the problems and their solutions, together with an examination of the initial conditions will help to illuminate the problems of language planning in India, and help to draw lessons in the light of Soviet experience.

With the stated aims and methods of inquiry in mind the thesis is organised into four parts. In Part I an attempt is made to identify and intellectualise the problem. Part II examines the various policy solutions formulated to solve the language problem. In Part III the contextual variables, including both the ideological and the institutional factors are identified and described. Finally Part IV, in the light of the nature of the problem a study of its solutions and the framework of the initial conditions in which problems arise and policies operate, attempts to give some suggestions for future language planning in India.

This study is based on library sources, both primary and secondary. Whereas official sources for India have been relatively easy to come by, in the case of the Soviet Union official sources have been supplemented by the writings of British and American observers. The presentation of the references and the bibliography in this thesis has been guided by the instructions contained in A Manual for Writers of Term Papers, Theses and Dissertations by Kate L. Turabian.[1]

1. Turabian, K.L.: A Manual for Writers of Term Papers, Theses and Dissertations, (Revised Sixth Impression. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1970).

INTRODUCTION

Major political changes overtake India and the World, during the present century. In this political outlook of India we traverse from the days of the British crown to the dreams of the Indian national army duly, thereby ending over three hundred years of alien rule over the subcontinent. Shortly there dawned Gandhi, the Quit India movement to finally culminate the Two Political Change in this many might not have known as Pakistan or as India, alone proceeded from the hands of the rule of Indigenous people to another. Nevertheless, the fact remains that significant political change took place in these two countries of the same part.

Further comes Arabs **PART II** India and the World, in their respective cultural diversity. Both countries are a conglomeration of diverse races, languages, religions and castes, and this cultural society has been handicapped, perpetually **THE PROBLEM** not by, British political utopia idea, have come down to the countries with a stable cultural diversity. This experiment which lies between the political and cultural patterns of India and the World, has been identified as a major source of their respective internal problems.

The Indians, during British rule, English proved to be their lingua franca as well as the language of higher education in India. Subjugation and the consequent dumping as well as placing expenditures brought into the Empire paved the making of the common Indian language for use in administrative and planning. The problem of creating national political unity in the midst of this diversity has confronted Indian leaders ever since. In the Pakistan, whereas the larger Arabic unifying factor which became and identified the question of religion as the unifying language did not solve the political unity problem which was made by Islam to overcome the further

INTRODUCTION

Major political changes occuredin India and the U.S.S.R. during the present century. In 1947 political control of India was transferred from the hands of the British crown to the leaders of the Indian national movement, thereby ending over three hundred years of alien rule over the subcontinent. Exactly three decades earlier, the Bolsheviks had taken over in Russia after overthrowing the Tsar. Political change in this case might not have been as traumatic as in India, since power passed from the hands of one set of indigenous rulers to another. Nevertheless, the fact remains that significant political changes took place in these two countries in the recent past.

Another common feature shared by India and the U.S.S.R. is their respective cultural diversity. Both countries are a conglomeration of diverse races, languages, religions and customs, and this cultural mosaic has been handed down, practically unchanged, upto the present day. Certain political changes then, have come about in two countries with a stable cultural diversity. This asynchronous change between the political and cultural patterns of India and the U.S.S.R. has been identified as a major source of their respective language problems.

For instance, during British rule, English served as the lingua franca as well as the language of higher education in India. Independence and the concomitant changes as well as rising expectations brought into the linguistic arena the claims of the numerous Indian languages for use in administration and education. The problem of creating national political unity in the midst of this diversity has confronted Indian leaders ever since. In the U.S.S.R., whereas the lingua franca during Tsarist rule was Russian and therefore the question of replacing it by an indigenous language did not arise for the Bolsheviks; an attempt was made by Lenin to reverse the Tsarist

policy of cultural assimilation of the nationalities. His theoretical declaration to the effect brought the latent demands of the various nationalities and their languages to the surface. The resulting situation, therefore, is problematic for both countries and one in which several broad policy solutions are possible, such as: (a) retaining the imperial language for the purposes of administration and education; (b) adopting a single indigenous national language; or (c) giving equal status in administration and education to all the languages.

In Part I of this thesis, therefore, the problem will be identified according to Holmes' approach, by using a model drawn from Almond[1] and Easton[2]. For Almond and Easton a political system is a system of interactions and includes both the political structures and the political culture of a nation. It will be assumed in this study that Holmes' political norms are Almond's and Easton's political cultures, and Holmes' political institutions are Almond's and Easton's political structures. There may thus be identified three main areas of study namely, political institutions or structures, political norms or cultures and cultural diversity.

Following Holmes, changes occured in the political institutions or structures. What is doubtful is whether the political norms or cultures also underwent change. At the same time, cultural diversity has certainly not changed. Thus, whereas there is a change and non-change between the political and cultural patterns; within the political pattern there may be asynchronous change between political institutions or structures and political norms or cultures. This gives rise to several related questions. Is it possible, for instance, to have changes in the political institutions while overtly retaining cultural diversity and still have a national political culture?

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1. Almond, G.A.: "A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics" in Almond, G.A. and Coleman, J.S. (eds.) The Politics of the Developing Areas. (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1966) pp.3-64.

2. Easton, D: A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice Hall, 1965).

What part does language play in the reallocation of new political values? Can a single language be used as a tool for creating a national political culture, i.e., a national system of allocation of values which are acceptable, while maintaining cultural diversity, and to what extent?

According to Almond and Easton, the functions of a political system are "integration and adaptation" and the "allocation of values", respectively. Hence the issue to be examined is, how far were the new political structures of India and the U.S.S.R. able to integrate diverse groups and allocate values of national political unity i.e., create a new political culture within a framework of cultural diversity. Language, as an aspect of culture, perpetuates certain values. At the same time, a single language is adopted by both governments for creating new norms of national political unity with varying success. Later sections of the thesis will seek to examine why a similar policy appears to have succeeded in the U.S.S.R. but not in India.

In Part I, however, the vaguely perceived language problem is identified and analysed first in general terms, and then examined within the specific contexts of India and the U.S.S.R.

Chapter I identifies and analyses the general problem. Some conceptual models of political systems, as presented by Almond and Easton, are outlined in order to identify, intellectualise and compare changes in the political norms and institutions of India and the U.S.S.R. Similarly, a model for identifying and comparing cultural diversity is also developed. Finally, a distinction is drawn between the concepts of unity, integration and assimilation, since one or more of these goals are usually aimed at in formulating language policies.

Once the general problem has been identified, Chapter II examines it within the specific contexts of India and the U.S.S.R. The pattern of political change in the two countries is described and compared, as also the

particular characteristics of their cultural diversity. Such an examination is expected to reveal the problem in its proper perspective and highlight its specific features in each context. Subsequently, the relationship between linguistic diversity and national unity is considered. It has been frequently argued that the adoption of a single indigenous national language leads to national unity. Before accepting or refuting this statement it is useful to ask whether linguistic diversity has so far caused national disunity and conflict in India or the U.S.S.R. On the answer to this question could depend the extent to which language is regarded as a factor of national cohesion by the two countries.

CHAPTER I

PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND INTELLECTUALISATION

Linguistic diversity in India or the U.S.S.R. is not a new or sudden phenomenon, but one which has gradually evolved through the years as a result of conquests, invasions, annexations, migrations or colonization. What is striking, however, is that it is largely in the post-1947 period in India and the post-1917 period in the U.S.S.R. that their respective linguistic diversities appear to pose an impediment, if not a challenge, to their efforts at nation building. This problem is identified as the result of change in another sphere of society, namely the political. During the present century political control has changed hands in the two countries; in the case of India, from a foreign power to native leaders and in the U.S.S.R. from one set of native rulers to another. These political changes within the culturally diverse societies of India and the U.S.S.R. have been identified as the source of their respective language problems.

Prior to independence in India and Bolshevik rule in the U.S.S.R., inspite of administrative unity, whatever sense of community or feeling of unity existed among the different people was, for the most part, negative, derived in the former case from a shared hostility to foreign rule, and in the latter from a hope of terminating the oppressive rule of the Tsar by joining forces with the Bolsheviks. Once political power changed hands, this hostility in both cases ceased to be a potent factor in the making of national unity . It seems, therefore, that in both India and the U.S.S.R. a political state has preceded the emergence of a single nation. Whereas the U.S.S.R. is a federation of distinct nationalities, there are to be found in India too, diverse cultural groups holding allegiance to a particular region, race, language, caste or religion.

If the aim of the two governments has been the building of a nation and the creation of national political unity, a common task facing them is the subordination or domestication of the intense loyalties based on race, language and religion to a larger national loyalty. In other words, the diverse groups have to be integrated within a nation state and values of national political unity have to be allocated through the new political institutions. In this context, the general consensus of opinion seems to be in favour of the adoption of a single indigenous language as one of the ways of bringing together the various groups divided on a cultural basis, thereby superseding the various primordial loyalties by a national or civic loyalty fostered through a national language.

At the same time, the rise, at least in theory, of democratic institutions following political change in the two countries, and the mobilisation of the hitherto unpoliticized social groups have put a premium on the development of their native languages. Universal suffrage and the political mobilisation of the masses calls for an increasing use of the regional languages in administration and education. Any prospective policy solutions, therefore, would have to take into consideration these dual demands of creating national unity while retaining cultural diversity.

Before considering the policy solutions, however, it is desirable to identify and analyse the problem, first, in general terms and then in the specific contexts of India and the U.S.S.R. In order to identify political change and cultural diversity in India and the U.S.S.R., it is useful to (a) examine some conceptual models of political systems; and (b) identify and intellectualise the phenomenon of cultural diversity with special reference to linguistic diversity. Some general policy solutions will then be considered and a distinction drawn between the concepts of unity, integration and assimilation. It is assumed that a country's language policies will depend on whether its overall policy is one of uniting, integrating or assimilating

diverse cultural groups.

Conceptual Models of Political Systems: Political change in a culturally diverse society has been identified as an important source of its language problems. It is therefore necessary to specify first what is meant by politics and the political system.

Politics or political science is defined by Frey as the study of power.[1] By "power" he refers to an interpersonal relationship such that the behaviour of one actor(s) alters the behaviour of another actor(s). In any social unit or system, at a given time or a given period of time, one can define a pattern or series of patterns of such power relations. Frey maintains that the notion of "political system" refers to this "set of power relationships prevailing in a social unit for a designated period of time, and to the processes by which it is maintained or changed."[2] From this it would follow that all social units have a political system and it would be possible to identify political systems of a nation, a society, an institution, an organisation or a small group. However, this is a rather broad definition of political systems, and as Frey himself concedes later, the political system of prime interest to political scientists is that of the society. Hence, by political change here is meant change in the political system of the society at large.

This necessitates a narrower conception of the political system which excludes all but the political system of the society. Such a definition is provided by G. Almond who rejects the notion of power in favour of functions, and introduces certain restrictions on what he conceives to be

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1. Frey, F.W.: "Political Science, Education and Development" in Fischer, J.(ed.) The Social Sciences and the Comparative Study of Educational Systems, (Pennsylvania, International Textbook Co., 1970) p.352.

2. Ibid. p.353.

the political system. Almond see the political system as

> ". . . that system of interactions to be found in all independent societies which performs the functions of integration and adaptation (both internally and vis-a-vis other societies) by means of the employment, or threat of employment, of more or less legitimate physical compulsion. The political system is the legitimate order-maintaining or transforming system in the society."[1]

The use of "physical compulsion", according to Almond, is what distinguishes a political system from other social systems. Further, for Almond, a political system includes not only the governmental structures of the executive, legislature and judiciary with their corresponding functions, but also the structures performing the "political" functions of political socialisation and recruitment, interest articulation, interest aggregation, and political communication.[2]

In his discussion on political system, D. Easton has referred to it as

> ". . . that system of interactions in any society through which . . . binding or authoritative allocations (of values) are made and implemented. . . An allocation is authoritative when the persons orientated to it consider that they are bound to it."[3]

Easton's definition of the political system, therefore, has three major

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1. Almond, G.A. "A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics" in Almond, G.A. and Coleman, J.S. (eds.) The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1966) p.7.
2. Ibid. p.17.
3. Easton, D.: A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice - Hall, 1965) p.50.

components: (1) its function is the allocation of values (by means of policies); (2) these allocations are authoritative; and (3) these authoritative allocations are binding on the society as a whole.

Both the Almond and Easton conceptions appear to restrict political systems to power or functions which are legitimate. Both define the political system as a system of interactions between individuals or groups, and proceed to lay down the content of interactions. While for Almond interaction is focused on "the functions of integration and adaptation", Easton orients it to be "allocation of values". From their formulations it is apparent that both Almond and Easton define the political system at the societal level, instead of emphasizing with Frey that every social unit, regardless of level, can have a political system.

Following Almond and Easton, the political system may be defined as a system of interactions of individuals and groups, qualified by possessing legitimate power and definite functions either of "integration and adaptation" or "allocation of values". Further, Almond attributes three main properties to the political system namely, (1) comprehensiveness, i.e. the system includes all the structures, both statutory and informal, in their political aspects; (2) interdependence, meaning thereby that a change in one subset of interactions produces changes in all the other subsets; and (3) existance of boundaries which demarcate points where other systems end and the political system begins. The boundaries between society and polity may be found to differ from political system to political system. Political systems, therefore, can be distinguished on the basis of these three main criteria.

In the event of political change, the actors involved in the system of interaction within a society change. Thus the performance of the functions of "integration and adaptation" or the "allocation of values" passes from the hands of one set of individuals to another. Together with this, there may also be a change in the way these functions are performed, or in Frey's terms,

how power is exercised by the new power holders and the concomitant changes in the role of other elements in the political system. Finally, there may be a change in how the exercise of power by the power holders or, in Almond's and Easton's terms the performance of the functions of integration and allocation of values, are controlled either by the interaction of the power holders themselves or by the power addressees. This control in a liberal democracy may be strong when compared to an autocratic state.

Both Almond's and Easton's conceptions of political systems implies an inclusion of both political structures and political cultures. Political change therefore involves change not only in the political structures, but may be accompanied by a change in the political ideology or culture governing the new structures. This brings to light an important aspect of the present discussion of political systems. The term "political system" is used here to cover two different but related areas: political culture or, in Holmes' terms, norms and political structure or Holmes' institutions. The latter, being more obvious and concrete, are frequently referred to in any discussion of the political system. However, it is both the political culture or norms and the political structures or institutions which together form a political system. Whereas the political structures perform the particular functions of the political system, the ideologies or political cultures are the values or value systems which underlie the political structures and determine their telos. Institutions, therefore, develop in a specific ideological or normative environment, so that when transplanted into a different ideological climate, they may lose their functional identity. Elections, parliaments and political parties developed by the political systems of liberal constitutionalism may change their intrinsic meaning and even their operational utility when applied by a totalitarian political system.

When describing the political changes in India and the U.S.S.R. during the present century, an attempt will be made to examine how far the

the change has been one of structure only, and whether it was accompanied by relevant changes in the political ideologies of the two countries.

Finally, political change may be the result of a war, a revolution, demands for independence, secessionist movements, or a coup d'etat. The transfer of power from the British Crown to the leaders of the national movement in India in 1947, and the rise to power by the Bolsheviks after the 1917 Revolution in Russia, signalled significant changes in political control in the respective countries. In the former case political power and the performance of political functions passed from the hands of the colonial rulers into those of the native leaders; while in the case of the latter, the Bolshevik party leaders captured power from the Tsar via the Provisional Government. In both cases, change of political control was immediately manifested in changes in their respective political structures. What is doubtful, however, is whether their political norms or cultures also underwent corresponding changes.

Conceptual Model for Identifying and Comparing Cultural Diversity With Special Reference to Linguistic Diversity: Culture can be regarded as a shorthand term for the basic rules for living agreed to by members of a particular social group and which guide their way of life. These rules may be in the form of mores, habits, social customs or taboos, or they could be laid down by law. More specifically, culture can be thought of as the "common, learned way of life shared by the members of a society, consisting of the totality of tools, techniques, social institutions, attitudes, beliefs, motivations, and systems of value known to the group."[1] Some of the important factors for identifying the culture of a social group and distinguishing it from that of other social groups would be its language, religion, social customs and practices including

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1. Foster, G.M.: Traditional Cultures: The Impact of Technological Change. (New York, Harper, 1962) p.11.

habits of food, dress and housing, and ethnic origin. Significant cultural differences can be observed between different social groups and when these are found within the boundaries of a single state, the latter is said to be characterised by cultural diversity or cultural pluralism.

By cultural diversity, then, is meant the presence of various linguistic, religious and ethnic rules and ways of life common to different groups within a single state.

Different forms of cultural diversity may be identified, depending on the particular type of society. One form of cultural diversity is that found in some newly independent areas of Asia and Africa formerly under colonial rule. Here an imported culture has been presumably superimposed on the indigenous culture, the former not necessarily assimilated by the latter. Moreover, the indigenous culture is usually regarded as traditional whereas the imported or foreign culture is considered as synonymous with modernity. Such a confrontation of tradition with modernity may be witnessed in India today.[1]

At the same time, there is to be found another form of cultural diversity in India. This is the product of regional varieties existing within the indigenous Indian culture. Thus, even within the indigenous culture there may be found diversity of regional cultures arising as a result of the coming together of different social groups through migrations, conquests or annexations. During foreign rule these culturally diverse groups are generally brought under administratively convenient boundaries which may pay scant attention to cultural, linguistic or social congruence. In such cases, independence from foreign rule may reveal various cultural differences within the new state. Where independence has been accompanied, as in India, by

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1. See, Shils, E.: The Intellectual Between Tradition and Modernity: The Indian Situation. (The Hague, Mouton, 1961).

declarations of social and cultural equality, the different cultural groups have been found to assert their individual identity, thereby creating new problems for the new government.

Apart from the creation of a culturally diverse state by colonization and conquests, cultural diversity can also be created by voluntary federations. Most of the diverse nationalities brought under the Tsarist yoke in pre-Soviet Russia, after 1917 'opted' to join the Russian republic to form, what is today known as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. One of the principles underlying their federation with the Russian republic was the guarantee of cultural autonomy and equality by Lenin. This naturally raised their expectations for cultural autonomy, thereby posing for the Bolsheviks the problem of creating national unity in the midst of cultural diversity.

Political change in both India and the U.S.S.R., therefore, has been observed to give an impetus to the expectations and claims of the various groups for cultural autonomy and equality. This necessitates the formulation of various policy solutions.

As mentioned earlier, cultural diversity includes linguistic, religious as well as ethnic diversities. For the purpose of this study, however, attention is paid chiefly to linguistic diversity. Language, being an important tool of communication, is a way of conveying rules, mores, customs and a media for allocating the values of a group. The question can therefore be raised as to how far the preservation of linguistic diversity perpetuates the traditional norms and values of the different social groups. At the same time it can be examined whether a single language can be used to allocate new values and create national political unity, and to what extent. Tied up with this is the practical necessity of having a single common language for inter-regional and elite-mass communication essential

to the efficient functioning of a democratic state.

In the absence of a single dominant language, the choice of a particular language or languages for pan-national use may be influenced, among other considerations, by the specific patterns of language division found in different multilingual societies. In order to comprehend a specific pattern, it is important to consider the number of language groups, their relative size, the degree of relatedness and distinction among them, variations in the standard languages and dialects, the differential literary tradition of the languages, the relation of language division to other social divisions, and the importance attributed to the language factor by the speech communities concerned. Roughly, the multilingual situation can be classified, following Rustow[1], into several broad patterns:

(1) A variety of closely related languages may coexist with one of them being accorded the status of a lingua franca, for example, Indonesia.

(2) There may exist a number of languages not closely related, of which only one has a long literary tradition, for example, Morocco.

(3) A variety of unrelated languages may be found, no one of which can claim a long literary tradition, for example, many parts of tropical Africa.

(4) A variety of languages may exist, each with its substantial literary tradition, for example, India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Malaysia.

In the first and second types of situations, the multiplicity of languages is not likely to pose major political problems. In the third and fourth types, the lack of an assured dominance of a single language tends to generate language rivalry expressed in political forms. Two dimensions of

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1. Rustow, D.A.: A World of Nations (Washington D.C., Brookings Institution, 1967) pp.51-55. Also, Dasgupta, J.: Language Conflict and National Development (Bombay, Oxford University Press, 1970) pp.19-20.

the resulting problem can be identified. In the first place there is the question of finding a suitable indigenous language to serve for pan-national purposes. The problem is complicated by situations where it is difficult to assess the dominance - qualitative and quantitative - of one single language. The choice of one national language involves so many political considerations that convenience, rationality and efficiency are not necessarily the decisive criteria.

Secondly, adoption of one or more indigenous languages may be hampered if these are not sufficiently developed and standardized to function as pan-national languages. This is usually found to be the case where a foreign language, or a court language, has served, over a considerable period, as the lingua franca as well as the language of administration and higher education. Hence the question of standardizing languages and developing them for national use arises. Standardization of languages, however, seems to lag behind political modernization, since languages develop primarily through usage. Social mobilization and political transformation, however, may expedite the development of existing languages and the creation of *new* standard languages from locally current dialects. By its very nature, within a multilingual society there are more than one standard languages, thereby giving rise to the familiar problem of choosing the appropriate one for national purposes.

Further, for a single language to serve as the national language of a multilingual society, non-native speakers of that language have to learn it. Thus the question of a national language gets tied up with its role in the system of education, language rivalry thus filtering from the sphere of administration into that of education. The national language question, therefore, needs to be considered in the perspective of the growth of literacy, the expansion of education, and the extension of communication that accompanies modernization and political change.

To conclude, political change in two societies with a stable cultural diversity has been identified as the source of their respective language problems. As a result of political change, the political structures or institutions are generally observed to undergo change. It is doubtful, however, whether the accompanying political norms or cultures also undergo simultaneous change. At the same time, cultural diversity is found to remain constant. Following Holmes' analysis, this asynchronous change (a) between the political and the cultural patterns; and (b) within the political system, between the political norms and the political institutions, has been identified as the source of the language problems in India and the U.S.S.R.

On the basis of Almond's and Easton's models of political systems, the functions of a political system are seen to be the allocation of values through policy-making and the integration and adaptation of society. Hence the question arises whether the new political structures set up as a result of political change perform the functions of integration and allocation of values, in this case of national political unity, vis-a-vis the diverse cultural groups. Politically the diverse groups may be brought together within a body politic, and geographical and political unity may be achieved relatively easily. What needs to be examined, however, is whether the diverse groups have been integrated culturally and the values of national unity and integration have been allocated and accepted.

One generally proposed policy solution is the adoption of a single language to achieve national unity. Language, being an important medium of communication, attempts may be made, with varying success, to allocate values of national political unity through the adoption of a single language. At the same time, cultural diversity may or may not be encouraged. The particular policy solutions adopted with regard to cultural diversity, would depend on whether the aim is to unite and integrate diverse groups, or to assimilate them. Moreover, even within a single state the aim may

fluctuate between integration and assimilation, resulting in shifts in its language policy. Before analysing the different policy solutions it is, therefore, desirable to define and distinguish between the concepts of unity, integration and assimilation.

Distinction Between National Unity, Integration and Assimilation: The solutions designed by a particular country to meet language problems arising out of the asynchronous change between its cultural and political patterns may be found to depend on whether its aim is to allocate, through its language policies, values of national unity, integration or assimilation. Related as these concepts are, they are by no means the same, and hence it is desirable to define each of them and distinguish one from the other in order to help ascertain the particular goal of each country and evaluate the policies designed to attain those goals.

According to the Oxford dictionary definition, unity is "the fact, quality, or condition of being one in number . . . feeling, action or purpose." Unity implies the act of harmonious combination of parties or persons for a specific purpose like defence, commerce or government. As such, unity may be limited in time or purpose as when the diverse elements within a country are united against a common enemy, or come together politically to perform the functions of government. Unity inspired by a common danger may disappear once that threat is removed. In the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa, the desire to oust the colonial rulers brought together the diverse peoples of the country in national political organisations, without in any way necessarily integrating them into the body politic. As a result, once independence was achieved, though political unity continued, rivalries based on differences of race, language or religion threatened the stability of the new state.

Political unity, therefore, does not necessarily ensure national

unity, that is, a "we-feeling" or a common sentiment of oneness. Under these circumstances it is sometimes assumed that the adoption of a common national language, as a badge of nationhood, may, together with a common territory and a common government, serve to create a feeling of national unity. In culturally diverse societies mention is sometimes made of creating a "unity in diversity". What is implicit in this statement, usually, is the desire to create a national unity.

Often, the terms national unity and national integration are used interchangeably, though they are not synonymous. The feeling of national unity is largely abstract, intangible, at times even subjective, and therefore difficult to measure. On the other hand, integration, defined as "the action or process of making up of a whole by adding together or combining the separate parts or elements," connotes a more concrete, objective and all-embracing phenomenon. When diverse groups are integrated to form a whole, unity among them is automatically implied.

Several categories of integration are normally subsumed under the general title of national integration. In fact, national integration comprises of political, social, cultural and other forms of integration. As far as national political integration is concerned, Coleman draws a distinction between its two dimensions: the vertical dimension, which refers to the bridging of the elite-mass gap and the development of an "integrated" political process; and the horisontal dimension, which refers to the welding together of previously separate socio-cultural groups into a larger, more all-embracing polity.[1]

Moreover, the question of political integration can be considered separately from the other forms of integration.[2] In fact, in the multiethnic,

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1. Coleman, J.S.(ed.): Education and Political Development. (Princeton,N.J., Princeton University Press, 1965) p.30.
2. Dasgupta,J: Language Conflict and National Development. Op.cit. p.9.

multilingual and multireligious new states, the political development of the nation is likely to precede and is expected to promote national loyalty and cohesion. As Easton suggests, "it is quite possible, . . . that in the formation of new societies and associated political systems, a sense of belonging together politically may normally follow rather than precede the emergence of a political community. If this is so, there could be little doubt that a political community is phenomenally independent, at least in its initiation, from the feelings of solidarity that are usually considered to be a major pre-condition."[1]

On the question of achieving political integration, some studies[2] are of the view that reducing the cleavage, discord and parochial loyalties found in culturally diverse societies is a necessary prerequisite to political integration. This is, however, a negative definition of political integration. It is, moreover, an oversimplified and extreme view which holds that the way to integration lies through forcible subordination and assimilation of the parochial and primordial groups under authoritarian rule.

This is because, the static distribution of the multiplicity of primordial groups per se, does not threaten political integration. Rather, it is the dynamic processes of the political transformation of these groups which may pose a challenge to integration. As primordial groups, hitherto quiescent, are mobilised and inducted into the political process, they discover they are different from other groups and may, therefore, seek political expression for their newly discovered cultural identity. The political impact of a primordial group therefore depends to a considerable extent on how a hitherto unpoliticised group has transformed itself into a significant politicised group. Socio-cultural segmentation by itself does not reveal

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1. Easton, D.A.: A Systems Analysis of Political Life. (New York, Wiley, 1965) p.188.

2. See Emerson, R.: From Empire to Nation. (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1960) pp.289-290. Also, Apter, D.E. in Eckstein, H., and Apter, D.E. (eds.) Comparative Politics (Glencoe, Ill., Free Press, 1963) p.649.

much about the patterning of the various groups' participation in politics and its consequences on political integration. The mode of participation depends, as DasGupta points out, on "the definition of political interest of such groups, the style of their leadership, the nature of the political system in which the leaders act, and the methods of action which have been found in practice to gratify the demands of the conflict groups."[1]

Socio-cultural divisions, therefore, are significant in the process of political integration when they appear as political divisions. Not all socio-cultural divisions are political. Moreover, it is assumed that political divisions do not necessarily hinder political integration. As DasGupta points out, to assess the impact of political divisions on political integration, they have to be balanced against factors of cohesion.[2] The possibility that political cohesion may result from a relative lack of political divisions, is irrelevant here because of the heterogeneous nature of the states under consideration. But two other possibilities have been suggested by Eckstein[3], namely, that political cohesion can exist despite divisions, if not because of political divisions. These two possibilities are important in the light of the assumption that political divisions do not necessarily hinder political integration. However, even when these divisions take the form of concrete political conflicts, as pointed out by DasGupta, these conflicts may "prove to be a factor of positive sociation leading to a possibility of integration."[4] Together with this there may be found parallel cohesive norms and institutions which may contribute to political integration. It is in this context that the positive role of the

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1. DasGupta, J.: Language Conflict and National Development. Op.cit. pp.11-12.
2. Ibid. p.13.
3. See, Eckstein, H.: Division and Cohesion in Democracy: A Study of Norway (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1966) p.69.
4. DasGupta, J.: Language Conflict and National Development. Op.cit. p.13.

political institutions of the community and a normative legitimation of certain overarching values may be important for political integration.[1]

Political integration, therefore, may be defined as "the minimal cohesion necessary for the coordination of the political groups through the institutionalized procedures of the political community."[2] This minimal cohesion does not simply mean a lack of violence in the resolution of group conflict. The institutionalisation of group coordination through a pluralist decision-making system is of primary importance to the process of political integration.

This pluralist system of decision-making is contrary to the authoritarian model which holds that the only decision making-system that is appropriate for the task of national integration follows the rule of amalgamation. The rationale behind this modal appears to be the view, stated earlier, that political integration can be achieved through reducing or eliminating cleavage, discord and parochial loyalties. Consequently, a pluralist system of decision-making is perceived, by the adherents of this view, as a post-integrational system and not as a developmental system which can initiate and promote integration in a new state.

This brings us to the third concept under consideration, namely, assimilation. Assimilation is defined as "the action of making or becoming alike or similar."[3] Assimilation, therefore, falls at the extreme end of a continuum if the concepts of unity, integration and assimilation are put on a continuum. Here the diverse groups are absorbed into the main or majority group; they are merged into a whole to the extent that they may lose their individual identity. An example of this is the Tsarist attempt at Russification which was directed towards assimilating diverse nationalities

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1. DasGupta, J.: Language Conflict and National Development. op.cit. pp.13-14.
2. Ibid. p.14.
3. The Oxford Dictionary (Third Revised Edition, 1964).

under the supremacy of the Russian Empire with the Tsar at the apex.

This distinction between assimilation and integration leads to two distinct policies of language planning undertaken by multilingual countries, according to whether they are committed to the former or the latter ideal. These are: (1) the strategy of assimilation; and (2) the strategy of integration. In the first case, linguistic diversity is sought to be eliminated in favour of a single language, whereas in the latter instance linguistic pluralism is an accepted fact, with provision made for the preservation and use of the major languages of the country, supplemented by universal use of one or more languages.[1]

Both strategies, thus, place a premium on the use of a single national language for integrating diverse groups and allocating values of national political unity. The policy of integration, however, accepts and makes allowances for the existing linguistic diversity by permitting and in some cases even encouraging the use of the major languages in the country for some or all of the purposes of administration and education, thereby maintaining cultural diversity while at the same time striving to achieve national unity.

These two policy alternatives will be elaborated in Part II III and used as a basis for comparing the policy solutions of India and the U.S.S.R.

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1. Stewart, W.A.: "An Outline of Linguistic Typology for Describing Multilingualism" in Rice, F.A. (ed.) Study of the Role of Second Languages in Asia, Africa and Latin America. (Washington, D.C., Center for Applied Linguistics, 1962) pp.15-16.

CHAPTER II

IDENTIFICATION AND COMPARISON OF THE PROBLEM IN INDIA AND THE U.S.S.R.

In the previous chapter the language problems in the two multilingual societies of India and the Soviet Union were identified as the result of asynchronous change between their respective political and cultural patterns. Following this general statement of the problem, an examination, in the present chapter, of political change and cultural diversity in India and the U.S.S.R. is expected to throw light on the specific problems found in each society, and facilitate their comparison. Events leading to the problems in the two countries are by no means identical. Apart from the fact that the twentieth century has witnessed a political transformation in both societies while their cultural pluralism remains as vigorous as ever, there are to be observed significant differences in the contextual backgrounds of their individual problems, and hence an identification and comparison of the events giving rise to the problems in each case would show the extent to which they are similar and the amount of anxiety they present to the government of each country. Thus, both the nature of the problems and their impact on national integration will be compared. Such an exercise first necessitates an examination of the nature of political change and the type of cultural diversity found in India and the U.S.S.R.

Political Change in India and the U.S.S.R.

The political changes witnessed in India and the U.S.S.R. in the present century may be classified into two broad types: (a) change of

government (with or without violence) as a result of independence from former imperial powers; and (b) change of government by violent revolution. Both these types of political changes have been accompanied by a radical change in the membership of the governing elite, and the performance of the essential functions of a political system has passed into the hands of this new elite. Coupled with this change of personalities in the governing elite, the political structures have also undergone significant changes and new political structures have been set up. Further, following political change, there have been changes in the sources of power and authority in each country. Finally, it has been observed, that political change may lead to a change in the aims and objectives of the state and its attitude towards diverse cultural groups, depending on its particular political ideology.

With these general observations in mind, the specific political changes in India and the U.S.S.R. are examined in the subsequent pages.

August, 1947 saw the end of British rule in India, when political power was transferred from the hands of the British Crown to the leaders of the national movement in India. Long years of struggle for independence finally came to an end when the British as rulers withdrew, and India emerged from the status of a mere colony to that of a newly-independent republic. This event heralded quite a new experience for a country which, prior to British rule, had never been united and governed as a single political unit. However, the leaders of independent India, as will be seen later, inherited a system of government from their British predecessors which helped them considerably in their new task.

Just as 1947 stands out as significant in the history of India, the year 1917 marks a turning point in the Soviet political arena. After nearly four centuries of Tsarist oppression, the beginning of 1917 saw all social groups - military, intelligentsia, entrepreneurs, civil service,

peasantry and working class - ready for a radical change. Tsarist power, already weakened by the 1905 rehersal, was finally brought to an end by two sudden changes in government in February and October 1917: in the first the autocracy collapsed and the Provisional Government was formed; in the second the Bolsheviks came to power. The 1917 revolution, therefore, brought about significant political changes for the Soviet Union.

A 'revolution' has been defined as "a popular movement whereby a significant change in the structure of a nation or society is effected. Usually an overthrow of the existing government and the substitution by another comes early in such a movement and significant social and economic changes follow."[1] The abdication of the Tsar, and the setting up of a Provisional Government in February, 1917 involved the first stage of the revolution, namely, a change of government, but did not carry out "significant social and economic changes." For such changes to come about, it was necessary, according to Lenin, for the Russian proletariat to overthrow the bourgeois Provisional Government. In his April (1917) Theses he called for a boycott of the Provisional Government and the installation of a 'Republic of Workers, Agricultural Labourers and Peasants' Deputies'. On 25th October the Bolsheviks seized the Winter Palace and overthrew the Provisional Government, and on 26th October the Government of People's Commissars was established.[2] The Bolsheviks had taken power.

Political change in the two countries, therefore, brought about changes in the membership of the governing elite. In the case of India, however, this change was much more radical since a predominantly British governing elite was replaced by leaders from the native population. In the Soviet instance, the change was from one set of native rulers to another

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1. Gottschalk, L.: "Causes of Revolution", in American Journal of Sociology, Vol.50, no.1 (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, July, 1944) p.4.
2. Lane, D.: Politics and Society in the U.S.S.R. (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970) p.46.

with the result that it was, possibly, not accompanied by significant changes in the 'residues' or sentiments which guide political action.

The Historical Legacy: The influence of history, generally, is too potent to be completely wiped away by an act of government. The political systems of modern states are usually developments from earlier times and bear at least some of the marks of their predecessors.[1] New states, whether born of revolution or after long years of struggle for independence from colonial rule, reflect the accumulated experience of the past which undergoes change in response to changes in other aspects of human thought and behaviour.

The British legacy to the government of free India can be discerned at two levels: (1) the institutional or material, that is, the machinery of government; and (2) the normative or psychological, that is, a widely held sentiment regarding the importance of there being a government. Before the British came to India, the country had never been united under a single powerful ruler or had a single uniform system of government. Nearly three centuries of British rule gave India an awareness of government, a sense of its importance, and a feeling of the need for its stability and strength. Together with this, as a result of Western education, ideas of liberty, independence, democracy and self-government took root in India. There existed, therefore, the elements of a preliminary normative legitimation for a democratic form of government from the very beginning of the national movement. The norms of a democratic decision-system were instilled in the participants in the national movement long before they were used to applying the norms through formal political authority.

Regarding the more tangible machinery of government, the federal

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1. Morris-Jones, W.H.: The Government and Politics of India. (London, Hutchinson & Co.Ltd., 2nd edition, 1967) pp.13-14.

nature of the Indian Constitution of 1950 can be seen as a legacy of the last Act of the British Parliament - The Act of 1935 - which layed down a pattern of government for India in the direction of federalism.[1] The Government of India Act of 1935 established a federation composed partly of the provinces and partly of such princely states as wished to enter. The experience of partial representative mechanisms reinforced the norms of a democratic decision-system during the later phase of British rule. The federal structure and the decentralization of powers are thus an important part of the material legacy of government received from British rule. With the transfer of power in 1947, the British as rulers withdrew, but the great machinery of government set in motion continued, it being not only impossible, but unwise for the new rulers to completely discard this legacy. India, therefore, emerged from colonial rule as a Sovereign, Democratic Republic, enjoying a federal form of government, the powers and responsibilities of the centre and the states duly laid down in the Constitution.

In the Soviet instance, to assess whether the Bolsheviks, in theory, inherited a form of state government from the Tsars, it is essential to examine their definition of the State. According to Marxism, the guiding theory of the Bolsheviks, the State is "the proletariat organised as the ruling class".[2] The political system, according to Marxism is a superstructure dependent on the base, namely the economic system. The transition from capitalism to communism/follows, must, inevitably be accompanied by a transition from the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie to that of the proletariat.

Hence, after the proletariat had won political power, it was affirmed, the old state machine must be completely destroyed and replaced by a new one consisting of an organisation of the armed workers. "Revolution",

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1. Morris-Jones, W.H.: The Government and Politics of India. Op. cit. p.17.
2. Marx, K. and Engels, F.: Communist Manifesto (1847) (Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1965) p.37.

said Lenin, "consists not in the new class commanding, governing with the aid of the old state machine; but in this class smashing this machine and commanding, governing with the aid of a new machine."[1] Under Socialism much of 'primitive' democracy will inevitably be revived, since, for the first time in the history of civilised society, the mass of the population will rise to taking an independent part, not only in voting and elections, but also in the everyday administration of the state. Under socialism all will govern in turn and will soon become accustomed to no one governing.[2]

Following Marx, Lenin argued that with the abolition of the capitalist state, it would be necessary to replace it with government institutions controlled by the proletariat. In the short run, the state would not begin to "wither away" but the dictatorship of the proletariat or the proletariat organised as the ruling class would be dominant. The state, being a special organisation of force for the suppression of the exploiting class, namely, the bourgeoisie, was necessary "to abolish completely all exploitation", to defend the proletariat against a possible counter-revolution and to organise a socialist economy. The dictatorship of the proletariat was, therefore, essential during the transitional period from capitalism to communism. Once exploitation is completely abolished, the state, being constituted only to suppress exploitation, begins to wither away. Lenin pointed out that only under communism, when no exploiting class would exist, would no "special apparatus of suppression" be necessary and that with the development of society from capitalism to communism, would the state begin to "wither away".

So much for theory. In actual practice, however, over half a century of Soviet rule has shown no signs of the state withering away. The

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1. See, Lenin, V.I.: "The State and Revolution" (1917) in Collected Works, Vol. 25. (Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1964) pp.381-492.

2. Ibid.

power of the State was in Marx's view an essentially short-term prospect while counter-revolutionary forces would be mopped up. In the Soviet Union, however, in the absence of the anticipated proletarian revolution in the West, some Western observers argue that a minority government has developed into a dictatorship mobilising the people, rather than, as in the original Marxist scheme, an expression of the people.

It can be argued, therefore, that while political change in the U.S.S.R. brought about a change in the governing elites, and new political structures, including the parliamentary, ministerial and party-structures were created; the political norms remained essentially the same. The Bolshevik revolution overthrew Tsarist rule but inherited a centralisation of power, the absolutism of the Tsar being replaced by the absolutism of the Communist party of the Soviet Union. This centralising tradition in all matters of state importance was a legacy of the past and not a product of the Revolution. Nearly three centuries of Mongol domination, followed by an era of Tsarist domination, left Russia with the essentials of a political system characterised by absolutism, centralism, social stratification, and a church linked to and dominated by the State.[1] A system of government evolved which rested on coercion and on unrestrained rule by the few. After the Revolution, absolute political power passed from the hands of the Tsar into those of the Communist party elites.

Thus the new political systems of India and the U.S.S.R. are found to have identifiable roots in the past, especially with regard to their political cultures. However, the specific circumstances prevailing in each case has necessitated the formulation of new policies to meet the rising expectations and demands of diverse groups and at the same time to unite the nation. Attempts, therefore have been made by each country to allocate values of national political unity through the language policies.

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1. Rubinstein, A.Z.: Communist Political Systems. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice Hall, 1966) pp.4-5.

Linguistic Demands Following Political Change: A change of political control in India and the U.S.S.R. was accompanied by rising expectations from various sections of their respective societies. These expectations are diverse, but the prime task here is to examine those which arose as a result of the culturally pluralistic form of society found in both countries. Significant changes can be observed in the attitude of the new rulers towards the various cultural groups and their languages.

At no time in Indian history has an indigenous language served as the lingua franca of the country. Sanskrit during the ancient period, Persian during the Moghul period and English during the British period served as the language of administration and higher education for the chosen few. The mass of the people were generally left out of this administrative network and the educational system conducted through the language of the rulers. Vernacular schools existed, but they were for the most part restricted to the primary and in some cases, the secondary levels. During the later British period, therefore, English, by facilitating political promotion and upward social mobility, secured a firm footing in the educational and administrative fields in India.

With political change in 1947, a democratic parliamentary form of government was adopted for the country which called for the participation in politics of all sections of the society. As a result, hitherto quiescent social groups were brought into the political arena. The various diverse groups, now recognised on a footing of equality, could, however, be effectively mobilised through their own languages, thus putting a premium on the use of the vernaculars. Moreover, the development of popular languages was necessary in order to build a communicational bridge between the general population and the political authority through representational systems of participation.

Apart from the question of elite mass communication was the equally

important problem of communication between the elites of various language groups. It was felt that English, which had till then effectively performed this function, could no longer be allowed to continue, being as it was a symbol of foreign domination. An indigenous language had to be found to replace English at the national level. The task of national development inevitably meant that the political authorities had to act as conscious agencies for national language promotion and development.

Moreover, independence was accompanied by the promise of equality - of status and opportunity, any form of discrimination based on caste, class, language or religion being forbidden. This guarantee of equality gave an impetus to the demands of the various language groups for educational opportunities, at all levels, in their native languages.

The relatively high-degree of political participation following independence and the political mobilization of diverse social groups has thus led to a plethora of new demands on the political community. Many of these demands are based on the competitive strivings of the politically mobilized social groups. Cries for a linguistic reorganisation of states, de demands for education in the vernaculars at all levels, and claims by various languages to the esteemed position of the national language, are but a few of the demands which pose serious problems in post-independence India.

Such a problematic situation calls for a formulation of new policies for national unity. The demands for and the creation of linguistic states, coupled with the granting of State autonomy in certain areas have given rise to a political diversity which, if not balanced by parallel norms of national cohesion, could lead to instability and eventual disintegration of the nation. The need, therefore, arises for the allocation of political values of national political unity in the midst of diversity.

In the Soviet Union as well, significant demand followed the

Revolution of 1917. Soviet Russia's leaders, as Marxists, believed in the establishment of a new form of society previously unknown to history. In theory, this new society was to be socialist: the polity was to be democratic, the economy was to be governed by the principle of production for use, not for profit, and social relations were to be equalitarian. It is the last mentioned aim which is of concern here.

Pre-revolutionary Russia was characterised by an extreme heterogenity of population, more than sixty nationalities or national groups differing widely as regards economic or cultural development, mode of life, national traditions and religions co-existing within its boundaries.[1] As more and more non-Russian speaking, non-Slavic areas were incorporated into the empire, the Russian autocracy pursued a policy of Russification with the aim of building a strong empire. This meant conversion to Orthodoxy and adoption of the Russian language for instruction in the schools and communication in society. As Rubinstein points out, "the dominating concept guiding official policy towards the myriad national minorities was, 'one Tzar, one religion, one language'."[2] Thus one of the characteristic features of the political system of Imperial Russia was its ruthless oppression of the non-Russian elements, which left them, both economically and culturally, far behind the dominant Great Russian stock. The pre-revolutionary Russian Civil Code openly proclaimed the inequality of subjects of the Empire, depending on their social category, nationality or religion.[3]

Centuries of Tsarist oppression and discrimination inevitably

1. Tsamerian,I.P. and Ronin,S.L.: Equality of Rights Between Races and Nationalities in the U.S.S.R. (Paris, Unesco, 1962) p.17.
2. Rubinstein,A.Z.: Communist Political Systems. Op cit. p.197.
3. Tsamerian,I.P. and Ronin,S.L.: Equality of Rights Between Races and Nationalities in the U.S.S.R. Op.cit. ff. p.21.

aroused a deep hatred for the system among the various national groups. The latter, struggling for national liberation, found a powerful ally in the revolutionary struggle of the Bolsheviks against Tsarism and the exploiting classes for social and political emancipation. Lenin, in his quest for allies, promised a considerable measure of cultural autonomy to the various nationalities.[1] Once the Revolution was successfully completed, his Declaration of the Rights of Nationalities considerably raised their hopes, in the field of cultural and political equality.

To satisfy some of these demands, the major nationalities were formed into Union Republics having their own constitution and the theoretical right to secede from the federation. Together with this, the right to conduct their administration and the education of their children through their respective national language was guaranteed. Republican autonomy, however, was to exist within a framework of pan-Soviet unity, this unity being created, among other things, through the medium of a common language, namely Russian.

To conclude, political changes in India and the U.S.S.R. have brought about a change in the members of the governing elite, and have created new political structures in the two countries. Whereas, on the one hand, these new political structures have provided a channel, especially in India, for the articulation of the demands of diverse groups; the rise of new governing elites has been accompanied, to a considerable extent, by a change in the attitudes towards and the response to these demands. This calls for a reassessment of the situation and the allocation of new values, through the framing of new policies, to create a national political unity, without at the same time eliminating diversity. Twentieth century developments have witnessed a political change in the countries under consideration, but political change, by itself, has not guaranteed national unity or integration. Regional and

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1. Pipes, R.: " 'Solving' the Nationality Problem" in Nogee, J.L.(ed.) Man, State, and Society in the Soviet Union. (London, Pall Mall Press, 1972) pp. 505-506.

subnational loyalties, the results of cultural diversity are often found to be in conflict with national loyalties. Adequate policies to maintain a balance between the two are, therefore, a prerequisite to national political unity.

Before examining the policy solutions devised by each country, it is necessary to trace the events leading to their respective cultural diversities and the nature and components of such diversity, since these considerations have important implications on the policies devised.

Cultural Diversity in India and the U.S.S.R.

In the newly independent, or newly-created, multi-national states, multilingualism - often as the linguistic aspect of a still-vigorous cultural pluralism - has given rise to serious problems. Before examining the problems arising out of multilingualism, it is essential to look at the wider phenomenon of cultural diversity of which it is a part.

The Antecedents of Cultural Diversity: The wide variety of languages and cultures found among the Indian and Soviet peoples today is the result, in each case, of years of intermixture of diverse races and peoples, with their varied languages, religions and ethnic differences. Rubinstein's claim that the Soviet Union "has the most extensive nationality problem, the most complex demographic mosaic of distinguishable races, nationalities and tribes, speaking more than a hundred different languages and practicing a variety of religions"[1], can perhaps be matched by a similar diversity of races, languages, cultures and religions within a single country only in India. Over three thousand years of intermingling are responsible for the perplexing mosaic of cultures found in the subcontinent today.

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1. Rubinstein, A.Z.: Communist Political Systems. Op. cit. p.197.

History has been a silent witness to centuries of invasions and migrations along with the absence of strong central governments in India. This has resulted in leaving the country divided, and accounts for a highly diversified mixture of races, religions, languages and cultures on the Indian soil. However, only that aspect of cultural diversity will be examined here which has characterised India as multilingual.

Prior to Western encroachments, all invasions of the region came through the north-west by land-oriented powers with strong linguistic and military ties to Central Asia and the Middle East. Probably the oldest people who came to India were the Negroid or Negrito race from Africa whose only trace now is found in the Andaman Islands. The Proto-Australoids were next to come and the language of the Kol and Munda people in Central Asia and the Khasis in Assam are a legacy of the Austric people. The Dravidians came in about 3500 B.C., and their original speech form is believed to have come from Western Asia and Eastern Mediterranean areas.[1] The Aryans, coming in about 1500 B.C. from Central Asia moved through the passes of the Hindukush mountains to the plains of India, having a great impact on the development of Hindu religion and social structure and on the languages which were soon to dominate the north and central portions of the subcontinent. The predominance of Aryan speech was a result of its adoption, together with Aryan culture, by the peoples of North India speaking Dravidian, Austric and Sino-Tibetan dialects. Aryan supremacy on the battlefield paved the way for Aryan dominance at the cultural level also. In this way, with an Aryan aristocracy at the top, the whole of North India appears to have become substantially Aryanised in speech by 600 B.C.[2]

The spread of Aryan language in North India and its adoption by

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1. Sarkar, A: Handbook of Languages and Dialects of India. (Calcutta, K.K. Mukhopadhyay, 1964) pp. X - XI.
2. Chatterjee, S.K.: "The Languages of India" in Narasimhan, V.K., et al (eds.) The Languages of India, (Madras, Our India Directories and Publications Private Ltd., 1958) p.10.

people of other speeches modified the development of the Aryan language, because the non-Aryan speakers in adopting the Aryan language introduced in it their own speech habits, pronunciation, phonetics and vocabulary. Sanskrit, a younger form of the old Indo-Aryan speech, was the most dominant medium during the ancient period. In the evolution of Sanskrit the non-Aryan people had a considerable hand, which fact is also responsible for the great degree of similarity that most Indian languages share with Sanskrit and with each other.[1]

The earlier dialects of the Vedic period, which were a modification of Sanskrit by the masses, gave birth to the primary Prakrits. The period from about 600 B.C. to about 1000 A.D. is roughly the one for middle Indo-Aryan or the Prakrits which later developed into the Apabhramsas.[2] From the various Apabhramsas as they were current in different parts of North India, round about 1000 A.D. developed the modern Aryan languages of India, the new Indo-Aryan speeches. In the Dravidian group rose Tamil, Telugu, Malayalam and Kannada, which were substantially influenced not only by Sanskrit but by the new languages as well.

From the times of the Aryans through the Mughal invasions of the sixteenth century, the passes of the Hindukush Mountains in the northwest served as the gateway for one invader after another. Following the last of these important land invasions, namely the Muslim invasion, Persian became an official court language and Persian and Arabic words entered the vernacular languages, while wealthy Hindu families adopted Persian social customs. Numerous conversions to Islam took place to the extent that it became the majority religion in the northwestern region and in parts of northeast as well.

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1. Chatterjee, S.K.: "The Languages of India" in Narasimhan, V.K., et al (eds.) The Languages of India. Op.cit. p.3.
2. Ibid. pp.11-12.

Together with the adoption of Persian as the court language, the Mughal period saw the development of a new language outside the literary and official circles. This was a mixed form of Hindi in which quite a number of words of Arabic, Persian and Turkish origin had been absorbed. This mixed form of speech became a sort of lingua franca in the military camps and bazaars outside the Mughal palaces. The name 'Zabanee-Urdu -e-Maula', that is, 'the language of the exalted camp' was given to it. It later on assumed a shorter form 'Zaban-e-Urdu' or simply Urdu. With the adoption of more and more foreign words and ideas Urdu came to be established towards the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century as a separate language written in the Persian script. [1]

Prior to Western impact, however, the southern part of the sub-continent remained aloof from northern influences. Separated from the north by the Vindhya mountains and politically outside its control (no invading force from central and western Asia ever extending its domain to the deep south), it differed in other ways too - that is, in language, dress, food and culture - from the north. With the advent of the British, this entire region from the Himalayas to Cape Comorin fell under a single ruler. By the establishment of a network of railways, a post and telegraph system, a national currency, a central administrative organization, the use of the English language, and a university education system, the British created the basis for a modern national state in India.

In 1837 English replaced Persian as the official language of administration, and Lord Auckland's Minute of 1839 settled the medium of instruction question in favour of English. English became an important subject of study as well as the medium of instruction at the tertiary level, and served as a new lingua franca for the educated elite. A Government Resolution

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1. Prasad, B.N.: "Hindi" in Narasimhan, V.K., et al (eds.) The Languages of India. Op. cit. p.37.

of 1844 threw high posts in the administration open to Indians, thus providing the necessary socio-economic incentive for the learning of English and resulting in a rapid growth of English education.

Along with the ascendancy of English at the higher levels of administration during British rule, Indian regional languages were brought into use at the lower levels of the administrative machinery, generally below the district level. This gave rise to a long drawn controversy regarding the choice of the language to be used, especially in the North-Western Provinces, the Central Provinces and Bihar, which had a significant Muslim population.[1] The Hindi movement, in these areas denounced Urdu as a survival of Muslim tyranny and as a symbol of Muslim domination over Hindus. The Urdu movement, on the other hand, saw in Hindi's achievement of equal status with Urdu in official transactions a threat to Muslim economic and cultural interests. The rivalry between Hindi and Urdu became identified with the religious communities of Hindus and Muslims, and the problem of language became symbolic of the problem of Indian nationalism.

The U.S.S.R. too is a multilingual, multinational federation in which as many as 180 languages and dialects are used in daily speech.[2] A fundamental difference, however, is that while in India the present multiplicity of cultures and languages is a result primarily of foreign invasions and migrations of different people into a single geographical unit; the U.S.S.R. is a federation of pre-existing nations. As such, the great diversity found here is a consequence of the coming together, chiefly by conquest and annexation, of a number of distinct nationalities, each with their own national areas and cultures. Thus, whereas in India the invaders or migrants settled down within a common geographical unit outside their respective

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1. See, DasGupta, J.: Language Conflict and National Development. (Bombay, Oxford University Press, 1970) pp.98-105.

2. Hans, N.: Comparative Education. (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958) p.55.

homelands; in the U.S.S.R. the different nationalities, most of them with their own national areas territorially contiguous with Great Russia, came together to form the present federation of the U.S.S.R.

The old Russian Empire was multinational, being composed of more than sixty nationalities and national groups,[1] differing widely as regards economic and cultural development, mode of life, national traditions and religion. After their liberation from the Mongol domination in the fifteenth century, the Great Russians conquered and established their rule over many peoples, both in European Russia (Poland, Finland) and eastward across the Urals. Russian expansion in Asia falls into three phases. By the end of the seventeenth century the Russians moved east from the Urals to the Pacific, encountering only primitive tribes which were soon outnumbered by the Russian settlers. The second phase was the gradual spread over the Steppe Region, or what is today called Kazakhstan. Begun by Peter the Great at the beginning of the eighteenth century, this movement continued until the middle of the nineteenth century, its driving force being the desire to establish some kind of frontier from which trade could be conducted with settled areas. However, it was soon discovered that the States to the south were not organized well enough for profitable trade, and hence the necessity of pushing the frontiers of the Empire further south. This was the third phase which began in 1855 with an advance to the frontiers of Persia and Afghanistan and ended with the battle of Gok Tepe in 1881. The Russians now entered the so-called Oasis region which had been the centre of Muslim learning since the end of the tehth century and was culturally advanced than the Kazakh Steppes.[2]

The geographical factor is significant in understanding this

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1. Tsamerian, I.P. and Ronin, S.L.: Equality of Rights Between Races and Nationalities in the U.S.S.R. (Paris, Unesco, 1962) p.17.

2. Wheeler, G.: Racial Problems in Soviet Muslim Asia (London, Oxford University Press, 1960) pp.3-4.

expansion, because the absence of any sharp land or water frontiers between Russia proper - the Upper Volga and Oka region - and the Pacific, the Himalayas or the Black Sea, permitted Russian colonists to move steadily outward, engulfing or bypassing other ethnic groups in countries territorially contiguous with their own homeland. In their rapid spread over Asia, for instance, the Russians had successively encountered the primitives of Siberia, the nomads of Kazakhstan, and the relatively sophisticated and cultured peoples of the oases without great difficulty. Apart from the geographical contiguity, the 250-year Mongol domination of Russia and the fact that the Tartars of the Volga Region had been an integral part of Russia since the sixteenth century meant that the Central Asians were not such strangers to the Russians as perhaps the British were to the peoples of India.

The resulting composite character of the Russian Empire was reflected in the position of the Tsar who besides being the Emperor of Russia, became also King of Poland, Grand Duke of Finland, King of Georgia and Khan of Tartary.

Contemporary Patterns of Cultural Diversity: With the breakdown of communication barriers and increased facilities for transport, no country today can claim to be culturally homogenous, each having within its domain some minority group or other with a culture different from its own. There are, however, degrees of cultural diversity as can be seen from a relatively more homogenous country like Britain, through the nation states of Western Europe where generally the political order (the State) has been closely related to the national unit (Belgium, Switzerland and the border areas of Germany being possible exceptions), to the countries of Eastern Europe and pre-1917 Russia where the boundaries of state and nation do not coincide, each state having within its domain several nationalities and cultures.

A similar situation can be identified in the newly-independent

developing countries of Asia and Africa where an alien culture has been introduced within an indigenous culture, the latter itself showing interesting varieties. In the case of India, such natural barriers as mountain ranges on one side and the sea on the other, did not prevent diverse peoples from entering and populating the subcontinent. Desire for trade, search for fertile lands for crop and cattle, and the ambition to trade, colonize, conquer and rule are some of the significant reasons for the presence of cultural pluralism in India.

Thus, Greeks, Persians, Afghans, Turks, Arabs and Mughals at one time or the other, all flocked into northern India through the mountain passes. Through the centuries Jews from the Middle East, Christians from the Nestorian Community in Syria, persecuted Zorastrians from Persia and modern refugees from Fascist Germany have found a home in India. While a few of these groups have been assimilated into existing cultures, most of them have maintained their own identity thus making the subcontinent as rich an area in cultural diversity as can be found anywhere in the world.[1] Almost all the world religions find a representation in India, which however, is under the impact of three distinct and highly developed religions, namely, Hinduism, Islam and Buddhism. Besides these can be found Christianity, Jainism, Zorastrianism and Judaism, to mention a few. Moreover, almost each variety of ethnic stock and some of the important language families can be identified in India. In fact, the major languages found in India have been classified into four main speech families[2]:

(1) The Austric or Austro-Asiatic family - Santali, Mundari, Ho.

(2) The Dravidian family - The four South Indian languages, Tamil, Telugu, Malayalam and Kannada.

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1. Weiner, M.: "The Politics of South Asia" in Almond, G.A. and Coleman, J.S. (eds.) The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1960) p.157.

2. See, Chatterjee, S.K.: Languages and the Linguistic Problem (London, Oxford University Press, 1943) for a detailed classification of the main speech families of India.

(3) The Indo-European (Aryan) family - (a) Old Indo-Aryan: Sanskrit;
(b) Middle Indo-Aryan: the Prakrits and Apabhramsas;
(c) Modern Indo-Aryan: the principle modern languages of India.

(4) The Sino-Tibetan family - Some Tribal languages.

The major modern languages of India fall into the second and third groups, the former restricted largely to South India, the latter to the North. These two groups together contain the fifteen major languages of India, which are in popular use today at advanced cultural and literary levels and which are recognised in the Eighth Schedule of the Indian Constitution as the fifteen (previously fourteen, before the inclusion of Sindhi) languages of India. These are: Hindi (including Hindustani), Urdu, Punjabi, Telugu, Marathi, Tamil, Bengali, Gujarati, Kannada, Malayalam, Oriya, Assamese, Kashmiri, Sanskrit and Sindhi.

Linguistic and religious boundaries do not always coincide in India. For instance, the dominant religion, Hinduism, has followers not only among the Hindi speaking population, but also among the Punjabi, Marathi, Bengali, Gujarati, Oriya and Assamese groups, not to mention the four South Indian languages whose adherents are also largely Hindus. On the other hand, some Telugu and Malayalee speakers, together with those of Urdu and Kashmiri are Muslims, while Gujarati as a language is shared both by the Hindus and Muslims from Gujarat and the Parsis who follow their own religion, Zorastrianism. Nevertheless, most of the language groups are restricted to specific regional areas of the country, especially after the linguistic reorganization of States. This is in contrast to the position of English, which still holds an important place in Indian public life. The English-speaking population is distributed relatively uniformly throughout the subcontinent, and English, not being identified with any particular regional

group, provides the same social and economic costs and benefits to all.

After the 1917 Revolution, Soviet Russia inherited a multinational state, the position of the constituent nationalities being, at first, rather ambiguous. Whether they continued as part of the new federation or not depended very much on the policy of the Soviet government. Following the Revolution, Poland, Finland, the Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia seceded from Great Russia and declared themselves independent states. The need for consolidation was apparent and so to win back the seceded territories and prevent further break ups, the new Government, on November 3, 1917 issued a declaration of rights of nationalities proclaiming the equality of all races, creeds and languages[1], thereby granting the various nationalities some cultural autonomy and a pseudo-federal status. Moreover, in theory, each Republic had the right to secede from the federation at will. One by one the independent Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaidzhan, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania became the members of the U.S.S.R.[2]

Like the major language groups of India, the various nationalities forming the Soviet Union, are largely confined to specific areas, with the result that linguistic and territorial boundaries generally coincide. The main Slavonic groups (the Poles, Ukrainians Byelo Russians, and Great Russians) are located in the Western and Central European parts of the country and eastwards, through emigration, to the Urals and Siberia. Though Slavonic, they form distinct national groups with separate cultural identities; the Poles being Catholic by religion, and the other Slavonic groups Orthodox. In the Baltic provinces (Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia) Indo-European languages quite different from Russian are spoken. Similarly the Armenians,

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1. Desheriev, J.D.: Development of Non-Russian Languages in the U.S.S.R. (New Delhi, The Information Department of the U.S.S.R. Embassy in India, 1957) p.7.
2. Hazard, J.N.: The Soviet System of Government (New Delhi, Sterling Publishers, 4th revised edition, 1968) p.218.

Azerbaidshans, Georgians, Persians and Tatars living in the Caucasus, as well as the multitude of indigenous peoples in Central Asia and Siberia have their own distinct cultural tradition, history and languages, most of them being non-Christian, often Muslim. After the Revolution, religious differences, at least in theory, were levelled down because the Bolsheviks, following Marx, regarded religion as being dependent on class relationships and exploitation, and therefore argued that with the abolition of capitalism, religion would wither away. Immediate measures were taken to combat the religious beliefs and institutions which flourished in Tsarist Russia. Linguistic differences, however, persisted, and are at times even allowed for, if not encouraged. Consequently, Soviet Russia today has within its boundaries languages falling into the following six main speech families:[1]

(1) The Indo-European Group - The Slavonic Languages (Russian, Ukrainian, Byelorussian) and other Indo-European languages (Armenian, Moldavian) including the Baltic languages (Lithuanian, Lativian), the Iranian languages (Tadjik, Ossetic, Kurd, Talysh, Tat) and other Pamir dialects of the Iranian languages.

(2) The Turkic Group - Azerbaidjani, Turkmen, Tatar, Bashkir, Yakut, Kazakh, Kirghiz, Uzbek, Chuvash.

(3) The Iberian-Caucasian Group - genealogically it is divided into four subgroups: the Abkhaz-Adyghei, the Veinakh, the Daghestan and the Karthelian or Iberian group.

(4) Languages of the People of the North - divided into three groups: the Paleo-Asiatic, the Tungus-Manchu and the Samoyedic.

(5) The Finno-Ugrian Group - Finnish, Estonian, Karelian, Komi-Zyrian, Komi-Permian, Udmurt, Mari and Mordvinian.

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1. Desheriev, J.D.: Development of Non-Russian Languages in the U.S.S.R. Op. cit. pp.11-17.

(6) The Mongolian Group - Buryat-Mongolian and Kalmuk.

Of the other languages of the peoples of the world found in the U.S.S.R. the one spoken by a more or less significant population include the Jewish, Korean, Dungan and Aiss.

The contemporary linguistic situation in India and the U.S.S.R. thus presents a complex of similarities and differences. Both countries are a federation of many distinct cultural groups, each group having a more or less distinct language of its own. Moreover, in both cases not all the languages have developed to the stage of standard languages, most of them having neither a literature nor an alphabet. What constitutes however, a striking difference in the language patterns of the two countries is in the availability of a common language of communication across linguistic boundaries. The great importance attached to Russian in the Tsarist period and its acceptance as the exclusive medium of education, political life and administration, gave that language a position in Soviet Russia which is not enjoyed by any indigenous language of India. The function that Russian performed in Tsarist Russia was in India performed by English, a foreign language. Aversion to the English language after the withdrawal of the English rulers created a void in the Indian linguistic arena, which has not been easily filled by any indigenous language. This creates problems unique to India.

Differential Stages of Language Development: A significant feature of the linguistic diversity in India and the U.S.S.R. today is the vast disparity in the levels of development of their respective languages.

Before the Bolshevik Revolution the various languages of the U.S.S.R. varied in their degree of development, as did the level of the national cultures of the various peoples making up the Soviet Union. According to the Marxist theory of Social evolution, the present stage of

communism has evolved from a socialist society and the capitalist and feudal societies which preceded it. Seen in this light, the Russians, Latvians, Armenians and others possessing a highly developed language have evolved a feudal and then a capitalist society before reaching the period of socialism and that of the construction of Communism; other nationalities were still living under feudalism in 1917 and have been drawn into the era of socialism without having passed through the stage of capitalist development; lastly, some smaller linguistic groups scattered in remote areas have never known either feudalism or capitalism and are experiencing a direct transition from patriarchal tribalism to Communism. It is claimed that "the transition is too rapid for their languages to develop apace with their economic progress and their cultural and political advance."[1] Hence, in 1917, while some languages like Russian, Ukrainian or Byelorussian had a fully established system of writing and a long-standing literary tradition, there were many languages with an under-developed written form either in the Arabic script (Turkmen, Bashkir, Karakalpak, etc.) or else based on Russian (Komi, Erzya, Moksha, Chuvash, Udmurt, etc.). Some other languages had no written form whatsoever.

The Tsarist policy of Russification with its emphasis on Russian as the medium of administration and education, was largely responsible for pushing the national languages into the background and establishing Russian as the pan-national language par excellence. What position Russian, an indigenous language enjoyed in Tsarist Russia, was the position of English, a foreign language in British India. The various Indian languages, growing in the shadow of English, and prior to that of Sanskrit and Persian remained outside the pale of contemporary life and experience and thereby suffered a certain imbalance of development, especially in the branches of knowledge

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1. Koutaisoff, E. and Dalton, R.H.F.: "The Problem of Expanding Education in the Multilingual States, with Special Reference to the Soviet Union" in "The World Year Book of Education (London, Evans Brothers Ltd., 1965) p.303.

so vital for rapid advance in the modern world.

The oldest language, Sanskrit, grew as a great cultural and religious language of India to the extent that the name Deva-bhasa or "the language of the Gods" was often used to refer to it. This language was purely the domain of the Brahmins who, in the caste-ridden Hindu society, were at the apex of the hierarchial caste structure and as such were the sole possessors and exponents of religious knowledge. The mass of the people being left out of the cultural and literary activities entwined with religion, had little scope for developing their languages. Gradually, enlightened religious leaders realised that in order to reach the masses religion must be explained to them in their own language and hence the different Indian languages developed as vehicles of religion. This activity increased tremendously in the nineteenth century with the consolidation of British power and the challenge it posed to everything that was essentially Indian.

Side by side with the national movement therefore, there grew a protest, generally on patriotic and nationalistic grounds against the use of the English language. The national politics of the time was reflected in the educational programme, in which among other things, were included such items as the imparting of education through the medium of the vernaculars and preparation of suitable textbooks in the local languages. The Non-Cooperation movement gave great impetus to the demand for the vernaculars and the study of the Indian languages, which was ignored for many years, also started receiving some consideration. Nevertheless, the rate of development of the various Indian languages was not uniform, factors like availability of education in the indigenous language, the presence of a literary elite in the particular language and its use in the literary and religious spheres, making certain languages like Bengali and Tamil more highly developed than, for instance, Punjabi or Kashmiri. Ironically too, it is this half-baked stage of the vernacular today which provides a justification for the use of

English, both in the official and the educational circles in India. Till these languages are sufficiently developed to be vehicles of thought and communication in all spheres of knowledge, English will continue to hold a grip over India's intellectual life.

Linguistic Diversity and National Unity

In general, a common problem has been identified in India and the U.S.S.R. as arising out of radical political changes within societies with static patterns of cultural diversity. However, the nature of the political change in each country as also its particular type of cultural diversity qualify the specific form of its respective problems. Moreover, the intensity of the problems found in each country may vary according to the initial conditions in which they arise. The question that arises, therefore, is whether, following political change, linguistic diversity has led to conflict and disunity in each country and to what extent. In this context, the post-1947 and the post-1917 events will be examined in the respective countries to assess how far conflicts detrimental to national unity and cohesion have been the result of linguistic diversity.

British India and Imperial Russia had been fashioned into political units by the Imperial power of the Crown and the Tsar respectively. As long as strong Imperial governments lasted the two countries functioned as viable political units. Political change left India with several competing groups striving for political power at the national or regional levels. In the U.S.S.R. following the Revolution, secessionist movements grew among the diverse nationalities forming Imperial Russia. This posed the problem, in both countries, of creating national political unity out of areas in which great diversity existed.

Post-1947 India witnessed a series of agitations and conflicts originating out of language differences, which seemed to threaten the very

unity of the State.[1] Just when the tentative unity, derived from opposition to British rule had begun to lose its effectiveness and the Government of India needed a strong national sentiment as an integrating force, fissiparous tendencies in the form of demands for linguistic States, that is making language the chief criterion for determining the political boundaries of the States within the Indian federation, came to the fore. Thus a country, striving to find its feet, was thrown into a vortex of controversy, bitterness and uncertainty, which for a while threatened its very unity and stability.

One of the earliest demands for a linguistic state came in 1952 from the South where the Telugu speakers, distributed in the three States of Madras, Hyderabad and Mysore, claimed a separate Telugu-speaking Andhra. At the same time Tamilians sought for a Tamilnad independent of the Malayalee-speaking Kerala. In the Central Provinces arose the conflict between Hindi and Marathi speaking areas and in Berar between the claims of Maha Vidharbha and Samyakta Maharashtra. The greatest agitation arose over bilingual Bombay, that city being claimed by both the Gujarati and the Marathi speaking population. At the same time Maharashtrians looked for a state of their own in place of a Bombay shared with Gujaratis. The tribal peoples were not to be left out, tribes of Orissa and Bihar demanding a "Jharkhand" State and the Nagas in the east claiming for an independent Nagaland. Agitations for a separate Sikhistan for the Sikhs and a Haryana independent of the Punjabi-speaking Punjab State continued well into the sixties.

The danger of such centrifugal tendencies was pointed out early by Ambedkar who envisaged that "Linguistic Provinces (would) result in creating as many nations as there are groups, with pride in their race, language and literature.... They may develop the mentality of political insubordination.

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1. See, Harrison,S.S.: India: The Most Dangerous Decades (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1960)

If such a mentality grows, it may easily make the working of the Central government impossible".[1]

The threat which linguistic balkanization posed to the unity of the country was also perceived by M. Gandhi, who in his prayer speech on January 25, 1948 warned that "such redistribution should not militate against the organic unity of India . . . If each province began to look upon itself as a separate, sovereign unit, India's independence would lose its meaning and with it would vanish the freedom of the various units."[2]

Though the successive committees and commissions appointed by the Government of India to study the demands for linguistic states advised against the principle, it was evident that a point might be reached when "unity would not be helped but harmed by continued resistance",[3] since all political attention in the fifties was being focused on this one spot and the energy of the new state was directed almost exclusively to putting down language agitations.

The first step was taken towards the reorganisation of States when, faced with mounting pressure, lawlessness and indignation in the Telugu region, the government gave in and a separate state of Andhra was created in 1953. The success of Andhra convinced other regions that if what their movements lacked was sufficient fervour, it could soon be remedied, thereby triggering off widespread conflict and disorder throughout the country. As a result, following the report in 1956 of the States Reorganisation Commission, the government acceded to nearly all the major linguistic pressures, and the Indian Union was reorganised into fourteen States each of which had a clearly dominant language group. The controversial issue of Bombay State

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1. Ambedkar, B.R.: "Memorandum to the Dar Commission" (1948) cited by Munshi, K.M. in Indian Constitutional Documents, Vol.I (1902-1950)(Bombay, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1967) p. 228.
2. Cited in Ibid. p.230.
3. Morris-Jones, W.H.: The Government and Politics of India. Op.cit. p.98.

remained unsolved, calling for widespread riots in Bombay City in January 1956 which drew together diverse sections - rural leaders, students, artists, businessmen and civil servants - in a common enthusiastic sentiment and sense of unity unparalleled on a regional scale. Further agitation and violence finally secured in 1970 the splitting of Bombay province into Gujarat and Maharashtra, with Bombay city included in the latter. The process begun in 1953 continued till, by February 1972, the number of linguistically determined States had risen to twenty-one.

The States, as reconstituted seem in the main to be stable entities, but the fact that most of these conflicts are geographically based, and there are increasing demands for state autonomy means that potential secessionist movements might exist. Linguistic and cultural groups often demand not only provinces, but in some instances even countries of their own. A case in point is the demand before 1967, for an independent "Dravidistan" by the D.M.K. (Dravida Munnetra Kazagham), an anti-Brahmin movement which gradually extended its role to the advocacy of Tamil regionalism and championed the cause of the Tamil language in Madras. While successful secession by any community is probably unlikely, attempts to secede or to agitate for greater autonomy, may occupy the resources of the army, administration and government to such an extent that a precarious unity and stability in government may result. The question then would not only be whether there will be unity, but at what price?

Moreover, the threat of linguistic diversity to the unity of the country is not exhausted by the reorganisation of states. In the first place, the new state governments, recognizing in the use of their regional languages the prospect of increasing communication and thereby mobilising a greater proportion of the population than was hitherto possible, are bound to advance the regional language by every means - including the educational system. The regional language would thus serve increasingly as a preserver of regional loyalties and regional values as opposed to national loyalties and

national values and signal the possible disintegration of national unity. Secondly, if the adoption of Hindi as the national language of India is aimed at achieving a sense of nationality and national unity, then the new enthusiasm and scope for the dominant regional languages could impinge on the position of Hindi as the all-India language, and weaken its force as a factor making for national unity.

The series of agitations on linguistic grounds in post-independence India serve to highlight language as the single significant factor threatening the unity of the country. In the absence of an accepted common language to unite diverse groups and promote national loyalty; the diverse language loyalties as an emotional force, and linked with regional loyalties could, by provoking demands for greater regional autonomy, prove to be destructive of the unity of India.

Events in the Soviet Union after 1917 present the problem in a different perspective. Though comprising of as many, if not more language groups as India, the Soviet government is not, at least overtly, faced with the same demands for political autonomy on a linguistic basis as is the case in India. No doubt, following the Revolution, the various nationalities forming the Tsarist Empire seceded from the Soviet Union and attempted to set up sovereign States, but such national movements on the part of nationalities which had formed independent states prior to their annexation to the Tsarist empire were soon overpowered by the Bolsheviks and the nationalities brought back into the Soviet fold.

The Russian Empire, which, until the end of the nineteenth century was generally regarded as a viable political organism evidenced the first stirrings of national sentiment among the subjugated people towards the end of the century. This embarrassed both the Russian liberals and the socialists who, in their desperate fight against Tsarism, feared nationalism as a divisive force and preferred to ignore it. While the liberals believed that

the national problem would solve itself with the introduction of political democracy, the socialists were equally certain it would disappear with the expropriation of private property.[1] Nationalism, dependent on economic formations, was according to the latter a by-product of the capitalist mode of production and therefore doomed to disappear with the introduction of socialism.

At the same time Lenin was quick to recognise and exploit the frustrations of the national minorities for revolutionary purposes, promising in return political self-determination, that is, the right of each minority to separate and form an independent state if they did not acquiesce to assimilation.[2] Lenin, at that stage, rejected any middle way, such as federalism or cultural autonomy, because he felt they institutionalised and therefore perpetuated national distinctions. His thesis on national self-determination was criticised by fellow Bolsheviks on the ground that it would split Russia into many small states and thereby hamper the development of capitalism and socialism. Lenin, however, was optimistic and regarded the national problem as essentially a short-term one. In the long run, he prophesized, with the triumph of socialism, national boundaries would be destroyed and people would be united on a class basis. Under solialism bourgeois nations would be replaced by socialist nations more solidly united than any bourgeois nation because they are exempt from class contradictions and "are far more representative of the whole people than any bourgeois nation."[3] Only under communism would nations merge and develop into the international socialist world.

Contrary to Lenin's predictions, once the Revolution was over, the separatist movements among the various minorities matured with great

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1. Nogee, J.L.: Man, State and Society in the Soviet Union. Op.cit. p.505.
2. See, Lenin, V.I.: "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination" (1914) in Collected Works, Vol. 20. Op.cit. (1964) pp.393-451.
3. Stalin, J.V.: "The National Question and Leninism", in Collected Works, Vol.11 (Moscow, 1946) p.355-56.

rapidity. However, no single cause can be attributed to the various secessionist movements, each being determined partly by geography, partly by foreign invasion, as also be the popular support enjoyed by the Bolsheviks and the ability of the new Soviet government to enforce its decisions. In some areas, separatism was due to a desire of local group to escape the bloodshed of the civil war. In others, it was the result of intervention by Germans, Austrians and Turks.[1] After the Revolution Poland, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia all became established States, being (except for Finland) under German occupation at the time of the Revolution and having strong anti-Russian counter elites. In these countries, national social-democratic parties were strongest and they favoured separation. Lenin's principle of secession was applied and the Baltic States were established in the early 1920s.

In the Ukraine, which had a more complex national and class structure, the land-owning elite was mainly Polish and Russian, and the petty-trading strata consisted largely of Jews. At the same time the industrial working class was largely Russian by nationality. A Ukrainian national movement could not be led by such alien national strata, and so was taken up by the professional middle strata: writers, teachers, lawyers, and professors. In November 1917, a nationalist Rada proclaimed a Ukrainian People's Republic.

In the Caucasus which had eight indigenous national groups, numerous national governments, often with English, German or Turkish support were founded between 1917 and 1920. In the central and eastern areas of Russia the indigenous national leaders, at first, supported the communists, especially during during some crucial periods of the Civil War.[2] Consequently, largely as a result of Soviet economic policies (such as nationalisation) which

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1. See, Carr, E.H.: The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1923, Vol. I (London, Macmillan, 1950) for a detailed history of each region.

2. Pipes, R. The Formation of the Soviet Union, (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1964) p.295.

undermined the economic foundations of the national elites, independent national governments were formed among the Kazakhs, Bashkirs and Tatars which asserted autonomy for these people and independence from Petrograd.

Thus, the years 1918-1920 saw the rise of several independent States after their separation from Russia, the various separatist movements threatening the disintegration of the Russian Empire and reduction of the domain of the Bolshevik regime to the size of Muscovy in the reign of Basil II. Moreover, the separatist movements coincided with the Civil War when the communists were fighting for survival and not only needed the support of the various peoples, but had to prevent the borderlands from turning into White outposts. It was imperative, therefore, that the breakaway republics be subjugated and reoccupied by Soviet forces. Gradually, the Ukrain, Azerbaidshan, Armenia and Georgia were all brought back into the Russian fold. In 1918, following the pattern of the Ukraine and Caucasus, the Soviet Government militarily intervened against the 'bourgeois nationalist' governments to the east, and pro-Bolshevik governments were set-up. Finally, the Baltic States, established in the early 1920s were reoccupied in the early 1940s and subsequently absorbed as national republics into the U.S.S.R.

By 1927, the communists had consolidated their rule. A federal state was founded in which, by 1936, were set up union republics, autonomous republics, autonomous regions, and national areas which gave the nationalities a degree of control over their affairs.[1] The so-called Union republics are in theory able to separate and form independent, sovereign states. The autonomous republics and regions were set up within a Union Republic (the majority in the Russian Republic-RSFSR) as administrative units based on the predominant national group in each area. Unlike the Union Republics they do not have the right to secede from the U.S.S.R. The Soviet Union, therefore,

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1. The Constitution of the U.S.S.R. (Moscow, 1936). Articles 13, 22-29.

is federal in form, the federal structure being recognized by Lenin as a psychological asset in overcoming the suspicion of the national minorities towards the Russians.

Though political unity was secured within a few years of the Revolution, the granting of cultural autonomy to the various national republics, in the hope that with the triumph of communism and the creation of a new proletarian culture, national differences would cease to exist, only served to threaten national unity. In the first place, Russian nationalism, or in Soviet terminology, 'Great Power Chauvinism', was not dead in the Union, while in the individual national Soviet Republics the Soviet regime had to struggle against the nationalism of so-called 'local chauvinists' whose policy was directed against Great Russian elements and the national minorities, and even sometimes displayed political separatist tendencies.[1] Recognised as members with equality of rights, the diverse people in the Soviet Union have sought not so much to cooperate in the creation of a common socialist proletarian culture as to develop their own national cultures.

Meanwhile the course of events outside the Soviet Union necessitated the rise of a new pan-Soviet nationalism. Until about 1925 the Union was regarded almost exclusively as a stepping-off place for the world revolution. As Lenin pointed out in the summer of 1918: "We are deeply convinced that in the near future historical events will bring the West European proletariat to supreme power, and in this respect we shall not be alone in the world arena as we are now."[2] Stalin writing in April 1924 had taken a similar position.[3]

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1. Report by the Royal Institute of International Affairs: Nationalism (London, Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 1963) pp.73-74.
2. Cited in Baykov, A.: The Development of the Soviet Economic System. (London, Cambridge University Press, 1946) pp.47-48.
3. Stalin, J.: Problems of Leninism (Moscow, 1934) p.138.

However, the non-appearance of the world revolution and the necessary coexistence of the Socialist Soviet Union with capitalist States placed the Communist Party in a quite peculiar situation. So far the possibility of the continued existence of a proletarian State in a capitalist environment had been regarded as impossible; now in 1924-25 Stalin propounded the thesis of 'Socialism in a single country'.[1] The credo that socialism could be achieved by the efforts of Soviet Russia alone gave birth to a new Soviet nationalism built on national pride and self-sufficiency. It harnessed traditional national values and it directed them to definite economic tasks at home and to the defence of the Fatherland from enemies abroad. Hitler's accession to power in Germany in 1933 and the expansion of the Japanese on the Asiatic mainland promoted still further the development of the Soviet Union into a national power. Thus the question of national unity arose in the Soviet Union as a result of events both at home and abroad, and called for subordinating national loyalties of the individual Soviet Repub-lics to the new loyalty to the fatherland of the Soviet Union. Hence within a decade of the revolution there could be discerned a shift from the position of granting political and cultural autonomy to the national republics to one of not only uniting them politically and making them subordinate to the central government at Moscow, but creating a national unity by attempts to make individual national loyalties subordinate to loyalty to the Union.

An advantage that the Soviet Union has here over India is the presence of a single dominant language for pan-national use. Consequently, while both countries are faced with the problem of creating a new political culture and allocating values of national political unity, in the U.S.S.R. the vehicle, for such allocation of values already exists in the form of the Russian language. India, on the other hand, is faced with the dual task of first shaping the tool and then using it as one of the means for securing national unity.

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1. Stalin, J.: Problems of Leninism. Op.cit. p.140.

This study began by identifying twentieth century political changes in societies with traditional cultural diversities as the source of their respective language problems. The foregoing description of events in post-1947 India and post-1917 U.S.S.R. presents the problems in a slightly different perspective in the two countries. While in the case of India national unity seems to be threatened directly by linguistic diversity and the demands of the politically mobilised language groups; in the U.S.S.R. the language problem is tied up with the larger problem of nationalities and national autonomy. What appears to be a common problem at first, shows up unique traits following a more detailed examination of conditions in each country. However, the problems, though not identical, are quite similar in the two cases, the differences being due, largely, to the different contextual backgrounds in which the particular problems arise.

The disruptive tendencies arising out of linguistic passion and prejudice after independence have led several Indian leaders to stress the role of a single national language in domesticating the diverse linguistic loyalties and creating a "unity in diversity". Linguistic bickerings in India have hampered the growth of national unity which, besides geographical and political unity, depends on a degree of social communication as regards language, ideology, common interests, psychological behaviour and the acceptance of a common heritage. To the extent, then that a common language is one of the major factors making for national unity, a common language policy may be adopted to allocate values of national unity. But in the democratic, egalitarian framework of India, the rights and demands of all the diverse groups need to be given due recognition. This necessitates the simultaneous formulation of policies regarding (a) a common national language; and (b) the various regional languages.

In the Soviet Union, the various secessionist movements after 1917 were the culmination of national movements on the part of nationalities

who, prior to their inclusion into Tsarist Russia, had been independent entities. Cultural, including linguistic suppression of the nationalities under the Tsar was one of the motivating factors for secession. Linguistic demands in the U.S.S.R., therefore, were included within the larger demands for national autonomy. Nevertheless, these nationalist movements within the State, coupled with the external threat gave a sense of urgency to the task of creating national unity. Russian, as the language of the dominant group provided the most viable medium for allocating new values of national unity. A particularly striking feature of political and intellectual developments to be observed in the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s was a growing tendency to strengthen and glorify the Russian element in its most varied forms of expression - literature, history and language. The policy pursued was one of strengthening the position of the Russian language as both, the State language of the Union and the "international language of socialist culture".

In the previous chapter, a distinction was drawn between national unity, integration and assimilation. The three are not mutually exclusive. Two governments pursuing a common policy of national unity through the adoption of a national language may, at the same time, pursue a policy of integration or of assimilation vis-a-vis the diverse cultural groups. There are, however, certain broad areas of policy-making which are common to any country striving for viable language policies operative in a multilingual context. These are:

(1) Choice of a common official language which, in a federal structure of government and administration is, for practical reasons, absolutely necessary.

(2) Development of a link language for communication across linguistic boundaries. Such a language need not, and often cannot be the same as the official language.

(3) Defining the role and scope of the various regional or national

languages in administration and education.

(4) Determining the language policy in education. This covers two aspects: (a) the choice of a medium of instruction at each level of education; and (b) the choice of language or languages as subjects of study.

The solutions adopted by India and the U.S.S.R. with regard to these four aspects of language policy-making will be compared in the three chapters in Part II.

INTRODUCTION

The Kurdish question in India and the U.S.S.R. have fulfilling political stages in the two countries, posed possible problems for their respective governments. These problems may be in the form of demand for political autonomy on a linguistic basis which have threatened the unity of India or they may manifest themselves as part of a wider nationality problem in the U.S.S.R. In either case, the particular multi-ethnic situation of each country calls for specific policy solutions.

General Kurd policy solutions are possible, the choice of the Kurd policy depending on whether the role of a particular government is to create national unity through a strong Congress, which at the same time allowing for or even encouraging the use of the various other languages or it is to create a unity by the subordination and annihilation of the diverse groups and their languages to the dominant group and its language.

THE POLICY SOLUTIONS

The solution to the language problem, formerly, "... a relative minority to the will of society that the entirety of the two nationalities to be dealt with here, different conceptions of the social order will yield different and often contradictory, solutions to the question ..."[1] However, it must be remembered that these language are not the only divisive force in society, a language policy cannot be regarded as the only instrument for maintaining unity, to the extent that that the language policy of a country in itself tries to create the basis of obtaining national unity, but yet such unity cannot be brought by the establishment, certainly of India and the U.S.S.R. to maintain national unity through their respective language policies.

An interesting point to note, before proceeding to examine the

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1. Robin A. Ritchie, B.A. (Hons.) Dip. Ed. (Cantab.) Ph.D. (Cantab.) (Senior University Tutor, Hull) p.1.

INTRODUCTION

The linguistic diversities in India and the U.S.S.R. have, following political changes in the two countries, posed specific problems for their respective governments. These problems may be in the form of demands for political autonomy on a linguistic basis which have threatened the unity of India; or they may manifest themselves as part of a wider nationality problem, as in the U.S.S.R. In either case, the particular problematic situation of each country calls for specific policy solutions.

Several broad policy solutions are possible, the choice of the actual policy depending on whether the aim of a particular government is to create national unity through a common language, while at the same time allowing for, or even encouraging the use of the various other languages; or it is to create a unity by the subordination and assimilation of the diverse groups and their languages to the majority group and its language. The solution to the language problem, therefore, ". . . relates ultimately to the kind of society that the architects of the new nation hope to bring into being. Different conceptions of the social order will yield differing and often contradictory, solutions to the question . . . ."[1] However, it must be remembered that since language is not the only divisive force in society, a language policy cannot be regarded as the only instrument for maintaining unity. To the extent then that the language policy of a country is looked upon as one of the means of attaining national unity, the present study examines the attempts by the multilingual societies of India and the U.S.S.R. to maintain national unity through their respective language policies.

An interesting point to note, before proceeding to examine the

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1. Dakin, J., Tiffen, B., & Widdowson, H.G.: Language in Education (London, Oxford University Press, 1968) p.4.

policy solutions of the two countries, is the dual nature of the language phenomenon, namely, its divisive and integrative potentialities. Whereas, on the one hand, a common language unites its native speakers into one cultural group, as the language of that group it serves as a powerful preserver of group loyalties and thereby a possible threat to national unity. To succeed, a language policy, therefore, has to take into account this dual and seemingly contradictory nature of language.

Two very general strategies of policy solutions have been presented by W.A. Stewart[1] to study the particular language policies of multilingual countries. These he calls the strategy of assimilation and the strategy of integration. Compartmentalization of language policies into rigid categories is not always easy, considering the great variations in actual policies undertaken by the numerous multilingual states that have emerged since the second World War. Nevertheless, whatever the differences in precise details, Stewart's classification of these policies into two general strategies has been generally accepted as a basis for classifying and comparing language policies.

A new state, faced with the problem of competing languages, may choose to suppress this competition and to impose one over the others. This is the strategy of assimilation and it strives towards "the eventual elimination by education and decree of all but one language, which remains to serve for both official and general purposes."[2] In Indonesia, for instance, despite a great diversity of language, Bhasa Indonesia, the language of a small minority, was imposed as the national language. This was possible because the linguistic diversity there involved minimal political challenges, the political competition of the regional languages for national status

1. Stewart, W.A.: "An Outline of Linguistic Typology for Describing Multilingualism" in Rice, F.A.(ed.) Study of the Role of Second Languages in Asia, Africa and Latin America (Washington D.C., Center for Applied Linguistics, 1962) pp. 15-16.

2. Ibid. p.16.

being rather low. Apart from claiming to meet the needs of internal communication, the assimilationist strategy proceeds generally on the assumption that a single language is the badge of nationhood. Such a strategy with regard to language is usually part of larger strategy towards ethnic and cultural minorities, which attempts to build a homogenous national culture by shattering subnational ties. The policy of imposing a single language, however, may be of temporary value only since it could serve to alienate the various social groups from the political authority. As a result, temporary stability and political discipline might be purchased at the cost of political integration.

In a linguistic situation with a high degree of competition among the several major languages, a policy of imposition would seem to create more problems than it would solve. Here, the strategy of integration, accepting a situation of linguistic pluralism, would appear to be more feasible. This involves "the recognition and preservation of important languages within the national scene, supplemented by universal use of one or more languages to serve for official purposes and for communication across language boundaries."[1] Such a strategy, therefore recognizes and encourages the use of the important languages of the country for official purposes at local or regional level, while at the same time fostering the learning of an additional language or languages on a nationwide basis in order to facilitate inter-regional communication through the use of the "link" language. This policy in terms of a "link" language partakes of a general strategy which seeks to establish a national loyalty and identity without destroying subnational ties, the strategy of "unity in diversity."[2] Such a strategy endeavours to build a

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1. Stewart, W.A.: "An Outline of Linguistic Typology for Describing Multilingualism" Op. cit. p. 15.
2. Weiner, M.: "Political Integration and Political Development," in The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 358 (Philadelphia, American Academy of Political and Social Science, March, 1965) p.56.

national loyalty over and above local loyalties, moderating and domesticating the latter but not eliminating them. The strategy of integration does not ensure loyalty to the nation at the cost of loyalty to the province; for it, loyalty to both is good enough.[1] By providing gratifications to the diverse groups, the policy of integration indirectly endeavours to build and sustain national loyalty on the part of the citizens.

In actual practice, however, neither policy may be found to be implemented in its extreme form, the various language policies incorporating features of both in varying degrees, with their over-all orientation tending toward one strategy or the other. The suitability and feasibility of one strategy rather than the other would depend to a considerable degree upon the specific linguistic situation. As Stewart suggests:

> "Generally speaking the discouragement of linguistic pluralism is most feasible in countries where essentially one language has already come to enjoy a high degree of usage and prestige, while the acceptance of linguistic pluralism is a more realistic course for nations which are subdivided into a number of established and to some extent culturally autonomous linguistic communities."[2]

Finally, several areas of language policy-making can be identified. Consequently, determining the language policy for a multilingual country proves a complicated task, involving a series of inter-connected decision-making processes. The choice of a common language of communication is linked with the question of an official language, and both in turn are connected with the problem of language in education. As the Official Language Commission

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1. Stern, R.W.: "Maharashtrian Linguistic Provincialism and Indian Nationalism," in Pacific Affairs, Vol.37, No.1 (Vancouver, University of British Columbia, 1964) pp. 37-49.
2. Stewart, W.A.: "An Outline of Linguistic Typology for Describing Multilingualism". Op.cit. pp.15-16.

in India realised, "the language problem in the sphere of public administration, the problem with reference to legislation in the law-courts, the place of linguistic studies in the educational system, the linguistic media of competitive examinations for entry into public services, all are issues which bear upon each other in numerous ways."[1]

Stewart lists as many as ten functional categories of language systems,[2] the areas in which explicit policy-making is desirable or possible, varying from state to state. These categories are: (1) Official; (2) Provincial; (3) Wider Communication; (4) International; (5) Capital; (6) Group; (7) Educational; (8) School subject; (9) Literary; (10) Religion.

The languages in use for each of the above-listed functions may vary within a single country, and their respective use may or may not be laid down by the language planners. There are, in general, two main sectors of national life in which language planning is undertaken, namely, government administration and the educational system. In the sphere of administration there is the question of the official language, first for the whole nation, and second, for each linguistic region. Together with the official language there may be attempts at times to legislate on the use of a common or 'link' language. In the field of education, there is the dual question of (a) what language or languages should serve, and at what stages of education, as the medium of instruction and education, and (b) what languages should be made the subject of training and study.

These two sectors are obviously closely interrelated. A language that is made an official language, regardless of any direct intervention -

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1. Report of the Official Language Commission, 1956 (New Delhi, Government of India, 1956) p.5.

2. Stewart, W.A.; "A Sociolinguistic Typology for Describing National Multilingualism" in Fishman, J.A.(ed.) Readings in the Sociology of Language (The Hague, Mouton and Co.,1968) pp. 540-541.

in the educational system, comes to occupy an important part in school and college curricula. The elevation of allanguage to the status of an official language creates "a social 'updraft', a veritable 'lift-pump effect',"[1] throughout the national life of the new State. At the same time, the nature of programmes implemented in terms of the medium of instruction and language training in the field of education would also in their turn, vitally influence the likely prospects of successful change in the official language.

Chapters III and IV, therefore,examine these two areas of policy-making in India and the U.S.S.R. In Chapter III, the official language policies, (a) at the national level and (b) at the regional level, are described and compared. Some attention is also paid here to policy-making regarding a common or 'link' language. Chapter IV looks at the language policiesin education of the two countries, with special reference to (a) language as a medium of instruction, and (b) language as a subject of study.

Besides these two major areas of language policy-making, there is a third which merits attention. This is in the sphere of policies designed for developing the various languages and scripts in a multilingual country. Obviously, not all languages have been developed upto a uniform level to serve the official and educational functions with equal proficiency. The question then is firstly, whether policy-making in this area is aimed at developing each and every language found in a country to make it a worthy tool of administration and education, or to concentrate efforts on developing only on a few. Secondly, where the policy of developing the various languages and scripts is adopted, it has to be examined whether the emphasis is on modelling them on a classical language, a foreign language or the dominant indigenous language. It is also significant whether attempts are made to

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1. Deutsch, K.W.: Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality. (Cambridge, Mass.: Technology Press, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1953) p.97.

evolve a common script for all the languages or to develop the different scripts for each of the languages. All these issues, as they are dealt with in India and U.S.S.R., form the substance of Chapter V.

In determining the official language policy of a multilingual multicultural country, several kinds of policy positions are available: it may be that a foreign language is declared the sole official language or a local language may be made the official language or a local language may be given a primary official status while the real official language is a foreign language or a local language and a foreign language may both be made official languages.[1]

The official language, especially at the national level, is sometimes confused with the national and common languages of a country, and hence it is necessary at the outset to distinguish between them (this being before exploring the official language policies of India and the U.S.S.R.

[illegible] In a multilingual state, the adoption of a common language sometimes tampers the state. However, in a multilingual country, national policy sometimes favors a national language or languages, free from the vestiges of foreign rule, as one of the important symbols of nationhood, but these categories of language, however, are distinct from the official language, though the three terms are often used interchangeably and the same language may serve all three purposes. In formulating the official language policy of an independent nation it is necessary to see such categories with caution. While adopting or promoting languages into distinct 'national languages' or the accepted language of administration as well as a means of communication between the governed and the governors[2] According to

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1. Fishman, J.A. 'Patterns of Language Planning in the New States' in Fred W. Riggs, Ed. Language Planning (Honolulu: East West Center, Culture Learning Institute, October 1968) p. 4.

2. Nadeem Ahmad Faruqui, Language Planning (Aligarh, 1969), p. 1.

CHAPTER III

OFFICIAL LANGUAGE POLICIES

In determining the official language policy of a newly-independent multilingual country, several kinds of policy solutions are available: it may be that a foreign language is declared the sole official language; or a local language may be made the official language; or a local language may be given a titulary official status while the real official language is a foreign language; or a local language and a foreign language may both be made official languages.[1]

The official language, especially at the national level, is sometimes confused with the national and common languages of a country, and hence it is necessary at the outset to distinguish between these three terms before comparing the official language policies of India and the U.S.S.R.

Distinction Between Common, National and Official Language: In a multilingual state, the exigency of communication demands a common language understood throughout the state. Moreover, in newly-independent countries, national pride and patriotism demand a national language or languages, free from the vestige of foreign rule, as one of the important symbols of nationhood. Both these categories of language, however, are distinct from the official language, though the three terms are often used interchangeably and the same language may serve all three purposes. In formulating the official language policy of an independent nation it is necessary to use such categories with caution. UNESCO experts reporting on vernacular languages have defined 'official language' as "an accepted language of administration as well as a means of communication between the government and the governed."[2] According to

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1. Ornstein, J.: "Patterns of Language Planning in the New States" in World Politics, Vol.17, No.1 (Princeton,N.J., Center of International Studies, Princeton University, October 1964) pp. 42-44.

2. UNESCO: The Use of Vernacular Languages in Education (Paris,Unesco,1953)p.46.

Stewart's functional categories of language systems, an official language is "a legally appropriate language for all politically and culturally representative purposes on a nationwide basis. In many cases the official function of the language is specified constitutionally."[1] Thus the official language is the one used primarily for the purposes of government and administration and has, usually, behind it a statutory sanction.

The term 'common language' denotes a much wider category than that implied by the official language. It stands for a "generally comprehensible code of communication used throughout the nation."[2] Stewart prefers to call this the language of 'wider communication' in that it predominates as "a medium of communication across language boundaries within the nation."[3] The common language may or may not be coextensive with the national language, more so in a multilingual society with a plurality of national languages. This is true if, by 'national language' is conceived "the natural speech of a major linguistic community for which the members of the group nurture a primordial affection."[4] Thus defined, a national language is synonymous with the native language of a language group. Here it is necessary to distinguish between a national language, as defined above, and of which there may be many in a multilingual state, and the national language of a state. In the latter case a single indigenous language functions as the common and official language of the nation, besides being a major symbol of nationhood and a medium for allocating values of national unity.

The lack of uniformity evident in the use of these three terms is a reflection, perhaps, of the confusion and complexity present in this area.

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1. Stewart, W.A.: "A Sociolinguistic Typology for Describing National Multilingualism" Op.cit. p.540.
2. DasGupta, J.: Language Conflict and National Development.(Bombay, Oxford University Press, 1970) p.30.
3. Stewart, W.A.: "A Sociolinguistic Typology for Describing National Multilingualism" Op. cit. p.540.
4. DasGupta, J.: Language Conflict and National Development Op.cit. p.30.

Thus, whereas M.K. Gandhi referred, first to Hindustani and then to Hindi, as the national language of India[1] in the sense of serving as both the official language and as the language of communication not only between the elites and the masses, but across linguistic boundaries as well; Nehru, as late as 1963, while addressing the Indian Parliament said that all the "thirteen or fourteen" languages mentioned in the Eighth Schedule of the Indian Constitution were "national languages"[2], reserving for Hindi the title of All-India language[3], meaning thereby an official language, as well as an inter-regional link language.[4] Several ministers, however, have referred to Hindi as "the national language"[5], while the official report of the Committee on Emotional Integration refers to all the fourteen languages listed in the original Eighth Schedule of the Constitution as having the "Status of national languages"[6], although the report of the Official Language Commission refers to those languages (except Sanskrit) as "regional languages"[7]. In the U.S.S.R., on the other hand, the term "national language" is used in its narrower sense as referring to the sixteen major languages of the Constituent Union Republics, the same languages also being referred to as the "native" languages of the peoples of the U.S.S.R.[8] The title of official or State language is theoretically denied to any single language, all the major languages of the Union being recognised equal and serving the official purposes in their respective regions. Lenin, and, before 1930, even Stalin categorically

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1. Gandhi, M.K.: Thoughts on National Language (Ahmedabad, Navjivan, 1961) pp.4-5.
2. See, Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, Vol. 4. (New Delhi, Government of India, 1964) p.65.
3. Nehru, J.: The Unity of India (London, Lindsay Drummond, 1941) p.256.
4. Ahmad, Z.A.(ed.): National Language for India (Allahabad, Kitabistan, 1941) p.71.
5. Cited in Report of the Official Language Commission, 1956. Op. cit. p.22.
6. Report of the Committee on Emotional Integration (New Delhi, Govt. of India, Ministry of Ed., 1962) p.51.
7. Report of the Official Language Commission, 1956. Op. cit. p.22.
8. See Article 121 of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. 1936.

denied to Russian the status of an official language, while recognising at the same time that it was the common language of the Union.

It would be easier to see through this confusion if it is recognised that one or more of the national languages in a multilingual State may be recognised as the official language, but this language need not be the same as the common language, though such a situation would, no doubt, be ideal. While all national languages within the boundaries of a single State may not be designated as the official language, the official language, at the same time, may not serve as the common language unless it existed as such prior to being accorded official status or was sought to be created deliberately or accepted by means of a conscious language policy, as was the case with Hebrew in Israel and Bhasa Indonesia in Indonesia.

In the federal structures of India and the U.S.S.R., the official language policy needs to be examined at two levels:

(a) at the national level; and

(b) at the regional or state level.

Official Language Policies at the National Level in India and the U.S.S.R.

INDIA

The Constitutional Settlement: Considering the great confusion in the use of terminology, the provisions of the Indian Constitution regarding language have explicitly avoided the mention of a common or national language, restricting their sphere to the choice of a single official language. Nationalist thinking since the 1920s had been in the direction of replacing English by an Indian language at the Centre and by the regional languages at the level of the provinces, the former step seeking to foster a spirit of national identity and self-respect; and the latter to forge a communication link between the elite and the masses, facilitate participatory politics, and encourage

education through the mother tongue.

This movement for an indigenous language reached its culmination after 1947 when the question of the language policy to be adopted became an integral part of the task of framing the new Constitution for India. With regard to the official language question, most members of the Constituent Assembly of India were of the view that a provision about the official language should form an essential part of the Constitution, to secure national solidarity. The choice of this official language, however, was the result of one of the bitterest debates and controversies both within the Congress-nominated Constituent Assembly and the Congress party itself. The final constitutional settlement, therefore, was more in the form of a compromise measure.

Two closely-linked questions arise in considering the ends sought by the framers of the official language policy. First, what was the aim of the Indian leaders in wanting to adopt an Indian language for the official purposes of the Union? Second, what was their aim in choosing Hindi for this purpose?

The linguistic history of India shows, for the known historical period, the singular fact that the official language was never a national language: Sanskrit during the ancient period, Persian during the medieval period, and English during the modern period, have served the purpose of the official language without themselves becoming at any time truly national languages.[1] The twin motives of the Indian leaders opting for the adoption of an indigenous language for official purposes were national pride and national unity. English, being associated with colonial rule, could not possibly be allowed to dominate the Indian scene after the departure of the British. National pride and self-respect demanded a cultural autonomy

1. Katre, S.M.: "The Official Language and the National Languages of India" in Language and Society, (Simla, Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1969) p.165.

following political independence, and this was hoped to be achieved by the use of an indigenous language for the whole country. Moreover, the use of an indigenous language, generallyunderstood by all, was expected to unite not only the government and the governed, but also people from all the diverse language communities in the country. Gandhi, for instance, insisted that he placed so much emphasise on "our language" because according to him, "it is a powerful means of achieving national unity," and that "the more firmly it is established, the broader will be our unity."[1] It must be remembered, however, that Gandhi was writing at a time when the urgency for national awakening and national unity were the order of the day, and national independence the goal of all action.

That an indigenous language should be the official language of the Union was generally agreed upon both in the pre-independence India and during the framing of the Constitution, since an Indian language for pan-Indian use symbolised national unity. But controversy arose over the question of choosing this single Indian language which was to "unite" all India and be used for pan-Indian purposes. The two main contestants here were essentially two forms of the same language, namely, Hindi and Hindustani.

The census authorities take Hindi as the acknowledged name for the speech of the area in and around Delhi, the capital of India.[2] Though not a language of the majority, Hindi has a pre-eminent position among the Indian languages, its speakers constituting the largest single block of population among different language groups of India.[3] However, there has been some confusion over the term Hindi, or the nature of the Hindi to be adopted for

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1. Gandhi, M.K.: Thoughts on National Language. Op.cit. p.53.
2. The Census of India, 1961. (New Delhi, Government of India, 1961).
3. The 1951 Census returned 42% as the figure for the Hindi-speaking population, which was really an aggregate for Hindi, Urdu, Hindustani and Punjabi. The 1961 Census figures for Hindi alone were 30.4% of the population, but if the figures for Hindustani and Urdu are clubbed together with Hindi, the result is 35.7% which is actually a more accurate figure since the three languages are very similar.

official purposes. When Gandhi pleaded in favour of Hindi, he was not referring to the increasingly Sanskritised Hindi in official use today. For him it was the ordinary language spoken and understood by the common people in North India, both Hindus and Muslims, and written in both Devanagari and Urdu scripts.[1] Gandhi wished for a fusion of Hindi and Urdu into Hindustani even as he wished for Hindu-Muslim accord. In fact he believed that a fusion of the two languages into a single language, but with two scripts, would be a powerful influence in promoting Hindu-Muslim unity, and invented the term Hindi-Hindustani to denote the common language of his conception.

Gandhi's influence persuaded many other important leaders of the national movement to accept Hindustani. Thus, Nehru declared in 1937 that Hindustani should be officially recognised as the all-India language[2] and that a basic Hindustani on the model of Basic English could be the official language of India. Such a basic Hindustani, he claimed, "with a little effort from the state will spread with extreme rapidity all over the country and will help in bringing about that national unity which we all desire."[3] The same attitude towards Hindi and Urdu was also expressed by R. Prasad, who believed that structurally there was nothing to distinguish between these two languages, both representing a "common heritage of both Hindus and Musalmans".[4]

If there was a Gandhian pro-Hindustani bloc within the Constituent Assembly, there was also a strong pro-Hindi bloc under the leadership of men like P.D. Tandon, Govind Das, Sampurnanand, Ravi Shakar Shukla, and K.M. Munshi, whose adherence to Hindu tradition and orthodoxy characterised their personal and political careers.[5] They tended to identify Hindi with Hindu cultural

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1. Gandhi, M.K.: Thoughts on National Language. Op. cit. p.5.
2. Nehru, J.: The Unity of India. Op. cit. p.256.
3. Ibid. p.254.
4. Prasad, R.: India Divided. (Bombay, Hind Kitab, 1947) p.54.
5. DasGupta, J.: Language Conflict and National Development. Op.cit. pp.131-132.

interests, as they defined them, and strove for a "purity" of language which for them, implied Sanskritising Hindi. In the period when the country was passing through the travails of partition, the pro-Hindi and pro-Hindustani blocs in the Constituent Assembly were the main adversaries on the language issue.

During the initial sessions of the Constituent Assembly, the Rules Committee decided that the Assembly proceedings should be transacted in Hindustani or in English. The language debates of this period reflected the persuasiveness of Hindustani. However, the stand of the Constituent Assembly changed after partition. By the time the fourth Assembly session met in July 1947 under the ominous shadow of the impending partition, a concerted move was made by the orthodox Hindi leaders to dislodge Hindustani and to install Hindi in its place. The most prominent leaders of the Hindi movement were also important members of the Constituent Assembly. For them, Hindustani was a symbol of appeasement of the Muslim demand for Urdu. They identified Urdu with the demand for Pakistan and as a symbol of secession, and therefore not to be given a place in India. According to them Hindi alone should be recognised as the national language of India. Besides the supporters for Hindustani under the prestigious leadership of Nehru and Azad, the Hindi leaders in their advocacy of Hindi had to contend with the powerful Congress leaders from non-Hindi areas, particularly South India and West Bengal. To outvote the latter and inhibit the support for the retention of English for all practical purposes, the Hindi leaders sought to build a common front of Hindi and Hindustani blocs by invoking the need to maintain continuity with the Congress heritage of supporting a national language to replace English.[1]

At the same time, to oust the Hindustani supporters, the Hindi leaders mobilised votes for the cause of Hindi in the Constituent Assembly

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1. See, The Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol.1, no.2; Vol.8, no.3; Vol.9, nos. 32, 33 and 34. (New Delhi, Government of India, 1946-1950).

and the Congress Party. As a result, at a crucial voting which took place in a meeting of Congress Party members in the Assembly in 1949, the Hindi bloc won by 78 votes against 77 votes cast for Hindustani. Given the almost equal strength in the Assembly of the rival blocs in the Congress Party, a measure of compromise was needed for a viable language policy. The necessary compromise was reached in the form of the Munshi-Ayyangar formula[1] which did not provide for a national language as originally demanded by the Hindi leaders, but used the term 'official language of the Union' and provided that this language would be Hindi in the Devanagari script.

The official language policy, as it finally emerged, found statutory recognition in Article 343, Clause 1, of the Constitution of India, which lays down that "the official language of the Union shall be Hindi in the Devanagari script."[2] However, in view of the difficulties of an immediate switchover, Clause 2 of the same article states that "for a period of fifteen years from the commencement of this Constitution, the English language shall continue to be used for all the official purposes of the Union for which it was being used immediately before such commencement," at the same time, empowering the President to authorise, during the said period, "the use of the Hindi language in addition to the English language . . . . for any of the official purposes of the Union". Thus, the constitutional settlement sought to replace English by a single Indian language for official purposes, the change to take place gradually over a period of fifteen years. It seems, however, that the constitution-makers foresaw some inherent difficulties in the change-over, in the form of a threat to Indian unity or a lack of efficiency in administration, because they added an element of caution in the implementation of the official language provisions in the form of Clause 3 of Article 343 which provided that "notwithstanding anything in this article,

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1. The Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. 9, no. 32, Op. cit. pp.1321-1323.
2. The Constitution of India. (1950). Article 343, p.166.

Parliament may by law provide for the use, after the said period of fifteen years, of the English language . . . . for such purposes as may be specified in the law".

Further, the Constitution draws a distinction between the "deliberative" functions of legislatures and the actual legislative enactments; and similarly between the "proceedings" of a court of law, on the one hand, and the judgements, decrees and orders of the court, on the other. Thus, whereas in the case of the former functions, Hindi or any other Indian language may be used,[1] for the latter set of purposes in both cases, English was perceived to be desirable,[2] even imperative, in the interests of accuracy and precision of language, till such time as the Indian languages and the Union Hindi were sufficiently developed to take over in their respective spheres. Thus, the Indian Constitution did not extend the scope of Hindi to the law courts, and neither did it seek to replace English by Hindi as the medium of the competitive examinations conducted by the Union Public Service Commission for personnel recruitment to the prestigious all-India services. It was, therefore, concerned with a limited area of official and public life and refrained from legislating in the sphere of the "semi-public" (education) or the "private" (business, industry, mass-media etc.) sectors.

Revision of the Official Language Policy: Despite the acceptance of the settlement by the Constituent Assembly without a division, that settlement has never received complete legitimacy among the major groups in India which fear discrimination against the non-Hindi States. At the same time, the compromising nature of the provisions themselves make them vague and inconsistent, and hence difficult to implement. However, no further significant legislation in the sphere of the official language was to be forthcoming, till 1963, when the fifteen-year deadline was coming to an end.

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1. The Constitution of India, Article 120, Clause 1 and Article 348, Clause 2.
2. Ibid. Article 348, Clauses 1, 2 & 3.

In the meantime, the Official Language Commission, appointed in 1955, in accordance with a constitutional provision[1] to make recommendations concerning the use of Hindi as the Union's official language, the restrictions to be placed on the use of English and the preparation of a time-schedule for the gradual replacement of English by Hindi, endorsed the provisions of the Constitution regarding the official language.[2] The Commission, however, was apprehensive that the fifteen-year period may be too short, and refrained from making any recommendation at the time to place restriction on the use of the English language for any official purposes of the Union. Nevertheless, possibly looking ahead to a time when English would be completely displaced as an official language both at the Union and State levels, the Commission fearing the impact of such a displacement on the unity of the legal and administrative framework of the country as well as on the mobility and interchangeability of personnel and information, recommended replacing English by Hindi in many important areas, such as the language for judgments, decrees and orders of high courts, and the authoritative texts of legislation in States, where now regional languages were strong competitors.

What seemed a very feasible policy for 1950 soon began to be questioned as the fifteen-year time limit for the retention of English as an associate official language began to draw to a close, and it was realised that the removal of English would not only be difficult but disastrous. To the non-Hindi groups the replacement of English and the implementation of the official language provisions posed a grave threat to their sense of regional community, interregional balance of power and personal status security. Ironically, therefore, a policy which was supposed to bring about national unity became itself a basis of future discord and dissatisfaction, the non-Hindi groups seeking to put pressures on the Union government and the dominant party in order to counteract the influence of the Hindi leaders.

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1. The Constitution of India. Op.cit. Article 344, Clause 1-3.
2. Report of the Official Language Commission, 1956. Op.cit p.40.

When by 1958 the Commission's report was reviewed by a Special Committee of Parliament, the issue had become one of first political importance, with the result that the Committee expressed anxiety about a too hurried switch-over to Hindi. In fact, it recommended that "from 1965 when Hindi becomes the principal official language, English should be used as a subsidiary official language for purposes to be specified by Parliament by law in due course for as long as may be necessary".[1] By now opposition to Hindi was extremely vigorous and militant especially in Madras and West Bengal. Realizing the disruptive potential of the controversy, Nehru favoured a go-slow policy. In a statement in the Lok Sabha in 1959 he assured the non-Hindi areas that English would remain for an indefinite period as an additional or associate official language, by giving these areas almost a veto over when Hindi should completely replace English; by assuring that no handicap would be imposed on people from non-Hindi areas in regard to recruitment to the public services; and by underlying his opposition to the imposition of the compulsory study of Hindi in any state.[2] Unfortunately, his assurance had no formal sanction behind it, and his death in 1964 removed the source behind the assurance.

With increasing pressure, the retreat from a rigid 1965 switch-over was made official in a Presidential Order of April 27, 1960, which declared that after 1965 English should continue as the subsidiary official language and that provision be made for "the continued use of English even after 1965 for purposes to be specified by Parliament by law for as long as may be necessary."[3] The proposed legislation to postpone the replacement of English and establish its "associate" status for an indefinite period became the occasion for an intensification of the controversy.

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1. Report of the Committee of Parliament on Official Language (New Delhi, Government of India, 1958) p.13.
2. Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, Vol. 4, op.cit. p.97.
3. Notification, No.2/8/60-OL of Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, April 27, 1960.

In 1963, the government introduced the Official Languages Bill to eliminate the constitutional directive for the removal of English as the official language and at the same time to accord Hindi the status of official language. Whereas the report of the Committee of Parliament and the Presidential Order had asked, in line with the provisions of the Constitution, for the continuance of English for certain specified purposes only, the bill broadened the commitment, providing that the use of English may continue for "all the official purposes of the Union for which it was being used" before 1965 as well as for the transaction of business in parliament.[1] Hindi and English together were now to be India's official languages, the former having the status of "official language" and the latter that of "associate or additional" official language. The Official Languages Act, passed by Parliament in 1963, and providing that English may be used for the official purposes of the central government and the business of parliament after January 26, 1965, appeased neither the Hindi nor the non-Hindi speaking factions of the country. While the former felt that the Act postponed the effective establishment of Hindi as the official language; the latter held that it did not make mandatory the continuance of English, but only provided for authority to do so. The elevation of Hindi to the status of official language was accompanied by massive outbreak of violence in Madras and demands for the incorporation of "the Prime Minister's assurances" into law.

Dissatisfaction with the Official Languages Act, 1963 from both the Hindi and the non-Hindi groups necessitated an amendment, as suggested by the Congress Working Committee in February, 1965.[2] Domestic crises and the war with Pakistan, however, prevented effective legislation till the end of November, 1967. The Official Languages (Amendment) Bill and an accompanying

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1. The Official Languages Act, 1963 (New Delhi, Government of India, Ministry of Law, 1963) pp. 1-2.

2. Link, Vol.7, No.29 (February 28, 1965) pp.6-7.

resolution on language policy,[1] sought to give statutory form to the assurances given by Prime Ministers Nehru and Shastri for the non-Hindi regions, by affirming that the status of English as an associate language would continue as long as the non-Hindi States wanted it.

On December 16, 1967, the Lok Sabha adopted the Official Languages (Amendment) Bill, thereby establishing a two-language policy for official transactions. As finally enacted, the Official Languages (Amendment) Act 1968 provides that English may, in addition to Hindi, continue to be used in all such official purposes of the Union for which it was being employed before, 1965 as well as in the business of the parliament, but specifies in some detail the official purposes for which English shall continue to be used in addition to Hindi, and furthermore, refrains from laying down any time limit for the displacement of English by Hindi in all these official purposes. The purposes specified, for which English must continue to be used by the Union indefinitely in addition to Hindi, are:

(i) resolutions, general orders, rules, notifications, administrative or other reports or press communiques issued or made by the central government and its agencies or corporations;

(ii) administrative and other reports and official papers placed before parliament;

(iii) contracts and agreements executed, and licenses, permits, notices and forms of tender issued by the central government and its agencies or corporations.

The Act gives any non-Hindi State a veto over the displacement of English by Hindi in the instances explicitly specified; English to continue to be used for these purposes until legislatures of all non-Hindi States adopt resolutions demanding otherwise. Further, for communication between the Union

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1. See, The Hindustan Times, (New Delhi, December 17, 1967) for a text of the bill and the resolution as passed by the Lok Sabha.

and States and among the States, the act lays down that (a) English shall be used between the Union and a non-Hindi State, and (b) English translations shall accompany Hindi communications from a Hindi to a non-Hindi State but that, by agreement, Hindi alone may be used between the Union and a non-Hindi State, between a Hindi State and a non-Hindi State, or among non-Hindi States. In relation to the internal working of the Union Government, the act provides that an English translation shall accompany a communication, if it is in Hindi, among ministries, departments and corporatives or companies controlled by the central government until such time as the staff of the receiving agency has gained a working knowledge of Hindi.

At the same time, the amending act and the accompanying resolution embody several concessions to the supporters of Hindi. Although English is to continue indefinitely as an additional official language along with Hindi, its compulsory use is restricted to the official purposes clearly specified and not generally for "all official purposes"; the way thus remains open, legally at least, for Hindi to displace English as the "working language of the Union". Moreover, any State is free to use Hindi for purposes of communication with the Centre or any other state. Furthermore, English is to be used in interdepartmental correspondence at the Centre only until such time as the staff has acquired a working knowledge of Hindi. More importantly, the resolution on language policy commits the government to a more energetic effort in the development and propagation of Hindi and to an increasingly greater use of Hindi in the official business of the Union. In addition, the resolution provides that, after consultation with the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC), all the languages listed in the Eighth Schedule of the Constitution shouldbe allowed as alternative media for purposes of UPSC examinations.

The Official Languages (Amendment) Act, instead of resolving the language controversy once and for all, became the centre of heated controversy

and violent agitation throughout the country: in North India for allegedly perpetuating the hegemony of English in India, and in South India for allegedly foisting Hindi on the non-Hindi people. The reactions of the various political parties to the provisions of the Act have been varied. At one extreme, there is great hostility to the continuation of English as the official language in any sphere. The Jan Sangh and the Samyukta Socialist Party, both drawing their support largely from North India, as well as many inside the Congress party, have vigorously opposed any plan to provide a continued role for English as the official language. On the other hand, there is widespread opposition to Hindi, primarily from the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) in Madras, as also from the Communist Party of India (Marxist) and the Swatantra Party.

The DMK asked for an amendment of the Constitution to adopt all the regional languages listed in the Constitution as the official languages of the Union[1] and to continue with English as the official language until that is done.[2] This is because the DMK is concerned with the fundamental question of the equality of Indian languages, believing that only through retaining English as the sole official language can the Dravidian language groups maintain parity with the Aryan language groups.[3] The Communist Party of India (Marxist) is also in favour of continuing with English for all official purposes until such time as the non-Hindi people are willing to dispense with it; at the same time wanting all regional languages to be used at the Center for as many official purposes as possible. The Swatantra Party too is generally against Hindi and in favour of English as the official language of the Union.

Thus, although the government's policy has by and large the support

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1. Statement of C.N. Annadurai, Hindu Weekly Review (Madras, April 17, 1967).
2. See, Annadurai, C.N.: On Official Language, (Madras, DMK Head Office, 1965).
3. Memorandum of the Madras Government to the Union Ministry of Education, in The Hindu Weekly Review (Madras, August 28, 1967).

of the Congress Party, the Communist Party of India and the Praja Socialist PParty, the two extreme and irreconciliable positions taken by the pro-Hindi and pro-English groups in the body politic shatter all hopes of a compromise settlement and make it difficult to speculate on the future status of Hindi and English as official languages of the Indian Union. At present both English and Hindi share the status of official languages, one defacto and the other dejure but hopeful of becoming defacto eventually. Far from satisfying the major groups in the country and forging a unity, such a policy seems to have a very high potential for political tension and conflict within the country. In the context of the present configuration of political forces it seems extremely difficult to formulate a policy that would successfully integrate the large but diverse sections or regions of the Union; the compromise reached by the Official Languages (Amendment) Act approximating as closely as is possible in the Indian language situation, to an acceptable solution.

THE U.S.S.R.

Language Policy During the Revolutionary Period: In contrast to the great emphasis placed on the question of the official language of the Union by the Constitution, the government and the political parties in India, controversy on this question seems, from the available literature, to be relatively insignificant in the U.S.S.R. In fact, the 1936 Constitution (as the 1924 one before it) makes no stipulation regarding the official or state language of the Soviet Union, and neither is there any evidence of legislation on this subject. This, however, does not mean that the U.S.S.R. does not have a definite language policy, or that, if it has one, it is unanimously accepted by all. If anything, this difference in emphasis only reveals the differences in the functioning of the two systems. Critics of the U.S.S.R. are often found to comment on the divergence between communism's tactical objectives and ultimate aims, and this discrepancy is perhaps reflected clearly in the language policy of the Soviet Union. Theoretically, there is

no statutory backing to Russian as the official language - indeed, [illegible] declarations to the contrary can be cited from the works of Lenin and Stalin before the 1930's. Nevertheless, actual practice reveals otherwise. [illegible]

During Tsarist rule, Russian was enforced as both the state and the common language of the Empire, the languages of all other nationalities being relegated into the background. The transfer of political power from the Tsar to the Bolsheviks called for a reframing of the language policy to suit the multinational character of the State. Several factors at the time emphasized the suitability of Russian as the official language of the U.S.S.R. Besides being the language of the ruling class during the Tsarist period, it is, since the Revolution, the language of the Republic which holds the seat of central government, namely, the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR). Moreover, Russian is the language of the dominant group which constitutes a majority of the population[1], and owing to its privileged position during Tsarist rule is the most developed of all Soviet languages and has a high prestige value.

Inspite of all the obvious advantages of Russian as the dominant language, Soviet leaders, before and immediately after the Revolution rejected the idea of a compulsory state language. Though their ultimate aim might have been the emergence of Russian as the state language, they did not, in the early years, wish to grant any statutory sanctions to Russian's claims to be the common state language. Soviet language policy, in fact, developed in two distinct stages. The first, during the pre-and post-revolutionary years refrained from imposing a single language on all peoples; while the second stage, in the 1930's and after was indirectly aimed at imposing the supremacy of Russian in the guise of Soviet patriotism.

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1. According to the 1959 Census of the U.S.S.R., 54.6% of the population is Russian speaking.

Even before the Revolution, Lenin, who formulated the communist approach to minority languages in his "Thesis on the Nationalities Problem" of 1913, said that his Party rejected a "State language", since it signified "compulsion for some nations and privileges for others." By "state language" he was referring to a common official language, which for him, was Russian. From his writings it is clear that it is not merely the idea of a common state language which is rejected, but rather it is the acceptance of Russian as the State language of the Union which is put off for the time being. In other words, if there is a shift in policy, or the time is ripe to adopt a single state language, that language, without doubt, would be Russian. This is clearer when the main reason he gave for his rejection of the nomination of Russian as the state language is considered. His claim was that since seven-tenths of the population of Russia were Slavs they would rapidly arrive at the same language under economic pressures. It was Lenin's thesis that the peoples of Russia would learn Russian voluntarily if it were not thrust upon them by force because "the needs of economic exchange always lead the nationalities living in a single State (if they wish to live together) to learn the language of the majority."[1] Elsewhere he stated; "compulsion . . . will only lead to to one thing; it would impede the spread of the great and powerful Russian language to other national groups."[2] Lenin's true intentions regarding the choice of a common state language for the U.S.S.R. are plain, though his policy was one of gradualism and restraint. According to him, the slightest compulsion here would "set at nought the incontestably progressive significance of centralism, of large State, and of a single language."

It is significant to note that Lenin was writing at a time when the party (then known as the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party) needed

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1. Lenin, V.I.: Collected Works, Vol. 19, (Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1964) p.215.
2. Ibid. Vol.20, p.56.

the support of the diverse nationality groups in their opposition to the Tsars. What better way was there then to promise the discontented and oppressed nationalities their cultural autonomy?

At the party conference in 1913 the position on the State language was elaborated and restated. The resolution of the gathering declared in favour of: ". . . . full equality of rights for all nations and languages, with the absence of a compulsory state language . . . and the inclusion in the Constitution of a fundamental law which would proclaim as illegal any privileges whatsoever to any nation and any breach of the rights of the national minorities."[1]

Returning to the question again on the eve of the Bolshevik Revolution, the Seventh All-Russian Conference of the Communist party in April 1917 adopted a resolution on the national question in which it voiced its support for " . . . wide local autonomy, abolition of control from above and abolition of a state language . . ."[2] Lenin was the inspiration behind the programme and the resolutions of the party, being convinced that Russia's great possibilities could only be achieved through the application of Marxist theory to produce a socialist society based on the abolition of exploitation and on equal rights for all citizens. Among the latter was to be included equality of national rights. It was seen in the previous chapter that the problem facing Soviet leaders was not so much of a narrow linguistic nature, as a broader one of nationalities, and hence the language policy was always formulated in terms of a nationality policy, it being necessary to woo the nationalities in order to procure their support for the Union.

Stalin also pronounced against a State language in the early years

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1. Communist Party of the Soviet Union in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Plenums of the Central Committee, 1898-1954, Vol.1 (English translation)(Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1954) p.291.
2. Ibid. p.322.

of his career. Defining in 1918 the general principles governing the promotion of the Russian Federation and the rights of national minorities, he proclaimed: "No obligatory State language - neither in court proceedings nor in schools! . . The same full equal rights of the language both of the minorities and majorities will be observed in all social and political establishments."[1] Thus the national language of each Republic was to be its official language, the work of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., however, being conducted in Russian. Nevertheless, it is constitutionally guaranteed that "the laws passed by the Supreme Soviety of the U.S.S.R. are published in the languages of the Union Republics. . ."[2] When everything is considered, the language policy of the U.S.S.R. was relatively liberal in the 1920s, till events of the 1930s and later sought to legalise the defacto position enjoyed by Russian as the common state language.

Shifts in Official Language Policy Since the 1930s: Though the ideology of "proletarian internationalism" had been the spearhead of Soviet propaganda to the non-communist world since 1917, till the 1930s there was no sign of a world revolution. As a result, some critics of the Soviet Union point out, Stalin had to reframe ideology to justify socialism in one country. Domestic propaganda since the early 1930s, therefore, increasingly made its appeal to the Soviet citizen in terms of nationalistic symbols and slogans, gradually producing a new ideology of "Soviet patriotism"[3] in order to bridge the lag between ideology and practice. It appears that a popular patriotic sentiment was sought to be created and the Soviet citizen was expected to shift his loyalty away from "international socialism" towards the state and its leaders. By an appeal to the dormant nationalistic feelings of the population this new loyalty to the state was expected to emerge. But here the multinational

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1. Cited in Soviet Language Policy: The "Russianization" of the U.S.S.R. (n.p., n.pub., n.d. Pamphlet in Institute of Education Library, accession no. F(190) y).
2. The Constitution of the U.S.S.R., 1936. Article 40.
3. Lucero, J.: "Soviet Nationality Policy: The Linguistic Controversy" in Problems of Communism, Vol.3, No.1 (Washington, D.C., U.S. Information Agency, 1954) p.24.

structure of the Soviet state presented obvious difficulties. "Soviet patriotism" having no specific ethnic or linguistic content per se, had to be designed to appeal to all national groups of the multinational state. As a Soviet writer outside the U.S.S.R. has consistently tried to prove in his book[1], political expediency, and the centralism Stalin deemed necessary for the U.S.S.R. to survive in a hostile capitalist environment, required that Soviet patriotism be focused on the numerically-dominant group of the U.S.S.R. - the Russians.[1] Thus in many concepts, such as "Soviet culture" or "Soviet superiority" the epithet "Soviet", it is believed became a mere euphemism for "Russian".[2] The same emphasis is noticeable whenever the functions of language have entered into discussions of "Soviet superiority". In the absence of a "Soviet" language, therefore, it is the Russian language which is being glorified, though, here again there have been no statutory enactments to the effect, in spite of the shift in the proclaimed policy of the party. The 1936 Constitution was not amended to accord Russian the status of the State language, nor is there available any resolution or decree of the communist party or any law of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. making Russian the dejure official language of the State. However, the policies designed during this period in the spheres of language in education and the development of the various national languages to be discussed later, could reveal significant inroads made by Russian in the Union Republics, and point to the possibility that by facilitating and encouraging the spread of Russian as the common language the Soviet leaders hoped that it would eventually emerge as the sole common, official and national language of the Union. Their policy, implicitly at least, may be regarded as one of assimilation.

This statement is substantiated by the new Party Program of 1961, according to which one of the explicit distant goals of the Communist Party

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1. Kolasky, J.: Education in Soviet Ukraine. (Ontario, Peter Martin Associates Ltd., 1968) p.19.
2. Kucera, J.: "Soviety Nationality Policy" Op.cit. pp.24-25.

is the fusion of all nations of the U.S.S.R. into one Soviet nationality; the clearly implicit and immediate objective is to assimilate the other peoples to the Russians. Khrushchev, speaking at the Twenty-Second Congress in 1961 described it thus: "In our country there is going on a drawing together of nations . . . . In the process of unfolding construction of communism there will be achieved the complete unity of nations."[1]

It is, nevertheless, debatable whether Russification is the drivingg force or motive of Soviet nationality policy, or merely its instrument, if not its result. One view is that it is not likely that Russification is the driving force, Soviet leaders not being interested in Russian nationalism, per se. The conflict is not so much between the Russians and the smaller nationalities, but between these nationalities and a centralized totalitarian regime. The regime suppresses nationalities as it suppresses all groups not created by itself. For the suppression of the nationalities it uses Russians as its instrument, because Russians are the most numerous and culturally and economically the most advanced of the peoples of the Soviet Union. Seeking to achieve the twin aims of centralization and total domination over the large multinational area of the U.S.S.R., the Soviets strive for cultural uniformity, for which some kind of linguistic unification is necessary. At the present stage of the study, and with the limited information available, it is neither possible nor advisable to conclude decisively whether Russification is a distinct aim of the Soviet regime.

In the sphere of the official language of the Union it may be seen that the avowed policies in India and U.S.S.R. are not only different, but

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1. Twenty-Second Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Oct.17-31, 1961. (Stenographic Report I, Kiev, 1962) pp.205-206. Cited in Kolasky,J.: Education in Soviet Ukraine. Op.cit. p.161.

that within the same country policy proposals have been modified according to changing circumstances. Though eventually expecting the emergence of Russian as the common state language, Lenin during the early years opposed compulsion in the belief that equality of all nationalities would be a sure foundation for the building of a socialist State, and that political change and economic necessity would bring about the desired integration of diverse cultural groups.[1] It is obvious that the exigencies of the moment shaped Lenin's views since he was writing at a time when the party needed the support of the various nationalities to oust the Tsar. Likewise, the post-independence official language policy in India was also determined by events of the moment, nationalist leaders, following Gandhi, assuming that, in the wake of independance, by granting cultural equality and adopting a single indigenous official language national unity could be achieved. Thus, while Indian leaders, in the early years, sought to adopt a single indigenous language for official purposes and gave it a constitutional sanction, with the aim of achieving national unity; the Soviet authorities chose to refrain from legislating on this significant question with the hope, thereby, of winning the support of the various nationalities, while at the same time relying on socio-economic factors for the ultimate emergence of Russian as the common state language.

Unlike India, the U.S.S.R. was not faced with the pressing problem of replacing a foreign colonial language by an indigenous language on grounds of national pride, since Russian, the language of the Tsars is also the language of the dominant group in the U.S.S.R. Moreover, whereas the Indian rulers sought in the adoption of a single language for official purposes the best way of maintaining national unity; Soviet leaders, confronted by a complicated linguistic mosaic within the boundaries of one political unit sought to establish a culture "socialist in content and national in form", the native language being the main part of the 'form' of national culture.

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1. See, Chapter II, p.38.

This policy of cultural decentralisation thus found its concrete expression in the relatively liberal language policy of the 1920s.

Despite guarantees of equality for all national languages of the U.S.S.R., Russian is found to be the defacto single, obligatory state language, used in State and party functions and meetings in all Republics. In that its position is very much like that of English in India, which inspite of Hindi's position as the dajure officialianguage, is still the defacto language of the Indian Union. The adoption of Hindi as the official language,far from bringing about the desired unity, witnessed several agitations and disturbances in the country calling for various modifications and amendments of the original policy in order to accommodate English as the associate official language of the Union. Soviet policy too underwent a change in the 1930s, Stalin's goal of absolute power and rigid centralisation necessitating a subordination of the diverse nationalities. Legally, however the language policy did not undergo any change in the U.S.S.R., Soviet leaders aiming at a shift in policy through the channels of the language policy in education and the development of the minority languages. What is aimed at here is the installing of Russian as the common language of the Union, which step ultimately is expected to lead to its emergence as the common state language throughout the country with all other languages subordinated to it. Here lies one of the fundamentql differences in the official language policies of the two countries. Whereas in the U.S.S.R., Russian was, even before the revolution, the common language of the Expire and current policies are aimed at strengthening this position of Russian prior to legally enforcing it as the state language; in India Hindi, as it is developing as the official language today, has never been the common language of the country, and, as will be seen later, with its increasing dependence on Sanskrit, it is being further removed from emerging as a common or 'Link' language. It has often been felt among certain quarters that Hindi has been elevated to the status of an official language before it has actually developed as the common language of the people. This,

while emphasizing the close link between the official language of the union and the common language for the country, raises several issues. In the first place, is it necessary that the two functions official and 'link' are performed by the same language, and does a language have to serve as the common language before it is successful as the official language? If the answer is yes, then is it possible to legislate in the sphere of a common language, or is it, by its very nature, best left to evolve naturally, with or without support from the state? Considering the close connection between the question of the official language and the common language, an examination of the common language situation in the two countries could reveal an important factor in the success of their respective official language policies.

A Common or 'Link' Language for India and the U.S.S.R.: While the official language of the Union, besides being the language of government and administration at the Centre, serves the purpose of inter-state communication at the governmental level; a common language is a generally comprehensive code of inter-regional communication for the majority of the people. As such, whereas an official language may be statutorily provided for, a common language evolves freely and voluntarily through social interaction and use in journalism, literary works, mass media and private commerce and industry. This natural process may be stimulated by deliberate measures like introduction of the language in the school curriculum; making it the official language of the State; and developing it as an expanding channel of access to all departments of knowledge. On the whole, however, as the Official Language Commission in India points out, in the field of common language the "linguistic pattern must be allowed to freely develop as it may, by the voluntary choices of the people" and "from the interaction of the various forces and incentives."[1]

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1. Report of the Official Language Commission, 1956. Op.cit. pp.46-47.

In an ideal situation, the same language would function as both the common and official language and thereby emerge as the national language of the country. The emergence of the national language therefore means in effect the evolution of a common language and its induction as the official language, without any significant competition from the other languages.

To become the common language of a country, a language must fulfill the criterion of universality, that is, it must be understood not only by the majority in the country but by the majority in each linguistic group. In order that it may serve as an effective means of inter-regional communication, the speakers of a common language should be more or less evenly distributed throughout the country. Given the 'cluster' pattern of the distribution of language groups in India and the U.S.S.R., where linguistic distribution is closely parallel to the geographical and political divisions of the country, such a criterion of universality assumes great importance.

In terms of interregional communication, India has really to reckon with the presence of some fourteen or so major and historically important regional languages whose speakers are concentrated primarily in states organised along linguistic lines. At the same time, these languages have many elements in common relating to syntax, grammar, vocabulary and script which, though not of immediate significance for communication, are likely to facilitate language learning if one of these languages is decisively selected to serve as the medium of pan-Indian communication.

Throughout the history of India, whatever the state of political unity in the country, cultural and geographical factors have created the need for a single link language, and one or other language has been available to fill this role. Though most of these languages, for example, Sanskrit, Persian, and English have been confined to the elite, there have been other link languages of wider usage[1], which , even though originating in the

1. See Nayar, B.R.: National Communication and Language Policy in India. (New York, F.A. Praeger, 1969) p.51.

northwest area of present-day India and largely confined to the Indo-Aryan language family, eventually spread to south India as well with the establishment of political rule in the Deccan by the Muslims from north India between the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries. Hindi today stands at the end of a series of link languages representing "the latest phase in the history of a Common Language for Aryan India."[1]

With the adoption of English for official purposes of the country, and as an important subject of study and medium of instruction in higher education, English became, during the British period, the new lingua franca and continues to be so at least for the educated elite. In its early years, the nationalist movement, with its narrow urban base, functioned effectively through the medium of English. With its development into a mass movement in the 1920s and the accompanying stress on the regional languages for mass mobilization, there arose the need for a common language to unify the nationalist movement. Gandhi, the chief advocate of a common language during this period placed implicit faith on Hindustani serving this purpose and eventually emerging as the national language of India.

Following independence, when nationalist leaders turned to framing a national language policy for the country, Hindi appeared to be the obvious choice for the official language. However, because of its identification with a single region in a federal system consisting of a number of major units, apart from the practical difficulties of a change-over, Hindi has faced strong opposition which has made uncertain its eventual emergence as a full-fledged official language of the Union. The policy of adopting Hindi as the official language has hurt rather than helped the cause of Indian unity by arousing resentment among the non-Hindi people. What most of the critics of the policy object to is not the choice of Hindi, but the supposedly hasty manner in

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1. Chatterji, S.K.: Indo-Aryan and Hindi. (Rev. and enl. 2nd ed. Calcutta, Firma K.L. Mukhopadhyay, 1960) p.179-82.

which it has been accepted as the official language and is being introduced in public life.[1] They would hold the introduction of Hindi in official life in abeyance till it has become "the language most widely understood in India, being accepted voluntarily." Once Hindi is firmly set on its way as the common language, it is claimed, its ultimate adoption as the official language would be a certainty and would not evoke all the resistance that it has. Thus, it has been a wrong tactical move to consider measures for inducting Hindi as the official language before adopting measures to accelerate its pace towards becoming the common language. Through the medium of Hindi as the common language it is hoped to preserve that political and national unity which was brought into being and given shape through a foreign language medium, namely English.

Though legislation in the field of common language is undesirable and not undertaken by the Constitution of India or the Parliament, basic to the whole conception of Hindi as the official language is the impulse driving Hindi towards the position of the common language. The proposal to make Hindi the official language becomes practically unworkable if any other language eventually becomes the common language.

That the Constitution envisaged the ultimate emergence of Hindi as the common language can be gauged from its special directive for the development of that language. Article 351 of the Constitution states:

> "It shall be the duty of the Union to promote the spread of the Hindi language, to develop it so that it may serve as a medium of expression for all the elements of the composite culture of India and to secure its enrichment by assimilating without interfering with its genius, the forms, style and expressions used in Hindustani and in

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1. See S.K. Chatterji's Note of Dissent to the Official Language Commission in the Report of the Official Language Commission, 1956. Op.cit. pp.301-310.

the other languages of India specified in the Eighth Schedule and by drawing, wherever necessary or desirable, for its vocabulary primarily on Sanskrit and secondarily on other languages."

This constitutional directive, like the rest of the language provisions, obviously tried to satisfy all the diverse groups in the country, which would be necessary if Hindi were to emerge as a link language for use within and outside the government.

In the Soviet Union, on the other hand, however anxious the government may have been to refrain from imposing a compulsory state language, the Russification policy of the Tsars, numerical dominance, the importance of the Russian element within the local communist parties, the use of the Russian language in the Red army, and the large-scale migrations of workers have, as already mentioned, led to the emergence of Russian as the undisputed link language of the U.S.S.R. Added to this, the compulsory study of Russian in schools and the influence of Russian language and script on the development of minority languages in the post-revolution era serve to strengthen the position of Russian as the common language of the Union.

In the early years of the republic, however, when a liberal language policy, as part of a broader nationality policy was in operation, Lenin, recognising the great political importance of the language question advocated great caution and the utmost tact in re-establishing the Russian language in the non-Russian republics.[1] Looking ahead into the future, Lenin envisaged a great community of free people, drawn together by common bonds based on the brotherhood of man, and speaking a common language. But this was to be a language freely evolved in the process of developing civilization, and was not to be enforced on the people. Faced with the

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1. See Lenin's note of December 31, 1922 in Pipes, R. The Formation of the Soviet Union. (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1954) pp.276-277.

practical problems of ruling a multinational state, he vehemently opposed the imposition of the Russian language on the non-Russians and emphasized that each nation was to have the full right to free national development.

The shift in Soviet language policy in the early 1930s showed signs of a politically motivated and rigidly enforced pro-Russian linguistic orientation in all non-Russian areas of the U.S.S.R. In public life, administration and culture, Russian has regained the position of the official language of the State,[1] and as pointed out by a Soviet observer, remains "the exclusive medium of communication between one Soviet people and another."[2]

In an attempt to bring linguistic theory in line with the language policy of the 1930s Stalin repudiated the theories of the Russian linguist N.Ya. Marr, contending that language is not a class phenomenon and does not constitute a part of the superstructure. In support of his argument, he pointed out that the language of the Russian nation has remained basically the same as it was before the October revolution, and that it has served as a common national language of all classes of the successive feudal, capitalist, and socialist societies.[3] Refutation of Marr's theory cleared the way for an ever greater glorification of Russian and the linguistic expansion of the language.

In the pronouncements of the present Soviet leaders statements about the "final merging of languages" are still to be found, but this is to happen only under what they term a universal communist system. Stalin first pronounced this doctrine in 1930 and repeated it during the Marr controversy when he

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1. Kuccra, J.: "Soviet Nationality Policy". Op. cit. p.27.
2. Mathews, W.K.: Languages of the U.S.S.R. (London, Cambridge University Press, 1951) P.119.
3. Stalin, J.: "On Marxism in Linguistics" in Pravda, (Moscow, June 20, 1950) pp. 3-4. (An English translation of this article is available in Simmons, E.J. (ed.) The Soviet Linguistic Controversy. (New York, King's Crown Press, 1951) pp. 70-76). For a discussion of Stalin's views on language, see Chapter VII.

stated: "As the result of long economic political and cultural cooperation between nations, will be sifted, at the beginning, the richest, unified zonal languages, which will later coalesce into one general international language; this, of course, will be neither German, nor Russian, nor English, but a new language, which has imbibed the best elements of the national and zonal languages."[1] This fusion of languages into one general language would take place after the victory of socialism on a world-wide scale. In the epoch before the world-wide victory of socialism, when instead of cooperation and mutual enrichment of languages there is assimilation of some and the victory of other languages, the hybridication of two languages results not in the formation of a new language but in the triumph of one of these languages and the defeat of the other. Hence, according to Stalin, the period before the emergence of international socialism would witness the triumph of Russian in the U.S.S.R.

The extent of the penetration of Russian in some Republics as described by the Twenty-Second Congress of the CPSU shows that "a significant part of state, social and political activity in the republic (regional) and not infrequently on the district level is carried on in the Russian language. This means that various congresses, conferences and meetings are carried on mainly in the Russian language. In it most frequently is conducted official documentation and business correspondence."[2] Thus, Russian serves, beyond doubt, as the defacto common State language of the U.S.S.R. and performs the function which English, a foreign language, performed in pre-independence India. Hence, whereas India has to evolve a new pan-Indian medium of communication and adopt it for official purposes, the U.S.S.R. has already inherited a common language in the form of Russian and the language policy since 1930 has been directed towards extending and strengthening the scope

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1. Stalin, J.: "Replies to Comrades" in Pravda, (Moscow, August 2, 1950), p.2.
2. "The Twenty-Second Congress of the CPSU and the Problems of the Study of the Orderly Development of Contemporary National Languages of the Soviet Union", cited in Kolasky, J. Ed. in Soviet Ukraine op. cit. p.162.

of Russian.

Official Language Policies at the Regional Level in India and the U.S.S.R.

In a federal form of government the question of official language at the regional level assumes great importance, and is an index of the degree of autonomy awarded to the various language groups occupying a definite geographical area. Moreover, it may be argued, to ensure that democracy does not degenerate into government by a narrow class of people, the improvement and effective utilisation of the state language is not only desirable but necessary. The people cannot be brought to accept responsibility for their own local and provincial affairs unless they can deal with an administration that does its speaking and planning in their language.

The major language groups of India and the U.S.S.R. are by and large confined to definite geographical areas whose boundaries coincide with the political and administrative boundaries of the States in India and the Republics in the U.S.S.R. The States of India and the Union Republics in the U.S.S.R. have each a definite majority language within its boundaries, popularly known as regional languages in India and national language in the U.S.S.R. The role assigned to these languages in the official and administrative spheres of the respective areas reveals the particular policy adopted by the governments of India and the U.S.S.R. towards the various groups and their languages.

INDIA

The future prospect of Hindi succeeding English as the official language of India is intimately tied with the effective introduction of the regional languages for official purposes at the state level. It is hoped that with the regional languages taking over from English in the twenty-one States forming the Indian federation, both the vested interests in English and the

fear of Hindi usurping the place of the regional languages would diminish, thereby modifying the opposition to Hindi from the non-Hindi areas. On the other hand there is a risk that with the displacement of English at the State level, without a simultaneous development of Hindi as the link language, there would occur a vacuum in the field of inter-regional communication which in the long run would prove to be more harmful than beneficial to the cause of national unity. Both these possibilities have, therefore, to be weighed in determining the official language policy at the state level in India.

The role which a link language plays in interregional communication on a nation-wide basis is fulfilled at the state level in the sphere of elite-mass communication by the regional languages. Both these forms of communication are essential to the process of integration. The importance of the regional languages in bridging the communication gap between the elite and masses of each language group was realised during the nationalist movement when a strong group of Indian nationalist leaders felt that to expand the structure of popular support for the national movement, it was necessary to create a channel of communication between the leaders and the people. This required the identification of the people as wellas the leaders of the community with a common language that would serve as a bridge for communal mobilisation. The need for mass mobilisation thus provided the necessary motivation for the English-educated Indian leaders to focus attention on the major regional languages.

In Bengal, Bankim Chandra Chatterjee, for instance, wrote that it is the task of the Bengalis to "disanglicise ourselves, so to speak, to a certain extent and to speak to the masses in the language which they understand. He suggested that only regional languages have the power to move the people.

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1. This is part of a letter that B.C. Chatterjee wrote to Bengali Past and Present, Vol. 8, part 2, (April-June, 1914) pp. 273-274.

Similar attitudes gradually became popular in other parts of India as well, and the initial decades of the twentieth century proved to be a fertile period for the development of the individual speech communities. Gandhi, together with his strong advocacy for Hindustani as the national language of India, pleaded for the regional languages to be used as official languages at the state or provincial level.[1] He recognised the need for encouraging the use of the indigenous languages in administration and education, and this was one of the reasons for his support of the idea of a federal system and a demarcation of States along linguistic lines. In supporting both the regional languages and Hindustani, Gandhi's aim was to supplement Hindustani by the regional languages for national communication, not to supplant it. Under Gandhi's leadership Congress policy favoured the encouragement of the regional languages at the State level also, whereas during the British rule regional languages were in use only below the district level of administration. This policy of the Congress party has been given statutory recognition in the section of official language in the Constitution of India.[2]

It is significant to note that except in the case of one chapter heading, the term "regional languages" is not used in the Constitution, the languages in question, being referred to as the "official language or languages of a State". These languages listed in the Eighth Schedule to the Constitution under the title "Languages" total fifteen in number, and are: Assamese, Bengali, Gujarati, Hindi, Kannada, Kashmiri, Malayalam, Marathi, Oriya, Punjabi, Sanskrit, Sindhi, Tamil, Telugu and Urdu.

Article 345 of the Constitution of India stipulates that, subject to the limitations of the provisions on the language of communication with the Union and among the States (Article 346), and on minority rights

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1. Gandhi, M.K.: Thoughts on National Language. Op. cit. p.21.
2. The Constitution of India (1950). Part XVII, Chapter II, Articles 345-347.

(Article 347), "the Legislature of a State may by law adopt any one or more of the languages in use in the State or Hindi as the language or languages to be used for all or any of the official purposes of the State." However, "until the Legislature of the State otherwise provides by law, the English language shall continue to be used for those official purposes within the State for which it was being used immediately before the commencement of this Constitution."

Regarding the language for Union-State and inter-state communication, Article 346 lays down that "the language for the time being authorized for use in the Union for official purposes shall be the official language for communication between one State and another State and between State and the Union." Nevertheless, "if two or more States agree that the Hindi language should be the official language for communication between such States, that language may be used for such communication."

To assure the rights of the linguistic minority in a State, Article 347 guarantees that "on a demand being made in that behalf, the President may, if he is satisfied that a substantial proportion of the population of a State desire the use of any language spoken by them to be recognised by that State, direct that such language shall also be officially recognised throughout that State or any part thereof for such purposes as he may specify."

The intent of the constitutional settlement therefore, appears to be to displace English not only by Hindi but rather by both Hindi and the regional languages at the Union and State levels, respectively.

In contrast to the provisions regarding the official language of the Union, the constitutional provisions regarding the displacement of English by regional languages are only permissible and not mandatory. Moreover, the Constitution does not prescribe the language to be used by the States, the choice being left to individual States; nor does it impose a time limit regarding the proposed changeover. Nevertheless the policy of substituting

regional languages for English at the State level met with greater support, especially in the Hindi States which, as observed by the Official Language Commission in 1956, had progressed further than the non-Hindi States in displacing the English language in State administration. For the Hindi States such a switch-over was not only desirable in itself at the State level, but would additionally help the Hindi-speakers at the national level where constitutionally Hindi was to become the official language by 1965. The non-Hindi States on the other hand, feared that by changing the regional languages they would only lose their proficiency in English which allowed them participation at the Union level, and as non-Hindi speakers, they would at the same time be at a disadvantage to compete in the Hindi language with Hindi-speakers. However, the language policy resolution passed by parliament in 1967, directing the government to allow an option for using the major regional languages as media for UPSC exams[1] may serve to allay these fears and thereby quicken the pace for the switchover to regional languages as official languages at the State level.

Another significant development since independence, and one which has given an impetus to the use of the regional languages in administration at the State and district levels is the increasing politicisation of the rural areas. As a result, a new generation of leaders has arisen at the local level, voicing the particular demands and interests of local groups through the representative political processes. These demands and interests, therefore, may differ considerably from those of the urban westernised elite. The latter defend English since their control over it gives them a relatively easy access to social status and white-collar jobs, besides facilitating inter-state mobility. The new generation of leaders with a largely rural support structure tend to confine their vision to the narrow range set by the limited

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1. Parliament Resolution on Language (New Delhi, Government of India, 1968).

perceptions of their audience.[1] The only language which really matters to the relatively less mobile, illiterate, rural masses of India is invariably the local dialect or a popular form of their regional language. Both Hindi and English are equally inconsequential for their daily activities. Hence, to mobilise these masses and win their support local administration needs to be conducted in their particular language.

The regional languages thus have become powerful media of mass mobilisation, and the new leaders have been quick to recognise and exploit the political potentialities of the regional languages. Apart from communicating with the rural masses who are handicapped by lack of literacy, in order to win their support, the leaders have to find means to relate the relatively upward-mobile sections of the rural areas to the centres of power at the local, district or state level. For all these processes the only relevant language of communication can be the regional language together with its variants.

It is not surprising, therefore, that at the state leve, the importance of the regional language has been steadily increasing. In the administrative sphere, all the States have gradually adopted a regional language as their official language. By 1969, with the exception of Nagaland which opted for a continuance of English, all the States had legislated for the adoption of their particular regional language for official purposes.[2]

Despite the dejure official status of the regional languages in the States, in actual practice there is a prospect of, what Nayar calls, a continued bilingualism[3] with English as an important language, being essential in many spheres of the state administration. The language of the high courts

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1. DasGupta, J.: Language Conflict and National Development. op.cit. p.194.
2. Nayar, B.R.: National Communication and Language Policy in India. Op.cit. p.139.
3. Ibid. p.140.

is English, the authoritative texts of all Bills to be introduced, Acts passed and orders, rules and regulations issued by State legislatures must be in English;[1] and State accounts have to be kept in English for purposes of Central audit. Moreover, for recruitment to the State Public Service Commission, the regional language cannot be made the sole medium, option for Hindi or English being necessary to safeguard the constitutional right of Indian citizens to equality of opportunity in matters of public employment.[2] Endorsing this view, the Chief Ministers Conference in 1961 stressed that in recruitment to State Services under the State Government, language should not be a bar. However, despite the limited effect of the formal declarations regarding the adoption of regional languages as official languages in the States, the fact remains that the use of regional languages for official transactions is growing.

THE U.S.S.R.

As champions of national liberation the Soviet authorities theorized on the promotion of local languages and customs in the U.S.S.R. As such, they insisted that whereas in "exploiter" multi-national states the tongue of the ruling nation is accorded the status of "state language", in the Soviet Union all the national languages enjoy equal status.[3] In practice, this implies the use of the national languages in republican administration and education.

Like India, the Soviet State is, in theory, organized on the federal principle. This was a tactical move, in part aimed at subduing the various nationalist movements that threatened the unity of the multi-national State after the Tsar's abdication. The Third Congress of the Soviets in January 1918, declared that, "The Russian Soviet Republic is instituted on the basis of

1. The Constitution of India, (1950) Article 348.
2. Ibid., Article 16.
3. Hans, N. and Hessen, S.: Educational Policy in Soviet Russia (London, P.S. King & Son, Ltd., 1930) p.191.

free union of free nations as a federation of Soviet national republics."[1] This declaration was afterwards included as one of the articles in the Federal Constitution. The Communist Party rejected the theory of national personal autonomy in favour of territorial autonomy based on ethnic or linguistic units,[2] and the actual policy of the government was in conformity with these ideas. There were thus set up, Union Republics, embracing territories inhabited by more or less homogenous populations of non-Russian origin, or by different branches of the Russian nation, which joined the Union "voluntarily" and had, besides their own governmental machinery, the formal right of secession.[3] At the same time, smaller national groups were given the status of Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics, Autonomous Regions, or National Areas. The Republics are free to use their own national language for official purposes, in court proceedings and for official documents.

In his book Multilingualism in the Soviet Union, Lewis[4] refers to an important political act taken in 1925 which concentrated national and ethnic groups within eponymous territories, thereby bringing together as many as possible of the Uzbeks, for instance, in one administrative area or Republic. This concentration helped to ensure the greater linguistic homogeneity of the various republics, thereby promoting the use of non-Russian national languages for the administrative and educational purposes of the republics. As in the case of India, this linguistic homogeneity of administrative units helps to determine the dominant language of the unit which, in turn, serves as the official language of the area. This right of nationalities to conduct government in their own language is safeguarded by Article 123 of the 1936 Constitution which guarantees that the "equality of

1. Cited in Hans, N. and Hessen, S.: Educational Policy in Soviet Russia, op.cit. p.171.
2. Ibid p.172.
3. The (First) Constitution of the U.S.S.R. (January, 1924).
4. Lewis, E.G.: Multilingualism in the Soviet Union (The Hague, Mouton, 1972) p. 58.

"equality of rights of citizens of the U.S.S.R., irrespective of their nationality or race, in all spheres of economic, government, cultural, political and public activity, is an undefeasible law."

At the same time, Article 110 of the Constitution provides for judicial proceedings to be conducted:

"in the language of the Union Republic, Autonomous Republic or Autonomous Region, persons not knowing this language being guaranteed the opportunity of fully acquainting themselves with the material of the case through an interpreter and likewise the right to use their own language in court."

However, the language policy of the Communist party has been found to vacillate according to the political exigencies of the moment, linguistic theory and the concomitant interpretation of Marxist doctrine being suitably modified to keep pace with the shift in policy.

In the early years of the communist rule, considerable efforts were devoted to fostering national cultures. It was thought that the ultimate goal - proletarian internationalism - could be attained only after socialism has become 'rooted' and integrated into the older form of national culture.[1] At the Congress of the Party in 1921, it was decided that the task of the Party was "to help the toiling masses of non-Great Russian peoples to catch up with Central Russia which is ahead of them, and to help them: (a) to develop and consolidate their own Soviet State system in forms consistent with the national social conditions of these peoples. . . .; and (b) to develop and consolidate their own courts, administrative bodies, economic organs and government organs functioning in the native language and recruited

1. Koutaissoff, E.: "Literacy and the Place of Russian in the Non-Slav Republics of the U.S.S.R.", reprinted from Soviet Studies, Vol. 3, No.2 (October, 1951) p.3.

from among local people acquainted with the customs and psychology of the populations."[1]

During the period between the two constitutions (1924-1936) the rise of Great Russian chauvinism hindered the development of minority groups and their languages. In the absence of the emergence of "proletarian internationalism", it has been seen that this period witnessed the building of socialism in one country through the instrumentality of Russian nationalism. The importance and necessity of a common means of communication for a multilingual state was recognised, Russian being the only suitable language for the purpose. Though there was no legal reversion of policy, the rapidly increasing importance of Russian as both the State and common language was bound to put the other languages at a disadvantage, directly in the sphere of education and culture, and thereby indirectly undermining their claims to official status.

By ideological preference, the Communist leaders have been reluctant to help maintain national distinctions. Translated into practical policy, the so-called internationalist approach of Lenin, Stalin and Khrushchev has been, on balance, to favour the Russians, the largest people of the Soviet Union, though tactical considerations to the feelings and desires of the non-Russian peoples have been made from time to time.

Several issues arise out of an examination and comparison of the official language policies of India and the U.S.S.R.

In the first place, it is interesting to note that almost contradicting official language policies have been adopted by the two countries to achieve more or less similar goals. While India hoped, by installing Hindi

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1. See, Stalin, J.: Marxism and the National and Colonial Question. (London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1947) p.275.

to the status of the official language of the Union, to maintain and preserve national unity and bring together the diverse language groups; Soviet leaders chose to abstain from legislating on precisely the same question, thereby hoping to win the support and "voluntary" union of the national groups. An observation of actual practice shows that the policy of adopting Hindi in India has had the adverse effect of generating conflict leading to possible disintegration; while in the U.S.S.R. Russian functions as the defacto State language despite official declarations to the contrary. Why this discrepancy? An examination of the initial conditions in which the policies of the two countries operate is expected to give an answer.

At the regional level, both countries have attempted to provide cultural autonomy and the right to government in the regional or national languages to their respective linguistically homogenous States and Republics. This policy, though generally accepted and rapidly implemented in India, has created, in the absence of a link language, the problems of inter-regional communication and political and administrative unity of the country. The question arises whether the constitutional settlement regarding the official language at the State level does not reduce the role of Hindi for inter-state purposes. In allowing the states to adopt their own languages for official purposes it rejects the notion of adopting a strategy of assimilation, in favour of Hindi, in regard to the other Indian languages. In other words, the official language policies at the national and regional levels seem to be pulling in two opposite directions, the constitutional provisions regarding the regional languages going apparently contrary to the avowed aim of the official language policy to maintain national unity. Reference here is obviously to the divisive tendencies of the language phenomenon.

If language is so important in the development of national sentiments, it is an equally powerful preserver of regional loyalties. The prospect of increasing communication by the use of regional languages and hence of

mobilising a greater proportion of the population than hitherto has to be weighed against the possible disintegration of national unity. The promotion of regional languages serves to create regional consciousness of solidarity which can be a preparation ground for potential outgroup hostility. This regional language consciousness, which can have a divisive effect on national political cohesion of major groups, tends to be provoked and strengthened by state policies making the vernacular language the language of administration and education in the State. Such policies may be necessary and in some instances desirable, but they raise problems of how to relate these regional networks, and more importantly, regional loyalties to national loyalties through some national communication network. Since India has decided to drop English as a national language in favour of Hindi, the question arises whether the latter will satisfactorily tie the various linguistic regions together.

Precisely this fear was raised by the Official Language Commission (1956) which, looking ahead to the time when English would be completely displaced as an official language not only at the Union level but also at the State level, was deeply concerned with the impact of such displacement on the unity of the legal and administrative framework of the country as well as on the mobility and interchangeability of personnel and information. In his note of dissent to the report of the Official Language Commission, S.K. Chatterji also warns that the change to Indian languages would hurt the cause of Indian unity, the switchover to regional languages at the level of state administration coupled with the shift to Hindi at the Union level destroying the administrative unity of India.

How far these fears are justified can be adjudged only from the actual working of the policy and its effects, but it nevertheless highlights the dilemma of reconciling the goals of national unity and inter-regional communication, with those of regional linguistic autonomy and elite-mass

communication in India.

In the Soviet instance, the dominant position of Russian, coupled with the strategy of assimilation implicit in the Soviet policy of encouraging this hegemony, appear to mitigate the risk, rapidly growing in India, of regional loyalties superseding national loyalty. This does not imply that regional loyalties have been altogether replaced by national loyalty in the U.S.S.R., but the available evidence shows that they have been largely suppressed and remain latent, only at times to rise to the surface in protest against increasing discrimination. Here too, the particular circumstances prevailing in the two countries are expected to throw light on the differences in the success of two apparently similar policies.

In terms of Stewart's classification, while the official language policy in India explicitly follows the strategy of integration, recognising and preserving the major regional languages, supplemented by the universal use of Hindi and English, as the official and associate official language, respectively; the official language policy of the U.S.S.R. though theorizing on similar lines, in practice appears to be one of assimilation, particularly since the 1930s, with Russian striving to supplant the national languages for both official and general purposes.

In both countries the outcome of their respective official language policies is linked with language policies in another important field, namely education, the languages of instruction and study being influenced by and in their turn influencing the implementation of the official language policy of the state.

CHAPTER IV

LANGUAGE POLICIES IN EDUCATION

Language policies in education, being an aspect of the wider issue of the educational policy of a country, fall largely within the domain of the educational system. Education, however, especially since World War II, has been increasingly regarded as a panacea for socio-political problems. This may be an extreme position, but as Holmes argues, it is possible that education may have some role to play in relation to major problems.[1] The extent to which educational policies serve as a tool for transforming political problems and the outcomes of these policies would depend upon the specific circumstances of each nation. But the fact remains that educational policies may be designed to meet some socio-political or economic problems.

Following political change, one of the problems facing the governments of multilingual India and the Soviet Union was the allocation of new political values of national unity. A single common state language has been found to be one of the policies designed towards this end.

At the same time, attempts may also be made to modify existing values or allocate and legitimize new values through educational policies, with varying success. For instance, the language adopted for official purposes may be made obligatory in the school curriculum, while a definite role may be assigned to the native or regional languages, in line with the prevalent policy regarding the use of these languages in administration at regional level. In fact, the outcome of the official language policy, is linked with the language policy in education, it being desirable that the educated and politically relevant strata of the community at least, are conversant in the language chosen for official purposes. Similarly, the recognition and encouragement of

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1. Holmes, B.: Problems in Education: A Comparative Approach Op.cit. p.104.

regional languages at the state or republican level and the policy of linguistic autonomy and equality finds its educational manifestations in the demands for education through the vernaculars.

The language policies in education for a multilingual country, therefore, cover two main areas:

(a) the choice of a medium of instruction for each stage of the educational system; and

(b) the language or languages to be included as subjects of study in the curriculum at each of the educational system.

An examination of the policy solutions in these two areas would reveal how far the educational system has been regarded, by each country, as a useful channel for allocating the values of national political unity and integrating the diverse language groups through its respective language policies.

The Medium of Instruction in India and the U.S.S.R.

By medium of instruction is meant the language through which the formal education of a child is conducted at each of the three main stages of the educational system - primary, secondary and tertiary. Two related issues are found to bear on the choice of a medium at each stage: (i) the aim or purpose of education, i.e. whether education is an instrument for preserving the existing social order, or whether it is an agency of social change; and (ii) the scope of the educational system, i.e. whether it is restricted to the elites of society, or whether it is a mass system. In consequence, the policy with regard to medium of instruction is found to vary not only from one system of education to another, but also between the different stages of the same system.

In those multilingual societies where the function of education is to serve and to preserve the existing social order, the classical language in which the code of individual and social behaviour, and other branches of

sacred knowledge have been elaborated, serves the purpose of medium of instruction.[1] Thus in medieval Europe the language of education was Latin, and in India, until the nineteenth century, it was Sanskrit for the Hindus and Persian or Arabic for the Muslims. Moreover, in traditional societies the scope of education is usually restricted to members of the ruling class or the priesthood, and hence the question of providing education in the vernaculars does not arise. By contrast, societies in which education is seen as a means of social change and individual self-advancement, the complementary issues of education for the masses and education in the vernaculars have to be reckoned with. With the secularisation of education, the demand for instruction in the vernaculars comes to the fore to make universal popular education possible. Universal literacy, it is argued, would be achieved most efficiently through the medium of the vernaculars. Against the psycho-social arguments in favour of the mother tongue[2] are advanced practical objections on the grounds of national unity and communication, it being feared that education in the mother tongue would serve to compartmentalise the country into mutually incomprehensible language groups. The main contenders, therefore, for the role of the medium of instruction are the mother tongue or the native language on the one hand, and the official or common 'link' language of the country on the other.

The medium of instruction policy at each stage of the education system will be considered chiefly for the period following political change in India and the U.S.S.R., since it is the latter event which has transformed education and the language of education, into issues closely related to the survival of the new societies.

Medium of Instruction at the Primary Stage: The primary school stage in India, because of the lack of uniformity in the classification of the various stages

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1. Dakin, J. et al: Language in Education. (London, Oxford University Press, 1968) p.3.

2. See Unesco: The Use of Vernacular Languages in Education (Monographs on Fundamental Education, Paris, Unesco, 1953) p.11.

of education in the different States, refers to the first four or five years of formal education. In the uniform Soviet school programme, the first four years of schooling form the primary stage of formal education. Theoretically, the mother tongue is accepted as the medium of instruction in the primary schools of the two countries; the principle of universal education in India, and the Leninist nationality policy coupled with the practical necessity of eradicating illiteracy in the Soviet Union, being the chief considerations behind the choice of the mother tongue.

The implementation of the mother tongue policy in the multilingual societies of India and the U.S.S.R. poses obvious and formidable problems since it has to contend not only with the major languages in the two countries, but also with the prevalence of numerous dialects and the survival of linguistic minorities. While the abundance of dialects inhibits the standardisation of the main languages, the existence of linguistic minorities impedes the standardisation of regional education.[1] A rigid implementation of the mother-tongue principle would require providing education in each dialect in use within the country, and providing separate schools for all the linguistic minorities. These minorities are of three distinct types: (i) those residing in one region, whose mother tongue is the major language of another; (ii) those whose languages have a literature of their own, but are not the official language of any region, for example, Urdu and Sindhi in India, and Yiddish and Hebrew in the U.S.S.R.; and (iii) those tribes and minority groups whose languages are without any literature or script.

Hence, in actual practice there are several modifications to the mother tongue policy. Moreover, in the laying down of policy the term 'mother tongue' itself is variously defined. There are in India two distinct definitions of the mother tongue. The narrow definition holds it to be the home language of each child. This is the working definition of the 1951 Census

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1. Dakin, J. et al: Language in Education. Op.cit. p.32.

according to which the mother tongue is "the language spoken from the cradle. . . in the case of infants and deaf mutes . . . the mother tongue of the mother."[1] Far greater weight, for practical purposes, has been attached to the broad definition of the mother tongue which excludes all but the regional and literary languages of India, and thereby denies implicitly equal rights to an odd thousand languages. This definition of the mother tongue has been adhered to by the Central Advisory Board of Education, the University Education Commission, and the Official Language Commission. Judging by the provisions of the 1936 Constitution, in the U.S.S.R. the narrow definition of the mother-tongue seems to be recognised, Article 121 of the 1936 Constitution guaranteeing education through the native tongue for all Soviet citizens.

Though the Constitution of India places great emphasis on the official language provisions, initially it did not stipulate the language to be used as the medium of education in India. While recognising the fundamental right of every linguistic community to set up its own schools and to apply for government aid[2], the Constitution, by not guaranteeing that such aid would always be forthcoming, did not confer on minorities the right to receive education in their mother tongue. The omission suggests the Government's willingness to appear to tolerate the narrow definition of the mother tongue, together with its inability to accept the economic consequences.

At the time at which the Constitution was being drafted the Union Minister of Education, Maulana Azad, addressing the Conference of Provincial Ministers for Education in 1949 spoke in favour of giving equal treatment to all Indian languages "even when language transcends provincial barriers."[3] This was a reference primarily to the major regional languages, whose speakers have often emigrated to different regions, as is confirmed by a perusal of

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1. Census of India, (New Delhi, Government of India, 1951) p.1.
2. The Constitution of India (1950) Article 30.
3. Cited in Wadia, A.R.: The Future of English in India (Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1954) p.47.

the address made two years earlier wherein he has suggested, "we should decide that the medium of instruction all throughout will be the regional languages."[1] Because of the obvious practical difficulties of successfully implementing the mother tongue principle, the Government of India Ministry of Education Resolution of August 3, 1948 enforced the mother tongue principle at the primary stage only.[2]

Endorsing the 1948 Government resolution regarding the medium of instruction at the primary stage, the Central Advisory Board of Education meeting in 1949 further specified that "where the mother tongue was different from the regional or state language, arrangement must be made for instruction in the mother tongue by appointing at least one teacher to teach all the classes, provided there are at least forty such pupils in a school." If the number of pupils justified it, a separate school might also be established in which pupils could study in their own language.[3] These principles were re-affirmed by the Conference of Education Ministers meeting in August of the same year,[4] by the All-India Languages Development Conference in 1953[5] and by the Congress Working Committee Directive of April 4, 1954, the last named making specific mention of tribal languages and authorising their use as media of instruction in tribal areas.[6]

Whatever the merits of the CABE resolution, it nevertheless remained recommendatory and not obligatory that body functioning merely in an advisory

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1. Azad, M.: "Convocation Address at Patna University" in Ananda M.R., King Emperor's English (Bombay, Hind Kitabs Ltd., 1948) p.63.
2. Government of India, Ministry of Education: Resolution A3 (New Delhi, Government of India, Ministry of Education, 3 August, 1948) p.100.
3. "Report of the CABE, 15th Meeting, January, 1949" in Silver Jubilee Souvenir (New Delhi, Government of India, 1960) p.214.
4. See the "Resolution Adopted at the Provincial Education Ministers' Conference in August, 1949 and Approved by the CABE and the Government of India", in Report of the Commissioner for Linguistic Minorities: Fifth Report. (New Delhi, Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, 1963) p.125.
5. Reported in Harijan (Ahmedabad, 27 June, 1953).
6. Ibid (17 April, 1954).

capacity with educational policy-making vested in the hands of the state governments who were far from following a uniform policy in implementing it. It was not until 1960 that the Central government issued a memorandum establishing an All-India code, which as accepted by the Conference of Chief Ministers in 1961 reaffirmed; "the right of linguistic minorities to have education in their mother tongue" at the primary stage. The states were now intended to interpret the term "mother tongue" in the narrow sense, that is, as the home language of the child where it differed from the language of the region he was living in. The centre, however, can only advise and recommend, it cannot legislate on this issue for the whole country. The Constitution, on the other hand suffers from no such limitations, and in contrast to its initial reluctance, it now sanctions the use of the mother tongue for instruction in the primary stage. Article 350-A states: "It shall be the endeavour of every State and of every local authority with the State to provide adequate facilities for instruction in the mother tongue at the primary stage of education to children belonging to linguistic minority groups and the President may issue such directions to any State as he considers necessary or proper for securing the provision of such facilities."[1]

Thus, at the primary level in India today, the accepted policy is to use the mother tongue as the medium of instruction as far as possible.

The avowed policy of the Soviet regime during the early years was also one of favouring the mother tongue as the most suitable medium of instruction throughout the school stage. As early as the second congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party in 1903, a programme, personally drafted by Lenin, recognised the right of the population to receive an education in its own language, a right secured by the setting up of the necessary schools by the 'State'.

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1. Cited in Nayar, B.R.: National Communication and Language Policy in India. New York, F.A. Praeger, 1969) p.144 ff.

The liberal policy of the 1920s towards the national languages in the offical sphere was accompanied in the educational system by the large-scale establishment of non-Russian schools and the use of indigenous languages for instruction. This was at a time when support from the non-Russian peoples was essential to the consolidation of Soviet rule. At the congress of the Party in 1921 it was decided that the task of the Party was "to help the toiling masses of non-Great Russian peoples . . . to develop a press, schools, theatres, clubs and cultural and educational institutions generally functioning in the native language; and to organise and develop an extensive system of courses and schools both for general education, and vocational and technical training in the native languages . . . in order to accelerate the training of native cadres of skilled working men and Soviet and Party workers, in all spheres of administration and particularly in the sphere of education."[1]

Three distinct aims are implicit in the Soviet policy of encouraging instruction through the native languages, namely, the political necessity of winning the support of the diverse nationalities; the practical problem of eradicating illiteracy; and the creation of cadres of 'Soviet and Party Workers' in the native tongue, possibly for the effective dissemination of the party propaganda in the republics. This policy, therefore, was duly given the force of law when the Bolsheviks came to power and was written into the 1936 Constitution of the U.S.S.R. and the individual republics. Article 121 of the Soviet constitution recognises the right of the citizens of the U.S.S.R. to education, and guarantees this right, among other things, by providing "education in schools in a native language."

Theoretically, therefore, the native language is the accepted medium of instruction in all Soviet schools, but in actual practice in the schools of the smaller nationalities the medium of instruction in all but the very lowest form is found to be in Russian.[2] As in India, the presence of several minor

1. See, Stalin, J.S. Marxism and the National and Colonial Question, (London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1947), p.275.

2. Koutaissoff, E. and Dalton, R.H.F.: "The Problem of Expanding Education in Multilingual States, with Special Reference to the Soviet Union" in The World Year Book of Education (London, Evans Brothers, 1965) p.307.

languages and dialects, some of which are not sufficiently developed to serve as media of instruction, restricts the application of the mother tongue principle to the eighth, fourth or second forms, depending upon the level of development of the language and the availability of teachers and textbooks. Thus the native language policy is universally implemented, if at all, at the primary level only. This, of course excludes the Russian schools in the various republics where education, throughout is conducted through Russian.

The policy of the 1930s and after, which saw the rise of Russian nationalism coupled with the increasing domination of Russian as the State language, had its repercussions in the field of education also, policy in that sphere serving as an important tool for encouraging the spread of Russian throughout the Soviet state. However, the first step towards replacing the native languages by Russian as the medium of instruction was taken by an attempt to reorganise Soviet education through a thesis published in Pravda on November 16, 1958.

Clause 19 of the Theses of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. "Regarding the Strengthening of the Relationship of School and Life and for the Further Development of the System of Public Education in the U.S.S.R.", dealing with the language policy in education, sought to consider the question "of delegating to parents the right of deciding to which school, with what language of instruction they wish to send their children."[1] However, presumably to help parents take this 'democratic' decision, the theses takes care to outline at the outset the great advantages of the Russian language "which is a great means of international communication, of strengthening of friendship among the people of the U.S.S.R. and of introducing them to the treasures of Russian and world cultures."[2] This proposal may be construed as extending to parents a

1. "The CPSU on Culture, Education and Science", Collected Documents, (Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1963) p.76.

2. Ibid.

thinly-veiled invitation to transfer their children to Russian language schools, and thereby 'voluntarily' forgo their constitutional right of education through the native language.'

Surprisingly, the 1958 school law did not meet with "enthusiastic" and "unanimous" approval as usual, but triggered off a series of criticisms and controversies from those national republics which favoured a status quo. The various repercussions of the thesis will be dealt with in detail in the following section on the medium of instruction at the secondary level, since it was at the secondary stage that the greatest controversy arose. Suffice it to say here that the new law dealt a significant blow to the several theoretical declarations in favour of the native languages, as well as to the constitutional guarantee of education through a native language.

While the medium of instruction policy of the Indian government, starting on a hesitant note, ended up by supporting the mother tongue principle at the primary level in the interests of the spread of universal education; Soviet policy starting on the very optimistic note of granting equality to all nationalities and groups, gradually fell into line with the overall policy of centralisation and assimilation of language groups, through the very subtle means of Russification, ostensibly by parents' choice.

Medium of Instruction at the Secondary Stage: The secondary level of education in India covers a period of seven years after the primary stage, and is generally divided into two stages - three years of Middle or Junior Secondary, followed by four years at the Higher Secondary stage. The secondary stage in the U.S.S.R. can also be divided into two phases. After the school reform of 1958, secondary education extended for a period of seven years after the four years of primary schooling, the first four years of the secondary period, together with the four years of primary school forming the eight-year compulsory school. When three more years were added to this, it formed the complete secondary school covering

seven years in all. Since 1965, however, the length of secondary schooling has been shortened to ten years, the entire ten-year period being made compulsory from 1970.

Whatever the merits of theoretical arguments in favour of the mother tongue as the most suitable medium of instruction, the practical application of this policy faces severe impediments in a multilingual country, chiefly because of the prevalence of dialects and the survival of linguistic minorities. Hence, at the secondary level of education in India, where the mother tongue policy can no longer be effectively defended on the grounds of the emotional and psychological needs of the individual, the four practical objectives of economy, utility, ease of communication and political cohesion are expected to determine the medium of instruction.[1] On the basis of these four criteria, the most practical medium of instruction at the secondary level for India would be the standard form of each language, or in other words, the various regional languages of the country.

On financial grounds, a mother tongue policy would be too expensive and "is feasible only if the linguistic group is of an appreciable size and forms a compact region. . . In every well-defined linguistic region of India, small numbers of persons speaking other languages are to be found. If separate arrangements have to be made in each school, in each college, and in each university of that region for teaching of the children of all these different linguistic groups, the cost would be colossal."[2] Moreover, since few of the minor languages possess a script, their use in education would require the evolution of a literary standard and the preparation of translation of the necessary textbooks. This would not only prove to be too expensive, but would offend the criteria of utility as well, for literacy in a language with

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1. Dakin, J. et al: Language in Education (London, Oxford University Press, 1968) p.31.

2. Prasad, R.: "Speech at the Convocation of Osmanian University, 30th August 1961 in The Unity of India (New Delhi, Government of India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1961) pp.13-15.

no extensive literature of its own would be of little use. This was the view of the University Education Commission and the Official Language Commission, both holding that "the languages of the large, advanced or organized groups with a current literature, practice and tradition"[1] were the only "fit media of instruction."[2] Moreover, ease of communication would not be facilitated if children in a region were brought upto speak different dialects and languages and not possess a common language. Finally, the fourth criterion, political cohesion, requires that linguistic minorities be absorbed into a wider community where they can play a constructive rather than an obstructive part. For the linguistic minorities in a region to identify with the majority group it is desirable that they know the language of that group.

The CABE meeting of 1949 to consider the school medium expected, for reasons just mentioned, that at the secondary stage all pupils would study in the regional language.[3] This position was reiterated by the Conference of State Chief Ministers in 1961 which held that at the secondary stage "the mother tongue formula could not be fully applied" since "this stage gives a more advanced education to enable students to follow a vocation after the school-leaving age and also prepares them for higher education in universities."[4] Hence, at this stage "the languages used should be modern Indian languages mentioned in the Eighth Schedule of the Constitution (i.e. the regional languages and Urdu) as well as English."[4] The Secondary Education Commission, appointed in 1953, also recommended that the medium of instruction throughout the secondary stage should be the mother tongue or the regional language.

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1. Report of the Official Language Commission (New Delhi, Government of India, 1956) p.27.
2. Report of the University Education Commission (New Delhi, Government of India, 1949) pp. 305-306.
3. CABE 15th Meeting, January 1959. Op. cit. p.214.
4. Reported in The Sunday Statesman (Calcutta, 13 August, 1961).

Thus, at both the primary and secondary levels of education in India the chosen medium of instruction is an indigenous language, English not entering into the discussion of the medium at the school level, though there are some English medium schools also, especially in the metropolitan areas. The official language policy at the state level of adopting the regional language for official purposes is echoed in the education system by the policy of adopting the regional language as the medium of secondary education. The regional languages, it is hoped, would serve on a regional scale the same functions which Hindi is expected to perform on a national scale, namely, communication; political cohesion and integration of diverse groups; and the establishment of an indigenous sense of identity. Thus the regional language policy is accepted both for official and educational purposes by the States without much opposition. Though in the Indian federal structure education is a state subject, thereby making universal policies only recommendatory, as far as the medium of instruction at the school level is concerned, there has been very little controversy, all states following more or less uniform policies in favour of the mother tongue at the primary level and regional language at the secondary level.

In theory, the medium of instruction policy at the secondary stage of education in the U.S.S.R. remains the same as at the primary level, all language groups being granted the constitutional right of receiving school education in their native language. While Russian was to be the medium of instruction in the Russian-speaking republic, in the republics with highly developed native languages like the Ukraine, ByeloRussia, Georgia, Latvia, Estonia and Uzbekistan, instruction through the local languages is available throughout the secondary level; and in other republics upto the eighth or fourth forms depending on the stage of development of the respective languages. For instance, prior to 1953, in the Tatar, Bashkir, Armenian, Azerbaidzhan, Georgian and Kazah schools of the RSFSR instruction was provided in the native tongue upto grade ten, while for the people speaking Buryat-Mongol, Komi, Mari, Udmurt, Chuvash and Yakut instruction in their language was available upto the seventh grade, and for

others like Abazin, Avar, Balkar, Ossetin, Turkman, Khakars and Chechen speakers, upto the fourth grade.[1]

However, evidence from the various republics shows that in actual practice Russian schools play an increasing part in the various republics where, besides the children of Russian immigrants, large numbers of indigenous children are also educated. This can be seen from the difference in the percentage of Russians in the total population of a republic, and the percentage of children in Russian schools, as given in the following table:

TABLE 1

Comparative Percentages of Pupils in the Elementary & Secondary Schools of Union Republics Instructed in the Russian Language, and of Russians in the Total Population of these Republics

	(1) Percentage instructed in Russian (1956)	(2) Percentage instructed in other languages	(3) Percentage of Russians in Republic (1959)	Difference Between (1) and (3)
U.S.S.R.	65	35	54.7	10.3
Russian SFSR	94	6	83.3	10.7
Ukrainian SSR	26	74	16.9	9.1
Belorussian SSR	22	78	8.2	13.8
Uzbek SSR	20	80	13.5	6.5
Kazakh SSR	66	34	42.7	23.3
Georgian SSR	20	80	10.1	9.9
Azerbaidzhan SSR	23	77	13.6	9.4
Lithuanian SSR	11	89	8.5	2.5
Moldavian SSR	33	67	10.2	22.8
Latvian SSR	33	67	26.6	6.4
Kirgiz SSR	49	51	30.2	18.8
Tadzhik SSR	16	84	13.3	2277
Armenian SSR	9	91	3.2	5.8
Turkmen SSR	21	79	17.3	3.7
Estonian SSR	22	78	20.1	1.9

SOURCES: Kulturnoye stroitelstvo SSSR, statisticheskiy sbornik (The Cultural Structure of the U.S.S.R., a Statistical Compilation) (Moscow, Central Statistical Administration of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., 1956) pp. 186-187; and the Soviet Census of 1959, Summary volume, pp. 184, 202-206. Also, Kolasky, J. Education in the Soviet Ukraine, op. cit. p.41.

From the above table it can be seen that for every Republic the

1. Natsionalnive shkoly RSFSR (The National Schools of the RSFSR) (Moscow, 1958) p.23.

percent of pupils instructed in Russian was higher than the percent of Russian population in that Republic. This was the situation prevailing prior to 1958 when the new school law was introduced.

The 1958 school reform, and in particular its Clause 19, have been viewed, by critics of the Soviet Union, as accelerating the trend of increasing education through the Russian medium for non-Russian students at the secondary level.[1] From a perusal of Clause 19 it appears as though the regime hopes to restrict the use of the non-Russian languages in the schools of the Republics and thereby, perhaps, aid the process of assimilation of all Soviet peoples into one common nationality, namely the Russian nationality.

It has been mentioned that Clause 19 of the 1958 Theses of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers sought to consider the question "of delegating to parents the right of deciding to which school, with what language of instruction they wish to send their children". This, coupled with the glowing praise of Russian in the clause, as well as the dominant position enjoyed by Russian in the higher educational institutions, in government and in industry and commerce augured well for the possibility of parents preferring Russian to their native language as a medium of instruction. Moreover, the party and government have been proclaiming the great role and importance of the Russian language and the declining role of others, denouncing those who insisted on perpetuating their national languages and customs as bourgeois nationalists.

In fact, the basis for an increasing use of Russian in the non-Russian schools had been laid by a number of "theoretical" propaganda articles, the most important of which appeared in the organ of the Central Committee of the CPSU under the authorship of a Tadzhik scholar, director of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. and former

1. Kolasky, J.: Education in Soviet Ukraine. (Ontario, Peter Martin Associates Ltd., 1968) pp.26-34.

first Secretary of the Communist Party of the Tadzhik SSR. He criticised "nationalist survivals of the past," and emphasised the growing importance of the Russian language which has become "the second native language" for non-Russians and asserted that in a communist society""the disappearance of national differences and merging of nations will become inevitable" with a resulting "development of a single language."[1] On these theoretical foundations, it appears Khrushchev and the party leadership began to unfold a plan for reducing the national cultures and languages of the non-Russian peoples of the U.S.S.R. to the common Russian denominator.

Khrushchov's denunciations of Stalin had created a relatively more liberal and less rigid atmosphere in the U.S.S.R., with the result that when the new law was proposed for discussion it surprisingly met with severe criticism from the nationalrepublics. The non-Russians rejected the "democratic" procedure in the choice of the language of instruction in schools and favoured the existing policy of education through the native tongue.[2] These admonitions by local leaders were for the most part disregarded,[3] but nevertheless, at the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet session in December 1958, perhaps to forestall a possible defeat of the Government's proposal, thesis 19 was omitted from the U.S.S.R. legislative bill altogether[4], the matter being left to the individual republics to deal with in their parallel republican laws.

Between December 1958 and the spring of 1959, when the Republican Supreme Soviets passed the legislation, the central authorities apparently

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1. Gafurov, B.G.: "Successes of the Nationality Policy of the CPSU and Some Problems of Internationalist Education" (English Translation), Kommunist, No.11, (Moscow, 1958) pp.18, 23, 17, 16.
2. Kolasky, J.: Education in Soviet Ukraine. Op.cit. p.28.
3. See, Sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., 5th Convocation, 2nd Session, December 22-25, 1958, Stenograficheskii Otchet (Moscow, 1959) pp. 291-440.
4. Goncharov, N.K. and Koralov, F.F.: The New System of Education in the U.S.S.R. (in Russian), (1960) pp.55-70. Cited in Kolasky, J.: Education in Soviet Ukraine op. cit. p.33.

exerted considerable pressure behind the scenes,[1] as can be seen from the laws of the Republics which were a virtual carbon copy of the original thesis 19, in granting parents the right to choose the medium of instruction, the only exception being the Latvian law on school reform which omitted any mention of linguistic reforms altogether.[2] However, before the end of 1959 the first party secretary of Latvia was purged and the educational law of Latvia was brought in line with the rest. The 1959 republic education decrees, therefore, envisage that more and more parents of local nationality will waive their right under Article 121 of the 1936 Constitution to have their children taught through their native tongue.

Evidence from the autonomous republics comprising the RSFSR shows that the implementation of the principle of choice is not left to take its own course. With the passing of the new law on education by the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR on April 16, 1959, granting parents the right to choose the medium of instruction for their children, the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences and the Ministry of Education of the RSFSR began a campaign in the fifteen autonomous republics of the RSFSR to introduce Russian as a medium of instruction in the non-Russian schools. Schools were selected where experimental teaching was carried on in native classes with Russian as the language of instruction, and periodically conferences were organized on how to teach the Russian language. The following report emphasizes the quick results brought about by these efforts:"At the present time in a number of schools of the Russian Federation, in accordance with the wishes of the parents, pupils are changing to instruction in the Russian language. In addition the parents express the desire that the change be made in Grade I."[3]

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1. Bilinsky, Y.:"Education of the Non-Russian Peoples in the Soviet Union" in Comparative Education Review, Vol.8, No.1. (Madison, Wis., University of Wisconsin, June 1964) p.84.

2. See the Latvian law in Sovetskova Latviya,(20 March, 1959) p.1. cited in Ibid p.84.

3. Baraganov, N.: "Regarding Instruction in the Russian Language of Beginning Classes" in Russky Yazyk V Natsionalnoy Shkole (The Russian Language in the National School) No.2 (Moscow, 1963) p.29. Cited in Kolasky,J.: Education in Soviet Ukraine. Op.cit. p.34.

And this is the actual practice in the non-Russian republics of the RSFSR whose Constitution in 1925 declared, according to Article 13, the right of national minorities "to receive education in their mother tongue."

Theoretically, therefore, the right to education in the native languages at school level is still recognised in the U.S.S.R., where in actual practice the policy has taken a different turn. While in India the medium of instruction policy shifted from the mother tongue to the regional language in keeping with the regional language policy in official spheres; in the U.S.S.R. the explicit policy continued to be one in favour of the mother tongue, but the right to choose the medium ofinstruction given to parents in 1959 implied a shift in practice towards a greater use of Russian. This was in keeping with the general Soviet strategy since the 1930s of assimilation of the various nationalities.

Medium of Instruction at the Tertiary Stage: The tertiary level of education refers to all post-secondary education, including degree colleges, universities, professional colleges and technical institutes in India; and the Academy of Sciences with its distinctive special institutions, the universities, and separate technical and specialized institutes for practical training in the U.S.S.R.

The arguments in favour of the mother tongue lose much of their weight at the tertiary level which provides specialized training in a particular branch of knowledge and prepares students for a particular profession. It would be expected that the natural choice of medium of instruction at this level would be a language which provides easy access to the store of knowledge, and in view of the universal nature of education at this level, serves as a medium for the interchange of thought and personnal across linguistic barriers.

It is surprising, therefore, that from the first days of independence there were in India three main schools of thought on the university medium of

instruction: supporters of English, Hindi and the regional languages. During the entire period of British rule in India English had been the sole medium of university education, and proponents of English "prompted by the desire to increase the number scientists and technicians", as well as by practical considerations of the availability of books, reference materials and teachers, advocated a continuation of the status quo. The supporters of Hindi and the regional languages on the other hand, fairly vocal before independence, now raised their voices, being "motivated by interest in the country's cultural regeneration."[1] The presence of these three distinct schools of thought have led to numerous, and at times conflicting policy solutions regarding the medium of instruction at the university level in India. [illegible] English to regional languages in the universities over the next five years.[2]

The university medium of instruction received attention from the very first days of independence, though it was realized that no single, simple solution could fit the situation. In the early years the emphasis of Gandhi and Tagore was on the regional languages as university media for purposes of achieving a cultural renaissance and social integration with each linguistic region. Similarly, both Nehru and Azad were convinced that English would have to be replaced by Indian languages, the former being strongly in favour of a common medium.[2] But the Tarachand Committee appointed in 1948 to take a final decision on the university medium was against the idea of a common medium, and stated that "it was felt, in view of the diversities of the country, that although a common language for the purposes of Federal Government was needed, the Provinces should have their own languages for administrative and educational purposes."[3] [illegible] which [illegible][3]

The rights of the regional languages received further sanction from

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1. Naik, R.P.: Speech at the Annual Conference of the All-India Hindi Parishad, 1961. Quoted in the Editorial of Shiksha (January 1961).
2. Nehru, J.: Inaugural Address at the 14th Meeting of the CABE, January, 1948, in Silver Jubilee Souvenir (New Delhi, Government of India, 1960) pp.188-189.
3. Report of the Committee on the Medium of Instruction at the University Stage. (New Delhi, Government of India, Ministry of Education, 1961) p.3.

the University Education Commission appointed in 1948. In its report submitted in 1949 it argued that for the youth pursuing higher education "both from the point of view of education and of general welfare of a democratic community it is essential that their study should be through the instrumentality of their regional language." It deemed it desirable, however, that "universities should have the option to use the Federal Language as the medium of instruction either for some subjects or for all subjects."[1] Following the Conference of Vice-Chancellors of Indian Universities in May 1948 which advocated the replacement of English by Indian languages as the media of instruction over a period of five years, the Government of India, in August 1948, requested state governments and universities to change the medium of instruction from English to regional languages in the universities over the next five years.[2]

The failure of the universities to implement this policy brought to light, apart from the practical difficulties, the undesirability and danger of a rapid changeover. The resulting confusion in the universities reinforced the view held by some, that a unifying language was essential. Moreover, the linguistic tensions in the mid-fifties, generated by the reorganisation of States, appeared to threaten a linguistic balkanisation of India, and thereby weakened the position of the regional languages which were now perceived as threats to national unity. In a radio broadcast on 8 February, 1954, R.K.M. Munshi pointed out that with the removal of English from several spheres of life, Hindi has not stepped in with equal speed or success, the resulting vacuum therefore being filled by the regional languages. Hence, with the removal of English, instead of Hindi gaining, it was regional consciousness which was growing and bringing about a linguistic balkanisation of India.[3]

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1. Report of the University Education Commission (New Delhi, Government of India, 1949) p.323.
2. Proceedings of the Fifteenth Meeting of the CABE (New Delhi, Government of India Ministry of Education, 1949) pp. 52-53.
3. Quoted in The Pioneer (5 September, 1956).

In the interests of national unity, a common medium of higher education was advocated, which was expected to help create a truly Indian, as opposed to an exclusively regional, attitude of mind. Moreover, practical considerations of the desirability of inter-university migration of students and teachers, and the danger of making the educated elite only regionally functional, demanded a common medium at the university level. The two obvious contenders for the position of a common medium have been Hindi and English: Hindi on the grounds of its future position as the official language of the Union, besides being Indian in origin and the language spoken and understood by a dominant language group; whereas English, being an international language ensures not only interregional, but also international communication. Added to this, English is the language of science and research, which fact won for it the support of Nehru. Faced with a situation of internal disruption and the desirability of rapid industrialization, Nehru realised that the "man power for industrial, scientific and agricultural purposes cannot be trained in any Indian language in the forseeable future.", Such training had "to be given in English."[1] This position was reiterated by Azad, who "pleaded for the retention of English for some time to come as the medium of university education generally."[2] Since most of the books and papers essential for the intensive study of a subject were available in English, they held that without English, and relying solely on translations, it would be difficult to maintain standards, leave alone raise them. Thus, the exigencies of the moment in the fifties called for an immediate policy, thereby requiring the government to give priority to the criteria of practicability in the choice of a medium.

But English has its limitations in the sense that it creates a gulf between the educated few and the uneducated mass, a gulf which can be bridged

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1. Nehru, J.: Speech delivered at the State Education Ministers' Conference in 1956. Quoted in Shiksha (April 1957) p.62. (New Delhi, Government of India).
2. Ibid.

only through the language of the common man. Besides, English places some strain on the student, especially when he has had his entire school education in the vernaculars.[1] Hence, when the pressures of linguistic tensions relaxed, in the attempts to formulate a long term policy, advocates of Hindi and the regional languages renewed their demands. Though the question of the university medium was outside its terms of reference, the Official Language Commission, in 1956, noting the trend toward the displacement of English as the language of instruction suggested that the universities have the freedom to opt for the regional languages or Hindi, as the language of instruction in general or for particular fields or stages of education.[2] However, the Kunzru Committee, appointed by the University Grants Commission in 1955 to look specifically into the question of the language of instruction at the university stage, in its report submitted in 1957 recommended that the change to a regional language as the medium of instruction "should not be hastened", and, in any case, such change should come only after the language had been sufficiently developed for the purpose. In general, the University Grants Commission has not favoured a hasty change to the regional languages, and its approach to the question has been characterized by caution and an emphasis on adequate preparation for any change in the language of education as well as on the necessity for the continued study, possibly of an improved standard, of the English language.

Inspite of the practical advantages of a common medium, the supporters of the regional languages rejected both Hindi and English as unsuitable, claiming that they placed an unnecessary strain on the students. Hence the end of the fifties and early sixties saw a revival of the regional language policy, which left the question of national unity through a common

1. The University Grants Commission, Annual Report 1959-60 (New Delhi, 1960) pp. 10-11.
2. Report of the Official Language Commission (New Delhi, Government of India, 1956) p.93.

medium unsolved, the educational and political needs of the nation being subordinated to the more restricted interests of the individual and his region.

Supposedly to reconcile the claims of the nation and the various regions, there evolved in the 1960s a new principle - the link language formula, first put forward by the Conference of Chief Ministers in 1961. While approving of the regional language policy, the Conference, in the interests of teacher-student mobility and inter-university participation, underlined the importance of a common link language for universities, adding that "such a common link can only be English or Hindi. Ultimately it will have to be Hindi, and it is necessary, therefore, that every attempt should be made to make Hindi suitable for this purpose." However, "till such time as it happens, English may be continued."[1] The idea of a link language was, in general, endorsed by the National Integration Conference in September-October 1961; the CABE in 1962; the National Integration Council in June 1962; the Committee of Emotional Integration in 1962; and the Fourth Annual Conference of Vice-Chancellors of Indian Universities in 1962, all of whom, while conceding that regional languages should become the media of university education, favoured the emergence of Hindi as the eventual, and English as the transitional link between universities. Coming at a time when the official language policy of the Union was also undergoing modifications to accommodate both Hindi and English for official purposes, the link language policy in higher education, with English as the transitional and Hindi the ultimate link language between universities, made sense.

Further, the link language formula kept open the question of timing, English continuing indefinitely as the link, in the same way as it was expected to continue indefinitely as the associate official language after 1965. Because of the very nature of the link language formula it satisfied both the proponents

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1. Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth Meeting of the CABE (1962). (New Delhi, Government of India, Ministry of Education, 1962) pp.63-65.

and opponents of a rapid change to the regional languages; the former, because it upheld the regional language policy and the latter, because it advocated the use of English or Hindi as the common language. The various universities while following diverse policies could satisfy themselves that they were fulfilling the true spirit of the formula.

If an element of unanimity had been attained regarding the crucial question of the language of instruction in Indian higher education, fresh controversy was raised in 1966 with the issue of the Education Commission's report in that year. After a thorough review of the question of the language of instruction at the university level, the Commission supported moving energetically in the matter of switching to the regional languages,[1] with the exception of the All-India institutions, "which admit, in considerable numbers, students from different parts of the country." Here, English should continue undisturbed as the medium of instruction, for the time being, with eventual changeover to Hindi, when Hindi is effectively developed, if at the same time the chance of students from non-Hindi areas are not adversely affected.[2]

After the general elections of 1967, and the subsequent weakening of the Hindi faction in parliament and the congress party, the policy of a changeover to the regional languages as the media of university education seemed to be pursued with a new vigour and urgency. The new Union Education Minister, Triguna Sen, criticised for hustling the universities into changing to the regional languages justified his policy by claiming to bring some "planning and orderly progress in a movement that is proceeding in a desultory and chaotic fashion."[3]

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1. Report of the Education Commission, 1964-66. (New Delhi, Government of India, 1966) p.291.
2. Ibid. p.14.
3. Sen, T.: Speech in U.G.C., Conference of Vice-Chancellors Convened by the Ministry of Education and University Grants Commission, (New Delhi, Govt. of India, 1967) p.10.

Meanwhile, the Committee of M.Ps., in its consideration of the report of the Education Commission urged that the changeover to regional languages take place in five years - rather than ten as the Education Commission recommended - at all stages of education, undergraduate as well as postgraduate.[1] This principle was subsequently approved by the State Education Ministers' Conference,[2] and by the Union government,[3] the latter holding that the shift to regional languages should be made in five years at the undergraduate level and in ten years at the postgraduate level. This new policy of setting a time limit for the changeover resulted, in August 1967, in the resignation from the cabinet of External Affairs Minister, M.C. Chagla who saw in the educational policy of the government a reversal of the policies framed earlier under his tenure as Education Minister, and warned that it "is likely to threaten if not undermine the unity of the country"; for with the replacement of English by regional languages "the linguistic bond which contributes so much to our unity will have snapped."[4]

Inspite of these warnings, the trend in the direction of a changeover had gone too far to be reversed, as can be seen from the proposals of the Conference of Vice-Chancellors, called in September 1967, in favour of the change. At any rate, the Conference supported the continuation of English, as the medium of instruction in all-India institutions and in large urban centres with multilingual populations.[5]

On the basis of its consultations with the various bodies of

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1. Report of the Committee of Members of Parliament on Education. (New Delhi, Government of India, Ministry of Education, 1967) p.2.
2. The Hindu Weekly Review, (Madras, 8 May, 1967).
3. The Statesman Weekly (Calcutta, 22 July, 1967).
4. The Hindu Weekly Review, (Madras, 11 September, 1967). Also see Chagla, M.C.: Chagla on Language and Unity (Bombay, 1967).
5. University Grants Commission: Conference of Vice-Chancellors (New Delhi, Govt. of India, 1967) pp.34-35.

political representatives and educationists, the government proposed to issue a national resolution on education,[1] embodying by and large the recommendations of the Education Commission in the switchover from English to the regional languages in university education. In brief, the accepted policy of the Union Government with regard to the medium of instruction at the university level today seems to be that the regional languages should, in accordance with the recommendations of various commissions and committees, eventually replace English. At the same time, it is felt that this should be done in a programmed and gradual manner rather than in an ad hoc and hasty way, so that the change does not impair national unity or damage educational standards. In fact, in official declarations the controversy is not so much regarding the shift to the regional language as regarding the speed with which this ought to be brought about.

Recognising that in a multilingual country the imposition of a single language would raise uncontrollable opposition, the Government of India has paid its respects to English, Hindi and to the regional languages as the media of university education without defining the precise role of any of them. The choice is left to the individual universities which in India, are essentially autonomous institutions. This raises the possibilities of cleavage between university policies determined largely by local political pressures and central policies decided on the basis of national considerations. In the final analysis, therefore, it is the universities which decide which languages, in which proportions and at which stage can serve their purposes best. The choice of their policy would depend on whether greater importance is attached to national unity and uniformity of standards, or to the restricted interests of the individual and his region. At the school level the States have, generally, overlooked the interests of linguistic minorities in the greater interests of

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1. National Policy on Education. (New Delhi, Government of India, Ministry of Education, 1968).

regional conformity. Whether the same desire for uniformity, but on a national scale prevails at the university level, and if it does, whether English or Hindi should be the appropriate medium for achieving unity are issues which are still largely unresolved.

The important role that a common medium of higher education is expected to play in the realms of inter-regional communication, uniformity of educational standards and national unity can be appreciated from an examination of Soviet policy in this field. Whereas the right to education through the native language is, in theory, guaranteed at the school level, no such assurance is given with regard to education at the tertiary level. Admittedly, not all the languages of the U.S.S.R. are developed enough to serve as media of instruction beyond the school stage, but apart from this consideration, there appears to be a realization that the university medium of instruction is a potent factor of assimilation and as such a common medium policy is imposed by subtle measures. However, in the case of the U.S.S.R., unlike the Indian situation, the choice of the common medium provides no ground for controversy, Russian being the uncontended choice for this purpose, as it is for official and communicational purposes.

However, as is the case with the official language question in the U.S.S.R., there are, in the field of the language of instruction in higher educational institutions also, no explicit policy declarations assigning this role to Russian or the national languages. Moreover, statistics in this field are not easily available, with the result that the university medium in actual practice is even more difficult to determine than the language of instruction in secondary schools. By and large, it appears to be Russian, especially in engineering schools and natural science departments of universities; but college level education in the native language is available to non-Russian students at teachers colleges and in the language departments.[1]

1. DeWitt, N.: Education and Professional Employment in the U.S.S.R. (Washington, D.C., National Service Foundation, 1961) p.246b.

Occasionally complaints are voiced against the increasing use of Russian, which is one of the most potent forms of discrimination and Russification.

At the official level the practice of discriminating against the national languages in higher education was condemned after Stalin's death in 1953. Beria, one of the contenders for party leadership wrote a memorandum to the Central Committee condemning Russification and asking that the party return to Lenin's national policy of allowing non-Russians freedom to develop their languages and cultures.[1] This had repercussions in the various Republics. For example, a long editorial appeared in an official Kiev party organ which declared that: "It is necessary to end decisively the underprivileged position of the Ukrainian language in the higher educational institutions and to organize instruction in the native language all over the country."[2] Beria was liquidated before any changes could be made in the language of instruction, and Russian still dominates as the language of instruction in higher educational institutions.

Very little hard evidence is available in this field since this policy is not openly admitted, and the majority of non-Russians seem to take it for granted that certain college subjects will be taught in Russian. Occasionally, however, statements are made in unguarded moments that confirm the fact that the language of instruction in higher educational institutions of non-Russian republics is Russian. To support his argument that Russian is increasingly used as a medium of higher education, Kolasky quotes from a pamphlet, meant for internal distribution, which states: "Many students of various nationalities study in large scientific and educational centres of the country - Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Kharkiv, Lviv, Novosibirsk, Minsk, Tbilisi and others. Possibility of such study for students of all nationalities

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1. Reported in Kolasky, J.: Education in Soviet Ukraine. Op.cit. p.136.
2. Radyanska Ukraina (Soviet Ukraine) (Kiev, June 28, 1953) Cited in Ibid p.137.

is realised by a knowledge of the Russian language."[1] Obviously this practice of accepting students from one republic in the schools of another is greatly encouraged and is a major justification for using Russian, a common language, as the medium of instruction.

As far as the staff of the higher education institutes are concerned the majority of them are Russian, firstly because fewer local students enter higher educational institutions, and secondly because of those graduated, majority are posted outside their native region. As a result, instruction tends to be given in Russian. Moreover, most of the lecturers, trained during the old regime themselves learnt through Russian and hence find it difficult to teach in another language. Another means of ascertaining the increasing use of Russian in higher education is through the language of the textbooks. A breakdown for 1965 giving the total number of title and copies of textbooks and pamphlets for higher education published in (a) Russian, (b) non-Russian languages of the U.S.S.R. and (c) foreign languages is as follows:[2]

	U.S.S.R.	(a)	%	(b)	%	(c)	%
Titles	5,668	4,392	77.49	874	15.42	402	7.09
Copies (in thousands)	36,594	29,797	81.43	2,125	5.81	4,672	12.76

Another reasonably reliable source of information on the language of instruction are prospectuses issued by the higher schools themselves, or the Republican Ministries of Education. On the basis of one such reference book for candidates for admission to higher and certain other schools in the Uzbek SSR, one study has found that in the more specialised vocational high schools instruction was exclusively in Russian; nearly everywhere else both Russian and Uzbek were used, sometimes varying according to the nationality of instructors.[3]

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1. Bilodid, I.K.: Rosiyska mova - mova mizhnatsionalnoho spilkuvannya narodiv SRSR (Russian, The Language of International Communion of the Peoples of the U.S.S.R.) (Kiev, 1962) p.20. Cited in Kolasky,J.: Education in Soviet Ukraine op. cit. p.137.

2. Kolasky,J.: Education in Soviet Ukraine Op.cit. p. 142.

3. See "Higher Education in Uzbekistan" in Central Asian Review, Vol.3 (1955) p.73.

The 1958 school law, which strengthened the position of Russian in non-Russian schools is expected to have repercussions at the university level as well because of the increasing number of non-Russians opting for the Russian medium in secondary schools. Besides, there is some indication that from the 1963-64 academic year Russian language requirements for non-Russians who are not graduates of Russian language schools may have been subtly raised. Under the previous system these students had to simply pass an ungraded oral test in Russian. In 1963-64 they were free to submit themselves to a written test which would be counted as additional points in the very complicated admissions procedure.[1] At the same time when some prominent Russian educators, like Professor Alexandrov, the Rector of Leningrad University, were advocating the abolition of the present Russian examination for some native Russians, namely, those who may be brilliant scientists but cannot write a good Russian composition.[2] Protests are heard from the universities themselves as can be seen from the republican conference in 1963, sponsored among others by Kiev University, where the assembled educators and communications specialists protested against increasing restrictions on the use of Ukrainian in public life and in schools, especially colleges.[3]

At the tertiary level of education in the U.S.S.R., Russian is found to be, if not the only, at least the most dominant medium of instruction throughout the country. Knowledge of Russian being essential for admission to a higher educational institute, makes its study necessary for those aspiring

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1. Kantsov, V.F.: "Good New Replenishments for the Higher Educational Institutions" in Vestnik vysshey shkoly (Bulletin for Higher Schools), No.4. (April 1963), pp.15-17. Cited in Bilinsky, Y. "Education of the Non-Russian Peoples in the Soviet Union" op. cit. p.85.

2. Alexandrov, A.: "Make Way for Enthusiasts" in Izvestiya (News)(Moscow, 28 July 1962). Cited in Bilinsky, Y. "Education of the Non-Russian Peoples in the Soviet Union" op.cit. p.85

3. Dovhal, S.: "A Fight for the Language" in Problems of the U.S.S.R. no.18 (June, 1963) p.47.

to higher education and professional training. Such a policy, therefore, ensures the increasing use of Russian among the educated elite throughout the Soviet Union.

In conclusion, it is observed that the medium of instruction policies in both India and the U.S.S.R. reflect changes in the official language policy in particular and the political and social policy towards diverse groups in general. As such attempts are made, with varying success by either country, to keep the medium of instruction policy in line with the shifts in the political aims of the regime and the accompanying changes in the official language of the country.

The medium of instruction policies in the Soviet Union have successively emphasized the dual elements of pluralism and centralism evidenced in Soviet policy. The liberal policy of the 1920s towards various nationalities was a manifestation of the pluralist element in the policy by offering the chanceof the smallest languages to become languages of education for their native speakers. However, a prime motivating force behind the greater use of minority languages appears to be not so much the creation of individual excellence through education, but the mobilisation of diverse groups and the dissemination of a particular kind of ideology - communist ideology - through the medium of their languages. The expected result was the creation of greater social and political homogeneity implicit in a centralist ideology.

Moreover, the centralist principle has asserted itself since the 1930s in line with the Stalinist policy of greater centralisation through Russification. Consequently, the liberal policy of the 1920s has been gradually sought to be replaced by an increasing use of Russian. At the same time, the constitutional right to education through the native tongue remains unchanged, giving rise to a conflict between this right and the parents' choice to select the medium for their children. Through their own

choice, it is hoped, non-Russian parents will waive their constitutional right. The simultaneous increase in the importance of Russian for official purposes serves to provide yet another incentive to drop the native language in favour of Russian.

Implicit in its attempts to accelerate the use of Russian in administration and education, is the Soviet government's policy of gradual assimilation of all Soviet peoples into the Russian mould. Such a policy is bound to meet with opposition, as can be seen from the reaction in the various republics following the 1958 school law, not only because it suppresses the cultures and languages of the non-Russians, but also because it runs contrary to the basic principles on which the U.S.S.R. was constituted, namely, the voluntary union of all nationalities who are to enjoy an equality of cultures and languages.

While assimilation appears to be the general goal of the Soviet regime; in India the general principles guiding the language planning have been, on the one hand the creation of national unity and the development of a national identity through the use of a common indigenous language, and on the other the guaranteeing the equality of all major languages for use in administration and education. At the school level, therefore, the mother tongue at the primary stage and the regional languages at the secondary stage have been generally accepted as the most suitable media of instruction. Such a policy is considered not only educationally sound, but is also in line with the official language policy at the State level. Through its use in administration and education, the regional language is recognised as the best medium of achieving integration at the State level.

Controversy, however, arises over the medium of instruction policy at the university level in India. Here policy has not changed with changes in the official language policy at the State level and the medium of instruction policy in schools. Both these changes demand that the medium of

instruction policy at the university level should also change in favour of the regional languages. On the other hand, the demands of inter-state communication, exchange of knowledge and personnel, and the effective functioning of the educated class outside their regional areas, necessitate the use of a common language as the medium of higher education. The absence of a generally accepted pan-Indian language, however, has given rise to a considerable controversy over the language to be adopted for higher education. While the claims of science and technology and the availability of the sources of knowledge support the continued use of English; the hope that Hindi will eventually emerge as the official language of India and serve as an instrument of unity and inter-state communication has led some to favour its replacing English as the medium of instruction at the tertiary level in India. Because of the conflicting claims of Hindi, English and the regional languages, language planning at the university level in India has been the centre of much controversy, the resulting policy-making in this sphere being weak and indecisive.

Apart from deciding the question of medium of instruction, the language policy in education is also expected to specify the language or languages to be included in the curriculum at each stage of the educational process.

Language As a Subject of Study in India and the U.S.S.R.

In a fast-shrinking world, knowledge of a language other than the mother tongue is becoming an ever-increasing necessity, more so in a multilingual country. The social, political and economic conditions of a multilingual country create the need for a bilingualism - or even multilingualism, fostered through education. In general, language learning may take place either by relatively informal, unplanned imitation and use in actual communication situations or by formal study in a system of education.

Both India and the U.S.S.R. place great emphasis on formal language learning as can be seen from the various provisions made to entrust the teaching of languages to the specific agencies of formal education. The respective language policies of the two countries, therefore cover not only the question of the particular medium of instruction to be used, but also specify the language or languages to be studied at each stage of the system of formal education.

If the desire for universal education, eradication of illiteracy and bridging of the elite-mass gap calls for a regional language policy as far as the medium of education is concerned, inter-regional communication on a national scale and the ideal of national unity call for the use of a particular language as a link across linguistic boundaries and as an essential instrument of national unity. Moreover, where the success of the official language policy depends largely on a language becoming a common medium of communication, as is the case in India, the responsibility rests heavily on the educational system to impart and promote the study of the particular language chosen for this dual purpose. Similarly, if the official language and medium of instruction policies of the Soviet Union are aimed at assimilating the non-Russian element into a common Russian nationality, the process could certainly be speeded up if the language to be used for this purpose were to be made a compulsory subject of study in all schools.

Hence, it is not surprising that a 'second' language policy assumes paramount importance in language planning in India and the U.S.S.R. Implicit in its formulation is the hope that it will, together with the official language policy, serve as a useful instrument for maintaining national unity and integrating or assimilating diverse groups as the case may be.

Language Study at the Primary Stage: Recognition of the fact that language is an important tool of communication, coupled with the belief that a common medium of inter-regional communication would serve to bring together diverse

peoples and possibly unite them, it follows for Indians leaders that a common language could be used as a useful means for promoting national unity in the midst of cultural diversity. In the Indian context this means that it is desirable that every State should provide facilities for learning a common language, preferably Hindi, in the light of its future role as the official language of the country. Moreover, English, having served till independence as the only common language cannot be ignored till Hindi is developed enough to serve this purpose. Hence, repeated and varying policies since independence have attempted to accomodate these two languages in the school curriculum.

However, it is significant to note that the question regarding language learning arises chiefly at the secondary level in India. At the primary stage a knowledge of the mother tongue or regional language is considered sufficient, and the dangers of overburdening a child with a study of more than one language in the early years are recognised. As a result, the accepted policy at this stage is that both the medium of instruction and the language of study should be the mother tongue. The only qualification is where the regional language is different from the mother tongue, in which case the policy is that the study of the regional language should be introduced not earlier than Class III.[1] In recent years, several States have introduced the study of English in the primary stage from Class III, either on a voluntary, or a compulsory basis. Introduction of a second language at the primary stage is discouraged because it is believed that children should learn to read and write the first language moderately well before beginning the study of a second language. Moreover, considering the large number of drop-outs at the primary stage it is felt by some that for students who do not proceed beyond the primary school, whatever little knowledge they may

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1. See the "Resolution Adopted at the Provincial Education Ministers' Conference in August 1949 and Approved by the CABE and the Government of India", in Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Report of the Commissioner for Linguistic Minorities:Fifth Report. (New Delhi, Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, 1963) p.125.

have acquired of a language other than the mother tongue is apt to be soon lost. However, it is precisely on these grounds that some others argue that a study of Hindi should be extended to the higher primary stage also, in order that those who discontinue education at this level have at least a working knowledge of the future official language.[1] The arguments of the Official Language Commission, recommending a study of Hindi at the stage of compulsory education, are along similar lines. Considering the future status of Hindi as the official language of the Union, and keeping in view the aim of the government to provide free and compulsory education for all children between the ages of six and fourteen, the Commission recommended the inclusion of Hindi in the school curriculum so that "sufficient literacy" is provided in the Hindi language by the age limit of fourteen years. The Commission considered a minimum of three or four years of study of Hindi essential toward the close of the period of compulsory and free education.[2] However, it is left to the individual States to decide whether the study of a second language should be included in the primary school curriculum or not.

In the U.S.S.R. such a laissez-faire attitude towards second language teaching at the primary level is absent, the State choosing to legislate on this important question as on all others. Though, on coming to power, the Bolsheviks recognised the right of the population to be provided education in the native tongue, it was, however, always envisaged that local languages would eventually give way to a single state language. Rather than leave this to the slow process of voluntary assimilation, the first step towards giving Russian a privileged status in education was taken on March 13, 1938, when the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union and the Central Committee of the Communist Party decreed that Russian would be a

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1. See the "Views of S. Panandikar in Report of the Education Commission, 1964-66. Op.cit. p.195.
2. Report of the Official Language Commission, 1956 (New Delhi, Government of India, 1956) pp.73, 74, 80.

compulsory subject in all non-Russian schools.[1] This was at a time when Russian chauvinism was triumphant and all-out attempts were made by the Stalin regime to build Soviet patriotism by establishing the supremacy of Russism. The 1938 decree, introducing Russian as a compulsory second language, emphasised the importance of a common means of communication in a multi-national state, the need to raise the scientific and technical knowledge of non-Russian minorities who could obtain higher education only at Russian schools and the requirements of the Red Army.[2] A special conference of the People's Commissars for Education met in Moscow in 1940 to work out the implementation of this directive, and in 1941 the Scientific and Research Institutes of Schools sent out a curricula on methods of 'Teaching the Russian Language in non-Russian Schools'.

This bilingual policy of studying the native language and Russian is a reflection of the way in which the two languages are regarded as functionally related in Soviet society generally. ". . . the correct policy in the linguistic development of the Soviet multi-national state" it is argued, "should be to prompt the development of the national languages to meet the vital internal or local needs of each people, while the study of Russian should be extended so as to provide for all the wider, international communication demands."[3]

Hence from March 1938, as a rule the study of Russian was compulsory in all schools of the U.S.S.R., as was the study of the titular language of the Republic in which the pupil resided. Thus, at the primary level, in non-Russian Republics where the local language is the medium of instruction,

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1. Lewis, E.G.: Multilingualism in the Soviet Union. (The Hague, Mouton, 1972) p.183.
2. Koutaissoff, E.: "Literacy and the Place of Russian in the Non-Slav Republics of the U.S.S.R." Reprinted from Slavic Studies Vol.3, No.2 (October 1951) p.11.
3. Desheriev, E. et al: "Razvitiye i vzaimnoe obucheniye yazykov narodov SSSR" (The Development and Mutual Enrichment of the Languages of the U.S.S.R.) in Kommunist XIII (Moscow, 1966) p.81.

Russian is taught as a compulsory language from Class II, and if there are Russian medium schools in these Republics, the local language is taught from Class II.[1] Thus in the non-Russian speaking Republics, two languages - Russian and the native language are taught at the elementary level, while in the Russian-medium schools of the RSFSR only one language, Russian, is taught at this level.

Language Study at the Secondary Stage: Language study at the secondary level is a very controversial issue in India, where no unanimous decision has been arrived at yet regarding the choice and number of languages to be included in the secondary school curriculum. There is a sentiment that an Indian language should eventually serve, apart from the official language of the Union, as the link language among the people of India. This sentiment was translated into a constitutional directive, under Article 351, which lays it down as the duty of the Union "to promote the spread of the Hindi language." At the same time, it is felt that the role of English as the link language should be strengthened during the transitional period of indefinite duration, until Hindi emerges as the effective link language. Also, access to the sources of modern knowledge, especially in science and technology requires a knowledge of the English language. Finally, the growing importance and demand for the regional languages means their retention as subjects of study. All these arguments put together have brought into existence the three-language formula in Indian education, which is recognised as the minimum content of the language course necessary for the country. Variously stated and variously interpreted, the formula, in its simple form, includes the study of the mother tongue or regional language, Hindi and English at the secondary school level.

The idea of promoting the spread of a link language through the system of education was not exactly a new one since pre-independence nationalist

1. Kucera, J.: "Soviet Nationality Policy: The Linguistic Controversy" in Problems of Communism Vol.3, No.2. (Washington,D.C., United States Information Agency, 1954) p.27.

opinion had also advocated the teaching of Hindustani as a link language. The Sargent Report in 1944 had recommended the study of Hindustani, in either the Devanagari or the Persian Script, as a lingua franca.[1] This was in keeping with the national language policy of the time, advocating Hindustani (in both scripts) as the national language of India. However, it is with independence that the question of the position of Hindi in school curricula becomes a matter of serious concern for policy-makers in India.

Before any definite policy was formulated, several highpowered commissions and committees investigated the question of language instruction in school, and though there were differences regarding the exact stage at which the two languages were to be introduced in the school curriculum, there was general agreement from the Committee on Secondary Education appointed by the CABE in 1948; the University Education Commission, 1949; the Conferences of Professors of Hindi and English in 1959, the Secondary Education Commission 1953; and the Official Language Commission 1956, that both Hindi and English should be important subjects of study at the secondary level. At the high school stage, however, the Secondary Education Commission recommended a "two-language" formula, "one of which being the mother tongue or the regional language."[2] If implemented, such a policy would mean that high school students in non-Hindi regions could read either English or Hindi besides their own regional language, while Hindi-speaking students would get an opportunity to study both Hindi and English and hence have an advantage over the non-Hindi speakers. As such, the formula was found unsatisfactory, especially by the non-Hindi lobby.

In fact, one of the main justifications for the three-language formula is that it equalizes the "linguistic burden" throughout the country.

1. See, Post-War Educational Development in India: Report by the Central Advisory Board of Education, January 1944. (New Delhi, Govt. of India, Ministry of Education, 1944) p.16.

2. Report of the Secondary Education Commission (New Delhi, Government of India, Ministry of Education, 1953) pp.77-78.

This was because though the principle of including Hindi and English in the school curriculum was generally accepted, it was felt that this would discriminate in favour of Hindi-speakers who would be learning only two languages, as against the three studied by non-Hindi speakers. The burden was sought to be 'equalised' by requiring the Hindi speakers under the new formula to learn an additional Indian language. Originating at the All-India Council for Secondary Education in January, 1955, the three-language formula was accepted by the Central Advisory Board of Education meeting in the same month, when the following two variations of the formula were presented to the State governments for their opinion:[1]

I. (a) (i) Mother tongue or (ii) regional language or (iii) a composite course of mother tongue and a regional language; or (iv) a composite of mother tongue and classical language, or (v) a composite of regional language and classical language.

(b) Hindi or English.

(c) A modern Indian or a modern European language provided it has not already been taken under (a) and (b) above.

II. (a) As above.

(b) English or a modern European language.

(c) Hindi (for non-Hindi speaking areas) or another modern Indian language (for Hindi-speaking areas).

The implication of the first formula was that it provided no compulsion to study Hindi in the non-Hindi areas as a third language, but rather left it to the students to choose any modern Indian or European language. At the same time, it gave them a choice between Hindi and English for the second language. The second formula, on the other hand, although making Hindi compulsory as a third language in the non-Hindi areas, decidedly made English the second language throughout the country.

1. Proceedings of the Twenty-Third Meeting of the Central Advisory Board of Education (New Delhi, Govt. of India, Ministry of Education, 1956) p.16.

With some exceptions, most of the state governments agreed on the basic principle of the compulsory study of three languages in the secondary school, the preponderant weight of opinion being in favour of the second formula or some modified form of it. In September 1956, the annual State Education Ministers' Conference approved the second formula, except that now English alone stood as the second language without the alternative of a modern European language.[1]

Education being a State subject in India, a universally acceptable formula needs to be evolved if it is to be unanimously adopted and successfully implemented by each of the State governments. On the basis of the agreement reached so far, the CABE recommended to the Indian government that the modified second formula be accepted as the basis of an all-India policy, and that all State governments should consider taking necessary decisions so as to give effect to this all-India policy.

Till 1961, the three-language formula was more in the form of a worthy recommendation, than an accepted policy. A most important step in the evolution and acceptance of the three-language formula was taken at the Chief Ministers' Conference in August 1961, which proposed a single simplified formula for adoption in place of the existing variety of complicated formulations operating in different states. Recognising the need for Hindi for inter-state communication in both the official and non-official spheres; the importance of the mother tongue and the regional languages for groupsand regional purposes; and the role of English as a language of international communication and a window to the world, the Conference accepted the following formula for language teaching at the secondary level:[2]

1. The regional language and, if the mother tongue is different, also the

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1. Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth Meeting of the Central Advisory Board of Education (1957) op. cit. p.262.

2. "Statement Issued by the Meeting of Chief Ministers of States and Central Ministers Held on August 10, 11 and 12, 1961" in Report of the Commissioner for Linguistic Minorities: Fourth Report. (New Delhi, Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, 1962) pp. 90-93.

mother tongue.

2. Hindi in non-Hindi areas, and another Indian language in Hindi areas.

3. English or another modern European language.

Thus stated, for the linguistic minorities in non-Hindi areas, the three-language formula became, in effect a "four-language" formula, requiring the study of the mother tongue, a regional language, Hindi and English. Nevertheless, this formula was endorsed by the National Integration Conference, 1961, the Committee on Emotional Integration, 1961, and the National Integration Council, all of which were concerned with achieving national integration and regarded education as a potent instrument to achieve this goal.

Though there is almost universal agreement on the general principle of learning three languages in secondary schools, there is no uniformity as far as the regulating theories devised by the various states for implementing the general policy are concerned. Differences over the priorities to be accorded, the general standards to be attained and the time to be allocated to each of the three languages persist, thereby necessitating a constant re-opening of the issue and a continuous reworking and reformulation of the substance of the formula. This is because the impelling considerations behind the formula are mainly political and social instead of educational, and hence the actual policy in each state varies according to the particular pressures existing on the policy-making process.

It is not surprising, therefore, that in 1963 the Implementation Committee on the Three Language Formula, appointed in 1962 by the Sixth State Education Ministers' Conference, urged that there should be the largest measure of uniformity among the states in the implementation of the three-language formula and stressed that the "teaching of a language should be provided for not less than three years in a continuous course." The Committee further "pointed out that thethree-language formula in its application to the Hindi-speaking states envisaged that the third language should be one of the modern Indian

languages."[1] Reiterating the three-language formula, after consultations with the State Chief ministers and Union ministers, the Congress Working Committee in 1965 called for urgent action "to effectively implement the Three Language Formula evolved by the National Integration Conference and accepted by the country."[2]

It seemed that the reiteration of support by the Congress Working Committee in 1965 would make a shift from repeated policy formulations to effective implementation, but in 1966 the issue was once again reopened with the publishing of the Education Commission's report. Considering the difficulties and irregularities in implementing the three-language formula, the Education Commission felt that a new policy formulation on language study in schools was necessary and recommended the following three-language formulas:[3]

1. Mother tongue or regional language.
2. Official language of the Union (i.e. Hindi), or associate official language (i.e. English) so long as it had that status.
3. Any modern Indian or foreign language not covered under (1) or (2) and other than that used as the medium of instruction.

On the basis of its recommendations, the Commission claims that the pattern of language study at school, Classes I to X, would be as follows:[4]

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1. Proceedings of the Seventh State Education Ministers Conference. (New Delhi, Government of India, Ministry of Education, 1965) p.111.
2. The Tribune (Ambala, February 25, 1965).
3. Report of the Education Commission, 1964-66. Op. cit. p.192.
4. Report of the Education Commission, 1964-66. Op. cit. p. 194.



This formulation was clearly a reversion to one of the two formulas which the CABE had initially proposed and which had not received adequate support from the state governments. It really was a three-language formula as it did not impose a fourth language on linguistic minorities in non-Hindi areas. At the same time, it removed any compulsion to study Hindi in the non-Hindi areas and therefore allowed for lack of uniformity in the educational system with regard to teaching of Hindi as the link language. This was so inspite of the Commission's recognition that "English cannot serve as the link-language for the majority of the people. It is only Hindi which can and should take this place in due course."[1] Under the new formula, however, a non-Hindi speaking student could conveniently leave out the study of Hindi and still adhere to the formula, in form if not in spirit. Since the Commission's formula differed from that which had acquired some acceptance in the country earlier, the government was not eager to accept the new formula, but waited to renew consultations with the political leadership of the states subsequent to the 1967 general elections.

1. Report of the Education Commission, 1964-66. Op. cit. p.614.

The 1967 elections saw the formation of non-Congress ministries in nearly half the States which meant that Centre-State differences could no longer be glossed over through a vague consensus at meetings of the Congress party. Political parties representing the extremes on the language issue were now part of the state governments. Surprisingly, however, the formula did not receive so much opposition from the States, Annadurai, the Chief Minister of Madras, one of the most militant anti-Hindi States, announcing that the DMK Government which he headed was "committed to the three-language formula."[1] In contrast, it was at the Centre that a new proposal was put forward which made a radical departure from previous policy.

This new proposal came from the twenty-eight member Committee of Members of Parliament set up in April 1967 by the Union Education Minister to review the recommendations of the Education Commission and propose a national policy on education. In a dramatic shift from past proposals, this committee unanimously recommended a "two-language formula", according to which upto the high school stage, a student would be required to study his mother tongue and only one other language, which could be any language.[2] He may offer a third language of his choice as an optional subject in Classes VIII to X. By reducing the number of compulsory languages to be studied to two, the Committee hoped to lessen the excessive language load on the student in secondary school. Moreover, any suggestion of compulsion with regard to the study of Hindi, English or even the regional language was removed, as also any pretense of a link language. Subsequently, these proposals were modified to make compulsory the study of Hindi or English as a third language from Classes VIII to X for those students who had not had one or the other in their earlier education.[3] For classes XI and XII, the Committee advocated

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1. The Hindu Weekly Review (Madras, April 4, 1967).
2. The Statesman Weekly (Calcutta, April 29, 1967).
3. Report of the Committee of Members of Parliament on Education (New Delhi, Government of India, Ministry of Education, 1967) pp. 3-4.

the study of only two languages – one of which was being used as the medium of education, and another at the choice of the student.[1]

The Conference of State Education Ministers following the Committee of Members of Parliament reported complete agreement that a student at school should learn three languages, even though there was a lack of agreement over the question of compulsion in the study of Hindi or English. Meanwhile, the Centre made known its determination to stick to the three-language formula,[2] in the national interest even if it placed a supposedly excessive load on the student. If a prolonged bilingualism was envisaged in the sphere of the official language of the Union, as was the case with the passing of the Official Languages (Amendment) Act, 1967, then it had to be sustained by students learning both Hindi and English in addition to their mother tongue. However, it was precisely on the grounds of this indefinite bilingualism in the sphere of the official language of the Union that a two-language formula was implemented by some of the non-Hindi states, headed by Madras. English having been declared an associate official language till the States so desired, it was no longer found necessary to include a study of Hindi, never very popular, in the school curriculum. Thus it was that a government-sponsored resolution was passed by the Madras legislature in January 1968, by which the DMK Government completely eliminated the teaching of a third language in schools in the State and wiped out Hindi from the school curriculum as far as non-Hindi speaking students were concerned. This action of the Madras Government has confronted the Congress leadership at the Centre with a sharp dilemma. To accept it would mean the end of the three-language formula as well as of the aspiration of developing Hindi as the link language. On the other hand, in the present administrative setup, the Centre can only advise

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1. Report of the Committee of Members of Parliament on Education. Op. cit. p.4.
2. The Hindu Weekly Review (Madras, May 15, 1967).

and recommend to the States on questions of educational policies, it cannot dictate.

Meanwhile the Congress Working Committee reiterated support for the three-language formula in January 1968, and the Centre considered a national resolution on educational policy in which the states were likely to be urged to implement the three-language formula. But already there have been enough policy solutions, resolutions, endorsements and restatements regarding the desirability of a three-language formula, and the urgency of its implementation by the State governments. The more significant question now would be the amount of pressure, persuasion or incentives the centre is willing to use to make the compulsory study of three-languages uniform throughout the secondary schools of the country.

As far as the language load in the school curriculum is concerned, the situation in the U.S.S.R. is not very different, though the reasoning behind and the aim of learning a particular language may not be the same as in India.

With the 1938 decree a compulsory study of Russian was included in all non-Russian schools both in the RSFSR and the other republics of the U.S.S.R. At the same time, in Russian schools outside the RSFSR the language of the republic was introduced as a subject of study from grade II because of the great importance attached to the language of the republic for the cultural and official purposes of the republics. Together with this, there may also have been the consideration of 'equalizing' the language load in Russian and non-Russian schools of the republics on the lines of the reasoning behind the three-language formula in India. If this is one of the justifications it is not universally applied in the sense that in the Russian-medium schools of the RSFSR no other Soviet language is made a compulsory subject of study.

Apart from the languages of the U.S.S.R., at the secondary level a foreign language (either English, French or German) is taught, the stated policy governing the teaching of a foreign language in the U.S.S.R. being that every pupil must begin to study a language other than his own in the fifth grade of school and continue till the end of secondary school.[1] Thus in the ordinary schools the second language is introduced in the fifth grade, and continued upto the tenth grade.[2] Besides these, there are a few special language schools where the study of a foreign language is introduced in Grade II and gradually the language is used as a medium of instruction for certain subjects. These schools are set up on the principle that the earlier a foreign language is introduced the better is its mastery.

Thus, two different policies of language learning operated in the pre-1958 U.S.S.R. - a two-language policy for the Russian schools of the RSFSR (Russian and a foreign language), and a three-language policy for the non-Russian schools of the RSFSR, as well as for all schools, Russian and non-Russian of the republics. In the case of linguistic minorities in a republic, even the study of a fourth language was found necessary if the minorities wished to learn their mother tongue as well as the language of the republic. Hence in these republics of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, for example, the total school course was lengthened by a year to accommodate the time needed for extra language learning.

The pattern of language study found in Soviet secondary schools prior to the 1958 school reforms was as follows:

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1. Decree of the Council of Ministers (Moscow, June 4, 1961).

2. RSFSR Ministry of Education: "Curriculum and Syllabuses for the Eight-Year and Secondary Schools" reprinted in Soviet Education, Vol.3, No.1, (New York, International Arts and Science Press, 1964) p.18.



The reorganisation of Soviet education following the 1958 Theses of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. sought to change the pattern of language teaching in secondary schools. Clause 19, which gave parents a right to decide which school with what language of instruction was best for their children, also considered the question of the language teaching. It felt that "in connection with language study in the Union and autonomous republics there is a great overloading of children" those studying in the national schools learning three languages: their native tongue, Russian and a foreign one. To alleviate this overburdening of pupils with language study, the thesis proposed to let the parents also decide whether their children should take Russian when attending a school with a different language of instruction, or to study their native language while attending a Russian-language school."Granting the parents the right to choose which language the child must study" was, according to the thesis"the most democratic presentation of the problem, eliminating the resolving of this important question by administrative decree and liquidating excessive burdening of

1. "The CPSU on Culture, Education and Science" Collection of Documents (Moscow, 1960) p.76.

2. Ibid. p.76.

pupils with the study of languages."[1]

At face value the proposal appears harmless and even considerably democratic. A closer examination reveals it as another subtle tool of Russification, although the present Soviet leaders do not call their policies Russification. Nevertheless, the symptoms are the same. From the glowing praise of the Russian language in the earlier part of the proposal,[2] and the importance of Russian in higher education and employment opportunities, it could be reasonably concluded that the government did not envisage parents voting to ban Russian from the curricula of non-Russian schools. On the other hand, while the position of Russian remained secure, the study of the various languages of the Union was now threatened, they in no way being considered as important subjects of study.

The party and government proposals were discussed at numerous public meetings and there were many letters to the press in all the fifteen republics. In a number of them not only writers, parents and teachers, but also local leaders, administrators and Party officials took the position that the native tongue of the pupils should remain a compulsory feature of the school curricula, and that to leave the decision to parents would lead to neglect of the non-Russian languages. Non-Russian parents would want their children to learn Russian, for reasons already mentioned, whereas Russian parents would not wish to overburden them with the study of the local language.

The strongest opposition to these came from the republics of Ukraine, Latvia, Georgia, Azerbaydzhan and Armenia. V.T. Latsis, member of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. and the Central Committee of the Communist party of Latvia besides being the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Latvian SSR declared in an article in Pravda: "It is most expedient to

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1. "The CPSU on Culture, Education and Science" Collection of Documents (Moscow, 1963) p.76.

2. Ibid. P.76.

carry on the study of the Latvian language in the Russian Schools of Latvia. To work effectively in a Republic a man needs a knowledge of the national language. Abolition of compulsory study of the Russian and Latvian languages in the schools will hardly promote the strengthening of friendship of peoples."[1] In the Ukraine, P. Tronko, a Secretary of the Kiev Provincial Party Committee, wrote in an authoritative monthly journal of the Communist Party of the Ukraine; "Under conditions of our Republic, in our opinion, the study of Russian, Ukraine and one foreign language should be required in all schools."[2] Besides, two well-known authors in the Ukraine, Maxim Rilsky and Nikola Bazhan, came out strongly against parents being given the right of decision, maintaining that Russian and Ukranian should both be obligatory in all the thirty thousand schools of the Ukrainian republic.[3] In Azerbaidshan, Abdulla Bairamov, a party secretary of Azerbaidshan declared that Russian should be taught in all national schools, but conceded that the local tongue should be taught in the Russian schools in the Republics.[4]

Though thesis 19 was omitted from the U.S.S.R. legislative bill altogether, during the debate representatives of Belorussia, Ukraine, Moldavia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaidshan and Kirghizia opposed the principle of "choice" and argued for the status quo: compulsory teaching of Russian and local languages in all schools.[5] According to them both languages were necessary and therefore their study should be obligatory.[6] The Georgian delegate Abashidze made the impassioned appeal: "Comrade deputies!

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1. Pravda (Moscow, November 29, 1958).
2. Tronko, P.:"Te'cho Vymaha ye Zhyttya" (Life Demands This), in Komunist Ukrayiny (Kiev, December, 1958) p.23. Cited in Bilinsky,Y. "Education of the Non-Russian Peoples in the Soviet Union" Op. cit. p.83.
3. Pravda (Moscow, December 22, 1958).
4. Pravda (Moscow, December 11, 1958).
5. "Sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, 5th Convocation, 2nd Session December 22-25, 1958" Stenographic Report (Moscow, 1959) pp.291-440.
6. Ibid. pp.346-347.

We must not set up the Russian and the local indigenous language one against another by allowing people to choose between them. For us both languages are native languages, both of them are indispensable, and both are obligatory."[1] S.V. Chervonenko, then the Secretary in charge of ideology of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine asserted that many years of experience had proved that requiring both Russian and Ukrainian was fully justified. Any change in the existing arrangement would be, in his judgement, a step backwards.[2]

Inspite of these admonitions, parallel laws adopted some months later by all but two republics (Latvia and Azerbaidzhan) left it to parents whether a second language should be taken. The Latvian law on school reform omitted any mention of linguistic reforms altogether, because, as Deputy Prime Minister, Berklav explained, ". . . The residents of Soviet Latvia (had) unanimously indicated that in the eight year schools of our Republic it was absolutely necessary to continue the traditional instruction in three languages: Latvian, Russian and one foreign language."[3] The Azerbaidzhani government also omitted legislating on the parents' right of deciding whether their children should study either Russian or Azerbaidzhani as a second language, depending on which type of school they attended.[4]

Defense of their linguistic rights can be identified as a major cause of the extensive purges which followed in these two rebel republics, and with the expulsion of their top party and government leaders, the educational laws of these two republics were also brought in line with the

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1. "Sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, 5th Convocation, 2nd Session, December 22-25, 1958" op. cit. pp.346-347.
2. Ibid. p.356.
3. See the Latvian Law in Sovetskaya Latvia (March 20, 1959) p.2. Cited in Bilinsky, Y. "Education of the Non-Russian Peoples in the Soviet Union" op. cit. p.64.
4. See Article 11 of the Azerbaidzhan SSR law, in Bakinskiy Rabochey (April 2, 1959) p.1. Cited in Bilinsky, Y. Op.cit. p.64.

rest. With the passing of the educational decrees of the individual republics, there has been an extensive drive to promote the study of Russian as the lingua franca. This process still meets with local resistance, but is dismissed by Russian leaders as expressions of sheer bourgeois nationalism. On the national question they stand as one for the hegemony of Russian and the Russian language. And the educational system has obviously served as a convenient and effective instrument for promoting this hegemony. By a subtle two-stage plan the educational system of the non-Russian republics was changed to accomodate a great use of the Russian language. First the medium of instruction was sought to be changed from the native to Russian language with the former retained as a subject; the second stage, however, struck a blow to the study of the native tongue even as a subject, thereby strengthening the position of Russian not only as a subject of study, but also as the lingua franca and the State language of the U.S.S.R.

Language Study at the Tertiary Stage: The question of language study at the university level can be examined in conjunction with the medium of instruction policy at this stage. With the regional languages replacing English as media of instruction at the tertiary level in India, interregional communication is bound to suffer till such time as Hindi develops as the pan-Indian language of communication. Moreover, a knowledge of English is deemed essential for the acquisition of knowledge especially in the scientific and technical fields. Hence the arguments advanced by the Hindi and English schools for the use of the respective languages a media of higher education have been introduced with renewed force in the debate on including them as subjects of study at this stage. As a result, the question of whether the three-language formula in use at the secondary level, should be extended to the university level as well has been a matter of prolonged debate in India.

As early as 1948, the University Education Commission, recommending a change to regional languages for instruction at the university level, added

that students in universities should learn the federal language, and that such students in the Hindi area learn another Indian language "not merely to compensate for the efforts of students in other regions, but also to secure the eligibility of young men of this region to serve in other regions and to provide an adequate supply of those Hindi-speaking persons who can mediate between the provinces."[1] With regard to English the Commission recommended that it should continue to be taught, at least enough to impart "the ability to read books in English," in view of its contribution to national unity and its importance as an instrument "to keep in touch with the living stream of ever-growing knowledge" and "as our principal means of maintaining contact with the outside world."[2] These proposals met the approval of the C.A.B.E. and the Government of India as the only possible policy prescription that would be generally acceptable.[3]

Though the question of language in education was outside its scope, the Official Language Commission reiterated the recommendations of the University Education Commission. Realizing that a knowledge of English is essential as a "window" to scientific knowledge, the Commission advocated the study of English henceforth primarily as a "language of comprehension." At the same time it advised that instruction in Hindi be continued into the university stage for those studying through the regional language.[4] The Kunzru Committee appointed in 1955 by the University Grants Commission, in its report submitted in 1957 insisted that in case the regional language becomes the medium of instruction, "English should continue to be studied by all university students," with special methods employed "to secure and an adequate knowledge of English as

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1. Report of the University Education Commission (1949) (New Delhi, Government of India, 1949) pp.322-326.
2. Ibid. pp.321-322.
3. Central Advisory Board of Education, 1935-60: Silver Jubilee Souvenir. Op. cit. p. 247.
4. Report of the Official Language Commission, 1956. Op. cit. pp.78-81.

a second language."[1] These recommendations were later accepted by the University Grants Commission, which has consistently emphasised the necessity for the continued study, possibly of an improved standard, of the English language.

In the mid-nineteen fifties, faced on the one hand with internal disruption, and on the other with the problem of training manpower for the industrial development of the country, Nehru placed a lot of emphasis on the study of English.[2]. His views were echoed by the then Home Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri, who pointed out in his speech in the Rajya Sabha on November 29, 1962 that "a sudden change without the boys and girls learning one of the official languages could result in a compartmentalisation of the country, which India could not afford. English has to remain a compulsory language for some time to come."[3]

At the political level, the idea of developing English as the transitional and Hindi as the permanent link language through their teaching at the higher level was endorsed by the Chief Ministers' Conference in 1961. This was followed by agreement from the National Integration Conference held in 1961, the National Integration Council in June, 1962 and the Committee on Emotional Integration in 1962. The consensus reached on a link-language formula in higher education was endorsed by the C.A.B.E. at its meeting in February 1962, when it proposed that any university adopting a regional language, should continue to provide facilities for instruction in English or Hindi, "in order to facilitate the movement of students from one part of the country to another."[4]

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1. Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth Meeting of the CABE, 1962 (New Delhi, Government of India, Ministry of Education, 1963) pp.55-56.
2. Cited in Shiksha (April, 1957) p.62.
3. The Statesman (Delhi, November 30, 1962).
4. Twenty-Ninth Meeting of the CABE, 1962, Op. cit. pp.63-65.

Though, in principle, the link language formula was enthusiastically accepted both by politicians and educationists as far as implementation was concerned there were several irregularities and lack of uniformity, because of the highly ambiguous nature of the formula. By leaving open the question of timing, the formula had left the way open for different groups to interpret the formula differently to suit their needs.

The national resolution on education issued by the Union Government, recognised the importance of retaining, possibly strengthening, English as a subject of study at the University level. There have been occasional references in official declarations to the introduction of Hindi as a required subject, and although instruction in both Hindi and English in university education is stated to be "the accepted policy of Government"[1], in so far as Hindi is concerned, it is only a vague hope of which no one takes any serious notice. The lack of any concern for Hindi as a required subject at the university level, parallel to English, is also obvious from the report of the Education Commission.

The Education Commission in its report of 1966 recommended against the compulsory study of a language at the university stage, and opposed the extension of any three-language formula to the university stage on the grounds that it "would place a heavy language load on the students and lead to a waste of scarce resources and deterioration of standards of subject knowledge in higher education."[2] The Commission was against the study of any language being made compulsory in higher education. At the same time, however, it underlined the importance of English in education: "For a successful completion of the first degree course, a student should possess an adequate command over English, be able to express himself in it with reasonable ease and felicity,

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1. U.G.C.: Conference of Vice-Chancellors Convened by the Ministry of Education and the University Grants Commission, 11-13 September, 1967. (New Delhi, U.G.C., 1967) p.12.
2. Report of the Education Commission, 1964-66. Op. cit. p.196.

understand lectures in it and avail himself of its literature . . . English should be the most useful "library language" in higher education and our most significant window on the world."[1]

The Commission was ready to concede that "English cannot serve as the link-language for the majority of our people. It is only Hindi which can and should take this place in due course." However, in terms of concrete recommendations regarding Hindi, it was satisfied with the statement that "all measures should be adopted to spread it in the non-Hindi areas." On the other hand, in relation to English it felt that "every graduate will need to acquire a reasonable proficiency in a "library language", which will be English for most students."[2] As an "important "library language" English would play a vital role in higher education."[3]

Apart from the intrinsic merits of the language, the increasing importance attached to English as a link and library language by the Education Commission could be explained by reference to developments in the field of the official language of the Union. At the time when the work of the Commission was in progress there was talk of amending the Official Language Act of 1962 in order to accommodate English as the official language for an indefinite period. The emotion-charged atmosphere of the moment, together with the realisation that with the dejure recognition of English as the associate official language, the immediate urgency to learn Hindi could be delayed, might have been considerations weighing in favour of English for the Education Commission. A further merit of English study over Hindi is that a knowledge of English serves two purposes at one and the same time - namely as link and library language. Even if Hindi were to eventually emerge as the link language, it could not, except may be in the very distant future,

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1. Report of the Education Commission, 1964-66. Op. cit. p.15.
2. Ibid. p.15.
3. Ibid. p.29.

be conceived of as satisfying the requirements of a library language.

This renewed strengthening of the position of English found official support when after the 1967 general elections, the new Education Minister, while advocating the use of the regional languages as media of university education, emphasised the need to strengthen English for the access it provided to modern knowledge, so much so that without it "higher education is a mere travesty of its name."[1] Considering that the role of Hindi as the link language is still emphasised at the secondary level, it would seem that official policy is to encourage the development of two link languages to function at two levels - Hindi to serve as the link language of the masses and English as the link language of the university educated elite. As the Education Commission itself acknowledged, English "will thus serve as a link language in higher education for academic work and intellectual inter-communication."[2] Apparently, the elite-mass gap appearing in each linguistic region as a result of this policy would, it is hoped be bridged by the increasing part played by the regional languages as media of education at both the secondary and tertiary levels of Indian education.

At the tertiary level of education in the Soviet Union the question of language study does not assume as great an importance, or generate as much controversy as is to be found in India. This is because the two main practical purposes of second language learning at the university stage, namely, inter-regional communication of knowledge and access to the sources of knowledge, have been served by the increasing hegemony of Russian fostered through the medium of instruction policy in higher education and the compulsory study of Russian at the school level.

Russian in Soviet higher education, therefore is meant to perform

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1. Conference of Vice-Chancellors Convened by the Ministry of Education and the University Grants Commission (1967) op.cit. p.11.
2. Report of the Education Commission, 1964-66 op. cit. p.15.

the functions of both a link and a library language. Hence, the practical necessity of learning another second language does not really arise. Even the teaching of Russian as a second language in the universities is not deemed to be very necessary, because of the claim of Soviet authorities that on leaving school, a student of any nationality is as familiar with the Russian language as the Russian-speaking student himself. Regarding the study of a foreign language, students are expected to continue, at the tertiary stage, the study of the foreign language taken up at school. Thus, though there is no rigid policy regarding language study at the tertiary level in the U.S.S.R., the position of Russian appears to be secure.

A comparative study of the language policies in education of India and the U.S.S.R. confirms the general observations made at the beginning of this chapter that the educational system of a country may be used to mitigate or solve its socio-political problems, and that attempts may be made to allocate new political values through educational policies. Thus, whatever the particular educational philosophies of India and the U.S.S.R., from an analytical examination of their language policies in education it appears that the liberal idea of knowledge for knowledge's sake is superseded by the more pragmatic task of promoting the particular political aims of the two regimes, through their respective language policies.

Although the ultimate aims of the Soviet language policy may be debatable, its more immediate aim, namely to make Russian the common means of communication and the State language of the Union, is clear. Moreover, language being the differentiating factor par excellence, for a merging of the non-Russian peoples and the success of a centralized regime, some kind of linguistic unification is necessary. Hence, while Soviet officials still pay lip-service to Lenin's vision of a union of equal States ensuring the equality of all languages and education through the native language, the available evidence points towards a determined effort to homogenise the population of the Soviet

Union. Deliberate policies are designed not only to discourage the use of the native languages in schools and institutions of higher learning, but also to encourage an increasing use of Russian for these purposes. Though in theory the native languages are still recognised on par with Russian, personal and professional advancement, in practice, is impossible without a knowledge of Russian.

The "final merging of all languages" and nationalities, according to Soviet theory will take place after the victory of communism all over the world, when there will emerge a culture which is communist in content and international in form. As one critic of Soviet policy pointed out, this "emergence of linguistic unity proceeds through the wide adoption of one of the more diffused national languages, which, under conditions of Soviet nationality, is the Russian language."[1] That this was the aim of Soviet leaders is affirmed by Stalin's declaration that in the epoch before the world-wide victory of Socialism the policy is the assimilation of some and the victory of other languages[2], in the Soviet instance the victor, naturally, being Russian.

In the case of India, the dominating consideration behind its language policies in education is the question of maintaining national unity in the midst of regional diversities. In the pre-independence epoch, a common language, English had been a powerful unifying force, and was ironically the language which first served to unite the nationalist movement. Post-independence era, however, has revealed the divisive characteristics of language, with each language group making demands for political power on a linguistic basis. In the light of the events following independence it is not surprising that

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1. Mansvetov, N.V.; "Sblizhenie natsy i vozniknovenie internatsionalnoy obshchnosti narodov SSR" (The Rapprochement of Nations and the Emergence of an International Community of the Peoples of the U.S.S.R.), Voprosy Istorii (Problems of History) No.5 (May 1964) p.51. Cited in Kolasky,J.: Education in Soviet Ukraine op. cit. p.163.

2. Stalin,J.: Pravda (Moscow, August 2, 1950) p.2.

the Government of India pinned its hopes largely on a suitable language policy which would not only appease all groups but also unite them.

It is, however, one thing to formulate a policy, and quite a different thing to implement it, especially in the educational sphere in India. The development of an all-India policy is inhibited by the constitutional directive of making education a state subject, and by the configuration of social and political forces in India. Through high-level discussions the Centre has attempted to evolve some all-India agreement regarding the important questions of medium of instruction and subject of study, but they lack any legal backing to enforce them. Moreover, in the light of the wide diversity of views prevailing on these questions the "policies" arrived at by the Centre are largely in the nature of compromise solutions and hence are broad and vague enough to permit variations in implementation. Moreover, there seems to be no finality about the decisions reached at by the Centre as can be seen from the repeated debates on the same questions every few years.

Nevertheless, inspite of these limitations, certain broad policies have come to stay in the sphere of education. As far as the medium of instruction is concerned regional cohesion and demand for regional languages to mobilise the masses have led to their replacing English at the school level, and with opposition from some quarters, at the university level also. But this leaves out the question of national cohesion and interregional communication which is sought to be achieved by promoting the knowledge of a link language through the education system. At the school level this means, generally, a study of both Hindi and English, but because of its added advantage as a "library language" a study of English finds a greater support at the university level. The actual success of these policies would depend, among other things, upon the particular circumstances and power configurations in each of the states which have a final say in the matter of adopting and implementing educational policies.

The language policies in education of India and the U.S.S.R., designed to meet more or less similar problems present interesting similarities and differences. In the first place, both countries are in agreement on the question of maintaining national unity and pan-national communication through a common language. At the same time the process of evolving and/or encouraging the use of a single language is sought to be expedited by including its study in the school curriculum. Consequently, the study of Hindi in India and of Russian in the U.S.S.R. is expected to promote the use of these languages in the respective countries. Moreover, at the tertiary level, the use of this common language, preferably as the medium of instruction, and certainly as a subject of study, is intended to further the cause of national unity and inter-regional communication of ideas and personnel. Whether these similar policies in the two countries of promoting a common language through its use in their respective educational systems, has similar results in both cases depends on the specific initial conditions prevailing in each.

Secondly, with regard to the use of the various regional or national languages in education, the declared policy in both countries is the complete equality of all major languages for the educational purposes of their respective areas. This policy in India has resulted in the major regional languages being accepted as media of instruction at the secondary level to the extent that, in the absence of a link language, such a policy poses the threat of compartmentalizing the country and making the educated elite only regionally functional. In the U.S.S.R., on the other hand, since 1958 the observed trend is more towards a greater penetration of Russian in the non-Russian republics and the consequent assimilation and merging of non-Russian groups, while the explicit policy of the equality of all languages remains unchanged.

How far the ultimate aim in India is one of integration and that in the U.S.S.R. of assimilation may, perhaps, be judged better after an examination of the policies designed by the respective countries to develop their numerous minor languages and provide them with new alphabets and scripts.

CHAPTER V

POLICIES OF LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT

A task of great magnitude faces the Indian and Soviet governments if their respective policies of (a) providing education through the major languages of the country, and (b) adopting them for official purposes at the regional level, are to be successfully implemented. This is because not all the languages in the multilingual societies of India and the U.S.S.R. are found to have reached a uniform level of development and standardisation essential for them to serve as efficient tools of administration and education in the twentieth century. In other words, they may be deficient in one or more aspects which distinguish a language as a developed and adequate tool of communication beyond mere day-to-day needs. These necessary prerequisites are, a large and flexible vocabulary embodying new concepts, a uniform technical terminology, a long literary tradition coupled with the production of standard literature in academic fields, and a system of writing. Hence, the development and enrichment of the various national or regional languages, either by voluntary organisations or by governmental efforts, or both, together with a central agency to coordinate the work of the different agencies, is necessary for the implementation of a national or regional language policy.

However, the particular questions to be raised for each country in the field of language development and standardisation would depend on the actual linguistic situation found in each country, as well as on the specific aims of the respective governments. It was seen in chapter II, that the linguistic patterns in India and the U.S.S.R. differ in one very significant respect. Whereas in India, attempts to abolish English from the official sphere have left a vacuum which Hindi, as yet, is not able to fill effortlessly; in the U.S.S.R. the dominant position enjoyed by Russian under the

Tsars has continued unchallenged in the Soviet period. As a result, the U.S.S.R. is not faced with the momentous task of developing a common state language for the country, the majority of the efforts at language development being directed chiefly towards the different national languages. Here too, more time, energy and resources are expended in developing the non-Slavonic languages, as may be seen from the efforts in most of the Asiatic republics. Whether this policy is because the major Slavonic languages (Russian, Ukrainian, Byelorussian) are considered as having reached the necessary level of development prior to the Revolution, or whether the policy of developing the non-Slavonic languages is a guise for their eventual Russification is debatable. In India, on the other hand, the situation is complicated because of the lack of an assured dominance of a single language and the presence of a vast variety of languages having substantial literary traditions. The problems as such in India is, therefore, two-fold. In the first place, to ensure the success of the official language policy of the union, it is essential to evolve a new pan-Indian medium of expression out of Hindi; and secondly, to develop all the other fourteen languages mentioned in the Eighth Schedule of the Constitution, to make them worthy of use in administration and education.

The method and approach adopted for developing and enriching the languages would seem to follow from the overall policy of the two governments, depending on whether it is oriented towards the integration of the linguistic groups or their assimilation into a common mould. In the former case it is expected that in general vocabulary enrichment and evolution of new terminology take place from the available resources of the language, as also the development of its script. Where the main aim of language planning is assimilation, it follows that minority languages are enriched primarily by loan-words from the dominant language and attempts made to change or evolve its writing system to correspond to the script used for the 'donor' language. Both these policies have their advantages and disadvantages and the actual solution would depend

on whether higher priority is given to the benefits derived from a uniform script and terminology; or to the individual development of each language according to its own resources.

In both India and the U.S.S.R., therefore, the question of developing the various languages of the minority groups which have neither an alphabet nor a literary tradition is of prime importance. Coupled with this is the problem of enriching some of the more developed major languages with new terminology, especially in the scientific and technical fields, in order to equip them to meet the requirements of modern social life. A related problem is one of script. This may either be in the form of evolving a new script for languages which have never been written down, or modernizing the old ones and in some cases even replacing one script by another for the same language on various grounds. Besides these tasks common to the two countries is the problem peculiar to India of developing and propagating Hindi so that it may serve as the official language of the union as well as a medium of pan-India communication. Each of these aspects of language development will now be examined for the two countries.

Language Development in India

Development and Propagation of Hindi: Prior to its elevation to the status of the official language of India, Hindi was a regional language of the north, with no particular advantage over other languages save that of numbers. As such leaders from the non-Hindi regions in India, especially those with highly developed languages like Bengali and Tamil, have often described Hindi vis-a-vis the regional languages as the "first among equals", arguing at the same time, that sheer force of numbers does not justify Hindi being made the official language. The task facing the Government of India therefore is one of developing Hindi to a level befitting its status, as well as popularising its spread and study throughout the country.

Foreseeing the necessity of developing Hindi in order to implement its provision of making Hindi the official language of the Union, the Constitution of India, in a special directive laid it down that:

> "It shall be the duty of the Union to promote the spread of the Hindi language, to develop it so that it may serve as a medium of expression for all the elements of the composite culture of India and to secure its enrichment by assimilating without interfering with its genius, the forms, styles and expressions used in Hindustani and in the other languages of India specified in the Eighth Schedule, and by drawing, wherever necessary or desirable, for its vocabulary, primarily on Sanskrit and secondarily on other languages."[1]

This article not only laid it down as the duty of the Union to develop Hindi, but also specified the various tasks involved, namely, propagation, development and enrichment, in order to prepare Hindi as the official and link language of India. At the same time, the article is quite vague regarding the means to be adopted to enrich Hindi by laying down that it may draw from Hindustani, the regional languages and Sanskrit for its style and vocabulary. Thus the exact nature of the Hindi to be used as the official language of the Union is subject to various interpretations, thereby opening new grounds for fresh controversy. By attempting to satisfy different groups this provision raises the question whether a new type of Hindi is to be brought into existence, different from the language prevailing in the Hindi region.

Three distinct issues have to be examined with regard to the question of developing of Hindi, namely: (i) the tasks involved, i.e.,

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1. The Constitution of India (1950) Article 351.

propagation, development and enrichment; (ii) the agencies entrusted with performing them, i.e. official, non-official or both; and (iii) the means adopted to carry out the tasks, i.e. by borrowing from Sanskrit, the regional languages or Hindustani.

The actual task of implementing the Union government's policy of developing and promoting Hindi is under the auspices of the Union Ministry of Education. The ministry not only initiates and carries through its own programmes for the promotion of Hindi, but utilises the services of a large variety of organisations engaged in the task of propagation and development of Hindi.

Among the several programmes, both governmental and private for the propagation, development and enrichment are included: (1) the evolution, review, coordination and finalisation of Hindi terminology other than legal; (2) organisation of Hindi teachers' training colleges on a zonal basis in the non-Hindi speaking areas; (3) conducting correspondence courses in Hindi; (4) compilation of the Hindi encyclopaedia in ten volumes by the Nagari Pracharini Sabha; (5) preparation of bilingual and multilingual dictionaries; (6) translation of standard works in foreign languages into Hindi; (7) translation and publication of standard works on scientific and technical subjects; (8) translation into Hindi of codes, manuals, forms and non-statutory literature of the various Ministries and Departments of the Government of India; and (9) free distribution of Hindi books to schools, colleges and public libraries in the non-Hindi states.[1]

Various organisations have been set up by the Ministry of Education to perform these numerous tasks. The responsibility for translation and publication of standard works in Hindi is entrusted to whole-time, authorised

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1. India: A Reference Annual (New Delhi: Government of India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1969) p.74.

cells for specified subjects. During 1967-68 five such cells were located in universities, university departments and other academic bodies also providing agencies for the translation of books on various subjects.[1]

The Committee of Parliament appointed in 1958 to examine the recommendations of the Official Language Commission supported the prevalent feeling that the increasing load of technical and executive functions necessitated the creation of a separate subordinate office for dealing with the multifarious activities undertaken by the Ministry of Education. Thus it was that in 1960 the Central Hindi Directorate (Kendriya Hindi Nideshalaya) was set up as a "subordinate office" of the Ministry of Education. Formally, its job is to undertake programmes for the development and dissemination of Hindi, as well as to get the administrative materials of the Government of India translated. The Directorate has wide coordinating authority in order to perform the first task; while the second task is of great magnitude since on an average, one hundred manuals and two thousand forms are being translated by this office annually.[2]

Hindi publication programme, apart from the work of the Directorate, is undertaken by the Ministry of Education itself. The ministry handles an extensive programme for publishing Hindi primers and readers. It also offers facilities for publishing works of non-Hindi literature, either translated into Hindi or transcribed in Devanagari; offers various prizes to Hindi authors and subsidies to Hindi publishers; and it maintains an elaborate system for the distribution of Hindi books free of cost to the non-Hindi-speaking states for schools, colleges and public libraries.

Production and distribution of printed words, whether created or translated, represents only one dimension of the implementation of Hindi

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1. Reports 1967-68. (New Delhi, Government of India, Ministry of Education, 1968) pp. 119-120.
2. DasGupta, J.: Language Conflict and National Development. (Bombay, Oxford University Press, 1970) p. 167.

planning. Learning the language is equally important. To provide facilities for Hindi teaching, a central organisation, known as the Central Hindi Teaching Organisation (Kendriya Hindi Shikshana Mandal) was set up in 1960 to promote technical expertise and guidance for teaching Hindi. The training of Hindi teachers is systematically undertaken in this project. This body has sponsored a teacher-training organisation for Hindi (Kendriya Hindi Sansthan) at Agra since 1966.[1] Besides these central efforts, the Ministry of Education provides facilities and finances for the teaching of Hindi in non-Hindi-speaking states. In 1968 an extensive system of correspondence courses to teach Hindi was planned. In addition, the total cost of setting up Hindi teacher-training colleges in non-Hindi-speaking states is borne by the Ministry of Education.

Further, the Ministry of Education has undertaken certain technical innovations for the promotion and development of Hindi. The reform of the Devanagari script, standardisation of Hindi shorthand, rationalisation of key-board designs for typewriter, teleprinter and linotype machines are some of the more important moves in this direction.

Besides these official efforts, several voluntary organisations co-operate with the Ministry of Education in expanding and accelerating the activities regarding the propagation of Hindi. Chief among these organisations are the Hindi Sahitya Sammelan, the Rashtra Bhasha Prachar Samiti, Wardha; the Dakshin Bharat Hindi Prachar Sabha, Madras; and the Rashtra Bhasha Sabha, Poona. These voluntary organisations received substantial aid from the Government of India for their programmes. On the official level, the Committee of Parliament on Official Language accepted the recommendations of the Official Language Commission that the central government should give "liberal

1. Propagation and Development of Hindi, A Review (1952-1967). (New Delhi, Government of India, Ministry of Education, 1969) p.38.

financial assistance" to voluntary associations "for enlarging and improving their activities" for the systematic organization and expansion of the work of the propagation of Hindi.[1] Apart from the governmental assistance, the Hindi organisations also collect large sums of money through the process of conducting examinations in Hindi - a practice which is facilitated by the union government's recognition of these examinations.

Three other ministries, besides the Ministry of Education, participate in the union government's Hindi development programme. The Ministry of Law has been entrusted with getting the major texts of law translated into Hindi, and with promoting the progressive use of these Hindi versions in the courts of India. The Ministry of Home Affairs started a project of teaching Hindi to central government employees in 1955. Since 1960, training in Hindi has been made obligatory for all central government employees, with certain exceptions.[2] The Ministry of Home Affairs is also responsible for matters relating to the progressive use of Hindi for official transactions, and an advisory board called the Hindi Salahkar Samiti has been formed to assist the ministry in this direction.[3] Finally, the role of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting in promoting Hindi is significant, its main instrument for this purpose being the All-India Radio, the monopoly broadcasting organisation operated by the Government of India. In December 1949, it started a programme of Hindi lessons, which were broadcast from every radio station in the non-Hindi areas. The unimaginative way of conducting the programme resulting in their unpopularity, coupled with the emergency situation in 1962 led to the discontinuation of the programme for good.[4]

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1. Report of the Committee of Parliament on Official Language (New Delhi, Government of India, 1958) pp. 53-54.
2. The exceptions are employees aged over forty-five in 1961 and those below class III status. Central government employees in industrial establishments are also excepted. Moreover, "no penalties are attached to failure to pass the prescribed examinations." See, Report 1967-68 (New Delhi, Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, 1968) p.91.
3. Ibid p.92.
4. Awasthy, G.C.: Broadcasting in India (Bombay, Allied Publishers, 1965) p.131.

However, as an expert committee appointed by the Government of India noted, "the fact that this discontinuation has not raised a murmur of protest anywhere seems to indicate that these lessons have not enthused people."[1]

Apart from its Hindi lessons, the All-India Radio has sought to promote Hindi through an increasing use of the language in its news bulletins. A heated controversy prevails here, centered around the kind of Hindi to be used in the news bulletins, and the policy has fluctuated from Sanskritised Hindi to Urdu-dominated Hindustani depending on the strength of the rival pressures on the Union government.

From the preceeding information it is evident that stupendous efforts were made both by the union government and the Hindi faction inside and outside Parliament to step up the development of Hindi in order to meet the 1965 deadline. What is, however, really significant to note is whether these efforts yielded the desired results, namely popularising the study of Hindi and facilitating its use in official transactions. It is unfortunate that the actual use of the products of Hindi planning has rarely been subjected to systematic investigation. Success is usually measured by the number of terms, volumes, schools and programmes, rather than by the actual results. What is the nature of this new Hindi that is being developed, and is it being used by those for whom it is created? These important questions merit more attention than the amount of monetary investment taken by itself.

Moreover, the nature of the new Hindi which is evolved depends very much on the basic objectives of the experts entrusted with this task. This is because of the possibility, within the Indian political system, of these experts performing a political role through organised interest group action at the various stages of language-planning in India. This enables

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1. Radio and Television: Report of the Committee on Broadcasting and Information Media. (New Delhi, Government of India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1966) p.68.

the experts to attempt to impose their own objectives on Indian language planning, these objectives being not necessarily the same as those of the government.

The objectives guiding the Hindi experts appear to stem largely from their socio-cultural background. Leadership of the Hindi movement is composed almost entirely of personnel drawn from the literary and rhetorical sectors of social life,[1] since the scientific and technical personnel as also the academicians from the social sciences in the Hindi-speaking areas rarely ever speak in Hindi in the communications relating to their profession. DasGupta claims that this lack of "functional diversification" among the leaders of the Hindi movement, and its monopolisation by a literary elite, inevitably tend to "put a premium on the purity of the language and continuity with the tradition of the Hindi literati, than on the use of the language for functional efficiency and the expansion of communication."[2]

Most of the efforts, both official and non-official, aimed at the development of Hindi have been marked by a sense of urgency to meet the fifteen-year deadline. In their hurry the administrators seem to have gathered around them whatever experts were available in the Hindi intellectual circles, most of whom happened to be the literary leaders associated with the Hindi movement through the Hindi organisations. Once pressed into service, these Hindi experts were quick to bring their basic conviction to bear on their task of language planning. For them the demands of linguistic standardization in terms of orthodoxy and "purity" of the language seemed to be more important than the comprehensibility and functional efficiency of the language. They held that the development of Hindi is dependent on the creation of a vocabulary

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1. This is apparent from an examination of the professional backgrounds of the leading office-holders of the various Hindi organisations. Usually these leaders are either literary authors or active political leaders with literary reputations.

2. DasGupta, J.: Language Conflict and National Development. op.cit. p.178.

that is consistent with the genius of the Indian languages.[1] "Our languages will again go into the lap of mother Sanskrit, the language of India, when she was free. We shall have again our own words. . . When this is done Indians will be free of the thraldom of the European languages."[2] In creating a new vocabulary, therefore, "Sanskrit will be a mighty weapon for forging all our linguistic needs."[3] Moreover, it was argued that if the newly developing Hindi were to be Sanskritised, it would be brought closer to the other Indian languages. But the idea of bringing Hindi closer to the other Indian languages by simplifying its grammar or style was out of the question for these experts.

Hindi language-planners, generally, have justified their emphasis on the codification of the form of standard Hindi rather than on its universal comprehensibility on the grounds that it is the task of the experts to create the new language, while the attitude of those who were to use it should be "that of a learner, a receiver."[4] This artificial creation of a language by a small group of experts is, however, contrary to the popular notion of a language evolving gradually through usage. Nevertheless, the preoccupation of the Hindi experts with codification has led, in practice, to a disproportionate emphasis on the vocabulary problems rather than on the communicational capacity of the artificially increased lexical stock. Besides vocabulary changes, the new grammatical features and the new syntax are oriented more towards Sanskrit than towards colloquial Hindi as used in non-literary communication. As a result, there have been erected a set of new barriers between the newly standardised Hindi and the commonly comprehended Hindi as spoken and written in the Hindi areas till recently.

The same holds true for the Hindi used for the All-India Radio

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1. Raghuvira: India's National Language. (New Delhi, International Academy of Indian Culture, 1965) p. 221.
2. Ibid. pp. 206-207.
3. Ibid. p. 222.
4. Ibid. p. 223.

news bulletins. In November 1949, about the same time that Hindi was constitutionally recognised as the official language of India, the term "news in Hindustani" was suddenly changed to "news in Hindi." Together with this the language of the Hindi news bulletins also became highly Sanskritised to the extent that Nehru complained that he could not understand the language in which his own Hindi speeches were being broadcast.[1] This raises the interesting question of whether the Hindi news bulletins are understood by those for whom they are meant; and together with the overall policy of Sanskritising Hindi, presents another dimension to the problem of popularising the spread of Hindi. This is because, in the first place, the choice of Hindi as the official language of the country is not welcomed with equal enthusiasm all over the country, and added to that, instead of simplifying the language, attempts are made to alienate this new Hindi from the already prevalent colloquial Hindi understood almost all over the country.

Though a certain amount of arbitrariness is unavoidable in setting the norms of development of a language, there are available a set of norms drawn from linguistic expertise which can be used to guide language planning under any situation. One suggestion by Punya Sloka Ray invites attention to three components that should go into language planning, namely, efficiency, rationality and consonality.[2] Efficiency refers to the economy of the learning efforts, while rationality implies the intellectual capacity of a language to correspond to available knowledge. The third component, consonality, refers to "maximal adoption as token of a unified life of language use."[3]

For the Hindi experts, however, these criteria are secondary to the question of nationalist pride, as defined by them. Their preoccupation is more with the creation of a formal structure of an ideal "pure" Hindi, drawn

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1. Amasthy, G.C.: Broadcasting in India. Op.cit. p.132.
2. Ray, P.S.: Language Standardization (The Hague, Mouton, 1963) p.12.
3. Ibid.

from Sanskrit, than with the actual function that this structure is capable of performing as the official language of the Union. According to them, this classicalizing of Hindi is expected to meet the criterion of rationality. If, in the process, the criteria of efficiency and commonality suffer, the loss, in their view, is made up by the expected boost to national pride. Moreover, they hold that commonality should be imposed by politically forcing greater numbers to use the experts' products. This lack of emphasis on the functional utility of Hindi and the concentrated effort to purify it from all "alien" influences have provoked widespread criticism both within and outside the Hindi-speaking areas. Within the Hindi area the artificial product has tended to erect barriers between literary communication and mass communication on the one hand, and between the proposed literary language and the actually used scientific language on the other. Outside the Hindi area, this new Hindi, being different from the colloquial Hindi normally understood by the majority, has resulted in reinforcing the opposition against Hindi from the non-Hindi speaking communities and associations.

This common grievance against the new Hindi has facilitated a coalition of groups of the major non-Hindi states. Their opposition found expression in an organised form at the All-India Language Conference convened on March 8, 1958 under the initiative of C. Rajagopalachari, a keen opponent of Hindi from Madras. This conference was attended by representatives of the Tamil, Malayalam, Telugu, Assamese, Oriya, Marathi, Kannada and Bengali languages, all of whom had been provoked into opposition by the efforts of the Hindi experts. At this conference Rajagopalachari declared that "Hindi is as much foreign to the non-Hindi speaking people as English to the protagonists of Hindi."[1] Frank Anthony, a representative of the Anglo-Indian community, asserted that not even one percent of the "so-called Hindi-speaking

1. National Herald (Lucknow, March 9, 1958).

people" know the Hindi that is disseminated by the All India Radio.[1] But, he added, "worse than the stylised unreal character of the new Hindi is the fact that it has become, increasingly, the symbol of all that is reactionary and retrograde in the country. The new Hindi today is the symbol of communalism; it is a symbol of religion, it is the symbol of chauvinism, and worst of all, it is the symbol of oppression of the minority languages. . . . There is an unanswerable case for a complete revision of the language provision (in the Constitution) in the light of the experience of the past several years."[2] This may be a rather exaggerated pronouncement, but it nonetheless reflects the prevalent climate of opinion among leaders of the non-Hindi speaking groups. From the Punjab, itself engrossed in a bitter struggle against Hindi, Tara Singh referred to the way in which organised Hindi groups identified Hindi with Hinduism and Hindustan, concluding that the Hindi imperialism was a new menace posing a grave danger to Indian unity.[3] Ironically, the language chosen to foster national unity in India, has itself become the source of bitter controversy and conflict in the country.

Strong opposition and agitation from the non-Hindi areas served to modify the original constitutional provisions and give statutory recognition to the adoption of English as the associate official language. However, as far as the development of Hindi is concerned, there is no evidence to suggest that the trend of driving Hindi into the lap of "mother Sanskrit" has been reversed, or that the new language has been made functionally effective. Both, the Parliamentary Resolution on Languages and the Government of India Resolution on the National Policy on Education passed in 1968, reiterated the adoption and execution of more intensive and comprehensive programmes for accelerating the development and spread of Hindi and its progressive use for

1. Anthony, F.: "Address to the All-India Language Conference" in Modern India Rejects Hindi. Report of the All-India Language Conference, (Association for the Advancement of the National Languages of India, 1968) p.56.
2. Ibid. pp.56-57.
3. Ibid. pp.47-54.

the various official purposes of the Union. However, apart from reiterating the provisions of the Constitution that "every effort should be made to promote the development of Hindi," and that "in developing Hindi as the link language, due care should be taken to ensure that it will serve, as provided for in Article 351 of the Constitution, as a medium of expression for all the elements of the composite culture of India,"[1] these policy declarations do not lay down any normative patterns to guide the Hindi planners and ensure that in the struggle to maintain the "purity" of the language, comprehensibility and functional efficiency are not sacrificed in the interests of linguistic standardization. Consequently, as long as Hindi planning is influenced at each stage by the literary experts from the Hindi areas performing a political function through organised pressure groups, the resulting language will be determined principally by objectives arising out of the particular political interests of that region. Moreover, when these objectives are inspired by ideas of national pride and linguistic "purity" without any serious thought to the recognised norms of language planning, the development of Hindi will continue in the direction of increasing Sanskritisation and the accompanying alienation from the common language understood by the majority of Indians.

At the regional level, language planning in India has been undertaken Development of the Regional Languages: Side by side with the attempts to develop Hindi there have been similar movements in the different linguistic regions of India to develop and enrich the regional languages in order to make them effective vehicles of administration and education in the States. The movements to develop the regional languages include, besides the literary development of the language, the writing of new books, and translating of existing books from English to facilitate the change-over to the regional languages as media of instruction at the secondary and tertiary stages.

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1. National Policy on Education. (New Delhi, Government of India, Ministry of Education, 1968) p.4.

In fact, many of the problems faced by the contemporary Hindi planners were given considerable attention by the intelligentsia in several regional language communities as early as the nineteenth century. The Hindi planners justify their policy of Sanskritising Hindi on the grounds that this would bring it closer to most of the other Indian languages, such as Bengali, Marathi and Gujarati which have been borrowing extensively from Sanskrit. Using Sanskrit as a common source for developing most of the north Indian languages leads some leaders to pin their hopes on Sanskrit as a bridge between the various languages. But, a famous authority on language standardisation in India, Punya Sloka Ray warns that this belief is based in part on an oversimplification. According to Ray, though the various Indian languages have borrowed from Sanskrit, the results have varied considerably among these languages. The common source has not necessarily led to a convergence of the borrowing languages. Ray points out that "even when naturally intelligible, and this is not always true, the Sanskrit loanwords in the different languages may be felt as mutually grotesque and barbarous."[1] The Hindi leaders' expectation of building a linguistic bridge chiefly through the means of Sanskritisation is not justified unless the new Hindi embodies within it, the characteristic features of the other Indian languages.

At the regional level, language planning in India has been undertaken primarily by voluntary, non-governmental institutions. Their efforts have been aimed chiefly at translating educational books from English into the regional languages. The Bombay Native School Book and School Society, the Deccan Vernacular Translation Society and the School Book Society of Calcutta devoted systematic efforts to bringing Western literature in arts and science to the people through their own language media. These efforts were substantially augmented by the general attempts of their respective language societies to

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1. Ray, P.S.: Language Standardization. Op. cit. pp.72-73.

2. Ibid. p.74.

modernise the regional languages. Among the more significant of these organisational efforts were those of the Maharashtra Sahitya Parishad, the Maharashtra Shabda Kosh Mandal, the Gujarat Vidya Pith, the Gujarat Vernacular Society, the Bangiya Sahitya Parishad and the Tamil Cultural Society.

In recent years, especially with the emphasis on a change-over to the regional languages as media of higher education, the universities and state governments have stepped in to encourage the development of the various languages. For instance, when the vice-chancellors of the three universities in Andhra Pradesh decided to introduce Telugu as the medium in the degree classes, the government of Andhra Pradesh entrusted the Telugu Akademi with the task of preparing books for the degree classes in the Telugu medium.[1]

The central government, however, provides financial assistance to the voluntary organisations for the promotion of Indian languages. Under this scheme assistance has been given to various voluntary organisations for bringing out encyclopaedias, bilingual dictionaries, books of knowledge and other publications on cultural, linguistic and literary subjects.[2] Moreover, central grants are available to the different state governments for the production of university level books in the regional languages concerned in order to help the changeover in the media of instruction.[3]

Nevertheless, for various reasons, under private enterprise, not all languages were able to develop at a uniform rate. One of the chief drawbacks was the absence of an intelligentsia conversant both with the language and with a particular subject or speciality in each linguistic region. Co-ordinated efforts on a national level, therefore seemed imperative if

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1. University News, Vol. 9, No.6 (New Delhi, June, 1971) p.3.
2. India. A Reference Annual. (New Delhi, Government of India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1969) p.75.
3. Ibid. p.74.

all the languages mentioned in the Eighth Schedule of the Constitution were to be used for administrative and educational purposes.

It was with this end in view that the Government's Resolution of 16th January, 1968 on the Language Policy as adopted by both the Houses of Parliament emphasized that in the interest of the educational and cultural advancement of the country it was necessary to "take concerted measures for the full development of the fourteen major languages of India, besides Hindi;"[1] and enjoined upon the Union Government to prepare and implement a programme in collaboration with the state governments for the coordinated development of all these languages so that they grow rapidly in richness and become effective means of communicating modern knowledge.

One of the practical outcomes of this resolution was the establishment of the Central Institute of Indian Languages by the Ministry of Education at Mysore on 17th July, 1969 to promote the Indian languages, and assist and coordinate the existing efforts in this area. The Institute is intended to "serve as a nucleus to bring together all the research and literary output from the various linguistic streams to a common head", ensure equality and avoid duplication and waste.[2] Through a scientific study of the Indian languages it aims at unravelling the basic unity which underlies the Indian languages, and promoting inter-linguistic research leading to their enrichment. At the same time, the Central Institute runs four Regional Language Centres to serve the various linguistic regions of the country. Through their programmes of intensive training in Indian languages to Secondary School teachers, these Centres seek to provide incentive to all Indian states for the implementation of the three language formula.

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1. The Central Institute of Indian Languages (New Delhi, Government of India, Ministry of Education, 1971) p.1.
2. Pattanayak, D.P.: Language Policy and Programme (New Delhi, Government of India, Ministry of Education, 1970) p.4.

Thus, several attempts are made to enrich the various Indian languages, whose development "is a sine qua non for educational and cultural development," and without which, it is realised, "the creative energies of the people will not be released, standards of education will not improve, knowledge will not spread to the people and the gulf between the intelligentsia and the masses will remain, if not widen further."[1] Together with this, taking into account the vital role performed by English in Indian education, the declared policy is to improve the standards of teaching English in the country.. For this purpose an autonomous body known as the Central Institute of English, was set up by the Union Ministry of Education in 1958 at Hyderabad. The main task of the Institute is to improve standards of English teaching, both through organisation of research in this field and specialised training of teachers in modern scientific methods of language teaching based on linguistic research and experiment in the classroom.

Preparation of a Scientific and Technical Terminology: Changes in the social structure, new forms of government and rapid achievements in the fields of science and technology have given rise to new concepts which need to be expressed in new words and phrases. Creation of a new terminology, therefore, becomes an essential part of the process of developing a language to function effectively in a modern technological society.

Accordingly, attempts are being made in India to develop technical terms in Hindi and the other regional languages which would have a national acceptance. To coordinate the efforts of various bodies on a national scale, the Ministry of Education, in 1950, sponsored a Board of Scientific Terminology to prepare 350,000 new terms in Hindi, of which 290,000 were reported produced by 1963.[2] In 1961 the Board was replaced by a standing Commission for Scientific

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1. National Policy on Education. (New Delhi, Government of India, Ministry of Education, 1968) p.3.
2. See, Educational Activities of the Government of India (New Delhi, Government of India, Ministry of Education, 1963) p.134.

and Technical Terminology, which by 1967-68 had produced 200,000 terms related to the sciences, humanities and social sciences in Hindi, and published 125,000 terms in twelve glossaries which it released.[1] Apart from terms pertaining to academic fields, considerable effort has been invested in the production of specific terms relating to various departments and ministries. Besides evolving technical terms in different subject fields - about 61,000 terms by 1970, the Commission has also published 159 books of university level in Hindi during the last few years.[2]

Impressive as these figures appear, they are meaningless unless the practicality and functional utility of the terms evolved are examined. To be adopted with the minimum of effort, these terms have to take cognizance of the prevailing terminology in use in the various languages, and secure maximum uniformity for pan-Indian use. Here the question arises as to how far to adopt words and terms from English, coin new terms from those available in the various languages, or fall back upon Sanskrit. It was seen that the Hindi enthusiasts had a strong inclination towards Sanskrit. But they did not stop here. In their zeal to maintain the 'purity' of the language, the Hindi experts came out in favour of replacing international numerals with Devanagari numerals for use all over India, and introducing Devanagari symbols to replace the widely used symbols in mathematics and science based on Greek and Roman letters.[3] The insistence on the use of Devanagari symbols for these purposes is likely to provoke other regional languages to adopt their own symbols, thereby leading to a compartmentalisation of Indian scientific literature and the inevitable retardation of scientific communication and development in India.

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1. Report, 1967-68 (New Delhi, Government of India, Ministry of Education, 1968) p.119. For a sample of the official efforts see, A Consolidated Glossary of Technical Terms (English-Hindi) (New Delhi, Government of India, Ministry of Education, 1962).
2. Pattanayak, D.P.: Language Policy and Programmes. Op.cit. p.8.
3. See, Hindi Vishwakosha (Hindi Encyclopaedia), Vol.6 (Nagari Pracharani Sabha, 1966) pp.156-157.

As with the literary development of the language, so with terminology, most of the Hindi leaders have opted completely for a policy of Indianisation, falling back heavily upon Sanskrit as a source of supply. Purification is a costly process and sometimes produces an artificial idiom hardly intelligible to the common man. Precisely with these considerations in mind, the report of the Scientific Terminology of the CABE published in 1941, as well as similar recommendations emerging from other non-official sources have suggested a large measure of acceptance of foreign names and terms in all the regional languages.[1] None of them have recommended a complete Indianisation of the terminology. Rather, they caution against the complete isolationism that could result from a blind policy of Indianisation, especially in the field of scientific knowledge. These efforts are also marked by an awareness that modern science is a western development and that nothing would be gained by an obsessional purification of the language of science. Most of the Hindi planners, however, have not shown an eagerness to adopt this broad-minded approach to language development found in the relatively advanced regional languages of India.

This rigid adherence to Indianisation of terminology has provoked widespread criticism against the Hindi experts. Both Gandhi and Nehru were in favour of assimilating "many words from English and other foreign languages". Nehru added, "it is better to have well-known words rather than evolve new and difficult words from the Sanskrit or Persian or Arabic. . . The way to enrich our language is to make it flexible and capable of assimilating words and ideas from other languages."[2] Together with Azad, Nehru tried to gather support from a group of technically oriented experts who were recruited to represent their speciality subjects on the officially appointed boards of the Government of India, entrusted with the task of coining technical terms. The terms evolved by this groupdiffered significantly from those of the Hindi

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1. See, Chatterji, S.K.: Report Regarding the Indian Language Development Conference. (Poona, University of Poona, 1953) pp. 37-41.
2. Nehru, J.: An Autobiography. (London, The Bodley Head, 1953) pp.454-456.

experts in that they emphasized intelligibility more than regularity and rigidity in codification. The technical experts tried to maintain a balance between a policy of flexible borrowing from English and of maintaining a closer relation with commonly intelligible Hindi speech. In spite of their influence on the official evolution of scientific terms, and the support that they enjoyed from the Hindustani-oriented group in the Indian government, their efforts were too specialised and their scope too narrow to stem the tide of general influence exercised by the Hindi experts.

Not only is it essential to have a functionally effective terminology in Hindi and the other Indian language, but it is also equally important to have a uniform terminology in all the languages to facilitate interregional exchange of scientific knowledge. Coining of different terms for each regional language, if at all practicable and necessary, would mean a colossal duplication of work, endless funds and many years to complete. The necessity of developing technical terms which would have a national acceptance in India has been recognised by the officially appointed Commission for Scientific and Technical Terminology. In September, 1968, a conference of state officers in charge of regional languages was held by the Commission, wherein it was agreed that, as far as possible, scientific and technical terms in the various languages should be uniform, and the terminology evolved by the Commission should serve as a basis for adoption or adaptation in the regional languages. Complete data of terminological work conducted by various State agencies are being collected by the Commission, and a broad-based continuing "Terminology Unit" is proposed to be created to undertake terminological work in the future in various branches of sciences and to meet the needs of various government departments and universities in the developing Indian languages.[1]

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1. Report 1970-71 (New Delhi, Government of India, Ministry of Education, 1971) p.99.

The Problem of Script: The question of language development is closely linked with the question of evolving or developing a script. This is especially true in a multilingual country where several languages are in use, some written, others handed down by word of mouth. For the latter, either a new alphabet has to be created, or the script of an already developed language adopted to put them in written form. Moreover, many traditional orthographies are not suited to machine writing which requires simple writing systems using a limited number of characters which can be arranged in a single line.[1]

All the fifteen major languages of India are written in one of the four distinct families of scripts in use in India today, namely: (1) Devanagari script for most north Indian languages; (2) Dravidian script for the four south Indian languages; (3) Perso-Arabic script for Urdu, Sindhi, Kashmiri and Punjabi; and (4) Roman script chiefly for English, and also for Konkani. Usually a cultural value is attached not only to the languages but also to the traditional ways of writing them.

If the three-language formula is faithfully implemented in secondary schools, it would in the majority of cases, involve the study of not only three languages, but three scripts as well - the Devanagari of Hindi, the script of the regional or mother tongue if different, and the Roman of English. In such cases it could be advantageous to the students if the different languages were written in the same script, so that they do not have to learn to read and write a second time for the second language, but make a more or less direct transfer for their previously acquired abilities.

Even outside school, it is of practical value to have relative uniformity in the way in which the major languages of the country are written. To the extent that they are similar, the learning of an additional language is

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1. Unesco: The Use of Vernacular Languages in Education. (Paris, Unesco, 1953) p. 60.

facilitated, and the additional expense of specially constructed typewriters and teleprinters for each language is cut down.

All these considerations lead many far seeing Indians to advocate the use of a single script for all Indian languages. Controversy however begins on the question of choosing a common script. There are several obstacles towards achieving unification of scripts because of the attachment people may have developed towards a given form of script or because of a strong feeling they may hold against another one. The competition between Hindi and English for the position of the official language of India extends in the sphere of choosing a common script for Indian languages, the two main contestants here being the Devanagari of Hindi and the Roman of English.

Since its inception in 1893, the Nagari Pracharani Sabha at Benares, worked for the literary and political promotion of Hindi in the Devanagari script, Tilak declaring as early as 1905 that Devanagari should be accepted as the script for India.[1] A relatively moderate view was expressed by Gandhi. To support his advocacy of Hindustani, drawn from both Hindi and Urdu, as the national language of India, Gandhi allowed that it should be written in both the Devanagari and Urdu scripts, claiming, however, that "the script which has greater power will be more widely used and thus become the national script."[2] That this would eventually be Devanagari, was accepted by Gandhi without much doubt.

In more recent times, V.K.R.V. Rao, at one time Union Minister of Education, has advocated the development of Devanagari as the common script for India to help those wishing to learn a language other than their own, and promote the unity of the country.[3] Besides the practical difficulties of

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1. Gopal, R.: Lokmanya Tilak, A Biography (Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1956), pp. 240-242.
2. Gandhi, M.K.: Thoughts on National Language (Ahmedabad, Navjivan, 1961) pp. 5-6.
3. Rao, V.K.R.V.: Education and Human Resources Development. (New Delhi, Allied Publishers, 1966) pp.162-166.

adjusting the Roman script to the Indian languages, Rao maintained that adopting Roman as the common script for India would not be conducive to the self-respect of the Indian nation. Thus, it appears, national unity is to be achieved not only through a common language, but also through a common script.

The question of language and script has also been considered by various committees and commissions appointed by the Government of India, many of which are in favour of the Devanagari script. Among these may be mentioned the Wardha Committee, 1937; the Tara Chand Committee on the Medium of Instruction at the University stage, 1948; the Official Language Commission, 1956; the Conference of Chief Ministers, 1961; the National Integration Conference, 1961; and the National Integration Council, 1962.

A significant difference is evidenced in the recommendations of the Committee on Emotional Integration, 1962, which states the arguments for and against a common language and a common script with particular reference to emotional integration. Recognising the need for an easy all-India script for the official language, the Committee recommended that "to facilitate the adoption of Hindi as a common language in non-Hindi areas. . . the Hindi-speaking people should agree to the use of the Roman script as an alternative script for an interim period."[1] This, however, would not imply that the Hindi-speaking States would have to discard the use of Devanagari. It simply meant that to popularise the study of Hindi in the non-Hindi speaking areas a beginning may be made with the publication of Hindi books in the Roman script and the compilation of simple dictionaries in Hindi-other Indian languages, also in the Roman script. This, it was hoped, would promote the spread of spoken Hindi more rapidly than has hitherto been the case. Adopting the Roman script, it is generally believed, would not only save the efforts of learning extra scripts, but would also be easier, since the Devanagari script, though

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1. Report of the Committee on Emotional Integration (New Delhi, Government of India, Ministry of Education, 1962) p.52.

very scientific, is complicated when compared to the Roman script, besides being uneconomic since it is alleged to take 75 percent more space, and 50 percent longer to read and write.[1]

Many national leaders have proposed the adoption of Roman as a common script for India, without much success. S.C. Bose, after his visit to Turkey in 1934, was converted to the idea of adopting the Roman script for Indian languages. At the Haripur Session of the All India Congress Committee he said: "To promote national unity we shall have to develop one lingua franca and script."[2] The only suitable script for him was Roman, as that would bring India in line with the rest of the world. In view of the great diversity of script found in India, he maintained that "the choice of a uniform script for the whole of India should be made in a scientific and impartial spirit, free from bias of every kind."[3]

Nehru, Azad and Kabir have also supported the use of Roman as an optional script as a step towards national integration. Among supporters of Roman include such eminent political leaders and linguists as Zakir Hussain, S.K. Chatterji, Frank Anthony, C. Deshmukh and C. Subramaniam. Nevertheless the debate still continues, and will perhaps remain unresolved till a script is divorced from any emotional attachment. As Kabir points out, a script consists of mere visual signs to refer to particular letters in the alphabet. The same sound can and is represented by any number of different visual symbols. Therefore, technically, any language can be written in any script, provided the alphabet has the necessary sounds. The only basis on which to prefer a script, therefore, should be "clarity, legibility and capacity for easy manual and mechanical manipulation."[4] A script chosen for national use

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1. World Language Survey: India (Washington, D.C., Center for Applied Linguistics of the Modern Language Association of America, 1960) p.2.
2. Cited in the Illustrated Weekly of India. (Bombay, January 13, 1974).
3. Ibid.
4. Kabir, H.: "Language, Alphabet and Script". Forward to Saran, S. India's National Writing (Delhi, Oriental Publishers, 1969) p.IX.

should be comprehensive so as to satisfy the needs of every linguistic community, besides being as easy to learn and adopt as possible. Of these languages [illegible] written [illegible] either in Arabic script (like Turkish, Kashmiri and Kurdish), or else based on Latin (like Hausa, Swahili, Somali and Uzbek).[1]

These purely technical arguments, however, do not have much influence over those who are attached to a particular script, or prejudiced against another. The proposal for adopting the Roman script for pan-Indian use has not met with great enthusiasm partly because of sentimental attachments to the native script and partly because of the difficulty of rendering in the Roman script some of the phonetic peculiarities of the Indian languages. In the case of Devanagari, on the other hand, although its wide use and relatively greater technical advantage over the other Indian scripts, justifies its claim for the status of national script, it is very doubtful if the people speaking Dravidian languages will not consider any step in that direction as a sign of another 'imperialism' from the North. In the meantime, considerable time, energy and money continue to be expended in the attempt to learn three or more scripts. [illegible] literacy and developing national cultures, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union set the urgent task [illegible] Language Development in the U.S.S.R. [illegible] vernacular for people whose native tongue had no written form.[2]

Before the October Revolution, the languages of the peoples of Russia differed in their degree of development. In the first place, there are those languages which have had a fully established system of writing and a long standing and rich literary tradition (like Russian, Ukrainian and Byelo-Russian, Georgian and Armenian, Lithuanian, Latvian, Estonian, Azerbaydzhani, Uzbek, Tartar and Tadzhik). According to an official publication, these [illegible] languages "fulfill all the complex of functions of literary languages, that is, they serve in all sphere of life and activity of the given people."[1] [illegible]

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1. "XXII Sezd KPSS i zadachi izucheniya zakonomernostey razvitiya sovremennykh natsionalnykh yazykov Sovetskogo Soyuza" (The Twenty-Second Congress of the CPSU and the Problems of the Study of the Orderly Development of Contemporary National Languages of the Soviet Union) in Voprosy Yazykoznaniya (Problems of Linguistics) No.1 (Moscow, Akademiya Nauk SSSR, January 1962) p.5. [illegible]

2. [illegible] Information Department of the U.S.S.R. Embassy in India, [illegible] p.12.

However, there are other languages whose functions have "not gone beyond the circle of the local production and family sphere." Moreover, some of these languages have an under-developed written form either in Arabic script (like Turkmen, Bashkir and Karakalpak), or else based on Russian (like Komi, Erzya, Moksha, Chuvash and Udmurt).[1]

The different stages of cultural evolution reached by many small tribes and national groups, some of whom with no alphabet, literary tradition, or intelligentsia, made the application of Lenin's nationality policy, as embodied in the Declaration of Rights of Nationalities of November 3, 1917, very difficult. Accordingly, under the guiding principles issued by the Moscow Commissariat of Public Instruction, on April 27, 1927, the Academy of Sciences appointed special Commissions to study the languages of small tribes and national nationalities who had no alphabet, to create an alphabet and grammar, and to write textbooks.[2] Recognising the importance of the native tongue in eliminating illiteracy and developing national cultures, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union set the organs of public education and the research institutes the urgent task of drawing up written languages in the vernacular for people whose native tongue had no written form.[3]

Commentators on the Soviet Union have ascribed several motives to the spectacular encouragement of practically all the vernaculars in the country. One reason advanced is that cultural autonomy for each minority was a necessary condition of the unity and strength of the Soviet Union. Again, without the provision of schools in the vernaculars it is believed there could have been no such rapid conquest of illiteracy as the Soviet Union now claims to have achieved. Moreover, it is alleged that literacy and the use of the vernaculars

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1. Bryantseva, T.G.: "Languages of the People of the U.S.S.R." in Maxwell, R. (ed) Information U.S.S.R. (Oxford, Pergamon Press, 1962) p.183.
2. Hans, N.: Comparative Education (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958) p.6
3. Desheriev, J.D.: Development of Non-Russian Languages in the U.S.S.R. (New Delhi, Information Department of the U.S.S.R. Embassy in India, 1957) p.18.

have made possible the widespread propaganda of communist doctrine and the mass circulation of the reported speeches of the leading personalities as found in the U.S.S.R. today.[1]

Whether spread of communist propaganda has been the motive force or the result of developing the national languages is debatable. The avowed aim of the Communist Party, as put forward at its tenth Congress in 1921, was "to develop among (the non-Great Russian peoples) a press, schools, theatres, clubs and cultural-educational institutions in general, using their native languages."[2] In order to put these decisions into practice, a system of writing had to be worked out.

Choice of a Script: A research and organisational centre, called the Central Committee for New Alphabets, was set up after the October Revolution to draw up written languages in the vernacular for peoples whose native tongue had no written form.[3] The job of the Committee was to settle theoretical and general problems connected with compiling alphabets.

About fifty minority groups have been reported to have acquired an alphabet for the first time. Regarding the choice of an alphabet and script, it is claimed by Soviet authorities that the question of which alphabet their writing should be based on was decided by authoritative representatives of the peoples without a written language. The role of the scientists, it is held, was to explain the advantages and disadvantages of the existing alphabets.

However, in the late 1920s and early 1930s attempts were made in the Central Asian republics to abolish the Arabic script, common to all

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1. Webb, S. and Webb, B.: Soviet Communism: A New Civilisation (London, Longmans, Green and Co., Third Edition, 1944) p.724.
2. Resolutions of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Part I (Moscow, 7th edition, 1954) p.559.
3. Desheriev, J.D.: Development of Non-Russian Languages in the U.S.S.R. op. cit. p.18.

Turkic languages, and replace it by the Latin script. The First Turko-Tartar Congress at Baku in 1926 decided to replace the traditional Arabic alphabet by a Latin transcription adapted to Turkish languages.[1] In 1928 the Arabic script of the Uzbek language was changed to a Latin one, and latinized alphabets were also introduced for the Buryats who previously had their own Mongol script, and for the national minorities in Siberia. Officially, this measure was justified on the practical grounds of speeding up the liquidation of illiteracy. Implicit in this changeover, however, could have been the intention to isolate Soviet Muslims from their co-religionists outside the U.S.S.R., besides making it difficult for them to read the Koran and other pre-Soviet literature.

Latinisation of their scripts was bitterly resisted by the Asian peoples, even though, officially, it was undertaken at their request. An official Soviet source declared in 1930: "The Practical Application of the new latinised alphabet and its substitution for the Arabic alphabet in all the national republics and regions of the Soviet Union . . . . from the Caucasus, Azerbaidzhan, Tataria, the Crimea, Central Asia to the Altai and Buryatia, Mongolia and so on, has provoked a class struggle so embittered that in terms of sharpness and range of ideological clashes and discussions no other social reform on the Soviet East can compare with it."[2]

The second alphabetic revolution followed within a decade. Ideas of a world revolution which had, in part, prompted latinisation had been replaced within the Soviet Union by a policy of "socialism in one country" with the Russians as the dominant nationality. At the same time, Latinisation did not assist the non-Russian peoples in gaining a good command of Russian,

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1. Hans, N. and Hessen, S.: Educational Policy in Soviet Russia (London, P.S. King & Son Ltd., 1930) p.176.
2. The Revolution and the Nationalities, No.7 (Moscow, 1930) p.23.

since to learn Russian meant learning a new alphabet and script. With the 1938 decree making the study of Russian compulsory in all non-Russian schools, a revision of the latinisation policy became urgently necessary. The fact that Turkey itself had adopted a Latin alphabet may have contributed in prompting Moscow to introduce the Cyrillic script into Central Asia. In 1938-40 alphabets based on the Russian or Cyrillic script were introduced for all nationalities previously affected by latinisation. This transfer of the majority of languages to the Russian script, coupled with extensive borrowing from the Russian vocabulary, was held to expedite their development and enrichment. Indirectly, such a policy would, by eliminating the need to learn an extra script, facilitate the learning of Russian by the various nationalities.[1] It is not on record that there was any resistance to the compulsory introduction of this second alien script.

The adoption of the Russian alphabet with the addition of the necessary letters and signs for individual languages was effected by all people of the Union and Autonomous Republics, with the exception of Armenia and Georgia, which retained their own established national scripts, and the peoples of the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian Republics who had long been using the Latin script.[2] To avoid the confusion that had marked the introduction of the Latin alphabet, the adaptation of the Cyrillic to various idioms was carried out by the Institute of Language and Literacy of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences.[3] To ensure complete uniformity the autonomous republics of the RSFSR submitted their new alphabets and rules of spelling to the Minister of Education of the RSFSR.

If the aim in adopting Cyrillic as the common script for the Soviet Union was not the russification of the non-Russian population, the result

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1. Bol'shaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya (Large Soviet Encyclopaedia) Vol. 33 (Moscow, 2nd edition) p.99.

2. Desheriev, J.D.: Development of Non-Russian Languages in the U.S.S.R. op. cit. pp.19-20.

3. Koutaissoff, E.: "Literacy and the Place of Russian in the Non-Slav Republics of the U.S.S.R." Reprinted from Soviet Studies, Vol.3, No.2 (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, October, 1951) p.12.

was obvious. It ensured a single alphabetic basis for the native and Russian languages, and thereby considerably assisted the people of the Soviet Union in mastering Russian, the language of international communication in the U.S.S.R. This in turn strengthened the dominant position of Russian and possibly facilitated the spread of Russian culture to the non-Russian people. In so far as the new culture propagated was based on the communist ideology, this step no doubt facilitated a quicker spread of Party propaganda and policies among the different nationalities of the Soviet Union and helped to strengthen the centralist tendencies.

Preparation of a Scientific and Technical Terminology: Next in importance to the common alphabet for bringing diverse languages closer together and facilitating communication, is the creation of a common terminology, for in the words of the Soviet linguist N. Ya. Marr, "terminology is the language of the future."[1] The problem of terminology cropped up as soon as the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin began to be translated into the vernacular languages. The question was raised in 1924 at the Congress of Educational Workers, and again at the Baku Congress of Turcology, in 1926.

Work on creating terminology for the new written languages began immediately after the languages were established and marked the beginning of the evolution and systematisation of social, political, scientific, technical and other urgently required terms. The standing Government Terminology Commission set up in the various republics and regions, are an indication of the importance that is attached to the problem of terminology for the new written languages. New terms are evolved after discussion with linguists, educators and public figures, and after their approval by the Commission they are considered legal and are obligatory on all.[2]

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1. Koutaissoff, E.: "Literacy and the Place of Russian in the Non-Slav Republics of the U.S.S.R." Op. cit. p.13.

2. Desheriev, J.D.: Development of Non-Russian Languages in the U.S.S.R. Op.cit. p.35.

Desheriev identifies the main stages in the establishment and elaboration of terms for the new written languages. In the first stage, terms widely used in everyday life, school, political life, science, engineering, medicine and education are established. The second stage is a direct continuation, on a more intensified scale, of the first stage, when a more detailed elaboration of terms in various fields of science, engineering, industry, agriculture, literature and art is undertaken.

As in India, the method of adding new terms to the vocabulary of the native languages of the U.S.S.R. merits attention. There were several policy choices available for this task, namely, (a) drawing on the store of words of the given language and its word-formation possibilities; (b) drawing on the dialects; (c) using international terms; and (d) using terms borrowed from the Russian. Whereas a wholesale borrowing of international terms into the vernacular languages would make them alien and incomprehensible to the masses, the main danger of coining new words from old roots lay in the un-Marxian twist they easily acquired. For example, as Koutaissoff points out, the Tadshiks translated the phrase "general Party Line" by "Royal road."[1]

In the 1920s and early 1930s there was no endeavour to introduce Russian words; rather the opposite, Russianisms, like Arabisms, were to be eliminated. However, the expansion of technical and vocational education among the less advanced nationalities necessitated large scale borrowing of Russian scientific terms. Moreover, new concepts, connected with the most advanced social structure and achievements in modern technology have given rise to the appearance of new words and expressions, either via the media of the languages themselves, by means of word-formation, or by loanwords from other languages, particularly Russian. The enormously influential role of Russian is manifested not only via dialect loan-words, but also by

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1. Koutaissoff, E.: "Literacy and the Place of Russian in the Non-Slav Republics of the USSR". Op. cit. p.13.

numerous translated loans. Loan-words from Russian, mainly socio-political, economic, scientific and technical are common to all nationality languages, in view of the common socialist culture and socialist character of the economy.

Deliberate and conscious attempts at standardizing specialized terms to conform to their Russian originals began in the 1930s, when a vigorous drive was undertaken against elements of "bourgeois nationalism" in linguistics and in language codifications. Kucera observes that most of the neologisms of the 1920s and much other terminological material were replaced by Russian borrowings during the process of a purely one-sided "unification of terminology."[1] Many suitable domestic words disappeared, and many non-Slavic languages were "improved" with numerous Russian elements. While it is true that a uniform technical terminology is of advantage under any political system, and that the dominant position of Russian in the multinational Soviet Union would result in its influencing the terminology of the national languages, it is alleged by certain critics of the U.S.S.R. that "the enforced pro-Russian policy of the Soviets has artificially weighted this process to a degree which seriously threatens the future of the national languages and national cultures."[2]

That assimilation of Russian loan words has had a considerable effect on the vocabulary of the Asian languages, is also evident from certain Soviet sources. According to one survey, the percentage of Arabic and Persian words in a sample of Uzbek language newspapers fell from 37.4 in 1923 to 25 in 1940, while the percentage of Russian words rose from 2 to 15 percent.[3] That modern terminology tends to pack local languages with Russian words is also confirmed by the Soviet journal of Political Self-Education which states that 70 to 80 percent of new scientific-technical, social, political and other terms in the newly written languages are direct borrowings from Russian.[4]

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1. Kucera, J.: "Soviet Nationality Policy: The Linguistic Controversy" in Problems of Communism, Vol.3, No.2 (Washington, D.C., U.S. Information Agency, 1954) p.26.
2. Ibid. p.27.
3. Kary-Niyazov, T.N.: Ocherki Istorii Kultury Sovetskogo Uzbekistana (Outlines of the History of the Culture of Soviet Uzbekistan) (Moscow and Tashkent, 1955) p.264.
4. Political Self-Education, Soviet Booklet No.4 (April 1960) p.72.

Local nationalities are reported to have protested in the face of this increasing Russianisation. In the Ukraine, the newspaper Literaturna Gazeta, after a covering phrase about the desire of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples to effect a "mutual drawing together of their languages", slated newspapers, publishing houses, and other institutions for "violating with impunity the laws of our language, the laws of logic and common sense", for artificially introducing Russian expressions into Ukrainian, and for attempting to unify Ukrainian and Russian grammar.[1]

In the Soviet republic of Azerbaidzhan, a decree came into effect on January 1, 1959, modifying the alphabet in which Azeri is written, so as to give Russian loan words an Azeri form. Also, certain letters of the Cyrillic alphabet hitherto employed were abolished, and Latin characters adopted. This, coupled with the reluctance of the Azerbaidzhan Republic to implement the language provisions of the 1958 school reform, led, as was seen in the previous chapter, to the removal of I.D. Mustafaev from his post as First Secretary of the Azerbaidzhan Communist Party because, among other things, "confusion had been introduced into the wholly clear question of language."[2] M.A. Ibragimov, President of the Azerbaidzhan Supreme Soviet until early in 1959, also appears to have been involved. He confessed to having made "several mistakes in the language field", and admitted he had now learned that: "The Russian language has had an exceptionally creative influence on the development of the national languages, including Azeri. It has enriched their vocabularies, their grammar, their figures of speech and expressiveness."[3]

The new language policy has significantly affected not only the terminology, lexical stock and the phonetic pattern of the national languages,

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1. Literaturna Gazeta (Literary Gazette) (Kiev, July 19, 1959).
2. Bakinski Rabochi (Worker of Baku) (July 11, 1959).
3. Ibid.

but has also been found to influence their orthographies in the attempt to retain the original spelling of Russian loan words in the national languages. Thus, in June 1953, a decree was published that all Russian words incorporated in the Kirghiz language must be spelt as in Russian. There was some resistance to this legislation, since a year later the local Party newspaper Sovetskaya Kirghizia was obliged to complain that "some terms borrowed from Russian are translated in different way in Kirghiz."[1] Similar changes followed in other Central Asian republics, resulting in a Soviet philologist, Serdiuchenko, complaining that the orthographies of some national languages were in such a state of confusion that authors were compelled to create their own spelling rules. The methods of translation from Russian into Buryat-Mongol, for example, had degenerated to such an extent that many of the translations from Russian "remained incomprehensible to the readers."[2]

An article published in Voprosy Filosofii (Problems of Philosophy) by a Yakut Philologist, Mordinov, provides indirect evidence of Russian influence over the development of different national languages.[3] Mordinov's article criticises the "over-simplified and vulgarised manner" in which the role of Russian in the development of the national languages has been interpreted and condemns "a mechanical merging of the latter with Russian." What Mordinov rejects, therefore, are the methods and not the policy. The removal of alphabet letters which expressed certain phonemic peculiarities of the non-Slavic languages, and the transplantation into the latter of Russian lexical elements in the exact Russian spelling had, he concedes, alienated some literary languages from the popular vernacular, thereby leaving many native speakers illiterate. This criticism may be construed as indirect proof of the russification measures followed by the Soviet government. Mordinov

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1. Sovetskaya Kirghizia (Kirghiz Soviet) (December 7, 1954).
2. Serdiuchenko, G.: Pravda (Moscow, November 11, 1949).
3. Mordinov, A.: Voprosy Filosofii (Problems of Philosophy) No.3 (Moscow, Academiya Nauk, SSSR, 1950).

himself, far from rejecting the policy, goes on to argue for an "organic" introduction of Russian words, which may more successfully assure their acceptance into the non-Russian languages.

Following Mordinov's article, the Soviet linguistic magazine Voprosy Yazykoznanii (Problems of Linguistics) declared that "the solution of this complex problem, regarding the organic acceptance of Russian lexical elements into the non-Russian tongues, cannot be a single one, standard to all languages, but must be decided on the merits of each individual case."[1]

At the official level, since the refutation of Marr's new linguistic theory in 1950, and Stalin's assertion that to expect present day languages to merge into a single world language prior to the victory of world communism is contrary to Marxism, Soviet policy has showed signs of moving away from an unqualified russification of the national languages. In November 1950, the Department of Literature and Language of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. held a joint meeting with the Academy of Educational Sciences of the R.S.F.S.R. in order to discuss Stalin's works on linguistics as well as language teaching in Soviet schools. Observers of the U.S.S.R. hope that this increased interest in dialectology and in the internal laws of development of each language are likely to put a break on the infiltration of an undisguised Russian terminology. According to one report, in coining new terms, the Standing Government Terminology Commissions, set up in the various republics and regions of the U.S.S.R., try to keep a balance between the 'nationalistic' tendencies of reviving local expressions for conveying new concepts and the 'chauvinistic' Russian tendencies of introducing Russian terms where old vernacular words could be legitimately retained.[2]

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1. Voprosy Yazykoznaniia (Problems of Linguistics), No.1. (Moscow, Academiya Nauk, SSSR, 1952) p.34. Cited in Kucera, J.: "Soviet Nationality Policy: The Linguistic Controversy" op. cit. p.29.
2. Koutaissoff, E.: "Literacy and the Place of Russian in the Non-Slav Republics of the U.S.S.R." op. cit. p.14.

As in the case of the official language policy and the language policy in education, it is debatable whether the Soviet policy of drawing upon the Russian language and script for the development of the various languages of the country is a deliberate attempt at russification, or the best available solution, under the circumstances, to the problems of underdevelopment of the diverse national languages. That the accepted policy is the final merging of all nations is evident from a recent work on the question of the development of communism which states that "the development and rapprochement of nations will continue to their complete merging after the victory of communism all over the world."[1] However, according to Kolasky, a stern critic of the Soviet Union, the efforts of the present regime amount merely to a readoption of the old policy of the Tsars in a new garb;[2] merging, in Soviet terminology, being synonymous with russification. To support his argument Kolasky refers to an article in Voprosy Istorii (Problems of History) which criticises the thesis propounded by Lenin and Stalin of the merging of "all national languages into a common one", freely forged in the process of developing civilisation, and maintains that "the emergence of linguistic unity proceeds through the wide adoption of one of the more diffused national languages, which, under conditions of Soviet reality, is the Russian language."[3]

This statement, perhaps, contains the rationale of Soviet Linguistic policy, for without trying to pass any value judgement, it might be accepted that under Soviet circumstances, and on practical grounds, a strong leaning towards Russian appears to be the most feasible policy for developing the various languages of the country. Russian meets two of P.S. Ray's three criteria of language planning, that is, rationality and commonality. While on the

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1. Stroitelstvo Kommunizma i razvitie obshchestvennykh otnoshenii (The Building of Communism and the Development of Social Relations) (Moscow 1966) p.250.
2. Kolasky, J.: Education in Soviet Ukraine. Op.cit. pp.161-164.
3. Manuvetov, N.V.: "Sblizhenie natsy i vozniknovenie internatsionalnoy obshchnosti narodov SSSR" (The Rapprochement of Nations and the Emergence of an International Community of the Peoples of the USSR) Voprosy Istorii (Problems of History) No.5 (Moscow, May 1964) p.51. Cited in Kolasky, J. Education in Soviet Ukraine. Op.cit. p. 163.

one hand, Russian is developed enough to meet the requirements of modern knowledge, it is, on the other, not only the language of the majority, but, with its introduction as a compulsory subjects in schools since 1938, increasingly learnt by larger sections of the non-Russian peoples and the only common language of the U.S.S.R. Regarding the third criteria of efficiency, that is, economy of the learning efforts, it is hoped to be met by the current policy of adopting a common script and a uniform terminology for all the languages of the Soviet Union.

To conclude, a basic aim of language planning in both India and the U.S.S.R. is seen to be the "completion" and "enrichment" of existing languages, the widening of their scope and the transformation of tribal and regional languages into developed national languages with a rich terminology and vocabulary. While in the U.S.S.R., efforts in this field are directed primarily towards the non-Russian languages, especially those of Central Asia; in India language development is carried on at two levels: (i)development of Hindi at the official level; (ii) development of the other fourteen major languages of India for regional purposes.

This dual task of developing an All-India language as well as the different regional languages is undertaken by several agencies in India, both official and non-official. Though the Constitution specifies that the task of developing Hindi is the special responsibility of the Union, the Union Government is assisted by several voluntary and private organisations chiefly from the Hindi-speaking areas. Efforts to develop the regional languages by private organisations and state governments, are also coordinated by the Centre to ensure uniformity and avoid duplication. In the U.S.S.R. language development is in the hands of the centralised agencies of the State like the Academy of Sciences, the Central Committee of New Alphabets and the Standing Government Terminology Commissions set up in the various republics and regions of the Union. Recognising the importance of a uniform scientific

and technical terminology for the whole country, the Indian Government has also set up a Standing Commission for Scientific and Technical Terminology entrusted with the task of creating a terminology for Hindi and at the same time coordinate the terminological work undertaken in the different linguistic regions.

Regarding the method employed for the actual development of the languages of the two countries, their respective linguistic patterns and the actual agencies entrusted with the task have largely determined whether the minor languages are developed according to their own genius and by word-formation from their own sources or by a process of borrowing, either from a classical language, a foreign language, or the dominant language of the country. Historical factors have ensured the numerical domination and literary enrichment of Russian in the U.S.S.R. This, coupled with policy making being concentrated in the hands of a central government which, on several occasions, has implicitly or explicitly stated its aim of establishing Russian as 'a second native language', has resulted in Russian emerging as the 'model' for developing the non-Russian languages of the U.S.S.R. This can be seen from the adoption of the Cyrillic alphabet for almost all the languages of the U.S.S.R., the large number of Russian loan words, and the introduction of Russian grammatical, syntactical and orthographical features into the non-Russian languages. In contrast, no Indian language enjoys a position in India comparable to that of Russian in the U.S.S.R. Added to this, language planning in India, especially in connection with the development of Hindi is largely influenced by non-governmental associations staffed mostly by linguistic zealots from the Hindi areas, who appear more concerned with the purity of the language than its functional efficiency. Consequently, the new Hindi developed by them is moving closer to Sanskrit and further away from the spoken language. The regional languages on the other hand, are developed primarily by local intelligentsia, who, though borrowing at times from Sanskrit, adapt these borrowings to suit the peculiarities of their own language. As with

the vocabulary, so with terminology, greater stress is placed on terms evolved from Sanskrit to meet the needs of modern science and technology.

Though the question of a common script has not received as much emphasis in India as it has in the U.S.S.R., there is a strong pro-Hindi group arguing for the adoption of Devanagari, the script of Hindi as the common script of India. Though there is general agreement on the various advantages of a common script, the supporters of Devanagari are opposed on the one side by advocates of the Roman script and on the other by defenders of the various regional language scripts. In the resulting controversy, the status quo continues.

Developing each minor language according to its own genius and adopting a different terminology and script for each would not only mean endless resources of time and money but also greatly accentuate differences and compartmentalise knowledge. Consequently, the question whether the Soviet policy of merging them into a common Russian mould is not perhaps the best available, merits consideration. Considering the absence of a comparable language for India, and the hostility to English because of its foreign origins, it is to be wondered whether a virtue is not made out of the necessity of developing each language from its own sources or from Sanskrit, and using its own script. If Hindi were to enjoy the position in India which Russian does in the U.S.S.R., it could be asked hypothetically, whether a similar policy of developing the Indian languages on the lines of Hindi may not be attempted for India.

INTRODUCTION

For the purpose of this study, the various policy solutions designed by India and the U.S.A., as outlined in Part II, are regarded as hypothetical statements, because (a) they may or may not be valid to the particular extent for which they are made and (b) even if valid in a particular context, they cannot be regarded as universally valid, in other words, the success of a policy in a particular country, by itself, is no guarantee of its suitability, should it be used in a different context. Cultural barriers, therefore, have to be considered, after giving due consideration to the contextual background of the hypothetical solutions as found prevailing in each society.

PART III

Such hypothetical, ideal policies are distinguished from which follow from **THE CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES**. Various aspects of the social system are closely interrelated either logically or functionally.[1] Hence change in one aspect is very likely to affect the various other aspects. **SECTION A: THE NORMATIVE PATTERNS** [illegible] forces the socio-political-economic consequences of a particular policy and to study this from responsible **SECTION B: THE INSTITUTIONAL PATTERNS** [illegible] social problem solutions, by outlining them in terms, as far as possible, the consequences of any policy.

In order to make successful predictions, however, it is essential to consider as fully as possible the specific circumstances under which the prediction event is to take place. Such a requirement would involve an attempt to describe all the circumstances which might influence the outcome of a policy. The complex nature of the social structure makes such an attempt beyond the scope of a single study. However, it is also questionable

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1. Nadel, S.: Foundations of Social Anthropology. (London, Cohen & West, 1951) p.104.

INTRODUCTION

For the purpose of this study, the various policy solutions designed by India and the U.S.S.R., as outlined in Part II, are regarded as hypothetical statements, because (a) they may or may not be valid in the particular context for which they are made; and (b) even if valid in a particular context, they cannot be regarded as universally valid. In other words, the success of a policy in a particular country, by itself, is no guarantee of its achieving similar success in a different context. Cultural borrowing, therefore, has to be selective, after giving due consideration to the contextual background or the initial conditions as found prevailing in each society.

Being hypothetical, these policies are statements from which future events may be deductively inferred. It is assumed that "various aspects of the social system are closely interrelated either logically or functionally."[1] Hence change in one aspect is very likely to affect the various other aspects of the system. Successful prediction foresees the socio-politico-economic consequences of a particular policy and thereby aids those responsible for policy adoption to choose between several possible solutions, by enabling them to foresee, as far as possible, the consequences of any policy.

In order to make successful predictions, however, it is essential to examine as fully as possible the specific circumstances under which the predicted event is to take place. Such a requirement would involve an attempt to describe all the circumstances which might influence the outcome of a policy. The complex nature of the social structure makes such an attempt beyond the scope of a single study. Moreover, it is even questionable

1. Holmes, B.: Problems in Education, A Comparative Approach. (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965) p.73.

whether a complete analysis of the social structure is essential in order to predict the outcome of each policy. A more practical approach would be to examine those factors which are assumed to bear directly or indirectly on a particular problem and its policy solutions. The danger here is that the choice of factors may become arbitrary and subjective, and hence it is necessary to state at the outset the basis on which such a choice has been made for this study. In order to outline the contextual background of the language problem and policies in India and the U.S.S.R., critical dualism has been accepted as providing a suitable conceptual framework for identifying, describing and weighting the relevant factors in each context. By providing criteria of classification, critical dualism reduces the difficulties of identifying relevant background factors.

Critical dualism asserts that in any society there can be identified and distinguished two types of law - the normative and the sociological.[1] The norms or normative laws are, as Holmes describes, "statements of what ought to be the case", their important characteristic being that "they can be either accepted, rejected or changed by men."[2] Norms and normative laws are expressed in a legal code or a written constitution, as also in codes of behaviour, taboos, values, beliefs and ideas, which may or may not be laid down by a philosophical school of thought or by religion.

On the other hand, there are sociological laws, "which bear to man's social environment the same kind of relationship that natural laws bear to his physical environment".[3] These laws, however, are less under man's direct control, it being less feasible to control the initial conditions in social affairs. As a result, these laws can be used both to explain the

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1. Holmes, B.: Problems in Education. A Comparative Approach. Op. cit. pp.50-51.
2. Ibid. p.51.
3. Ibid. p.52.

operation of social institutions or organisations, and to predict future events.

On the basis of this distinction between normative and sociological laws, a useful model for the study of society can be set up by constructing two important social patterns or configurations, namely, the Normative Pattern, comprising of norms and normative laws, and the Institutional Pattern drawn from institutions and their associated sociological laws.

Part III, Section A therefore deals with the respective Normative Patterns of India and the U.S.S.R., while Section B is concerned with their particular Institutional Patterns. Construction of these two patterns is expected to reveal the initial conditions in which the language problems of each of these countries arise, and within which their respective policy solutions operate.

It was stated above that the sources of norms or normative laws are a legal code or constitution, and/or a philosophical school of thought and religion. This brings to light an important distinction to be noted before constructing the normative patterns of India and the U.S.S.R. for this study. It might be argued that the several policy solutions discussed in Part II represent norms since they lay down what <u>ought</u> to be the case and find expression in legislation. Why then construct another normative pattern for the two societies?

In so far as the policies discussed in Part II lay down an ideal to be followed by the respective societies, they shall be referred to in this study as 'legalised norms', and as such regarded as distinct from the traditional norms, values or attitudes which may guide the action of a people. In other words, the traditional norms or values are usually the accepted or internalised norms and therefore largely subjective and psychological. As a result, there may be inconsistencies between many new or 'legalised' norms which are not yet internalised, and the traditional norms and values which

may be incompatible with the former, but still continue to motivate the behaviour of individuals.

Again, within a particular society, the internalised norms or values generally provide the background against which the 'legalised' norms are set up. Hence societies with differing internalised norms should be wary or adopting similar 'legalised' norms or policies.

In constructing the Normative Patterns for India and the U.S.S.R., Part III, Section A is therefore concerned with their respective traditional norms and values, which essentially reflect the goals, aims, general rules and principles underlying the activities of a society. These internalised norms or value systems are studied by reference to those ideals, regulations, attitudes and ways of thinking which are explicitly or implicitly revealed in the works of representative philosophers for each country.

The choice of philosophers for the two countries has been determined by the period under consideration and the significant role played by each in the events of his country during that period. It has been observed that in the period immediately prior to and following the advent of independence in India, the thinking of M.K. Gandhi and J. Nehru have to a considerable extent moulded Indian life and thought; whereas in the U.S.S.R. a similar role in the pre and post 1917 period has been played firstly by Marxism-Leninism and later by Stalin. This does not in any way means that these men have exclusively influenced the value systems of their respective countries, but it assumes that their influence was significant in shaping the general pattern of thought. It may be added that in outlining the thinking of these philosophers the purpose is not to pass any value judgements, but only to use their ideas to

construct the value systems for each country.

It is, however, neither possible nor necessary for this study to include everything that each of these philosophers has written. A selection, therefore, is made from the available data to serve the purpose of this study which is concerned primarily with language policies. As attitudes towards particular language policies are part of the value system, an analysis of the latter can direct attention to certain modes of behaviour related to language policies.

The values or norms which are of particular interest, therefore, are those related to three fundamental issues, namely, nature of society, individual and knowledge. Of these three, the theories regarding the nature of society are assumed to be the greatest importance for this study since it is essentially the nature of the ideal society to be set up which is expected to determine the role which various languages are to play in it.

The value systems of each country, because of their great complexity, are discussed separately, Chapter 6 dealing with the Indian value system and Chapter 7 describing the value system of the U.S.S.R.

As mentioned earlier, the value system of a country represents the ideal. This ideal, if translated into practice, has to operate within a particular societal pattern. Section B of Part III, therefore, describes and explains the different institutional patterns within which the norms have to operate. It is the aim of this section to evaluate how far the different institutional patterns found in India and the U.S.S.R. make for the convergence or diversity of policies derived from their respective value systems.

The two main institutional patterns selected for study here are the political and the educational. While the official language policy is debated primarily within the political system, language policy in education is discussed and debated in the educational sphere. Hence in Chapter 8 the political

structures of India and the U.S.S.R. are described and compared; and Chapter 9 examines the systems of decision-making in education for the two countries.

In describing the political structures of India and the U.S.S.R., attention is paid to both the formal or statutory structures of the government as well as to the non-statutory structures which perform political functions. For this purpose, the functional categories presented by Almond and Coleman in The Politics of the Developing Areas[1] are to be used as a framework for comparing the two political patterns. The resulting similarities and differences identified between them will, it is hoped, serve to explain the difficulties faced by the Indian government, when compared to its counterpart in the Soviet Union, in finding and successfully implementing a policy solution acceptable to all.

Similarly, a description and comparison of the systems of decision-making in education is expected to locate the source of educational control in each country. The politics of educational control highlight the role of the central or regional and local bodies in educational policy-making and the resulting consequences for language in education. The successful implementation of similar policies could depend on the influence of local politics vis-a-vis the centre in decision-making.

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1. Almond, G.A. and Coleman, J.S.: The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1960) p.17.

CHAPTER 12

INTRODUCTION

To understand individual behaviour in a political context, it is needful to study the prevalent mores, values and attitudes, since it is the total conception of right and wrong, appropriateness and inappropriateness in a society which generally governs the behaviour of the constituent social elements. The important role played by values and attitudes in the evolution of the language policy of a country is pointed out by J. Rubin who states that even though the existing language policy of India may not be the most effective one, "it can scarcely be further until attitudes to language change."[1] Attitudes to language, in turn, present attitudes to the social order, so one Indian politician objected in favour of the regional languages, or of Hindi or English, quite frankly mentioned considerations about the kind of life which **THE NORMATIVE PATTERNS** This is not just a language controversy. It is an argument on the pattern and future of the country."[2]

In studying towards language and language policies one part of the total value system, an analysis of the latter will, it is hoped, direct attention to certain modes of behaviour related to language policies. The values and attitudes dominating the Indian mind may be discussed from the view and thought of the representative philosophers, historians/sociologists (social and industrial leaders). Since both these thinkers have expressed their views on general and social topics over a period of years, an attempt is made here to study their views on these fundamental issues which are generally

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1. Rubin, J., "Language and Education in India" in Rubin, J., et al. Language Education (London, Oxford University Press, 1968) p.102.
2. Gandhi, M.K. Harijan (Today, Popular Prakashan, 1/3), p.133.

CHAPTER VI

THE INDIAN VALUE SYSTEM

To understand individual behaviour in a particular context, it is useful to study the prevalent norms, values and attitudes, since it is the ideal conception of right and wrong, appropriateness and inappropriateness in a society which generally governs the behaviour of the constituent social elements. The important role played by values and attitudes in the evolution of the language policy of a country is pointed out by J. Dakin who claims that even though the existing language policy of India may not be the most effective educationally, "it can evolve no further until attitudes to language change."[1] Attitudes to language, in turn, reflect attitudes to the social order. As one writer points out: "Arguments in favour of the regional language, or of Hindi or English, derive from certain fundamental convictions about the kind of life which the nation should follow. This is not just a language controversy. It is an argument on the present and future of the country."[2]

As attitudes towards languages and language policies are part of the total value system, an analysis of the latter will, it is hoped, direct attention to certain modes of behaviour related to language policies. The values and attitudes dominating the Indian mind may be discerned from the views and thought of two representative philosophers, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. Since both these thinkers have expressed their views on several and varied topics over a period of years, an attempt is made here to study their views on three fundamental issues which are generally

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1. Dakin, J.: "Language and Education in India" in Dakin, J. et al. Language in Education (London, Oxford University Press, 1968) p.69.
2. Gaudino, R.L. The Indian University. (Bombay, Popular Prakashan, 1965)p.253.

debated everywhere, namely, the nature of society, the nature of individual and the nature of knowledge. The implications of these views on their attitudes towards languages and language policies are then examined.

Studying the value system of any country is a complex operation; but in a country which for three hundred crucial years of its history has been under foreign influence, this task has additional problems - indigenous values become coloured and moderated by imported ones so that at times it may be difficult to distinguish the native from the foreign. The Indian value system from the late nineteenth century to the present day has been moulded by the philosophy of men like Gandhi and Nehru who have not only shaped Indian thought, but sought to translate it into practice. In this sense, then, they may be regarded, in Plato's terms as philosopher-statesmen.

Though a close associate and 'disciple' of Gandhi, Nehru's views were by no means always similar to those of Gandhi. There is little in Gandhi's thinking and appeal which is not distinctly Indian. There is in his philosophy no grafting of foreign ideas perse, and through his life and teaching he bears testimony to the values for which India has stood for ages - faith in spirit, leaning towards religion, the acceptance of life's obligations, the validity of character. Nehru's is essentially a modern mind - scientific, objective, receptive to truth, impatient of obscurantism. Both visualised an ideal society for India, but their respective utopias differed on important points, as did their approaches and solutions. Yet both profoundly influenced the pre and post independence thinking in India and the difference in their views is, perhaps, reflected in the ambivalence of the Indian mind today, torn between tradition and modernity.

2. M.K. Gandhi's Views on the Nature of Society, Individual and Knowledge

Though theorising on a variety of topics, Gandhi never set down to write a complete statement of his creed. Consequently, his philosophy has to

be synthesised from scattered writings and utterances.

That Gandhi's philosophy has been deeply influenced by his religion can be appreciated from his consistent reference to the three important concepts of Hinduism, namely satya (absolute truth), dharma (duty) and ahimsa (non-violence), which form the basis of his thinking.[1]

At the apex of his beliefs is the Hindi concept of satya, absolute truth, the essential being, the supreme good.[2] Of these meanings, Gandhi preferred 'truth'. For a time he held that 'God equals truth', but later to make it acceptable to both theists and non-theists alike, he reversed the equation to say 'truth equals God'.[3] Gandhi considered absolute truth the same as divinity.[4] Moreover, he believed in the purposeful, moral government of the universe by an omnipotent and omniscient first cause which is both merciful and just,[5] attributes which are reflected in his stress on pacific means and political reform.

Gandhi's interpretation of the concept of dharma, that is, law or duty, is central to his system of beliefs. Together with artha, power or wealth and kama, pleasure or aspiration, dharma forms Hinduism's three aims of life which are progressive steps towards moksha or final release from the world. In Gandhi's theory, however, there is no special place for artha or kama, since he held that any legitimate power and pleasure are included in the higher moral law.[6]

As a basic concept of Hindu political thought, dharma has two major

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1. Power, P.F.: Gandhi on World Affairs. (London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd.) 1961) p.35.
2. Gandhi, M.K.: From Yeravda Mandir: Ashram Observances (Ahmedabad, Navjivan, 3rd edition, 1945) pp. 1-4.
3. Young India (December 31, 1931). (Madras, S.Ganesan, Triplicane, 1932) op.cit.
4. Harijan (February 24, 1946).
5. Young India op. cit. (May 25, 1921).
6. Harijan (July 21, 1940).

interpretations, namely, that it is a source of political, social and religious duties; and that it is an agency of absolute truth executing these duties in the world of men. Power believes that Gandhi made use of both meanings, but generally tended to understand dharma as a universal morality to which the affairs of men and states should correspond, much as the first view suggests.[1]

The third basic concept in Gandhi's philosophy is his understanding of the Vaishnavite, Jainist and Buddhist idea of ahimsa -- love or non-violence. His interpretation of the doctrine of ahimsa was the fundamental basis of his theory of pacific action.[2] However, contrary to the passive interpretations of non-violence and non-resistance as found in Jainism, Gandhi advocated dynamic non-violence. As he put it in very emphatic terms:

> "I do believe that where there is only a choice between cowardice and violence I would advise violence . . . . I would rather have India resort to arms in order to defend her honour than that she should in a cowardly manner become or remain a helpless witness to her own dishonour. But I believe that non-violence is infinitely superior to violence, forgiveness is more manly than punishment . . . . But abstinence is forgiveness only when there is the power to punish; it is meaningless when it pretends to proceed from a helpless creature . . . . Strength does not come from physical capacity. It comes from an indomitable will. . . . The dignity of man requires obedience to a higher law, to the strength of the spirit . . . . Non-violence in its dynamic condition means conscious suffering. It does not mean submission to the will of the evil-doer but it means

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1. Power, F.F.: Gandhi on World Affairs. op. cit. p.36.
2. Young India (March 12, 1925.
3. Young India (August 11, 1920).

...the putting of one's whole soul against the will of the tyrant.[1]

Albert Schweitzer believes that Gandhi's activist understanding of *ahimsa* is a major refinement of the Indian idea, traditionally one of quietism and negation.[2] Clearly, as Power points out, his view of *ahimsa* is not a denial of power as influence, pressure or force, but rather of power in its violent forms.[3] Though Gandhi held that *ahimsa* is the perfect means to reach ultimate truth, the end, that is, supreme good is higher in his scale of values than the means, namely, dynamic non-violence.[4]

Nature of Society: In his *Discovery of India* Nehru cites Gandhi's concept of the ideal society for India:

> "I shall work for an India in which the poorest shall feel that it is their country, in whose making they have an effective voice, an India in which there shall be no high class or low class of people, an India in which all communities shall live in perfect harmony. . . . There can be no room in such an India for the curse of untouch- ability or the curse of intoxicating drinks and drugs. . . . Women will enjoy the same rights as men . . . This is the India of my dreams."[5]

Gandhi, therefore, aimed not only at political change for the India under British rule, but also concomitant social and economic changes in order to set up the society of his dreams. His demand for *swaraj* or self-rule can be

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1. *Young India* (August 11, 1920).
2. Schweitzer, A.: *Indian Thought and its Development*. Translated from the German by Russell, C.E.B. (Boston, Beacon Press, 1957) pp.229-232.
3. Power, P.F.: *Gandhi on World Affairs*. Op. cit. p.37.
4. *Harijan* (March 28, 1946).
5. Cited in Nehru, J.: *The Discovery of India* (Calcutta, The Signet Press, 1946) p.433.

seen as one aspect of the wider concept of swadeshi, meaning to belong to or made in one's country. Gandhi gave the concept of swadeshi a broad interpretation, and incorporated many religious, economic, social and political ideas under its heading.[1]

In the field of religion, swadeshi stresses adherence to one's ancestral faith, not in the spirit of exclusiveness, but with respect for all religions as varied facets of one final truth. Swadeshi in economics suggests that India should bar foreign goods and rebuild the native economy to make for the country as self-sufficient as possible.

The social implications of Gandhian swadeshi are found in his view of the commune, classes and work. He held ancient India's village society with its emphasis on self-reliance and peace and ruled by the co-operative as an ideal to be aimed at in spirit, if not in form. In spite of the western introduction of centralising and depersonalising forces, he maintained that the Indian village had retained its ancient characteristic of social cohesion, economic simplicity and political autonomy.

In the ideal society of Gandhi's conception, the orthodox Hindu idea that caste status is the result of divine reward and punishment would be discarded in favour of the values of orderly functionalism in the caste system.[2] He was, therefore, not entirely against the four-fold structure of the caste system, symbolised by the priest (Brahman), warrior (Kshatriya), merchant (Vaishya) and worker (Shudra), because he supposed that it is based on hereditory differences in aptitude and personality. That he did not favour a rigid caste structure can be seen from his ceaseless activity for the benefit of the 'untouchables', or Harijans as he preferred to call them, to whom he wished to give Hindu status by returning them to the caste structure at the

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1. Gandhi, M.K.: From Yeravda Mandir. Op. cit. pp. 61, 66-67.
2. Young India (October 20, 1927 and November 24, 1927).
3. Harijan (March 31, 1946).

lowest level.[1] Thus, whereas on the one hand, his interpretation of caste bars an excessively rigid society, on the other hand, by recognising the [illegible] value of the system in allocating men to the basic tasks of society without producing class conflict, he excludes inter-class strife and disruptive [illegible] social mobility.

Linked with his faith in the villages of India, Gandhi's sympathies extended to the peasants of India whom he preferred to all the Indian classes. The simple ways of rustic life and rural values attracted him as a panacea for the depersonalisation and materialism of life evidenced in modern urban civilisation. He seemed to approve of the rural theory of labour which placed social existence close to the mainsprings of human endeavour, and committed himself to the alleviation of rural poverty.

From his faith in the rural theory of labour stemmed Gandhi's law of "bread labour". According to this "every able-bodied person will perform manual labour enough to produce the equivalent of what he consumes for his physical sustenance; this labour being employed in the production of basic necessaries of life like food, dress or shelter."[2] All men, whatever the nature of their special abilities may be, will, in a free society, be subject to the law of "bread labour".

Gandhi supplemented the law of "bread labour" by the theory of t trusteeship.[3] According to this all the time, talents, wealth and property of an individual belong to the society in which he lives, and should therefore be placed at its complete disposal. Both self-acquired and inherited property rightfully belongs to the community, and its owners are merely trustees, on behalf of the community, of all that is necessary for the production of wealth. Gandhi expected the wealthy voluntarily to become trustees of their property

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1. Gandhi, M.K.: The Removal of Untouchability (Ahmedabad, Navjivan, 1954).
2. Bose, N.K.: Studies in Gandhism (2nd edition, Calcutta, N.Chatterji, 1947) p.17.
3. Harijan (March 31, 1946).

and to function as stewards in the public interest. In part it is from Gandhi's idea of trusteeship that Vinoba Bhave, a leading Gandhian, has drawn inspiration for his Bhoodan movement, that is, a programme of voluntary land gifts to Indian peasants. Gandhi's motto for his philosophy of social classes, therefore, was sarvodaya, meaning, the welfare of all.

With regard to intellectual work, Gandhi held that such mental work was its own reward, and hence the wages of doctors, lawyers, accountants and engineers should consist of no more than their daily bread, which, of course, included all their natural wants.

However, Gandhi's law of "bread labour" is not a negation of the theory of division of labour and corporate activity, nor is it a plea for each individual leading an atomistic life. He is not against organization and interdependence per se, but what he insists upon is that this interdependence should on no account be based on coercion. It should be of a voluntary character, and all the cooperating units should enjoy the same measure of freedom and authority. This is not so under capitalism where economic power is unequally distributed. In its place Gandhi wishes to restore to the individual an adequate control over his life and destiny, before there can be interdependence and cooperation. This is the main consideration behind his insistence upon decentralisation, both of the productive system and of the social and political authority.

In the political order, therefore, Gandhi's notion of swadeshi calls for a state based on native forms of government, which in the Indian context were village panchayats or councils. Coupled with this, Gandhi's views of state power reflect his belief in a higher law holding government accountable to morality. To execute this accountability, he foresaw a decentralised Indian state established on villagellife where power is transformed into legitimate government.[1] To put these ideas into practice,

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1. Power, P.F.: Gandhi on World Affairs. Op.cit. p.44.

Gandhi, in his struggle against imperialism in 1920-22 called for Indians to withdraw from British-sponsored institutions, and in their place sought to establish a parallel state based on reconstituted village councils, a local system of native justice, and national schools using Indian languages.[1] He, therefore, envisaged a radical change not only of personnel, but of the system and methods as well.[2] This was based on his firm conviction that the modern state governing by positive law based on unilateral authority is open to objection and change, if this positive law is found, by discerning men, to be in conflict with the higher law.[3]

Though endorsing a decentralization of political power, Gandhi's local government ideal has the rudiments of a state equipped with a central government, however limited in power. His thinking reveals an acceptance of the use of central authority for social and economic problems insolvable at the village level.[4] This places upon his state the responsibility of providing welfare services and to redress social wrongs. Still, his state is never innately good, but is acceptable only to the extent to which it corresponds to the higher law of *dharma*. And his state does not have a moral character greater than the sum of the virtues of its citizens. It is essentially a technical tool rather than something of intrinsic worth.

In his ideal state Gandhi hoped for "sovereignty of the people based on pure moral authority."[5] This, instead of meaning that 'moral authority' is to take the place of state sovereignty, implies that the people have within themselves resources which the State does not possess and indeed should respect at all times. Gandhi wished to reconcile self-reliance and voluntarism

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1. *Young India*, (April 17, 1924 and December 26, 1924).
2. Ibid. (May 8, 1924).
3. Ibid. (October 22, 1924).
4. Bose, N.K.: *Studies in Gandhism* op. cit. p.206 ff.
5. *Harijan* (January 2, 1937).

with regulations enforced by the state. What he did not approve of was political sovereignty understood as dominion, that is, absolute, non-responsible power, and believed that the State is answerable to its subjects for the circumscribed power it administers. As far as his ideal state is concerned, he admitted that it would have criminals and police to deal with them,[1] for he did not endorse the idea of a stateless society for the temporal world.

Though in actual life Gandhi fought for the establishment of a democratic state for India, he was of the opinion that individuals should have as little to do as possible with the state in regulating social life; for the latter is ultimately based on violence. Thus in 1931, he wrote:

> "To me political power is not an end but one of the means of enabling people to better their condition in every department of life. Political power means capacity to regulate national life through national representatives. If national life becomes so perfect as to become self-regulated, no representation is necessary. There is then a state of enlightened anarchy. In such a State everyone is his own ruler. He rules himself in such a manner that he is never a hindrance to his neighbour. In the ideal state, therefore, there is no political power because there is no State. But the ideal is never fully realised in life. Hence the classic statement of Thoreau that that Government is best which governs the least."[2]

Similarly, in the course of an interview in 1934, he stated:

> "I look upon an increase in the power of the State with the greatest fear, because, although while apparently doing good by minimising exploitation, it does the greatest harm

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1. Harijan (March 10, 1940).
2. Young India (July 2, 1931).

to mankind by destroying individuality, which lies at the root of all progress. The State represents violence in a concentrated and organised form. The individual has a soul but the state is a soulless machine, it can never be weaned from violence to which it owes its very existence."[1]

When Gandhi spoke of swaraj for India, he meant:

"the Government of India by the consent of the people, ascertained by the vote of the largest number of adult population, male or female, native born or domiciled who have contributed by manual labour to the service of the State. . . Swaraj will come not by the acquisition of authority by a few but by the acquisition of the capacity by all to resist authority when abused. In other words, swaraj is to be attained by educating the masses into a sense of their capacity to regulate and control authority."[2]

This brings us to Gandhi's view on the means of achieving social and political change. He believed that social change can be engineered by bringing about a basic change in the present mental organisation of mankind through non-violent non-cooperation. This implied that the present rulers were not to be ousted from power anyhow, but that they were to be converted by means of self-suffering, so that they would ultimately join hands with their erstwhile victims in building up a new economic and social system based on freedom and equality. This method of non-violent non-cooperation he called satyagraha, meaning adherence to truth or soul force.

Within Society and the State, satyagraha provides for peaceful resistance to social and political authority. Resistance can be on an

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1. Cited in Bose, N.K.: Studies in Gandhism. Op. cit. pp.67-68.
2. Young India (January 29, 1925).

individual or mass basis. The vital activity of satyagraha is a search for justice to which the ethics of non-violence is united. "The first condition of non-violence," Gandhi believed, "is justice all round in every department of life."[1] In satyagraha, the personality of the exploiter is given due respect; its successful termination leaves no stigma of defeat, or pride of conquest. It, therefore, makes for the establishment of a more stable social order than can be brought about by violent means.

Thus, it should be appreciated that Gandhi vouched for the effectiveness of satyagraha regardless of the nature of the opponent, claiming that it can reform anyone.[2] His denial that satyagraha presumes a moral adversary,[3] is understandable in the light of the advantages a contrary statement would have given to the government he opposed. Nevertheless, the theory of Satyagraha posits some humaneness in the antagonist. In fact, Gandhi himself indicated this when he told the British Government members of the Round Table Conference in 1931 how civil disobedience would affect them. "I do know that you will suffer," he said, "but I want you to suffer because I want to touch your hearts; and when your hearts have been touched will come the psychological moment for negotiation."[4] Assumption about the opponent's ability to be reformed and to perceive good is essential to Gandhi's theory of resistance.

As an extension of ahimsa, satyagraha is legitimate if offered in the spirit of suffering and love. Resistance, however, must be based on initial obedience to authority, for example, one must first obey police enforcing an unjust law, and after briefly submitting, begin resistance.

Satyagraha as a means of social change, Gandhi maintained, is successful irrespective of the strength of its users. Though it is a way of

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1. Harijan (May 4, 1940).
2. Young India (April 24, 1924).
3. Harijan (April 15, 1939).
4. Quoted in "Proceedings of the Second Session of the Round Table Conference on India", House of Commons Sessional Papers. Vol.III (London, 1931-32) p.393.

revolution, the character of that revolution is completely non-violent. In explaining the difference between satyagraha and violent revolution, Gandhi said: "A non-violent revolution is not a programme of 'seizure of power'. It is a programme of transformation of relationships ending in a peaceful transfer of power."[1] While violence is directed towards the injury, including the destruction, of the aggressor, and is successful only when it is stronger than that of the opponent, non-violent action can be taken for an opponent, however powerfully organised for violence. Violence per se of the weak has never been known to succeed against the stronger in violence. Success of non-violent action of the very weak he claimed to be a daily occurrence.

As with individuals, so with states, the weakest state can render itself immune from attack if it learns the art of non-violence. But a small state, no matter how powerfully armed, cannot exist in the midst of a powerful combination of well-armed states. It has to be absorbed by or be under the protection of one of the members of such a combination.[2]

Moreover, the non-violent way was, for Gandhi, the way of democracy. Satyagraha brings the power of spreading one's opinions within the reach of even the physically weakest man. In Gandhi's words: "True democracy or the swaraj of the masses can never come through untruthful and violent means, for the simple reason that the natural corollary to their use would be to remove all opposition through the suppression or extermination of the antagonist. That does not make for individual freedom. Individual freedom can have the fullest play under a regime of unadulterated ahimsa."[3]

Besides being an agency of social and political change, satyagraha, for Gandhi, was a means of political control whereby the common people would

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1. Harijan (February 17, 1946).
2. Ibid. (October 7, 1939).
3. Ibid. (May 27, 1939).

be able to control the rulers at the centre. He stated in 1941:

> "We have been long accustomed to think that power comes only through Legislative Assemblies. I have regarded this belief as a grave error brought about by inertia or hypnotism. A superficial study of British history has made us think that all power percolates to the people from parliaments. The truth is that power resides in the people and it is entrusted for the time being to those whom they may choose as their representatives. Parliaments have no power or even existence independently of the people. . . . Civil disobedience is the storehouse of power. Imagine a whole people unwilling to conform to the laws of the legislature and prepared to suffer the consequences of non-compliance! They will bring the whole legislative and executive machinery to a standstill. The police and the military are of use to coerce minorities, however powerful they may be. But no police or military coercion can bend the resolute will of a people out for suffering to the utmost."[1]

Once Swaraj is attained, however, the grievances of the people would be met by legislative means.

> "Civil disobedience and non-cooperation are designed for use when people, that is, the tillers of the soil have no political power. But immediately they have political power, naturally their grievances, whatever their character, will be ameliorated through legislative channels. . . ."[2]

However, if after attaining Swaraj, the interests of the peasants are not safeguarded, Gandhi allows that the peasants may once again resort to non-violent non-cooperation. "If the legislature proves itself to be incapable

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1. Gandhi, M.K.: Constructive Programme: Its Meaning and Place. (Ahmedabad, Navjivan, 1945) p.8.
2. Hindusthan Standard. (Calcutta, January 15, 1945).

of safeguarding the Kisan's interests they will of course always have the sovereign remedy of civil disobedience and non-cooperation. But, . . . ultimately, it is not paper legislation, nor brave words or fiery speeches, but the power of non-violent organisation, discipline and sacrifice that constitute the real bulwark of the people against injustice and oppression."[1]

When he discussed the best state, Gandhi often employed religious terminology, declaring, for example, that politics subserves religion, and calling his ideal State Ramarajiya, or the rule of Rama. Nevertheless, Gandhi realised that his political formulation of non-violence was still an experiment in the making, and hence declined to specify the constitutional structure of his ideal state.[2] What he did say about a basic higher law to which the activities of a state ought to correspond applies chiefly to the local level; there the village panchayat or council of five members traditionally combines executive, legislative and judicial powers and exercises wide social and economic functions in the Commune.[3]

There is a certain lack of definiteness in Gandhi's views on the form of government to be adopted once India became independent. His experience of western parliamentary democracy, largely restricted to its colonial manifestations, left him disillusioned, hostile and eventually indifferent to western constitutionalism. From his viewpoint ordinary political parties, competing for voters, are divisive and probably unprincipled and should dedicate themselves to the common good even at the cost of their dissolution. In the case of the Congress party itself, he recommended that it should disband after the nation's freedom and become a Social Service organisation.[4]

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1. Hindusthan Standard. (Calcutta, January 15, 1945).
2. Harijan (January 2, 1937).
3. See, Agarwal, S.N.: Gandhian Constitution for Free India (Allahabad, Kitabistan, 1946), for a proposal for a village-based polity for free India which Gandhi endorsed.
4. Harijan (February 14, 1948).

The fact that most of his Congress associates desired parliamentary government based on the British model, coupled with his own realisation that the welfare of the masses could be advanced through a western-style democratic government, led Gandhi to endorse 'non-violent democracy' as his goal for free India.[1] This meant that democracy, as he understood it, was not his ideal since he believed it is open to corruption, over-centralisation, and excessive use of policy power, but he would accept democracy as a possible way to bring the rule of dharma.[2]

Finally, Gandhi's views on nation and nationalism are particularly relevant to this study. Though at times he used the term 'nation' when speaking of the social structure of society, at other times he used it in a more technical sense to mean an entity composed of a people with a common history and destiny. As Power points out, he frequently spoke of the Indian 'nation' despite the plurality of Indian languages, peoples and creeds.[3] Rather than seeing, with Churchill, many nations in the diversity that is India, Gandhi saw all Indians as one nation, and equal heirs to a rich civilisation. Culture divisions, he believed, should not prevent the creation of a state. As an illustration of his conviction his South African newspaper disagreed with the argument that India was too plural to become a state, citing the United States as evidence of successful pluralism.[4] Later, in answer to the contention of Lord Birkenhead, Secretary of State for India, that India could not be a nation because it had nine major religions and one hundred and thirty languages,[5] Gandhi wrote: "we contend that for all practical purposes . . . we are one nation."[6] Furthermore, as a pluralist, and a strong advocate of Hindu-Muslim

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1. Harijan (July 21, 1940).
2. Power, P.F.: Gandhi on World Affairs. Op. cit. p.51.
3. Ibid. p.43.
4. Indian Opinion. (June 27, 1908).
5. Cited in Power, P.F.: Gandhi on World Affairs op. cit. p.44.
6. Young India (July 23, 1925).

unity, he affirmed that no one aspect of a heterogeneous nation, in particular, religious faith, requires a separate political expression.

A significant characteristic of Gandhi's idea of nationalism is its international outlook, in the sense that Gandhi did not dream of benefiting the Indian nation at the expense of any other nation. Moreover, he held that if India possesses anything which other countries need, but do not possess, then it is the bounden duty of India to place it voluntarily at the disposal of humanity. Exclusive possession, whether for an individual or for a nation, can never be the rule in a world based on non-violence.

Gandhi always looked upon the whole of humanity as one, and not split up into fragments by means of hostile racial, religious, economic or political interests. As he put it:"There is no limit to extending our services to our neighbours across State-made frontiers. God never made those frontiers."[1] Elsewhere he stated:

> "We want freedom for our country, but not at the expense or exploitation of others, not as to degrade other countries. . . I want freedom of my country so that the resources of my country might be utilised for the benefit of mankind. . . My love of nationalism or my idea of nationalism is that my country may become free, that if need be the whole country may die, so that the human races may live. There is no room for race hatred here. Let that be our nationalism."[2]

Nature of Individual: Gandhi's understanding of human nature, like his views on society, is derived from his interpretation of the concepts of satya, dharma and ahimsa.

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1. Young India. (December 31, 1931).
2. Cited in Desai,M.: Gandhiji in Indian Villages. (Madras, S.Ganesan,Triplicane, 1927) p.170.

For him Satya, the absolute truth certifies man's being, consequently, "devotion to this truth is the sole justification for our existence."[1] Equating God with Absolute truth he claims that "to find Truth completely is to realise oneself and one's destiny, that is to become perfect."[2] Because of the limitation of man's senses it is not possible for him to comprehend the fullness of God. But it is possible to form a conception of the Higher Law working behind all that manifests itself through the senses, however imperfectly. The highest aim of human life, Gandhi maintained, is to try to discover the Law, and while so doing to purify every act of our life in conformity with the Law, in so far as it has been revealed to us by inquiry. The quest for truth should, moreover, be along the path of self-purification, free of the obstacles of the narrownesses of personal self.

Man can approach the ultimate goal through a variety of truths. Moreover, Gandhi conceded that the evolution of the human mind is not the same for all. Hence, truth as man knows it at his own level may appear differently to man from that of absolute truth, and differently among men. In the final analysis, truth for Gandhi, is "what the voice within tells you," the voice of conscience; and is not to be found by anybody who has not got an abundant sense of humility. "If you would swim on the bosom of the ocean of Truth you must reduce yourself to a zero."[3]

Till the Absolute Truth, the Eternal Principle, God, is realised, Gandhi is prepared to hold by relative truth as man conceives it. Despite this plurality of truths in Gandhi's view the world as man knows it is not maya, or illusion, as Vedantic Hinduism claims. The gap between what is really true and man's relative understanding of that truth places upon man the obligation to seek ultimate reality; "there is nothing wrong in every man

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1. Gandhi, M.K.: Yeravda Mandir. Op. cit. p.2.
2. Cited in Prabhu, R.K. and Rao, U.R.: The Mind of Mahatma Gandhi (London, Oxford University Press, 1945) p.13.
3. Ibid. p.17.

following truth according to his lights. Indeed it is his duty to do so."[1]

In laying upon man the obligation to seek Absolute Truth, Gandhi believes in the perfectibility of the human personality. In his quest for Absolute Truth man is responsible for his conduct and is capable of improving his nature in this world and the next. Man's will is free to the extent that he can discharge his obligation to erase his faults and to find the supreme good and spiritual liberty. On the other hand, to the extent to which man is unable to comprehend Absolute Truth, or the fullness of God, his perfectibility is limited. Gandhi admits that: "It is not given to man to know the whole Truth. His duty lies in living up to the truth as he sees it."[2] As Power points out, Gandhi's understanding of man "stands between one of rigid imperfectibility and one of full perfectibility."[3] "No one", Gandhi declared, "should dogmatize about the capacity of human nature for degradation or exaltation."[4]

In his interpretation of human personality, Gandhi placed great emphasis on the environment as a means of elevating or degrading human nature. Human nature was not fixed for all time but capable of growth and development. He, therefore, saw the potentiality of decency even in the most corrupt of persons, and consistently believed in the basic goodness and decency of all men, including those whom he opposed. Gandhi's faith in non-violent non-cooperation is based on this belief in the improvement of human nature through an improvement of the environment. Explaining his view, Gandhi wrote: "It is because the rulers, if they are bad, are so, not necessarily or wholly by reason of birth, but largely because of their environment, that I have hopes of altering their course. It is perfectly true that the rulers cannot alter their course themselves. If they are dominated by their

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1. Gandhi, M.K.: Yeravda Mandir. Op.cit. p.3.
2. Cited in Prabhu, R.K. and Rao, U.R.: The Mind of Mahatma Gandhi, Op.cit. p.19.
3. Power, P.F.: Gandhi on World Affairs. Op.cit. p.37.
4. Harijan (May 4, 1940).

environment, they do not surely deserve to be killed, but should be changed by a change of environment. But the environment are we - the people who make the rulers what they are. They are thus an aggregated edition of what we are in the aggregate. If my argument is sound, any violence done to the rulers would be violence done to ourselves. It would be suicide. And since I do not want to commit suicide, nor encourage any neighbours to do so, I become non-violent myself and invite my neighbours to do likewise . . . If we reform ourselves, the rulers will eventually do so."[1]

Though creatures of circumstance, there is, in Gandhi's view, a zone of freedom for men to alter their present course to something different and developtheir personalities. This they can do by searching for Absolute Truth.

It was pointed out that for Gandhi, Absolute Truth or the Higher Law could be discovered intuitively and not through rational interpretations. Nevertheless, Gandhi stressed another way, in his opinion, the superior way to Absolute Truth, namely anasaktiyoga or karmayoga, selfless action. Gandhi wanted men to follow the path of ethical action as a middle ground between inactive asceticism and activity for the sake of benefits, either from the world or for the self. For "mere knowledge of right or wrong", he believed, "will not make one fit for salvation." Nor will passive virtue suffice. "He who gives up action fails. He who gives up only the reward rises." Gandhi, thus, seems to draw his picture of the ideal man from the Bhagavad-Gita, which lays down what a man should be like - "He who does the task dictated by duty, caring nothing for fruit of the action, He is a Yogi"[2]

2. In the quest for ultimate truth Gandhi singled out courage as the

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1. Harijan (September, 29, 1934).
2. Gandhi, M.K. Yeravda Mandir, Op. cit., p.27.

crucial virtue which men must show. This fearlessness is "freedom from all eternal fear - fear of disease, bodily injury and death, of dispossession, of losing one's nearest and dearest, of losing reputation or giving offence.[1] Such courage produces a state of mental equipoise man needs to achieve his final ends. Passivity, cowardice and doubt are obstacles in the path of successful non-violent non-cooperation. Gandhi considered cowardly non-violence as the least satisfactory type of pacifism, the highest kind being that of the individual capable of violent action but who through self-discipline behaves peaceably. There were, however, two limitations to his doctrine of non-violence. In the first place, he believed that violence is preferable to cowardice and passivity; and secondly that some violence is unavoidable in the process of living.[2]

His ethics of non-injury is included in vows which he observed and recommended to his closest followers. These pledges consist of faith in absolute truth or God; physical and psychical courage; non-violence; swadeshi loyalty to one's native institutions; dietary self-control; honesty; chastity; belief in religious equality; manual labour; and the removal of untouchability. The practice of humility integrates these observances.[3] Recognizing that only some men can practice all of these vows, to ordinary men he expounded the way of non-violence, the means to truth, rather than insisting on all of the disciplines which he imposed upon himself. But in his explication of non-violence, he required one basic condition for its true manifestation, namely, suffering in body or soul as a substitute for injury to others.[4]

Gandhi recognized the basic equality of all men and thereby believed that all men, irrespective of class or religion, are qualified to know and

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1. Gandhi, M.K.: Yeravda Mandir. Op. cit. p.27.
2. Harijan. (April 27, 1946).
3. Gandhi, M.K.: Yeravda Mandir. Op. cit. pp. 1-48.
4. Young India (June 16, 1920).

practice the ideal type of non-violence,[1] and thus fulfill the duty to search fearlessaly for truth. Since all men are subject to the higher law of dharma, Gandhi holds that all mankind is one. "All men are equal in God's eyes. There are, of course, differences of races and status and the like, but the higher the status of man, the greater is his responsibility."[2]

Likewise, Gandhi affirmed his faith in the unity of man. "I do not believe. . . . that an individual may gain spiritually and those who surround him suffer. I believe in advaita. I believe in the essential unity of man and, for that matter, of all that lives. Therefore, I believe that if one man gains spiritually, the whole world gains with him, and, if one man falls, the whole world falls to that extent . . . . Hence, whether an individual is good or bad is not merely his own concern, but really the concern of the whole community, nay, of the whole world."[3] This implies a sort of collective responsibility, the individual being responsible not only for his own good, but the good of the society at large; society itself being responsible for the welfare of its constituent elements.

Nature of Knowledge: In Gandhi's thinking "knowledge includes all training that is useful for the service of mankind."[4] It, therefore, includes training not only of the head, but of the heart and the hand as well. The true purpose of education, he claims, is not to train a fragment of the mind, for example, the memory, but all its manifold powers, physical, intellectual and moral, envisaged as a unity, as an integrated whole.

Rather than make a fetish of literacy training Gandhi placed great emphasis on work experience as a means of acquiring knowledge. In his experience, literacy training by itself does not add an inch to one's moral height.[5]

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1. Young India. (November 27, 1924).
2. Prabhu,R.K. and Rao,U.R.: The Mind of Mahatma Gandhi. Op.cit. p.137.
3. Ibid. p.137.
4. Harijan (1947).
5. Saiyidain,K.G.: The Humanist Tradition in Indian Educational Thought. (London, Asia Publishing House, 1966) p.102.

One of Gandhi's purposes in taking this stand was to redress the lost balance in education where it had become usual for educators to equate book learning with the manifold and complex processes of training the mind and educating the personality. The essence of his educational thinking is that work is a true and more comprehensive medium of acquiring knowledge than the book and it has an impact over a wider surface of human personality. The type of education that he advocated was undoubtedly oriented towards the kind of society that he desired to bring into being - a society where manual and mental work would have equal status, a society governed by the law of "bread labour".

Translated into practice, his ideas found expression in his theory of basic education which envisaged a system in which books yielded priority of place to productive work, to what he called 'basic crafts' and the stimulus for the acquisition of knowledge must arise out of this "socially useful productive work" in which the child is "happily engaged". In the life of the young child, he pointed out, the point of emphasis is not the amount of the variety of knowledge that we impart, but the extent to which we can make it real, a well assimilated part of his life. By correlating practical work with theoretical knowledge the teacher can make this knowledge real for the children. If, at this stage, there are items or areas of knowledge which cannot be linked up with the children's activities, it would be safe to presume, according to Gandhi, that such knowledge is not very relevant or urgent at that stage of the child's life. However, to ensure that the correlations between doing and learning would not be artificial, Gandhi conceded that the process of correlation, besides being craft-centred, should be based also on the physical and social environments.

Moreover, Gandhi's system of basic education, was believed to be of practical advantage also, especially for a country like India where there is no adequate provision to meet the huge expenditure of providing compulsory, universal schooling for seven years. It was argued that the usable articles

produced by children taking up a basic craft could eventually be marketed, thus making the school self-supporting. That schools should be made self-supporting through remunerative work done by the students was pointed out by Gandhi when he said: "Apart from the necessity which is daily being more and more recognised of students having an industrial training side by side with literary training, there is in this country the additional necessity of pursuing industrial training in order to make education directly self-supporting. This can only be done when our students begin to recognise the dignity of labour and when the convention is established of regarding ignorance of manual occupation a mark of disgrace."[1]

The basic consideration, therefore, is educational and not economic in the sense that from the outset children learn to recognise the dignity of labour. What trains the mind and character is integrity in work, a feeling that all true work is worship, that half-hearted, slip-shod work is an affront to God as well as to one's own self-respect. This was because Gandhi firmly believed that every act has its spiritual, economic and social implications.

Gandhi's idea of basic education, it must be pointed out, was designed for the seven years of compulsory education only. Beyond this stage it is not clear how Gandhi expected knowledge to be acquired, apart from the fact that it should be based upon "indigenous cultures" and be acquired through an "indigenous medium". There should, however, in his opinion, be contact between school and society, between the curriculum and the vital activities which sustain life outside the school.

This is how he stated his general social theory of education:

> "My plan to impart primary education through the medium of village handicrafts like spinning, etc. is conceived as a spearhead of a silent social revolution, fought with the most far-reaching consequences. It will provide a healthy

1. Young India. (August 2, 1928).

moral basis of relationship between the city and the village and thus go a long way towards eradicating some of the moral evils of the present social insecurity and poisoned relationship between the classes. . . . It will check the progressive decay of our villages and lay the foundations of a juster social order in which there is no unnatural division between the 'haves' and the 'have-nots' and everybody is assured of a living wage and the right to freedom."[1]

Thus, he sees education as directly related to, and concerned with, the social issues of the age and as morally responsible for solving them. He would expect the school to become an active agent of social change and promote his ideal of a non-violent, cooperative commonwealth, inspired by faith in simple living. This would be possible if the educational process was itself permeated by the qualities of cooperation, respect for truth and non-violence, regard for the dignity of the human personality which the proposed 'social revolution' endeavours to bring about. This was because Gandhi believed that the nature of the means which we adopt to achieve an end is as important as the end itself. It is important that both should be pure - otherwise the contamination of the means will also spread to the ends which they are designed to serve.

It is debatable whether Gandhi can be labelled a pragmatist. To the extent that he decried literary education and placed emphasis on socially useful knowledge, he is a pragmatist. But he never justified the acquisition of knowledge for gaining material benefits like wealth or power. The purpose of acquiring knowledge was to develop both the intellect and character, gain mastery over thoughts and actions, and be equipped to serve humanity at large.

Finally, for the acquisition of knowledge Gandhi considered the

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1. Cited in Saiyidain, K.G.: The Humanist Tradition in Indian Educational Thought. Op.cit. p.105.

indigenous medium as the best and most successful. Education in a foreign language, inadequately mastered by a vast majority of students, tended to block self-expression, repress creative energy and, on the social side, estrange the educated classes from the masses. "A foreign medium means an undue strain upon the youngsters. It robs them of all originality. It stunts their growth and isolates them from their home."[1] Gandhi argued that "no country can become a nation by producing a race of imitators."[2]

This brings us to the implications of Gandhi's views about the nature of society, individual and knowledge on his attitude towards the various languages in use in India, and his opinions on the ideal language policy for the country.

Gandhi's Views on Languages and Language Policies: Gandhi's emphasis on all things Swadeshi is manifested in the linguistic sphere in his insistence on indigenous languages as a symbol of national unity and national identity. Gandhi had definite views on the language or languages to be used in education and administration, and the role to be assigned to the different languages of India.

Leading the struggle for India's independence, the urgency for national awakening and national unity was the paramount force that directed Gandhi's thinking. His thinking on the language issue, therefore, was more a direct result of the circumstances and needs of the moment than the cogitations of a philosopher. Independence of India was his goal, and truth and non-violence the means to achieve it. He, therefore, referred every problem to these guiding principles. As he once said:

"It is not that I am making a fetish of language. It is not that I would refuse to have Swaraj if I could have it at the

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1. Gandhi, M.K.: Medium of Instruction (Ahmedabad, Navjivan, 1954) p.7.
2. Young India. (April 27, 1921).

cost of our language, as indeed I should refuse to have it at the cost of Truth and Non-violence. But I insist so much on language because it is a powerful means of achieving national unity, and the more firmly it is established the broader based will be our unity."[1]

Gandhi was a strong supporter of the use of Indian languages for both educational and administrative purposes. He believed that the cultural growth of a people cannot take place except through the medium of their own languages. Gandhi laid down that in his ideal society, that is, under Swaraj,

". . . the official language for provincial governments, legislatures and courts, within a definite period, (was) to be the vernacular of the province; of the Privy Council, the final court of appeal to be Hindustani; the script to be either Devanagari or Persian. The language of the Central Government and of the Central Legislature (was) to be Hindustani. The language of international diplomacy (was) to be English."[2]

Each language, therefore, was assigned a specific role in Gandhi's ideal society. In the educational sphere, Gandhi was convinced that education could not adequately fulfil its function of developing the powers of the child and of enabling him to contribute fully to the life of the community to which he belonged, unless it was imparted through the medium of his mother tongue. Education in a foreign tongue, he believed, not only handicaps the student, but alienates the educated from the masses. Education in the vernaculars is, therefore, essential for an integrated society.

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1. Gandhi, M.K.: Thoughts on National Language. (Ahmedabad, Navjivan, 1961) p.53.
2. Young India. (December 26, 1924).

Enumerating the disadvantages of learning through a foreign medium Gandhi wrote:

> "The foreign medium has caused brain fag, put an undue strain upon the nerves of our children, made them crammers and imitators, unfitted them for original work and thought, and disabled them for filtrating their learning to the family or the masses. The foreign medium has made our children practically foreigners in their own land. It is the greatest tragedy of the existing system. The foreign medium has prevented the growth of our Vernaculars."[1]

He, therefore, believed it to be "as necessary for the urban child as for the rural to have the foundation of his development laid on the solid work of the mother tongue."[2]

His great insistence on the vernaculars by no means meant that Gandhi was hostile to English. On the contrary. While he advised students during the transition period from foreign domination to swaraj to suspend their study of English, he appreciated at the same time that "English is a language of international commerce, it is the language of diplomacy, and it contains many a rich literary treasure, it gives us an introduction to Western thought and culture. For a few of us, therefore, a knowledge of English is necessary."[3] What he resented was what he called the unnatural place occupied by English which had "usurped the dearest place in our hearts and dethroned our mother tongues." Therefore, "to get rid of the infatuation of English is one of the essentials of swaraj."[4]

Gandhi, thus, explained his opposition to English on the grounds of

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1. Young India (September 1, 1921).
2. Harijan. (September 9, 1939).
3. Young India (February 2, 1921).
4. Ibid.

the unnatural position enjoyed by that language in India. [illegible] Gandhi: "I love the English tongue in its own place, but I am its inveterate opponent, if it usurps a place which does not belong to it. English is today admittedly the world [illegible] language. I would therefore accord it a place as a second, optional language, not in the school but in the university course. That can only be for the select few - not for the millions."[1]

Just as Gandhi wanted to free India from the political dominance of the British without nurturing a hatred for the British people; he sought to free Indians from the cultural domination of the English language without fostering a hatred for English. That was in line with his belief in non-violence and love.

A logical consequence of Gandhi's belief that education and administration at the provincial level should be in the vernaculars, was his support of the view that all those with the same mother tongue should constitute a political unit, and that provinces, therefore, should be re-constituted on the basis of language. Only thus, Gandhi felt, the greatest development of the various parts of the country could take place. "I believe that the linguistic basis is the correct basis for demarcating provinces."[2]

Gandhi warned, however, that such a re-distribution should not militate against the organic unity of India. "Autonomy did not and should not mean disruption. . . . If each province began to look upon itself as a separate, sovereign unit, India's independence would lose its meaning and with it would vanish the freedom of the various units as well."[3] Though a

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1. Harijan. (August 25, 1946).
2. Ibid. (April 19, 1942).
3. Ibid. (February 1, 1948).

linguistic re-distribution of provinces was expected to give an impetus to [illegible] education and trade, it would be fatal if it led to narrow provincialism and mutual rivalries. For interprovincial communication as well as communication with the centre, Hindustani was to serve as the lingua franca. The function of Hindustani was to make the various provinces realise their organic relationship with India.

The Hindustani of Gandhi's conception had a definite role to play in his ideal society. For him, Hindustani was the ordinary language spoken and understood by the common people in North India, both Hindus and Muslims, and written in both the Devanagari and Urdu scripts.[1] Though based on a common foundation, both Hindi and Urdu had developed as two distinct languages, Hindi drawing inspiration and nourishment from Sanskrit whereas Urdu did the same from Persian and Arabic.

The tension between Hindus and Muslims tended to caste its reflection on the linguistic plane also and a controversy, marked by a sort of rivalry, arose between Hindi and Urdu. Gandhi wished for a fusion of the two languages, even as he wished for Hindu-Muslim amity. In fact he believed that the fusion of the two languages into a single language, but with both scripts, would be a powerful influence in promoting Hindu-Muslim unity. Gandhi, therefore advised the people to learn Hindustani for all-India communication, claiming that it is the language of "those vast tracts of India which speak nothing but Hindustani."[2]

Gandhi recognised the need for a fusion of Hindi and Urdu not only from the view point of national integration, but also from a linguistic point of view. He realised that an efficient national language can grow only from the ordinary speech of the common people and the efforts of men of letters to

1. Gandhi, M.K.: Thoughts on National Language. Op. cit. p.5.
2. Young India. (February 2, 1921).

express themselves through that medium. As regards the growth of this national language he said: "In order to strengthen Hindustani consistently with its genius, if a language can be said to have a 'genius', it must borrow from all the languages of the world."[1]

To conclude, Gandhi's philosophy is based on his firm faith in God, supported by the principles of Truth and Non-violence. Search for Absolute Truth through non-violent means was, for him, the goal of human endeavour. Projected into the sphere of mass action this took the form of collective Satyagraha which on a mass scale was the same discipline for realising the truth of human unity as the individual's private effort in that direction. Thus swarai in the socio-political field became synonymous with moksha or the highest emancipation at the level of the individual.

The goal of swarai was an offshoot of Gandhi's principle of Swadeshi or native, which encompassed all fields, social, political, economic and religious. Gandhi propagated the idea of Swadeshi, and encouraged the setting up of native political, legal and education[al] institutions, operated through the medium of the native languages. Only thus, he believed, could a country realise its true identity.

Gandhi disliked industrialism and the concomitant concentration of power and wealth in the hands of a few. As against this he put forward his law of "bread labour" and visualized a free society of the future where incomes from all socially necessary forms of labour would be equal. Natural inequalities would remain, but the talented persons would be persuaded by enlightened public opinion to place their talents at the service of humanity, the satisfaction thus received would be their reward.

To bring about this ideal society Gandhi elaborated a way by which

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1. Gandhi, M.K.: Thoughts on National Language. Op. cit. p.177.

common men and women, otherwise defenceless, could develop the strength to resist and change the existing social order. This was the way of non-violent non-cooperation, whereby, instead of returning evil by evil, he advised people t non-cooperate with evil. Non-cooperation, Gandhi held, was meant to transform the relationship between human beings which would ultimately lead to a peaceful transfer of power. Only by a conversion of the opponent and by gaining his co-operation in the making of a new system, could one build for permanency. A good social order, when imposed by force from above, cannot, he warned, root out the evil which lies hidden within. Good based upon authority is ultimately no good at all. Freedom alone is the prime condition of human growth.

J. Nehru's Views on the Nature of Society, Individual and Knowledge

Like Gandhi, Nehru's impact on Indian thought - political, social and economic has been profound. Yet in their attitudes to political, social and economic problems, a gulf separated the two men - a chasm bridged, nevertheless, by devotion to a common cause, the independence of India.

Most of what Gandhi propagated appeared to Nehru medieval and revivalist. But he was impressed by the older man's resolve and purpose, and mostly by his insistence on action, as opposed to mere verbal protests. As Nehru himself once confessed, the two men who most influenced his life were his father, Motilal Nehru, and Gandhi. Though an admirer and follower of Gandhi, Nehru had views of his own which often clashed with those of his mentor. In the earlier years this caused a great conflict in the mind of young Nehru, who sought to rationalise many of Gandhi's ideas which he could not accept.

Apart from rationalising Gandhi, Nehru provided a practical, forward-looking approach to Gandhism. Unlike Gandhi, who preferred to move step by step in response to the needs of the moment, Nehru was concerned not only with the exigencies of the present, but with the needs of the future, and eager to define ultimate objectives, whether political, social or economic.

His preoccupation with the future, nevertheless, did not lead him to ignore the present, for he recognised that a strong superstructure is laid only on a solid foundation.

Gandhi's approach to most problems was intuitive rather than intellectual. In the final analysis, the conscience was the arbiter of right and wrong. "The still small voice within you", said Gandhi, "must always be the final arbiter when there is a conflict of duty."[1] Nehru, on the other hand, talked of reason and of a "scientific temper". This thing is right, said Gandhi, therefore it is rational, Nehru, on the other hand, said: This thing is rational; therefore it must be right.[2]

An examination of Nehru's views on the nature of society, individual and knowledge, will not only reveal his trend of thought, but also highlight the similarities and differences between his views and those of Gandhi.

Nature of Society: Nehru's ideal was an egalitarian, democratic, socialist society based on scientific planning rather than tradition, religious dogmas and metaphysics.

Nehru recognised the organic unity of the various aspects of a social system - political, social, economic, industrial, educational and so on. He, therefore, held that change in one aspect, to be effective, must be accompanied by simultaneous changes in the other spheres as well. The socio-economic order could not be improved in the existing political framework of foreign rule; nor could political freedom have meaning without being accompanied by economic freedom.[3] He, therefore, aimed at a complete change in all sectors of life to prevent "overwhelming catastrophe". "A society," he said, "if it is to be

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1. Young India. (August 4, 1920).
2. Moraes, F.: Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography. (New York, The Macmillan Co., 1956), p.11.
3. Nehru, J.: The Discovery of India. Op. cit. p.615.

both stable and progressive, must have a certain more or less fixed foundation of principles as well as a dynamic outlook. Both appear to be necessary. Without the dynamic outlook there is stagnation and decay, without some fixed basic principle there is likely to be disintegration and destruction."[1]

Though standing in favour of a complete change of the social order, Nehru cautioned that this change should be in line with the existing pattern and integrated with it in order to create a feeling of continuous development. "National progress", he claimed, "can lie neither in a repetition of the past nor in its denial."[2] It is the right combination of traditional forms with a flexibility and openness of mind that creates a new stable social order. Only a living and growing mind can overcome the rigidity of traditional forms, only those forms can give it continuity and stability.

Inspite of his reverence for tradition, Nehru had no patience with an excessive reliance on religion. And this is where he parted ways with Gandhi, whose whole philosophy is based on his belief in God. Nehru claimed that India had too much of the past about it and has ignored the present. "We have to get rid of that narrowing religious outlook," he warned, "that obsession with the supernatural and metaphysical speculations, that loosening of the mind's discipline in religious ceremonial and mystical emotionalism, which comes in the way of our understanding ourselves and the world."[3] According to him, India must lessen her religiosity and turn to science.

Nehru, therefore, resented Gandhi's frequent stress on the religious and spiritual aspect of the civil disobedience movement. Gandhi's preoccupation with religion led many people to look upon him as a mystic and earned him the title of 'Mahatma'. But Nehru failed to see any connection between religion and politics. Consequently, Nehru did not have much faith in satyagraha as an

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1. Nehru, J.: The Discovery of India. Op. cit. p.615.
2. Ibid. p.630.
3. Ibid. p.633.

agency of social change. He admired the moral and ethical elements in non-violence but could not give absolute allegiance to it as a political creed. If Nehru accepted non-violence as a political weapon it was not because he regarded it as a dogma, but merely as the right policy for India under the prevailing conditions. He rationalised the doctrine of non-violence and looked upon it as a worthy weapon. "A worthy end," Nehru argues, "should have worthy means leading upto it. That seemed not only a good ethical doctrine but sound practical politics, for the means that are not good often defeat the end in view and raise new problems and difficulties."[1]

Nehru differed from Gandhi not only in his faith in non-violence, but his concepts of change also differed vastly from those of Gandhi. Nehru firmly believed that freedom was meaningless without a change in the social and economic order, and felt that Gandhi was vague in the definition of his political and economic objectives. Politically, Gandhi hesitated a long time before committing India to complete independence, and it was largely under Nehru's leadership that the Congress party adopted independance as its goal.

Political change, Nehru claimed, was meaningless within the existing political framework. The present structure had to be uprooted before a new political order could be brought into existence. "We wanted no change of masters from white to brown," Nehru asserted, "but a real people's rule by the people and for the people. . ."[2] Nehru advocated democracy based on the widest possible franchise, and trusted a wide electorate far more than a restricted one, based on property qualification or an educational test.

With Gandhi, Nehru saw a vast potential in the masses of India, the peasants and workers, whose inclusion in the nationalist struggle broadened its base. But his distinctive contribution to the nationalist movement was his

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1. Cited in Moraes, F.: ~~op. cit. p.10.~~ Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography. Op.cit.p.10
2. Nehru, J.: The Discovery of India. Op. cit. p.62.

recognition of the middle class intellectual as the most revolutionary force; and by intellectualising Gandhism he drew active support from this group. The educated middle class formed the backbone of Britain's administrative structure in India. Withdrawal of their loyalty to the British Raj, Nehru realised, would mean the collapse of the Raj itself. The middle class, however, had a vested interest in the existing structure. As a result their revolt was directed against the British rule and not the accompanying structure, whose products they largely were. It was, therefore, upto the masses who were outside this structure to revolt against the existing framework and uproot it.[1]

Like Gandhi, Nehru was imbued with a passion for social justice, equality and decency in human relationships. By equality he did not mean that everybody is physically or intellectually or spiritually equal or can be made so. Equality, for him, meant "equal opportunities for all and no political, economic or social barrier in the way of any individual or group."[2] It meant a faith in humanity and a belief that there is no race or group that cannot advance given the chance to do so. The backwardness and degradation of any group is not due to inherent failings in it, but principally to lack of opportunities and suppression by other groups. Hence, not only must equal opportunities be given to all, but special opportunities for educational, economic and cultural growth must be given to backward groups to enable them to catch up with those ahead of them.

Nehru, therefore, was opposed to the existence and continuance of classes in a social order, believing it to be contrary to the ideas of democracy. "Democracy means," for Nehru, "equality, and democracy can only flourish in an equal society. It is obvious enough that the giving of votes to everybody does not result in producing an equal society. In spite of adult suffrage and the like, there is today tremendous unequality. Therefore, in

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1. Nehru, J.: The Discovery of India. Op.cit. p.51.
2. Ibid. p.635.
3. Ibid. p.636.

order to give democracy a chance, an equal society must be created. . ."[1]

His love for equality and social justice found Nehru opposed to the traditional caste system, which, as he pointed out, had led not only to "the suppression of certain groups, but to a separation of theoretical and scholastic learning from craftsmanship and a divorce of philosophy from actual life and its problems."[2] He considered the system wholly opposed to the economic and social changes he had in mind, as well as to the democratic ideal, and therefore had no place for it in his ideal society.

This does not mean that Nehru underestimated the contribution of the caste system. In so far as the caste system provided for a "functional organization of social groups",[3] he was all for the system. The concept of abstract rights, he held, must give place to that of functions. This was naturally opposed to the idea of hereditary professions, and in favour of education imparted on the basis of aptitude and equality of opportunity. Within the framework of the caste-system, there can be neither equality in status and opportunity, nor can there be political and economic democracy. The two are incompatible, and, therefore, in the interests of democracy, the caste system has to be abolished.

If democracy demands equality, Nehru pointed out, it must necessarily also demand an economic system which fits in with it and encourages it. Political change, therefore, has to be accompanied by economic change. This economic change, for Nehru was in the direction of "a democratically planned collectivism."[4] This, Nehru was quick to add, did not mean an abolition of private property; rather, it meant the public ownership of the basic and major industries, as well as the cooperative or collective control of land. The

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1. Nehru, J.: Glimpses of World History (London, Asia Publishing House, 1964) p. 854.
2. Nehru, J.: The Discovery of India. Op. cit. p.634.
3. Ibid. p.634.
4. Ibid. p.636.

aim of such a system, Nehru stressed, "should be the expansion of the productive capacity of the nation in every possible way at the same time absorbing all the labour power of the nation in some activity or other and preventing unemployment. As far as possible there should be freedom to choose one's occupation. An equalisation of income will not result from all this, but there will be far more equitable sharing and a progressive tendency towards equalisation. . . . Class distinctions, which are essentially based on differences in income, will begin to fade out."[1]

Nehru claimed that this idea of collectivism, involving communal undertakings and cooperative efforts, was in harmony with the traditional Indian society based on groups, and this age-old tradition could be used as a basis to build up communal and cooperative concerns. However, unlike Gandhi, Nehru did not conceive of a village as being a self-contained, self-sufficient economic unit; but he was willing to see it functioning as a governmental unit, each unit functioning as a self-governing community within the larger political framework, and looking after the essential needs of the village.[2] Economically however, "growth and progress consist in cooperation between larger and larger units."[3]

The seeds of future progress, Nehru realised, lie in industry and urbanisation. "No country today is really independent or capable of resisting aggression unless it is industrially developed."[4] Whereas Gandhi laid stress not only on Swadeshi or Indian goods, but village-made goods, and looked upon industrialisation as causing mass unemployment and the concen-

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1. Nehru, J.: The Discovery of India. Op.cit. p.636.
2. Ibid. p.637.
3. Nehru, J.: Glimpses of World History. Op. cit. p.357.
4. Nehru, J.: Autobiography. (London, The Bodley Head, 1958) p.522.

tration of wealth in the hands of a few; Nehru warned against doing away with industrialisation, as that would mean "falling prey, economically and otherwise to other more industrialised countries."[1] Nehru's ideal society, therefore was to be highly industrialised.

Gandhi's views on machinery and modern civilisation irked Nehru. Gandhi's belief that private wealth constituted a trust was also unacceptable for Nehru. Whilst he appreciated simplicity, Nehru saw no particular virtue in poverty, and was indignant at Gandhi's praise of poverty and suffering. Although the ascetic life might suit individuals, Nehru could see no special virtue in it as a social ideal.[2]

For Nehru, such favoured projects of Gandhi as hand-spinning and hand-weaving signified the means to an end, not an end in themselves. He believed that unless village industries were harnessed to modern industrial techniques they could never provide even the essential material goods a country needed. He, therefore, advocated a balance between heavy industries and cottage industries, and this, in his thinking, called for a planned economy:

> "I am all for tractors and big machinery and I am convinced that the rapid industrialisation of India is essential to relieve the pressure on land, to combat poverty and raise standards of living, for defence, and a variety of other purposes. But I am equally convinced that the most careful planning and adjustment are necessary if we are to reap the full benefit of industrialisation and avoid many of its dangers."[3]

A socialist order, through phased planning, where the major industries, if not state-owned, are at least under rigid state control, became Nehru's ideal.

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1. Nehru, J.: A Bunch of Old Letters. (London, Asia Publishing House, 1958)p.392
2. Nehru, J.: Autobiography. Op. cit. pp.510-511.
3. Nehru: J.: The Discovery of India. Op. cit. p.488.

Here he drew inspiration from the social and industrial transformation of Soviet Russia, though he was at the same time appalled by the ruthless suppression, unnecessary violence and the spirit of wholesale regimentation prevailing in Soviet society. His was a "non-doctrinaire approach"[1] to socialism. He was essentially pragmatic in outlook being concerned merely with the solution of problems.

There are, however, in Nehru's view, limitations to planning. Planning by itself has little meaning and need not, necessarily, lead to good results. Everything depends on the objectives of the plan and on the controlling authority, as well as the government behind it. Real planning must recognise that no special interests can be allowed to come in the way of any scheme designed to further the well-being of the community as a whole.[2] Socialism, in a country dominated by an alien power is meaningless. Nationalisation of industry, unaccompanied by political democracy will lead to a different kind of exploitation. For while industry will then belong to the State, the State itself will not belong to the people.

Moreover, Nehru sought to reconcile Gandhism with its stress on the individual, and Marxism with its stress on the State. Planning, said Nehru, must therefore be planning for democracy and freedom. His Utopia was a state ensuring both economic security and liberty. A welfare state on the socialist pattern was his aim, and in a characteristic mood of rationalisation he interpreted Gandhi's concept of Ramaraiya as "a kind of Welfare State." But he held that the socialist pattern of society he envisaged should be achieved not by coercion but by consent, by a process of free discussion - in short that it should be planning by persuasion, for the people and by the people.[3] For us,

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1. Rao, V.K.R.V.: "Planning Without Dogma" in Zakaria, F.(ed.) A Study of Nehru (Bombay, Times of India Publications, 1959) p.307.
2. Nehru, J.: The Discovery of India. Op.cit. pp.610-611.
3. Moraes, F.: Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography. Op. cit. p.421.

Nehru, faced with the dilemma of maintaining individual freedom and initiative and yet having centralised social control and planning of the economy; socialism was an equation between individual liberty and a planned economic order.

Though a strong advocate of technological development, Nehru recognised that national development should proceed in a balanced way, for "all problems are not solved by material prosperity."[1] Individual happiness or contentment requires faith in some great ideals and purposes which are not fettered only to material goods. The mere piling up of material riches may lead, Nehru warns, to an emptiness in the inner life of man.

Nehru's views on society may, in his own words, be summed up thus:

> "I want India to advance on the material plane, . . to raise the standard of living of her vast population; I want the narrow conflicts of today in the name of religion or caste, language or province to cease and a classless and casteless society to be built up, where every individual has full opportunity to grow according to his work and ability. In particular, I hope that the curse of caste will be ended, for there cannot be either democracy or socialism on the basis of caste. . . I have no doubt that India will progress industrially and otherwise, . . . that education will spread . . . and that art and culture will enrich the peoples' lives. . . . But what I am concerned with is not merely our material progress but the quality and depth of our people. . . We cannot be untrue to science because that represents the basic facts of life today. Still less can we be untrue to those essential principles for which India has stood throughout the ages . . . . Industrial riches, without toleration and compassion and wisdom, may well turn to dust and ashes."[2]

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1. Nehru,J.: Azad Memorial Lectures. P.135. Cited in Saiyadin,K.G. The Humanist Tradition in Indian Educational Thought. (London, Asia Publishing House, 1966), p.4.
2. Nehru,J.: Azad Memorial Lectures. pp.43-46. Cited in Saiyadin,K.G.: The Humanist Tradition in Indian Educational Thought. Op.cit. pp. 18-19.

Nature of Individual: Nehru had definite views about the ideal man who would function in his ideal social order. He talked of the modern mind, or what he called "the better type of the modern mind" as being "practical and pragmatic, ethical and social, altruistic and humanitarian."[1] This was because Nehru believed that the nature of man is not something given for all time but that the ideals which move it represent the spirit of the age, the Yugadharma. In the present age of socialism and democracy the mind of man is governed by "a practical idealism for social betterment." As Nehru put it, "Humanity is its god and social service its religion."[2] For Nehru, there was no religion higher than duty. It is interesting to note, therefore, that the Hindu concept of dharma means both duty and religion.

Like Gandhi, Nehru realised that it was beyond any individual to perceive the whole or absolute truth, since the mind of every age is limited by its environment and perceives only some partial truth. Nevertheless, the values recognised by each age are a result of the culture of the age and therefore important as reflections of the thought and spirit of the age.

The universal highest ideals of the present age Nehru classifies under two heads: humanism and the scientific spirit.[3] There is today a growing synthesis between these two ideas and the old boundaries between the external world of service and the internal world of introspection are disappearing. The result of this synthesis, Nehru claims, is a kind of scientific humanism. Man has to function in accordance with the highest ideals of the age he lives in - philosophy and the search for ultimate reality in the ancient period; devotionalism and mysticism in the medieval; and scientific humanism today.[4] But there is an area of freedom for man in that he can mould the highest ideal of the age according to his national genius.

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1. Nehru, J.: The Discovery of India. Op. cit. p.680.
2. Ibid. p.680.
3. Ibid. p.681.
4. Ibid. p.680.

Inspite of his inclination towards science and the scientific attitude, Nehru was opposed to a science which was "impersonal, purposeless, and almost unconcerned with our application of the knowledge it puts at our disposal."[1] Nevertheless, he believed that the earnest scientist of today is a proto-type of the philosopher and the man of religion of earlier ages. He pleaded therefore, for the discovery of "a balance between the body and the spirit, and between man as part of nature and man as part of society."[2] To support his view he quotes Tagore to have said: 'For our perfection, we have to be vitally savage and mentally civilised; we should have the gift to be natural with nature and human with human society.'

Nehru agreed with Gandhi that absolute perfection is beyond man, because perfection means the end, whereas man is always journeying towards a goal which is ever receding. "For all our powers of reason and all our understanding and all our accumulated knowledge and experience, we know little enough about life's secrets, and can only guess at its mysterious processes."[3] Though Nehru steers clear off Gandhi's metaphysical jargon about Truth, Divinity, and the justification of man's existence, it seems that his "life's secrets' and its "mysterious processes" are not very different from Gandhi's ideas about Absolute Truth, and its juxtaposition with divinity.

Metaphysics did not attract Nehru the way they did Gandhi, and as he himself declared, he had nothing to do with religion. Yet he believed that man had something of the "stuff of immortal gods"[4] in him, which enabled him, inspite of his weaknesses and mistakes, to improve himself. Here he agreed with Aristotle, that "We must not obey those who urge us, because we are human and mortals to think human and mortal thoughts; in so far as we may we should practise immortality, and omit no effort to live in accordance with the best that is in us."[5]

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1. Nehru, J.: The Discovery of India. Op.cit. p.680.
2. Ibid. p. 685.
3. Ibid. p. 685.
4. Ibid. p. 685.
5. Cited in Ibid. pp. 685-686.

Nehru agreed with Gandhi's arguments regarding the changing of the external environment by changing the individual internally, morally and spiritually. But he regretted that Gandhi did not plead far enough and showed little interest in such harmful personal failings as covetousness, conflicts for personal gain, exploitation of man by man, and the war between nations.[1]

Among human traits Nehru, like Gandhi, admired fearlessness, and was impressed by the fact that in wiping out the stain of servitude, Gandhi was wiping out the stain of fear. Nehru always admired courage and agreed with Gandhi that courage is one sure foundation of character. Without courage there is no morality, no religion, no love.[2]

Nehru shared Gandhi's faith in humanity, and like him upheld the equality of men - not physical or intellectual equality, but equality of opportunity. There is no individual or group, Nehru insisted, which is intrinsically superior or inferior. All are products of their environment, and given the opportunity, can make good in their own way.[3] The quality of the individual, moreover, determines the quality of a nation, and a backward individual or group can put back others. "In the ultimate analysis", observed Nehru, "a country's development or position is due to and can be measured by the quality of the people."[4] Real progress and advance is a joint affair, to participate in which equal opportunity should be given to all. This was what Gandhi was referring to when he spoke of the "unity" of man.

Nehru was a great admirer of the spirit of man which has enabled him, inspite of his innumerable failings to sacrifice himself "for an ideal, for truth, for faith, for country and honour."[5] It is because of his capacity for self-sacrifice that it is impossible to lose hope for him. It is with

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1. Nehru, J.: Autobiography. Op. cit. pp.518-521.
2. Moraes, F.: Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography. Op. cit. p.10.
3. Nehru, J.: The Discovery of India. Op. cit. p.635.
4. The Indian Express. (Bombay, Oct.8, 1958).
5. Nehru, J.: The Discovery of India. Op. cit. p.22.

his mind, Nehru points out, that man seeks to master the elements. Because of this, Nehru concedes, "there is something godlike in man."[1]

Nehru feared that in the modern world, this indomitable spirit of man was being threatened. Though "material achievements are the very essence of civilisation," Nehru reminds us, "ultimately, culture and civilisation rest in the mind and behaviour of man and not in the material evidence of it that we see around us."[2] The modern mechanised, industrialised world appeared to Nehru to be getting out of tune with the mind and the spirit of man. While in specialised domains of science and technology and knowledge in general, the mind is active and dominant, it does not play its proper role in controlling human aims and purposes. According to Saiyidain, for Nehru one of the important problems of education was to restore the supremacy of the mind and spirit in life, "which is being threatened, curiously, by some of the most magnificient material creations of the mind itself!"[3] Nehru, therefore, encouraged people to cultivate the habit of thinking with a view to distinguish between truth and falsehood and arrive at independent decisions.

Nature of Knowledge: In his writings Nehru reveals a strong passion for science, the scientific approach to knowledge, and the cultivation of a scientific temper. "The way to. . . understanding", was for him, "essentially the way of science, the way of objective approach."[4] Conceding that there can be no such thing as true objectiveness, he insisted that the inevitable subjective element should, as far as possible, be conditioned by the scientific method.

Nehru weighed the relative merits of religion, philosophy and science for discovering Truth - the ultimate reality, which is eternal, imperishable and unchanging and settled for science.[5] Man's apprehension of this ultimate

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1. Nehru, J.: The Discovery of India. Op. cit. p.22.
2. Nehru, J.: Presidential Address, Indian National Congress (October 18, 1951).
3. Saiyidain, K.G.: "The Ideal Educationist" in Zakaria, R. (ed.) A Study of Nehru op. cit. p.394.
4. Nehru, J.: The Discovery of India op. cit. p.16.
5. Ibid. pp. 621-623.

truth, Nehru pointed out, is limited by time and space, the state of development of the mind and the ideology of the period. What man really perceives are the highest ideals of his age, and so truth has to be continually sought and reshaped to keep in line with the development of human life. Only then can this truth come alive for man and offer guidance in the present and for the future.

Religion, while laying down the values, standards and principles of conduct, has, in its narrow sense, tried to imprison truth in set forms and dogmas, and adopted a method of approach to life's problems which was not that of science. Instead of encouraging curiosity and thought, religion has "preached a philosophy of submission to nature, to the established church, to the prevailing social order, and to everything that is."[1] By shifting responsibility to a supernatural agency, it has curbed reasoned thought and inquiry, and checked the tendency to change and progress inherent in human society.

Philosophy on the other hand, encouraged thought and inquiry, and was guided by logic and reason, but Nehru felt that that logic was too much the product of the mind, unconcerned with fact, and cut off from life and its day to day problems. Concentrating on ultimate purposes, philosophy failed to link them with the life of man.[2]

It was science alone, according to Nehru, which looked at facts, and thereby opened up innumerable avenues for the growth of knowledge. It gave man power to understand and control his physical environment and thereby decreased his reliance on supernatural causes. Whatever man understood, ceased to be a mystery, so that with the advance of scientific knowledge the domain of religion narrowed.[3]

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1. Nehru, J.: The Discovery of India, op. cit. p.622.
2. Ibid. p.622.
3. Ibid. p.625.

Inspite of his admiration for science, Nehru was aware of its limitations. "Science", he pointed out, "ignored the ultimate purposes and looked at fact alone . . . (it) told us nothing about any purpose in life."[1] Moreover, he admitted, that the scientific method of observation is not always applicable to all the varieties of human experience. Here philosophy comes to the aid of science. But, Nehru felt, there are areas of knowledge which even science and philosophy cannot fathom, and here we have to rely on such other powers of apprehension as we may possess. What these powers are, however, Nehru does not specify.

Though science deals with positive knowledge, Nehru claimed that the temper which it should produce went beyond that domain. The scientific method of objective inquiry may not serve man's ultimate purpose of realising truth, gaining knowledge and appreciating goodness and beauty, but here too he claimed the scientific approach and temper were still necessary.[2]

Inspite of the limitations of the scientific method, Nehru would hold on to it, for without it, he reiterates, there can be no insight into truth or reality. For an understanding of life and the solution of its problems, "the scientific approach, the adventurous and yet critical temper of science, the search for truth and new knowledge, the refusal to accept anything without testing and trial, the capacity to change previous conclusions in the face of new evidence, the reliance on observed fact and not on preconceived theory, the hard discipline of the mind",[3] are all necessary. Therefore, he adds, "the scientific approach and temper are, or should be, a way of life, a process of thinking, a method of acting and associating with our fellow-men. . . The scientific temper points out the way along which man should travel. It is the temper of a free man."[4]

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1. Nehru, J.: The Discovery of India. Op.cit. pp.622-623.
2. Ibid. p. 624.
3. Ibid. pp. 623-624.
4. Ibid. p. 624.

The ideal approach to all knowledge, and ultimately to life, was for Nehru, the approach and temper of science, allied to philosophy and with reverence for all that lies beyond. Thus, he believed, man can "develop an integral vision of life which embraces in its wide scope the past and the present, with all their heights and depths and look with serenity towards the future."[1]

Nehru advocated a synthetic approach to knowledge, in the sense of widening the sphere of every individual and every nation to include the whole world, as its field of study. The development of science and its applications had made this possible, though, at the same time an increase of knowledge had led to specialisation and so to a narrowing of an individual's sphere. Though specialisation had its own merits, Nehru insisted that a synthetic view of human life should be encouraged, for it is only by an appreciation of others and cooperating with them can men build integrated personalities.[2]

It was this enthusiasm for the scientific approach which largely drew Nehru to Marxism. Marx's scientific approach stimulated him and helped him "to see history and current affairs in a new light."[3] In the solution of the problems of individual and social life, therefore, the methods of science, of observation and reasoning, became of prime importance to him. Without belittling the significance of intuition for sensing truth and reality and "certain psychic experiences", Nehru warned against a philosophy of pure speculation, substituting it by precise objective knowledge tested by reason and experiment. A living philosophy, he maintained, must answer the problems of today.[4]

Nehru's stress on science is carried over into his plan for the best kind of education a child should have. The aim of education should be

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1. Nehru, J.: The Discovery of India, op.cit. p. 626.
2. Ibid., p.632.
3. Ibid., p.17.
4. Ibid., p.20.

the development of "self-reliance, fitness of body and keenness of mind and a harmony between the two, and a certain basic sense of values. . ."[1] While conceding that the aims of education depend on a person's philosophy of life, and therefore vary from individual to individual, Nehru believed that there are certain perennial objectives which are universal. The training of intellect was one of them. Since we are required to face "the ever-changing present with the power of quick decisions,"[2] an untrained intellect would fail us at the first confrontation with reality. "In the times of storms and stresses the only capital that counts is intelligence - individual capacity to face a crisis calmly and to overcome it."[3]

Nevertheless, like Gandhi Nehru appreciated the importance of training both the hand and the heart, and seemed to anticipate Gandhi's philosophy of basic education when he said: "Education is not something in the air, cut off from the daily life of the student or from his future work as a citizen. Real education, it is felt, must be based on the actual environment and experiences of the child and it must fit him for the work he will have to do in after life."[4]

An admirer of the system of basic education, Nehru came very close to advocating it when he wrote: "It is well recognised now that a child's education should be intimately associated with some craft or manual activity. The mind is stimulated thereby and there is a coordination between the activities of the mind and the hands."[5] In what followed, however, he parted company with the Gandhian scheme, for he said, "so also the mind of a growing boy or girl is stimulated by the machine it grows under the machine's impact. . . and opens out new horizons. Simple scientific experiments, peeps into the microscope, and an explanation of the ordinary phenomena of nature, bring excitement in

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1. Nutthe Singh,K.: Letters to his Sister (London, Faber and Faber, 1963) pp. 151-152.
2. Ibid. p.150.
3. Ibid. p. 83.
4. Nehru's Speech in the Soviet Union, 1928. Cited in Wit and Wisdom of Nehru (New Delhi, New Book Society of India, n.d.) pp.173-174.
5. Nehru,J.: The Discovery of India, Op.cit. p.492.

their train, an understanding of some of life's processes and a desire to experiment and find out instead of relying on set phrases and old formulae."[1] Such an education was in line with the scientific approach he advocated, and was expected to lead to the growth of self-confidence and the cooperative spirit. "A civilization based on everchanging and advancing mechanical techniques", he claims, "leads to this." He avers, therefore, "Such a civilisation is a marked change, a jump almost from the older type, and it gives rise to new problems and difficulties but it also shows the way overcome them."[2]

Together with his faith in science, Nehru admitted his partiality for the literary aspects of education and his admiration of the classics. His bias, however, signified his desire for a balanced curriculum because in the same breath he stressed the need for some elementary scientific training in physics, chemistry and biology.[3] Such an education, he hoped, would help children understand and fit into the modern world; for while a literary education helped a child to appreciate higher values and enjoy the subtler things of life, the study of science developed a scientific temper and enabled him to adjust himself to this highly complex technological age.

Gandhi's education was designed to produce moral and spiritual men and women. He was against the idea of having an education to prepare for a career, and stressed that "the knowledge acquired through education, should not be used for earning money. . . . The means of livelihood must always be some form of productive manual labour."[4] Nehru, however, did not seem to share this view. He envisaged a highly industrialised society, which called for trained personnel to man the industries. It lay with the education system, therefore, to provide these trained scientists and technicians. A product of Western education himself, Nehru's ideal in several respects remained the West, and he

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1. Nehru, J.: The Discovery of India. Op. cit. p.492.
2. Ibid. p.492.
3. Ibid. p.492.
4. Gandhi, M.K.: The Problem of Education. (Ahmedabad, Navjivan, 1962) p.79.

admitted that the spirit of the age is represented by the West. Whereas for Gandhi the West with all its science and technology stood for materialism and power, for Nehru it was the answer to progress. Nehru realized that science and its discoveries, in themselves, where neither moral nor immoral. All depended on their use. He visualized science as furthering human progress and called upon the universities to train technical men who would serve their country and humanity at large. For, "science alone could solve the problems of hunger and poverty, of insanitation and illiteracy, of superstition and deadening custom and tradition, of vast resources running to waste, of a rich country inhabited by starving people."[1]

It was primarily Nehru's insistence on technological progress and the introduction of modern mechanized industry that led him to recognize the necessity of a knowledge of English, the language of science and technology. At the same time he sympathized with the claims of Indian languages as more appropriately reflecting the ideal of a democratic Indian Society, and appreciated the need for a common medium of communication. As the first Prime Minister of India, his views considerably helped to shape the language policy of the country.

Nehru's Views on Languages and Language Policies: The unity and stability of India were the prime concerns which motivated the thinking and actions of Nehru. He recognized the fact that below the external diversity and infinite variety of India there was an undercurrent of unity, an impress of oneness which held India together.[2] This he called the Spirit of India which allowed the widest tolerance of belief and custom, and acknowledged and even encouraged every variety within its fold. To strengthen and maintain this unity was Nehru's dream, and he realized that involved in the language question was the

1. Cited in Moraes, F.: Jawaharlal Nehru, A Biography, Op.cit. pp. 484-485.
2. Nehru, J.: The Discovery of India, Op.cit. pp. 53-57.

very unity of the country. Unless a solution was found the disruptive forces would eventually succeed in shaking the very foundations of India.

Nehru endorsed Gandhi's view that an indigenous link language would serve to unite not only the different parts of India, but also the elites and the masses. With Gandhi he realized that this common language for India could only be Hindustani, and therefore declared in 1937 that Hindustani should be officially recognised as the all-India language.[1] In order that this common language may be simple, easy to learn and have a wide appeal, he recommended some form of basic Hindustani on the model of Basic English, with very little grammar and a vocabulary of about a thousand words.[2] Such a basic Hindustani he believed, "with a little effort from the State will spread with extreme rapidity all over the country and will help in bringing about that national unity which we all desire. It will bring Hindi and Urdu closer together and will also help in developing an all-India linguistic unity. On that solid and common foundation, even if variations grow or diversions occur, they will not lead to separatism."[3]

This common language, Hindustani, Nehru insisted should be written in both the Devanagari and the Persian scripts. Moreover, in the 1930s he talked of unifying the scripts of all north Indian languages in order to produce a composite script suited to printing, typing and the use of modern mechanical devices.

At the same time, he advocated a common script for the four South Indian languages till such time as their scripts could be approximated to Devanagari.[4] A common language and a common script were his vision for India.

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1. Nehru, J.: The Unity of India (London, Lindsay Drummond, 1941) p.256.
2. Nehru, J.: "Our Language Problem" in Gandhi, M.K. Thoughts on National Language. Op.cit. pp. 194-197.
3. Nehru, J.: The Unity of India. Op.cit. p.254.
4. Nehru, J.: "Our Language Problem". Op.cit. pp. 194-195.

In the post-independence period, however, he modified his views regarding a common script for Indian languages, recognising that "it is difficult for languages to change their scripts."[1] Nevertheless he did not wish to give up the advantages of a common script, and so without proposing to replace the different scripts by Devanagari, he suggested that "along with their own scripts, Nagari should be used for writing these languages", this warning, at the same time, that this has to take place spontaneously "without legislative compulsion."[2] He therefore asked the people not to abandon any script for a single common script but let all type of selected literature appear in the Nagari script also, so that the barrier of script which at present divides the Indian languages would be removed.

Nehru was quite broad-minded regarding his views on the development of languages and disapproved of rigidity and classicalization of languages in the name of purity. Consequently, he expressed his wish that both Hindi and Urdu should not fall back upon Sanskrit and Persian respectively for enriching themselves. This would not only take the two languages further apart, but would isolate the language of literature from the language of the people, leading ultimately to the decay of the language.[3] Though a great admirer of Sanskrit, Nehru did not visualise its revival as the common language of India. In developing Hindi, Urdu and the other languages of India, and in creating a scientific, technical, political and commercial vocabulary, Nehru insisted that there should be a free borrowing from current terminology, and where necessary these words should be taken from foreign languages and bodily adopted.[4]

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1. Government of India: Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches Vol. IV. (New Delhi, Govt. of India, 1964) pp. 63-64.
2. Ibid.
3. Nehru, J.: The Discovery of India. Op.cit. pp.182-184.
4. Nehru, J.: "Our Language Problem" Op. cit. pp. 196-197.

In his book Away From Politics[1] Nehru declared that language was an index of a nation's 'character',[2] and reflected the nature of a people. Language, therefore, should be flexible enough to change with time, and at the same time it should be humble enough to accept the current terminology of the people, irrespective of its origin. The crucial test, then, of a national language should be its flexibility and adaptability. For India, he felt, this language could only be Hindustani.[3]

Inspite of his insistence on Hindustani, Nehru did not wish to neglect the modern Indian languages. He realised the danger of talking in terms of 'one nation, one culture, and language'[4], which implied the superiority of one culture and one language over all others. Though recognising the need for a link-language, Nehru did not wish it to flourish at the cost of the other modern languages whom he encouraged to flourish.

He realised the importance of the regional languages and resembled Gandhi in his insistence on using them for administration and education at the provincial level. "Our public work", he said, "should be carried on and State education should be given in the language of each linguistic area. This language should be the dominant language of the area."[5] Because of the obvious advantages of education through the mother tongue, Nehru conceded that primary education should be through the medium of the mother tongue, secondary and tertiary education being in the provincial language. "It is right and proper for our education to be in the regional languages if we have to deal with the masses of our people."[6] Hindustani, being the link language, should

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1. Nehru, J.: Rajnitr Se Door (Away from Politics) (New Delhi, Sasta Sahitya Mandal Prakashan, 2nd ed. 1950).
2. Ibid. p.138.
3. Ibid. p.140.
4. Nehru, J.: Presidential Address, Indian National Congress (January 17, 1953).
5. Nehru, J.: "Our Language Problem". Op.cit. p.194.
6. Government of India: Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches. Vol.II (New Delhi, Government of India, 1951) p.54.

be taught at the secondary and tertiary stages of education in the non-Hindustani speaking areas; and though provisions should be made for teaching foreign and classical languages at the secondary stage, these should not be compulsory.[1]

So far, Nehru's views do not differ significantly from those of Gandhi on the language question. In his emphasis on English, however, emanating from his faith in science and industrialisation, did Nehru part company with Gandhi.

The inclusion of English in the Indian school curriculum, Nehru stressed, was justified on the grounds that English provided a window on the world and could therefore be neglected only at our own peril. Speaking at the State Education Ministers' Conference in 1956, Nehru spoke emphatically in favour of English:

> "We are driven to English principally because we know it a good deal, we have people who can teach it, and because it is the most important language in the world today. The whole success of our development scheme depends upon training manpower. It is patent to me that this manpower for industrial, scientific and agricultural purposes cannot be trained in any Indian language in the foreseeable future. It is absolutely clear to me. . . that the scientific and technological training has to be given in English. . . . It is an absolute necessity."[2]

From this it is clear that for Nehru knowledge is more important than the medium. He realised that education would be of little value if it did not subserve development. For India to survive in this age of automation and atomic energy, he insisted that not only must the teaching of English as a language continue[3], but that English should remain the medium of instruction

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1. Nehru, J.: "Our Language Problem". Op.cit. pp.196-197.
2. Quoted in Shiksha (April, 1957) p.62.
3. Government of India: Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, Vol. III (New Delhi, Government of India, 1958) pp. 423 & 425.

for higher technical and scientific subjects. Nevertheless, he warned against the perpetuation of a new caste system in India, what he called "an English-knowing caste separated from the mass of our people."[1]

It should be noted that Nehru's belief in democratic principles continually led him to stress that "languages cannot be put over by compulsion on large number of people: it can be done only by agreement, only by consent."[2] This, he felt, would also avoid the separatist tendencies widespread in India. If all languages are encouraged to develop fully, "and one language group does not try to impose its will on other groups", Nehru was sure that the danger of linguistic separatism would disappear.[3] He, therefore, did not wish Hindi, the official language, to be forcefully imposed on any non-Hindi State.

It is precisely because of his laissez-faire attitude that Nehru has been criticised by the protagonists of both Hindi and English. For the former his go-slow policy with regard to the implementation of Hindi, and his dislike for linguistic purity in coining a new terminology, revealed a very luke-warm pro-Hindi policy to be really effective; whereas for the supporters of English, all his assurances and all his promises, without sufficient legislative backing, were meaningless. What many failed to see was that for Nehru both languages had their own place and their own function in the Indian context. Hindi was to be the official as well as the link-language of India, but till such time as it did, he advised India to maintain English to serve that purpose "so that there may be no gap."[4] Even after Hindi became the official language, he realised that a knowledge of English would still be essential for those engaged in the technological reconstruction of society.

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1. Government of India: Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, Vol.III. Op.cit. p.424.
2. Ibid. p.394.
3. Ibid. Vol. IV. p.53.
4. Ibid. p.67.

Industrialisation, central planning, equality of opportunity, political democracy, a common national language, and a world language of scientific literature: these were the basic ingredients of Nehru's dreams of an ideal society for India.

That in the current Indian language controversy, the views of Gandhi and Nehru have been cited in support of different, and at times even opposing, policies, is, in conclusion, a strong indication of the influence the thinking of these two men has had in shaping the values and attitudes of the majority of Indians throughout the subcontinent.

Gandhi envisaged "a peasant society of self-supporting workers, with simplicity as its ideal and purity as its hallmark."[1] Although he advocated a return to Hindu ideals and based his philosophy on the tenets of the ancient religious texts, Gandhi did not wish for a return to the languages of these texts in education. His sympathies for the common man led him to support the use of the languages of the common man in education and administration. Rather than endorse Gandhi's vision of a decentralised, non-technological society, Nehru saw in industrialisation a more rapid and effective way of bringing India materially on to a level with the Western world. To quote Spear: "His insistence on raising living standards prevented him from accepting Gandhi's belief in village democracies loosely knit in a non-industrial society, because he believed that the introduction of modern mechanised industry was the only way by which this could be done."[2] And though he agreed with Gandhi that the modern Indian languages should be given their due place in education and administration, his belief in technological progress eventually led Nehru back to English.

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1. Spear, P.: A History of India. Vol. II. (Penguin Books, 1965) p.99.
2. Ibid. p.246.

Both Gandhi and Nehru were essentially products of their time, and their thinking, consequently, is largely coloured by the exigencies of the period. This fact, however, seems to be generally over-looked by their present-day adherents who, either through a mistaken sense of loyalty, reverence, or the traditional Indian passivity and fear of change, try to find the answer to the existing problems in the writings of Gandhi and Nehru. "Gandhi said this, therefore it must be right", seems to be the general line of argument for the present-day Gandhians. Whether this attitude is right or wrong is not within the scope of this study to assess. What is pertinent here is that it reveals the fact that to study the existing attitudes and values of a majority of twentieth century Indians, Gandhi and Nehru provide a sufficiently authentic source. Their views have been consistently, and often unconditionally accepted by both the leaders and the led.

However, as Dakin points out, "there is an intricate relationship between successive changes in the social structure and evolving ideas on the function of language in education and society."[1] As long as the ideas in language and language policies keep pace with the demands of a changing social structure, and the necessary modifications are made in the policies, there is no problem. Ideas, however, belong to the realm of attitudes and values, which are normally slow to change, with the result that while a particular level of social development calls for a particular language policy, the policy usually presented as an answer may be the result of values belonging to a bygone era. A study of the value system of a country, therefore, gives the investigator a fair idea of the prevailing value system in which a problem has arisen, and within which the success or failure of the policy solutions is determined.

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1. Dakin, J. et al: Language in Education. Op.cit. p.55.

CHAPTER VII

THE SOVIET VALUE SYSTEM

If a study of the Indian value system is rendered complex by over three hundred years of British influence; in the case of the U.S.S.R., such a study seems almost paradoxical since the very prophet of Communism, Karl Marx, grosaly devalued the importance of ideas and ideologies, or as he called them, 'forms of consciousness', in shaping human conduct, subordinating them to the material basis of society.

Nevertheless, the great influence of his own ideas in shaping Soviet theory has been acknowledged both within and outside the Soviet Union; and Marxism, as interpreted and modified first by Lenin, and later by Stalin, forms the principle ideology governing the Soviet regime. Marxism-Leninism, taken together, therefore form the central source of ascertaining Soviet values. Apart from practical considerations of time and space, the reason for studying Marxism-Leninism as a single theory is that the main interest here is not in the thought of Marx as such, but in its interpretation, modification and adaptation by Lenin under Soviet circumstances. Lenin based his revolutionary activities in changing human society on the foundation of Marxism. As Stalin acknowledged: "Lenin was and remains the most devoted and consistent disciple of Marx and Engels, basing himself entirely on the principles of Marxism."[1] Lenin developed Marxism further during the epoch of the proletarian revolution so that their principle points of difference, where relevant to the present task of identifying Soviet values, are highlighted and discussed.

Apart from Marxism-Leninism, the views of Stalin are also examined in so far as they differ from Marxism-Leninism and influence Soviet thought;

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1. Cited in Lenin, Biography prepared by the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute, Moscow (London, Hutchinson and Co.Ltd., n.d.) p.193.

much the same way in which Nehru, though belonging to the Gandhian school of thought, differed on important issues from his mentor.

It is, however, neither possible nor necessary, within the limited scope of this study, to examine everything that Marx, Lenin and Stalin had to say on important social, political and economic questions. Since the purpose here is to identify and compare the normative backgrounds of India and the U.S.S.R., so that prediction may be facilitated in the case of policies in India, the issues regarding which Soviet values are examined are those on which Gandhi and Nehru's views have been studied in the previous chapter, namely, the nature of society, individual and knowledge, and their implications on attitudes towards languages and language policies.

However, though Marxism-Leninism is very comprehensive with regard to its views on society and the individual, there is very little direct mention in its tenets on the nature of knowledge or the role of different languages in society. Values on these important questions are therefore deduced by implication where possible, as also from the works of such Marxist psychologists and pedagogues as Pavlov, Krupskaya and Makarenko, and in the realm of language and linguistics from Marr's New Linguistic Theory which claims to be based on Marxism.

Such a study, it is hoped, will give a comprehensive picture of the prevailing Soviet value system in which its particular language question arises and is attempted to be solved.

Marxism-Leninism on the Nature of Society, Individual and Knowledge

Though Marx is one of the most influential figures in human history, there is available no systematic exposition of all his leading ideas and their relation to each other. This was possibly because Marx was more of a revolutionary activist occupied in influencing the course of events, than a pure academician interested in ideas for their own sake.

Unlike Gandhi, whose thought had roots in the basic principles of Hinduism, Marx considered himself a scientist. At the same time, his conception of science was pragmatic: "Science should not be an egoistic pleasure. Those who are fortunate enough to be able to devote themselves to scientific work should be the first to apply their knowledge to serve humanity."[1] Science, therefore, should yield practical results, it should not only interpret the world but also change it. This pragmatic attitude led him to the conclusion that the characteristic task of science is not to gain knowledge of past facts, but to predict the future.[2]

However, Popper points out[3], for Marx prediction of the future is possible only if the future is predetermined. This led Marx to the belief that a rigidly scientific method must be based on rigid determinism. Popper rejects determinism as a necessary pre-requisite of a science which can make predictions, and draws a distinction between scientific prediction, as in physics, and historical prophecy[4], which foretells in broad lines the main tendencies of the future development of society, and is not necessarily scientific. Marx's method, Popper claims, belonged to the second category since he attempted to draw scientific laws from an observation of historical events.

Possibly because of his stress on history, Marx's method of discovering the nature of future society has been called 'historical materialism' or 'dialectical materialism', though Marx himself never used either term - the first comes from Engels and the second from Plekhanov.[5] Marx spoke simply of the 'materialist basis' of his method of investigation, the term 'material' referring to the fundamental, primary conditions of human existence.

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1. Cited in Bottomore,T.B. and Rubel,M.(eds.): Karl Marx (England, Penguin Books, 1963) p.30f.
2. Popper, K.R.: The Open Society and its Enemies. Vol.2, (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 4th edition, 1962) p.84.
3. Ibid. p.84.
4. Ibid. p.86.
5. See, Bottomore,T.B. & Rubel,M.: Karl Marx. Op.cit. p.36f.

According to the deterministic or materialistic conception of social change, the social phenomena is purely a response to the environmental change which is itself either wholly independent of human activity, or only the cumulative consequence of man's efforts to satisfy his elemental desires. Marx located this decisive material factor as the economic factor, the forces of production and the class relationships which these forces engender; and he interpreted material evolution in the human world in terms of a dialectical movement, towards an ultimate end, a condition of complete harmony and integration in which man will rediscover his true, fulfilled nature. Marx called this ideal, ultimate society, Communism.

In his efforts to give a scientific account of social change, Marx propounded the thesis that the evolution of society is governed by specific laws, exactly as is the development of all forms of natural growth. Though this doctrine may be questioned, by showing the progress of humanity to be 'inevitable' from primitive-communal through slave-owning, feudalism, capitalism, and socialism, to communism, it provided for a more or less passive acceptance of the present system by the common Soviet man. His overall study of social change throughout history convinced Marx that an imperfect and irrational society was a transitory phase leading to a completely harmonious and integrated world. By its very nature, capitalism must annihilate itself by breeding the agent of its own destruction, the proletariat. Similarly, the existing "socialism" inspite of its limitations, is 'higher' than capitalism and 'inevitable' in the march towards communism. Observers of the Soviet Union consider this attitude of resignation to the inevitable as characteristic of the Soviet mind, and as an invaluable asset to the Soviet authorities.[1]

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1. Mehnert, K.: The Anatomy of Soviet Man (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1961) pp. 196-197.

Nature of Society: Marx was critical of postulating "society" as "an abstraction confronting the individual. The individual is the social being."[1] In Marx's view, 'society' refers to individuals in their interrelations or interactions, the most important of these interactions, according to him, being those taking place in the sphere of 'material' production.

Since he regarded society, as the product of man's reciprocal action in the 'material' sphere, it followed for Marx that men are not free to choose the form of society for themselves. The state of development of the productive forces of man, according to Marx, determined the form of civil society and political setup, but the former itself was not within the sphere of man's choice, every productive force being an acquired force, the product of former activity. Hence, Marx argued, the economic forces in which men produce, consume and exchange are transitory and historical. With the acquisition of new productive faculties men change their mode of production and with the mode of production all the economic relations which are merely the necessary relations of this particular mode of production. These material relations, Marx insisted, are the basis of all social and political relations.

This brings us to the characteristic distinction in Marxism, between the concepts of substructure and superstructure of society. 'Substructure', for Marx, refers to the material aspect of life and, especially, to the predominant tool or 'mode' of production; whereas 'superstructure' refers to the political, cultural, religious and intellectual aspects of life.[2] It is the substructure, or the 'basis of society', which determines its superstructure - the sum total of its ideas, theories, attitudes and its related ideological (political, legal, moral, cultural, religious) institutions and organizations. Changes in the economic relations produce corresponding changes in the social

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1. Marx, K.: Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts. (1844)(London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1961) p.105. Cited in Bottomore, T.B. & Rubel, M.: Karl Marx op. cit. p.33f.

2. Afanasayev, V: "Basis and Superstructure of Society" in U.S.S.R. Soviet Life Today, No.9 (84) (Moscow, September, 1963) p.38.

superstructure, which, Marx added, are especially deep when one type of production relation is replaced by another through social revolutions. Hence it was that he called social revolutions the "locomotives of history".

In his Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (1859) Marx claimed the primacy of matter over mind thus:

"The sumtotal of . . . production relations constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation on which a legal and political superstructure arises and to which definite forms of social consciousness correspond. The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and spiritual life-process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, on the contrary, their social being determines their consciousness."[1]

Endorsing this view, Lenin stated that the 'basic idea' of Marxism was this division of social relationships into two types - material and ideological, the latter being "merely a superstructure of the former."[2] According to Marxism-Leninism, therefore, it is not ideas, but economic forces, that are fundamental in history.

From this thesis it was easy to infer that ideology, including, perhaps, Marxism-Leninism itself, was not only secondary, but unimportant. This called for a revision and modification of the original thesis, bringing about a significant shift in theory. As early as 1890, Engels stated:

> "The economic situation is the basis, but the various elements of the superstructure. . . also exercise their influence on the course of the historical struggles and in many cases predominate in determining their form. There is an interaction

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1. Marx,K. and Engels,F: Selected Works, Vol.1. (Moscow, State Publishing House of Political Literature, 1950) p.329.
2. Lenin, V.I.: Sochineniya (Works) Vol.1 (Moscow, Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute) 1941) p.133f.

of all these elements, in which . . . the economic moment finally asserts itself as necessary."[1]

Marx himself believed that although the origin and influence of ideas and ideologies were socially conditioned, they played an important role in human affairs. This enabled him to conclude that his own ideas were of moment and their acceptance would determine in part the prospects of success of the socialist movement. Marx here drew a distinction between those theories and ideas which were scientifically grounded doctrines and those which were myths. All social philosophies incompatible with his own and teaching that interests are common in a class society were, according to him, myths. His own social ideas and theories he regarded as "scientific", and therefore, the only correct basis for the working-class movements.[2]

Faced with the practical problem of leading the working class movement, Lenin recognised the important role played by ideology. If left to itself, he believed the working-class to be incapable of transcending a negative trade-union consciousness, a narrow obsession with short-term reforms and immediate gains. Rather than let the Russian working-class movement develop gradually on the basis of economic pressure, he was concerned to infuse it with revolutionary class-consciousness.[3] This, he argued, could be brought to the working-class only 'from outside' - that is, by non-proletarian intellectuals. "Socialism", according to Lenin, "is introduced by ideologists into the proletariat's class-struggle which develops spontaneously on the basis of capitalist relationships."[4] In the autumn of 1917, shortly before the Bolshevik seizure of power, Lenin was even more specific: "Ideas become a force when they get hold of the masses. And particularly now, when the Bolsheviks. . .

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1. Marx, K. and Engels, F.: Selected Works Vol.2 op.cit. p.443.
2. Caute, D.: Essential Writings of Karl Marx (London, Panther Books,Ltd., 1967) p.20.
3. Conquest,R.(ed.): The Politics of Ideas in the U.S.S.R. (London, The Bodley Head, 1967) p.15.
4. Lenin, V.I.: Collected Works Vol.6. op.cit. p.143.

have embodied in their policy the idea which moves the innumerable toiling masses in the whole world."[1] Lenin found support of this view in what Marx had written as early as 1844: "Material force must be overthrown by material force; but theory, too, becomes a material force as soon as it has equipped the masses."[2]

The exigencies of the moment, therefore, helped to restore the role of ideology in general, and of Marxism-Leninism in particular, in motivating the masses. Together with his stress on ideology as a motive force, Lenin stressed the important role of the Party, both as a source of ideology and as the vanguard of the working class movement.

Lenin's belief that political activity involves the use of ideology led to his excessive stress on correct theory, on the Party and on the activities of professional revolutionaries. To prevent the penetration of bourgeois influences into the ranks of the working class and to imbue the working-class movement with socialist consciousness, the Party had to function as the vanguard of the proletariat. For Lenin, belittling the function of consciousness meant belittling the importance of theory in the eyes of the Party. And this, in turn, meant depriving the Party of a most important and indispensable weapon for the achievement of victory. "Without a revolutionary theory," wrote Lenin, "there can be no revolutionary movement. . . the role of vanguard can be fulfilled, only by a Party that is guided by an advanced theory."[3]

In the pamphlet What is To Be Done? (1902) and in the Letter to a Comrade on Our Organisational Tasks, Lenin laid down views on party organisation and on political strategy and tactics to which he adhered and which formed the basis of Communist political thought. The principle ideas of these

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1. Lenin, V.I.: Collected Works Vol.26. Op.cit p.104.
2. Marx, K.and Engels, F.: Selected Works Vol.1 op. cit. p.122.
3. Lenin, V.I.: Collected Works Vol.2, op.cit. p.48.

two pamphlets have been summarised by S.V. Utechin.[1] They stress the important role played by a party guided by an advanced theory in the political struggle. Theories develop in the heads of intellectuals and are not born spontaneously among the masses. Left to themselves, the workers merely produce demands aimed at imposing their position in relation to the employers. A policy based solely on these demands is essentially a bourgeois policy, since it leaves the employee-employer relationship intact. The task of the Party is to struggle against the "spontaneity" of the labour movement in order to divert it from the "bourgeois" path and imbue it with "consciousness", that is, the correct revolutionary and socialist theory.

In his book One Step Forward, Two Steps Back, (1904), Lenin worked out the organisational principles of the Marxist Party which, as the Party of the working class, must be "a centralised and disciplined revolutionary party."[2] To lead the masses systematically and efficiently, he insisted, the Party itself must be organised on the principles of centralism, with a uniform set of rules, a common discipline and a single leading body at the top; the minority must submit to the majority, the local organisations to the centre, and the lower organisations to the superior organizations.[3] Lenin concluded this book with the following prophetic words:

> "In its struggle for power the proletariat has not other weapon but organisation. Divided by the rule of anarchic competition in the bourgeois world, ground down by slave labour for capital, constantly thrust back to 'the lower depths' of utter destitution, savagery and degeneration, the proletariat can become, and will inevitably become, an invincible force only when its ideological unity around

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1. Utechin, S.V.: Russian Political Thought (London, J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1963) pp.217-218.
2. Cited in Lenin, Biography prepared by the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute, Moscow (2nd Impression) op.cit. p.51.
3. Ibid., p.51.

the principles of Marxism is consolidated by the material unity of an organization, which unites millions of toilers in the army of the working class. Neither the decrepit rule of Russian tsarism, nor the senile rule of international capital will be able to withstand this army."[1]

Lenin sought to use the party organisation to weaken and overthrow the existing government. Recognising, however, that the working class, though the main class was not the only class, and the working class movement, though the main, was not the only movement, he welcomed almost any other parties and groups that would cooperate, as temporary allies.[2] All classes and groups of the population oppressed, for whatever reason, by the enemy he was fighting, appeared to Lenin as potential allies who must be utilized in the struggle against the existing order.

These strategic principles became the basis of Lenin's practical policy of trying to win support for the workers' movement of all groups and classes opposed to and oppressed by the Tsar. At the same time, Lenin realised that to win the co-operation of an individual or a group, one must appear as the champion of the cause that this person or group holds to be of paramount importance. This led him to uphold the demands for independence of the various social, religious and ethnic groups in Russia, and as early as 1903 in an article entitled "The National Question in Our Programme", he formulated the theoretical grounds for the slogan: right of nations to self-determination.[3]

Lenin upheld in principle the right of every nation to self-determination, including the right of secession. His nationality theory required the harnessing of minority nationalist sentiments, first against a central authority the Communists wished to destroy, and then in assisting the Party in

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1. Lenin, V.I.: Collected Works Vol.2 Op.cit. p.466.
2. Utechin, S.V.: Russian Political Thought. Op.cit. p.220.
3. Cited in Lenin, Biography prepared by the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute, Moscow. Op.cit. p.46.

strengthening its own regime. For, as it has been pointed out, in the final analysis "... the national question is subordinate to the more general and fundamental question of the socialist revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat."[1] Moreover, it can be argued that Lenin's nationality policy is self-contradictory. While purporting to uphold the right of self-determination of each nation, Lenin, at the same time, upheld the international solidarity of the proletariat, and the consequent duty of every working class to prefer the working class of a neighbouring nation to the bourgeoisie of its own nation.[2]

The ideal society envisaged by Marxism-Leninism was a classless society. But Marx never fully defined a social class. By class he referred primarily to the economic group determined principally by its source of income and its relationship to the means of production. Accordingly, wage-labourers, capitalists and landlords, constituting the three main classes, were differentiated according to whether their source of income was wages, profit or ground rent.[3]

A basic principle of the Communist Manifesto is that the whole history of mankind has been a history of class struggles[4], contests between exploiting and exploited, ruling and oppressed classes; that the history of these class struggles forms a series of evolutions in which, now, a stage has been reached where the exploited and oppressed class - the proletariat - cannot attain its emancipation fromthe exploitation of the ruling class - the bourgeoisie - without, at the same time, and once and for all, emancipating society at large from all exploitation, oppression, class distinctions and class struggles.

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1. Kommunist (Moscow, October 1953). Quoted in Conquest,R.: Common Sense About Russia (London, Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1960) p.129.
2. Seton-Watson,H.: "Soviet Nationality Policy" in The Russian Review, Volume 15, no.1. (Stanford Calif., Hoover Institution, January 1956) p.3.
3. Marx,K.: Das Kapital (Capital) Vol.III (1893) p. 941.
4. Marx,K. and Engels,F.: The Communist Manifesto (1848)(Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1965).

Marx envisaged the ultimate reduction of mankind under capitalism - the final stage before the dawn of socialism - to two antagonistic classes: a small class of immensely wealthy monopolists, the bourgeoisie, and a huge revolutionary proletariat. The proletariat embodied the fundamental evil of capitalist society, namely the 'alienation' of man - his separation from himself and his neighbours, and from the products of his labour. According to Marx, man's alienation takes the social form of opposition to an external power which is an incarnation of arbitrariness and injustice. The result is class struggle.

Marx regarded the proletariat as a class destined to emancipate itself by force. For Marx,

> "Of all the classes that stand face to face with the bourgeoisie today, the proletariat alone is a really revolutionary class. The other classes decay and finally disappear in the face of modern industry; the proletariat is its special and essential product."[1]

Having nothing of its own to secure and fortify, the proletariat's mission is to destroy all securities for, and insurances of individual property. In Marx's words:

> "All previous historical movements were movements of minorities, or in the interests of minorities. The proletarian movement is the self-conscious, independent movement of the immense majority, in the interests of the immense majority. The proletariat, the lowest stratum of our present society, cannot stir, cannot raise itself up, without the whole superincumbent strata of official society being sprung into the air."[2]

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1. Marx, J. and Engels, F.: The Communist Manifesto (1848). Op.cit. p.64.
2. Ibid. pp.65-66.

Here, Marx claimed, it is philosophy, that is, scientific socialism, which brings to the proletariat consciousness of its role. This philosophy is provided by a leadership that has taken Marx's social theories to heart. Whereas, in a class society, consciousness is primarily class consciousness, the ideas of the ruling class being the ruling ideas of the age, with the abolition of classes, this comes to an end. As soon as society ceases to be organised in the form of class-rule, it is notlonger necessary to represent a particular interest as general or "the general interest" as ruling.[1]

According to Marxism-Leninism, therefore, the antagonism between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie is a struggle of class against class, a struggle which carried to its highest expression is a total revolution. A central theme of the Communist Manifesto is the gradual and inexorable growth and impoverishment of the proletariat until a situation is reached in which revolution follows almost automatically.

Revolution, then, was for Marx, the lever of social change. As he explained, a change in the material forces of production demands a change in the whole social superstructure. The latter, however, does not keep pace with the economic demand since it has created its own "ideologies" and its vested interests. It is those who are fettered by the now obsolescent order who awaken to the consciousness of its decay and accomplish its overthrow. A social revolution thus attends the birth of each new stage of society, which is, in itself unstable because the economic order depends on productive forces that develop to new forms. Each stage therefore contains the seeds of its own decay, and they ripen into the opposing order of its antithesis, the counter movement which asserts those aspects denied by the former. But the "antithesis" is also a development of what was implicit in the "thesis". It attains a higher level, and in its supersession the "synthesis" of the two comes into being.

1. Marx,K. and Engels,F.: Die deutsche Ideologie (The German Ideology)(1846) New York, International Publishers Co. Inc.,1947) pp.40-41.

In this process of evolution, Marx believed the capitalistic order to be penultimate. This is because the underlying processes of economic production are inevitably increasing the numbers of the proletariat in proportion to those of the bourgeoisie, preparing for the day when the latter shall become the whole and in the last revolution the class struggle shall end and the era of liberation from economic determinism itself shall begin. At this stage the level of social change, according to the Marxists, shall cease to function. With the abolition of classes and of class struggle a new era of liberty shall begin, in which material forces no longer control mankind, in which human beings become "the masters of themselves".

In their struggle against capitalism, Marx warned the workers and Unions not to fall into a reformist frame of mind. A policy based solely on demands to improve their position in relation to the employers was essentially a bourgeois policy, since it left the employee-employer relationship intact.[1] Marx believed that the evils of capitalism could be dispelled only by a revolutionary overthrow of the entire system. This revolution, for Marx, was not necessarily a non-violent revolution. In fact, he believed that violence had an immanent historical function. As he stated in Capital: "Force is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one."[2]

For Marx, a social revolution included a political revolution, but the latter, by itself, was not enough, since a political revolution could only lead to one set of rulers giving way to another set. Only the evolution of the underlying essence, the economic reality could, he asserted, produce any essential or real change - a social revolution. And only when such a social revolution had become a reality, only then could a political revolution be of any significance.

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1. Marx, K. & Engels, F.: "Wages, Price and Profit" (1865) in Selected Works Volume 1. Op.cit. p.446.

2. Cited in Caute, D.: Essential Writings of Karl Marx. Op.cit. p.219.

The process of social change from socialism to capitalism, for the Marxists, consisted of: (1) the act of political victory by which the old state forms were destroyed and replaced by new; (2) the socialisation of the basic instruments of production and the establishment of a new legal norm for non-personal property; (3) the emergence of the "first phase" of the classless society which still had some of the traits and stigmata of capitalist society and rewarded individuals according to what they produced; and (4) the "higher phase" of the classless society in which individuals contributed according to their capacities and were rewarded according to their needs.[1]

Regarding the nature of the state set up after the revolution, Marxism-Leninism distinguished between a bourgeois revolution, which succeeds with the support of the masses, and establishes a democratic government, at the same time facilitating socialist propaganda and organisation; and a subsequent proletarian revolution which would inaugurate a transition to socialism. During the period of transition to socialism there would prevail, said Marx, the dictatorship of the proletariat. Unlike Marx, Lenin appreciated the potentially revolutionary nature of the peasantry, and in his Two Tactics of Social Democracy in a Democratic Revolution (1905), he defined the regime to be established after such a revolution as a "revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry."[2]

When, before 1843, Marx spoke of overthrowing the capitalist State, and replacing it by one dominated by the proletariat, he was, to some extent, optimistic about the possibilities of perfecting the state. After 1843, however, he regarded the state - any state - as the negation of man.[3] The state, like religion and money, he now described as a manifestation of human

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1. Marx,K. and Engels,F.: Selected Works, Vol.2. Op.cit. p.23.
2. Cited in Utechin, S.K.: Russian Political Thought. Op.cit. p.222.
3. Caute,D.: Essential Writings of Karl Marx. Op.cit. p.181.

alienation, and one of the superstructures built on the economic basis.

Marx distinguished state from government, the former being composed of those institutions - the courts, police and army - by means of which disputes concerning economic interests, not decided by ordinary methods of negotiation, are ultimately settled. The state, for Marx, was the apparatus of coercion - the instrument of class rule. Not until the economic exploitation of man by man disappeared, could the state disappear. Such economic exploitation, Marx believed, would come to an end when the instruments of production were socialised. Since in such a society there would be no special class of owners, in as much as all citizens would be both owners and producers, by Marx's definition it was a classless society. At this stage, society and government, claimed Marx, will function without a state - the state will "wither away".

A stateless society, however, was to be possible only during the higher phase of communism. In the earlier transitory phase, suppression was still necessary, but it was to be the suppression of the minority of exploiters by the majority of exploited. A special apparatus of suppression, the "State" was still necessary, and the state in this period could only be the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat.[1]

Lenin, in his book State and Revolution reiterated Marx's theory of the state. Like Marx he identified the State with oppression and believed that with the abolition of classes, both oppression and its instrument, the State would disappear. Once the state was abolished, Lenin asserted, its non-oppressive functions would be performed cooperatively by a harmonious population because human nature and social relations would have been suitably changed by the Revolution.

Lenin also revived the old differentiation between socialism and communism as being mainly concerned with distribution: socialism provided

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1. Marx,K. and Engels,F.: "Critique of the Gotha Programme" (1875) in Selected Works Vol.2. Op.cit. pp.32-33.

for distribution according to work done, communism according to need. A classless, stateless society where the institution of private property and division of labour were abolished, and all means of production were owned by all citizens who would be provided according to their need, seems to be the ideal of Marxist-Leninist theory. This society they called Communism, and insisted that it was not "an ideal to which reality will have to adjust itself... (but) the real movement which abolishes the present state of things."[1]

Nature of Individuals: Marxism tends to reject any notion of an inherent, eternal human nature as distinct from man's actual and constantly changing behaviour in response to the environment. This changing human nature, according to Marx, would reach its culmination at the final stage of communism which would lead to the overthrow of all those conditions in which man is an abased, enslaved, abandoned, contemptible being. This unfulfilled condition of man Marx defined as 'alienation'[2], and traced its roots to the mode of production in a class society, the division of labour, and the use of machinery which, for Marx, "converts the labourer into a crippled monstrosity." Alienated man is divided against his fellowmen and therefore against himself. Overcoming this situation of alienation from his own products and from other men were, in Marx's view, necessary for man's progress towards fulfillment.

Since Marx viewed man as a product of his environment, he was led to conclude that the re-acquisition by man of his natural qualities and a rehabilitation of himself as a social being liberated from enslaving alienation, would proceed from a real transformation of society.

> "If man derives all his knowledge from the sensible world and from his experience of the sensible world, then this is to say that the empirical world should be arranged in such a way that man experiences and assimilates there what is really human,

1. Marx, K. and Engels, F.: The German Ideology. Op.cit. p.26.
2. Caute, D.: Essential Writings of Karl Marx. Op.cit. p.56.

that he experiences himself as man. If enlightened self-interest is the principle of all morality it is necessary for the private interest of each man to coincide with the general interest of humanity. If man is not free, in the materialist's sense, that is, if he is not negatively free to avoid this or that event, but is positively free to express his true individuality, then rather than punishing individuals for their crimes we should destroy the social conditions which engender crime, and give to each individual the scope which he needs in society in order to develop his life. If man is formed by circumstances, these circumstances must be humanly formed. If man, is, by nature, a social being, he only develops his real nature in society, and the power of his nature should be measured not by the power of private individuals but by the power of society."[1]

The society in which man would develop his 'real nature' was, for Marx, a Communist society, a society in which "the enslaving subordination of the individual to the division of labour, and therewith also the antithesis between mental and physical labour, has vanished."[2] At this stage productive forces would increase and cooperative wealth would grow to an extent to which it would be possible for society to provide each individual "according to his needs." In Marx's view:

> "Communism is the positive abolition of private property, of human self-alienation, and thus, the real appropriation of human nature, through and for man. It is therefore the return of man himself as a social, that is, really human, being, a

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1. Marx, K.: Die heilige Familie (The Holy Family)(1845). Quoted in Bottomore, T.B. and Rubel, M.(eds.) Karl Marx op.cit. p.249.
2. Marx, K. and Engels, F.: Selected Works. Vol.2 Op.cit. p.23.

complete and conscious return which assimilates all the wealth of previous development. Communism as a complete naturalism is humanism, and as a complete humanism is naturalism. It is the definitive resolution of the antagonism between man and Nature, and between man and man. It is the true solution of the conflict between existence and essence, between objectification and self-affirmation, between freedom and necessity, between individual and species. It is the solution of the riddle of history and knows itself to be this solution."[1]

Marx's early writings reflect the philosophical basis of his interest in communism. He saw it as the culmination of a dialectical process whereby man transcends his own alienation in class society, and then enters a realm of spontaneous cooperation and conscious self-determination. Man becomes 'truly human', the master of his own destiny, through his understanding and control both of nature and his own social relationships.

This vision seen by Marx implied a radical change in human nature. In 1917 Lenin referred to the foresight of 'the great Socialists' for whom Communism "presupposed both a productivity of labour unlike the present and a person unlike the present man in the street. . ."[2] However, whereas the determinist tradition of Marx's historical materialism conceived of man as conditioned by his social environment, Lenin held that the new society presupposes the new man, who must therefore, it would seem, be created artificially. In fact, Lenin believed that the transition from the lower to the higher forms of communism (that is, from socialism to communism) cannot become a reality unless the pattern of man's behaviour and the motivation of his activities were radically changed; in particular, the new attitude to property and work must

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1. Marx, K.: Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts. (1844). Quoted in Bottomore, T.B. & Rubel, M.(eds.) Karl Marx. Op. cit. pp.249-250.
2. Lenin, V.I.: Collected Works Vol. 25. Op.cit. p.441.

become part of human nature making such phenomena as outbursts of wanton destructiveness utterly inconceivable.[1]

The formation of a socialist attitude to public property and to work, and the substitution of the service motive for the profit motive were essential features of the psychological revolution envisaged by Marxists. Pavlov's behavioural psychology, which reduced responses to conditioned reflexes answered the Soviet desire to change man's behaviour patterns, and conformed to the belief in the plasticity of human nature. The behavioural school of psychology, therefore, held the field in the 1920s in the U.S.S.R.

The New Soviet Man, the Citizen of Socialist Society, whether seen as a consequence or as a condition of the new society, is imbued with the very finest of human qualities - love for one's socialist motherland and for one's fellowmen, friendship, comradeship, humanity, honesty, courage, love for socialist labour are some of the lofty, universal qualities with which the New Man must be imbued.[2] There is nothing really unique about the communist moral code which has assimilated several universal values. The novelty of the communist morality, however, lies in its insistence on the unity of theory and practice. All the powers of a totalitarian state, both coercion and mass persuasion are to be used to ensure that behaviour conforms to the ideal.[3]

Soviet experience seems to have confuted the thesis that a change in the economic base would automatically bring about a change in the superstructure and in the modes of human behaviour. As late as 1952, at the XIX Party Congress Khrushchev, in accusing party members of nepotism, corruption and slackness, revealed that not all members of the leading elite conform to the ideas of Soviet theory in their daily actions..

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1. Lenin, V.I.: Collected Works, Vol.29, pp.81-82 and 89-90.
2. Kalinin,M.I.: On Communist Education (Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1960) pp. 73-75.
3. Koutaissoff,E.: "Soviet Education and the New Man" in Soviet Studies, Vol.5, No.2 (October, 1953) p.136.

Nature of Knowledge: On the basis of Marx's thesis that ideas and ideologies belong to the realm of the superstructure which is determined by the economic base, and that ideas, therefore, are to be explained as creatures of their time,[1] it would follow that Marx denied the existence of any objective universally valid truth in the era of class society. Though we may identify certain universal ideas in each epoch, Marx claimed that this was possible only by detaching the ideas of the ruling class from the ruling class itself and attributing to them an independent existence. The ruling class, in order to represent its interests, as the common interests of society, itself imagines this to be the case, thereby giving its ideas the form of universality and representing them as the only rational and universally valid ones.

Consequently, whereas the laws of mathematics and the principles of natural science are regarded as objectively verifiable, philosophy and ideology in the era of class society, according to Marxism, has only a subjective significance, as reflections of conflicting social aspirations. In the classless society of the future, when it is no longer necessary "to represent a particular interest as general or the 'general interest' as ruling", the semblance that the ideas of the ruling class are the ruling ideas of the age would automatically end, and thought would emerge as pure reason.

Like all other socio-political institutions, the system of education too, is for the Marxists, a part of the superstructure and consequently, of the class system. However, insofar as the superstructure affects its economic base, education is a weapon in the class struggle. The ruling class, in the eyes of the Marxists, tends to monopolise knowledge and thus increase its fitness to rule, while, at the same time, it uses its intellectual superiority to elaborate ideologies favouring and justifying the domination of its class.

To wrest this weapon from the hands of the bourgeoisie, it is essential to

1. Marx, K. and Engels, F.: Die deutsche Ideologie (German Ideology), (1846). See Bottomore, T.B. & Rubel, M.: Karl Marx. Op.cit. pp.93-95.

make education available to the masses and, also, to replace the teaching of other ideologies by that of the Marxist doctrine. Knowledge, Lenin pointed out, is a weapon in the working people's struggle for liberation, and essential for them in achieving victory.[1] Marxism-Leninism holds that education has always been a servant of the ruling class, and consequently organised education functions as the handmaiden of politics. The Marxist-Leninist conception of education was outlined, as follows, by Lenin:

> "In the field of people's education the Communist Party sets itself the task of concluding the task begun by the October Revolution of 1917 of converting the school from a weapon for the class domination of the bourgeoisie into a weapon for the destruction of this domination, as well as for the complete abolition of the division of society into classes.
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> "During the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat. . . schools must not only be the channel for Communist principles in general, but must also be the channel for the ideological, organisational and educational influence of the proletariat on the semi-proletarian and non-proletarian strata of the working people, with the aim of training a generation capable of the complete establishment of Communism."[2]

The belief that knowledge is for serving the ends of the state makes of education an indispensable political weapon. Coupled with this is the Soviet conviction of man's infinite educability stemming from the thesis that man is a product of his environment. Soviet education quote with approval the dictum of the Russian physiologist of the last century, I.M. Sechenov, that "999/1000th of man's intellect is a result of education based in the

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1. Lenin, V.I.: Collected Works Vol. 28. Op.cit. p.69.
2. Ibid. Vol. 29, p.91.

broad sense of the word and only the remaining 1/1000th of it might depend on inheritance."[1] As a result, Soviet education strives to achieve nothing less than changing human nature by moulding the New Soviet Man to function in the new Soviet society.

The prevailing forms of psychology during the early years of the Revolution were of the behavioural type, based on Pavlov's theory of conditioned reflexes. The underlying principle was that the child's development is a response, an adaptation of a living organism to environmental factors; consequently, the function of the school is to provide an environment which stimulates certain responses and conditions certain reflexes. From the physiological point of view, Pavlov noted, "all learning consists in the formation of temporary connections."[2] It is with the forming of these connections that development takes place. Without the formation of temporary nervous connections, for the behaviourists, nothing new can or does arise in the child's behaviour, his actions, his relations to surrounding reality - consequently there cannot be development.

Whilst education guides development, the Marxists believe that education itself depends on the development of the child. The dialectical-materialist approach, proceeding from determinism, sees the 'spontaneous' character of development as inherent in self-movement. The development of any being, his 'own movement' his 'own life', is conditioned by 'the entire totality of the manifold relations' to surrounding reality.[3] An understanding of education as 'self-movement' explains how the need arises in the child's life, how he becomes independent, develops initiative, creative activity, the ability consciously to regulate his behaviour, and so also to discovering

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1. Cited in Singh, R.R.: Education in the Soviet Union (New Delhi, Government of India, Ministry of Education, 1962) p.2.
2. Pavlov, I.P.: Collected Works Vol.2 (1949) p.560. Cited by Kostiuk G.S.: "Some Aspects of the Interrelation Between Education and the Development of Personality" in Simon, B. & J.(eds.) Educational Psychology in the U.S.S.R. (London, Routledge and Kegal Paul, 1963) p.37.
3. Lenin, V.I.: Philosophical Notebooks (1947) p.192.

the directions in which educational methods can be improved. An education guided by the laws and characteristics of the process of development is in a better position to guide the development of personality in accordance with educational aims.[1]

The undifferentiated and common school curriculum found in the U.S.S.R. may be seen as a result of the fundamental tenet of Marxist psychology that all children are created equal and that abilities and aptitudes are acquired and not innate. It follows from this that differences between children represent differences in environmental conditions and the responses developed in them, rather than any kind of genetic characteristic. Poor achievement at school, therefore, is generally explained as the result of unwillingness to learn rather than lack of any ability.

Though Marx gave relatively little attention to the development of the theory and practice of education under socialism, his insistence on the combination of 'work with the mind' and 'work with hand' has played an important role in the history of Soviet education. "Practical activity" or "human sense activity" was for Marx, a fundamental means of conceiving reality. The interplay of mind, environment and activity was to be, according to Marx's theory of knowledge, the decisive criterion of perception and of the understanding of reality.[2] Marx, therefore, placed great stress on the role of manual labour in the process of education. For him, education which separates words from deeds is bankrupt; verbal pedagogical instruction which the child does not use fails to bring about any real change in his life. Education, therefore, fails if it does not take into consideration all the child's various interconnections with the environment, if it is divorced from his real life, from the subjective conditions and from the previous history of development of each educand.

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1. See, Kostiuk,G.S.: "Some Aspects of the Interrelation Between Education and Development of Personality"(1956) in Simon,B. and J.(eds.) Educational Psychology in the U.S.S.R. Op.cit. pp.45-47.

2. Marx,K.: Theses of Feuerbach (1845) in Bottomore, T.B. & Rubel,M. Karl Marx Op.cit. pp.82-83.

Marx's advocacy of the manual labour reducation combination[1] was later championed by Lenin under the name of polytechnical education. This was defined as one "which familiarises the child with the main branches of production and closely links instruction with socially productive work."[2] Children were made to understand that work is the basis of human life, and that while in capitalist countries the toilers are deprived of the fruits of their labour by the exploiting classes, in the land of Socialism peasant and worker toil for the common good.

Polytechnisation, it was hoped, would inculcate the habit of working. Work, in the sense of duty to the community, is an important part of the communist morality. Therefore, the habit of working, with their hands as well as with their mind, must be instilled in children and is a vital component of their education. "The country of socialism needs no fine gentlemen. Clever hands are needed at home and in every job, including technical work", wrote N. Krupskaya in an article entitled 'One Should Learn to Work with both Brain and Hands.'[3] Basing himself on the ideas put forward by Marx and Engels, Lenin defended the principle of combining education with productive labour:

> "an. . an ideal future society cannot be conceived without the combination of education with the productive labour of the younger generation: neither training and education without productive labour, nor productive labour without parallel training and education could be raised to the degree required by present level of technology and the state of scientific knowledge."[4]

Moreover, a practical argument behind the idea of polytechnisation was to provide the greatest number of specialists possible to man the rapidly

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1. Marx,K.: Das Kapital (Capital)(1867) Vol.1. (London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1961) pp.488-94.
2. Lenin, V.I.: Collected Works op.cit. Vol.24, p.99; 26, pp.157-163 and/pp.418-20.
3. Cited in Koutaissoff,E.: "Soviet Education and the New Man" Op.cit. p.119.
4. Lenin, V.I.: Collected Works, Vol.2. op.cit. p.472.

expanding industries of the Soviet Union.[1]

Rejecting the narrow view of monotechnic (that is, narrowly vocational) training,[2] Lenin called for the education of people in such a manner that all three aspects of education - general education, technical education and political training would be linked in one unified system of education.[3] According to Lenin a school must acquaint its pupils, both in theory and practice, with all the main branches of production, and education must be connected with work which would help in the study of science and engineering. While on the one hand, polytechnical education would equip the pupils with a knowledge of the scientific principles of modern production, general education, on the other hand, was necessary for each and every man irrespective of his trade for it helped to build up a scientific world outlook. This view had its ideological basis in the Marxist-Leninist stress on the scientific attitude as the only way to the truth and its discouragement of any tendencies towards mystical or religious thinking.

With regard to the third aspect of the education system, namely, political training, Lenin considered the school as an essential component of the socialist organisation of society, and sought to integrate schooling with politics. "A school outside life, outside politics is a lie and hypocrisy", wrote Lenin, adding that "teachers must consider themselves as agents of communist as well as general education."[4]

A characteristic feature of the new man to be raised on Marxist-Leninist principles was collective-mindedness, free from the reach of the selfish, possessive affection of the family. One of the most remarkable

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1. Koutaissoff, E.: "Soviet Education and the New Man" Op.cit. p.112.
2. Lenin, V.I.: Collected Works, Vol.9, Op.cit. pp.467-83.
3. Landa, N.: Lenin on Rearing the Youth. (Moscow, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1966) pp. 36-37.
4. Lenin, V.I.: Collected Works. Op.cit. Vol.27, p.409 and Vol.28, p.68.

experiments in collective, communist education was made by A.S. Makarenko in the Gorki Colony (1921-1927) and the Dzerzhinski commune (1927-1935). Education in and by a group - a kollektiv was the basis of his educational method.[1] Once a group is formed, sharing in a certain code of behaviour, it will, he believed, impose these norms on newcomers who will at first submit to what Makarenko called 'a demand without theory'. If the demand is reasonable, the child will accept it rationally and internalize it. When rules of behaviour have been accepted and internalised, the pressure of public opinion becomes compelling, and eventually, a tradition springs up, the authority of which is not questioned.

According to Makarenko there were no conflicts between the individual and the community if the latter was rightly organised. In case of conflict, Makarenko put the interests of the community first, believing that the individual owes allegiance to a community which caters for his needs. The noblest trait in Man, he believed to be his aptitude to subordinate his personal interests to those of the community. Makarenko formulated his aims as follows:

> "We wish to educate a cultured Soviet worker. Consequently, we must give him education, preferably secondary education, we must teach him a trade, we must discipline him, he must be politically conscious, a devoted member of the working class, a Komsomol and a Bolshevik. We must educatedin him a sense of duty and a notion of honour, in other words, he must feel his dignity and that of his class and be proud of it, and he must be made aware of his obligations to his class. He must know how to obey a comrade as well as to give an order to a comrade. He must be polite, stern, kind and pitiless according to the conditions of his life and struggle. He

1. The Story of Makarenko's Work in the Gorki Colony for young delinquents is available in English in his book The Road to Life (Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1943).

must be an active organiser. He must be persevering and steeled, self-controlled and able to influence others; if the community punishes him, he must respect the community and the punishment. He must be gay, cheerful, smart, capable of fighting and building, of living and loving life: he must be happy. And he must be such not in the future, but now, today, and every day."[1]

The ideological and theoretical basis of Makarenko's system was the Marxist teaching on the unity of physical, mental, moral and aesthetic education; the principle of combining school studies with productive labour in modern industry, as the only means of rearing harmoniously developed people. In setting out his educational aims Makarenko proceeded from the Marxist-Leninist teaching on Communist education which purports to provide for the all-round development of personality. "I take the aim of education to mean the programme of a human personality, the programme of a human character, and into the concept 'character' I put all that a personality holds," said Makarenko.[2]

Makarenko's method of teaching formed the basis of what came to be called 'polytechnical' education. However, socially useful productive labour, as a basis of education, was not organised from the purely economical point of view. In fact, the productive work undertaken in the colonies did not present any economic competition in post-revolution Russia. Makarenko not only rejected the purely economic advantage of productive labour, he was also sceptical of the educational value of the labour process per se. Work had to be real, that is, useful and productive enough to improve the material standard of living of those who performed it. In the Dzerzhinski commune Makarenko introduced optical and precision instrument works. This, in his opinion, was not only financially more remunerative, but pupils learnt

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1. Makarenko, A.S.: Problems of Soviet School Education (Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1965) p.13.
2. Ibid. : p.13.

technically more skilled types of labour; there was scope for the development of managerial abilities; and it was a good preparation for work in a highly organised modern industrial society.

At the same time Makarenko continued that work as the principle vehicle of education, should always be viewed in conjunction with the other means of that educational system, since "labour that does not go hand in hand with political and social education remains a neutral process of no educational value."[1]

As W.L. Goodman has pointed out, Makarenko's system was "the realisation in practice of the teachings of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin on education."[2]

Finally, the Marxist-Leninist principle of proletarian internationalism has its educational implications. Lenin defined the principle of proletarian internationalism, which stems from life itself, both as the policy and the world outlook of the proletariat. Proletarian internationalism, Lenin claimed, must become a principle in the life of every Communist. This internationalism, for Lenin, embraces both relations between the nations incorporated in one state, and the relations between the peoples of different states:

"We are opposed to national discord, to national exclusiveness. We are internationalists. We stand for the close union and the complete amalgamation of the workers and peasants of all nations in a single world Soviet Republic."[3]

Lenin recognised that internationalism demands that the complete equality of nations be recognised, and does not call for the abolition of diversity and national differences. At the same time, however, he warned against the danger of overemphasising of national peculiarities in the workers' movement. Consequently, Lenin demanded that in schools there should be created

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1. Makarenko, A.S.: Problems of Soviet School Education. Op.cit. p.19.
2. Goodman, W.L.: Anton Simonovitch Makarenko (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1949) p.69.
3. Lenin, V.I.: Collected Works Vol.3. Op. cit. p.341.

the main democratic conditions for the fostering of friendship between children of various nationalities on the basis of complete equality:

> "The interests of the working class, as well as the interests of political liberty generally - require, . . . the fullest equality of all the nationalities in the state without exception, and the elimination of every kind of barrier between the nations, the bringing together of children of all nations in the same schools, etc."[1]

Lenin, therefore, strove to make the adherence of the principles of internationalism and a feeling of fraternal unity and equality of all nations an inseparable part of the Communist education of youth. A significant aspect of this equality was the right given to various national groups to use their own languages in education and administration, and the official encouragement given to the development of various national languages. The implications of Marxist-Leninist theory on the question of language and language policies can now be inferred, partly from the previous discussion, and partly from the writings of Marx and Lenin, and their interpretations by social linguists.

Marxist-Leninist Views on Languages and Language Policies: The Soviet attitude to the various national languages and their choice of the ideal language policy have been coloured largely by Marxist-Leninist thinking on the subject. The principles and methods of historical materialism have been applied by Marxists in the field of linguistics.

Marxism in linguistics emphasises the social character, origin and function of language and maintains that the role and history of a language cannot be studied in isolation from the history of society itself. Language, accordingly, is a social phenomenon, to be studied in close connection with other social phenomena.[2] The social origin and content of language were

1. Lenin, V.I.: Collected Works. Vol.19. Op.cit. p.306.
2. Mazumdar, S.K.: Marxism and the Language Problem in India. (New Delhi, People's Publishing House, 1970) pp.99-100.

discussed by Marx and Engels in German Ideology (1846), wherein they acknowledged that man also possesses 'consciousness' and that language is as old as consciousness, in fact, they claimed, "language is practical consciousness". Like consciousness, they believed, language "only arises from the need, the necessity of intercourse with other men." Consciousness, and therefore its practical manifestation, language, are social products and remain so as long as men exist.[1] Language is the most common means of communication between human beings who are also social beings. Like its productive forces, each generation inherits the language given to it historically, the historical process of the development of language being determined by the economic basis of that society. Marx traced the process of development of national languages as follows:

> "Language is regarded as a product of the species. . . In every modern developed language the naturally originated speech has been superseded, partly owing to the historical development of the language from pre-existing material, . . . partly owing to the crossing and mixing of nations, ... partly owing to the concentration of the dialects within a single nation into a national language based on economic and political concentration."[2]

The question of language in Marxist doctrine forms a part of the wider nationality problem as found in the U.S.S.R. Here Lenin's reference to the role played by language in the formation and development of nations is of particular importance:

> "Throughout the world, the period of the final victory of capitalism over feudalism has been linked up with national movements. For the complete victory of commodity production,

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1. Marx, K.: and Engels, F.: Die deutsche Ideologie (The German Ideology) (1845-46). Cited in Bottomore, T.B. and Rubel, M.: Karl Marx. Op.cit.pp.85-86.
2. Cited in Mazumdar, S.N.: Marxism and the Language Problem in India. Op.cit. p.101.

> the bourgeoisie must capture the home market, and there must be politically united territories whose population speak a single language, with all obstacles to the development of that language and to its consolidation in literature eliminated. Therein is the economic foundation of national movements. Language is the most important means of human intercourse. Unity and unimpeded development of language are the most important conditions for genuinely free and extensive commerce on a scale commensurate with modern capitalism, for a free and broad grouping of the population in all its various classes, and, lastly, for the establishment of a close connection between the market and each and every proprietor, big or little, and between seller and buyer."[1]

Historically, therefore, for the Marxists, the concept of nationality has developed with the emergence of the bourgeoisie under the capitalist system. A common language, though one of the most important factors constituting a nation, is, according to the Leninist concept, not the only factor. The Marxist-Leninist concept of nation was defined by Stalin as "a historically constituted stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture."[2]

As nationalism, for the Marxists, was dependent on economic formations, it followed that the nature of national consciousness would change with the change in economic structures, so that the nationalism of the bourgeois era would develop into the internationalism of the socialist world. Marx observed that, with the growth of the world market, and uniform production relations, differences between national cultures would decline.

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1. Lenin, V.I.: Collected Works, Vol.20, op.cit. p.396.
2. Stalin, J.: "Marxism and the National Question", Collected Works, Vol.2 (Moscow, 1953), p.307.

> "National differences and antagonisms between peoples are daily more and more vanishing, owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, to freedom of commerce, to the world market, to uniformity in the mode of production and in the conditions of life corresponding thereto. . .
>
> In proportion, as the exploitation of one individual by another is put to an end, the exploitation of one nation by another will also be put to an end. In proportion, as the antagonism between classes within the nation vanishes, the hostility of one nation to another will come to an end."[1]

Marxists, however, have been found to differ in their attitude to national cultural values, some holding that under socialism they would flourish and that the abolition of national antagonism would not necessarily entail the abolition of cultural diversity; others believing that with the development of internationalism national cultures, including national languages, would die a natural death. These diverse views have led to the current controversy raging in the Soviet Union between those supporting the assimilation of nations into one Soviet culture and others who stress the enduring nature of national sentiment and champion the cultural and political rights of minority nations.[2]

Though Lenin was against the idea of separate national parties as that would weaken the class struggle, he conceded that a nationality should have the right to secede. The party programme adopted in 1903 gave the right of national self-determination for all nations comprising the state, together with the right to national minorities of education in their own language and put native languages on equal terms with the main government language in all

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1. Marx, K. and Engels, F.: Communist Manifesto Op.cit. pp.79-80.
2. See Hodnett, G.: "What's In a Nation?" in Problems of Communism, Vol.16, no.5, (Washington, D.C., U.S. Information Agency, September-October 1967).

public affairs. The Bolsheviks under Lenin believed that the national problem was essentially on short-term one. In the long run, with the triumph of socialism it was believed that national boundaries would be destroyed and people would be united on a class basis. National autonomy was necessary under socialism because the psychological consciousness of national identity would still prevail, though in a different form:

"The fact of the matter is that the elimination of the bourgeois nations signifies the elimination of not nations in general, but only of the bourgeois nations. On the ruins of the old, bourgeois nations, new socialist nations are arising and developing, and they are far more solidly united than any bourgeois nation, because they are exempt from the irreconcilable class contradictions that corrode the bourgeois nations, and are far more representative of the whole people than any bourgeois nation."[1]

Only in the communist epoch, it was maintained, would nations merge. Till that period was reached, Marxist-Leninist national policy advocated the equality of nations and languages and supported the right of oppressed nations to secession and to form an independent state.

In considering Marxist-Leninist views on language, it is necessary to examine briefly the "New Linguistic Theory" of the Russian linguist N.Ya. Marr, put forward in the late 1920s and early 1930s, not only because of its avowed formulation on the principles of dialectical materialism, but also because of the linguistic controversy it engendered during the Stalin era.

Marr tried to fit his philological ideas into the pattern of the Marxian doctrine that the economic structure of society is the basis on which all political, social, religious and aesthetic forms are developed as superstructure. Marr classified language as part of the "superstructure" which

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1. Stalin, J.: "The National Question and Leninism", Collected Works Vol.11, Op. cit. pp. 355-56.

is determined by the "material base", or economic structure, of society. ". . . language in general" Marr claimed, ". . . form(s) a superstructural category on a production and productive relation base."[1] According to historical materialism, any major changes in the material base, brought about by revolution, determine the changes in the superstructure. Marr, therefore, concluded that language, as part of this super-structure, should also be more or less violently subverted whenever a social revolution occurred. Marr believed that such "shifts" in language take place, "conditioned by the shifts experienced in the material base." This led him to conclude that each period of history - serfdom, feudalism, capitalism - had its own specific language. The "shifts" in the Russian language - lexical and phraseological innovations, as well as slang-elements - effected by the Bolshevik revolution, Marr considered to be "inevitable", and was therefore opposed to such academicians as Maxim Gorky who campaigned for the purity and accuracy of the Russian literary language. Marr demanded "a transition to the new paths of the real mass language."[2] The transition of society from one structure to another was, for Marr, accompanied by the transition of language from one state to another. This transition, he claimed, takes the form of abrupt and fundamental breaks in language-structure leading to new and qualitatively different language structures.

Moreover, Marr believed in the class origin and class nature of language, asserting that from the time speech first replaced the manual system of communication, every language was moulded and formed by a class and not by an ethnic group or a nation as a whole. There was no language which was not of a class nature, and in the grammatical dependance of words in a sentence, Marr saw a reflection of social relations.[3] Marr did not consider any single

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1. Marr, N.Ya.: Contribution to the Baku Discussion on Japhetidology and Marxism (Baku, 1932) p.25. Cited by Chikobava, A. "On Certain Problems of Soviet Linguistics" (Moscow, 1950). Reprinted in Simmons, E.J.(ed.) The Soviet Linguistic Controversy (New York, King's Crown Press, 1951) p.11.
2. Cited in Kucera, J.: "Soviet Nationality Policy: The Linguistic Controversy" in Problems of Communism Vol.3, No.2 (Washington, D.C., U.S. Information Agency 1954). p.26.
3. Marr, N.Ya.: "Language and Thought" (1931) Collected Works, Vol.3, pp.90-91.

language as a whole, as a national heritage, but rather approached it as a composite of various class languages, or of surviving elements of such class languages.

Marr's theories represented Marxist internationalism carried to its extreme and pleaded for more intensive research of the non-Russian languages. Marr stressed the importance of the native language in the cultural progress of the community, and declared that the new methods of his theory, "which gives equal consideration to allllanguages, will disrupt the pseudo-scientific, ideological principle of the autocracy of Russian."[1] While Marr believed in a future world language following the destruction of the capitalist order, he did not consider that any of the existing languages would take their place as the new international language. He believed that this new language would come into existence through hybridisation, as the product of the new social basis. According to Marr, all languages, major or minor, would prove to be "equally mortal" when confronted with the thought-pattern of the proletariat.[2]

Marr's concept of language as part of the superstructure and his denial of a "pure national language" could be utilised by the Soviet regime against non-Russians who claimed equal rights for the development of their language. Marr's theories, however, were meant to be equally applicable to Russian, and if applied in practice meant the hampering of efficient instruction of Russian in the high school grades and especially in the non-Russian schools. Moreover, Marr's claim that the international language of the future would be a new language was embarrasing to a regime which glorified Russian as the national language of the Soviet Union and the future world language after the world wide victory of communism. A revision of Marr's linguistic theory,

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1. Marr, N.Ya.: Collected Works Vol.1 (Russian edition) p.275. Cited in Kucera, J.: "Soviet Nationality Policy: The Linguistic Controversy". Op.cit. p.27.
2. Ibid. Vol.13. p.12.

therefore, was undertaken by Stalin in the 1930s.

Marxism-Leninism and Gandhism: Some Similarities and Differences.

As social philosophies both Gandhism and Marxism-Leninism are concerned with uplifting the poor and oppressed portion of humanity; the cause of human suffering being identified by both as the existence of an unjust social system which allows one class of men to live on the toils of another. For all men to be free again, this unjust social system has, therefore, to be destroyed. It is in the realm of the attitudes brought to bear on this task, as well as the means to be employed in bringing about social change that Marxism-Leninism differs from the philosophy of Gandhi.

Marxism-Leninism holds that the unjust socio-economic system exists because the exploiters hold the power of the State in their hands. If, by revolutionary means, this power is transferred to the exploited, the proletariat, it would bring the state under the dictatorship of the proletariat, abolish all class distinctions, recast property relations, reshape men's outlook by education, and bring society to its final goal - Communism. The historical determinism of Marx envisaged human society as steadily progressing forward towards this final goal which would eventually lead to the complete emancipation of labouring humanity all over the world. The role of the revolutionary leadership in this predetermined process was to perceive beforehand the way in which civilisation was moving and quicken its progress by removing any impediments in its way. For this purpose Marxism justifies the use of violence.

Gandhi, on the other hand, relied more upon a basic change in the present mental organisation of mankind brought about through non-violent non-cooperation. Instead of ousting the present rulers from power by violent means, Gandhi sought to convert them by means of self-suffering, so that they would ultimately join hands with their erstwhile victims in building up a new

social and economic system based on freedom and equality. Gandhi was opposed fundamentally to the violence involved in the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary scheme. For Gandhi the root of the problem lay not in the authority of the state, but in the character of the individual which had made the existence of the state possible. Those who rule, do so because others are afraid of violence. Therefore, if this fear is cast aside and at the same time men labour with their hands to create a new mode of production and distribute the wealth of society equitably if not equally, they can free themselves from their oppressors. Gandhi, therefore, directed his efforts at bringing about the necessary change in human character.

The wide polarity of means advocated by Marxism-Leninism and Gandhism can be explained by reference to the fundamental difference in their opinion regarding the role of the individual in human history. Marxism-Leninism holds that men are mostly creatures of circumstances, so that if they are to be made moral, they should be placed under circumstances which render a particular code of behaviour imperative. Gandhi, however, had implicit faith in the intrinsic goodness of human personality, and his appeal, therefore, was constantly to this innate goodness in order to bring about social change. Mere compulsion, or blind habit, Gandhi believed, would fail to develop the best which lies dormant in the individual. Nevertheless, Gandhi recognised the role of the environment in elevating or degrading human nature. All change in outward form should be an expression of the degree of inner progress.

The result of social change Gandhi envisaged to be a decentralised form of government based on the ancient village communes, where property would be held in trusteeship, the law of bread labour would prevail and sovereignty would rest with the people based on moral authority. He did not visualise a stateless society as did the Marxists who in the intermediary period dreamt of/a dictatorship of the proletariat.

In their attitude towards knowledge both the Marxists and Gandhi

placed emphasis on work experience and the hand-head combination as a means of acquiring knowledge. This principle found expression for Gandhi in his system of basic education and for the Marxists in their doctrine of polytechnization. Apart from the economic advantages, such a system emphasizes the dignity of labour and brings the school closer to society.

For a large multinational, multilingual country, the practical advantages of a common language were recognised by both Lenin and Gandhi, both at the same time realising the importance of providing equal status in education and administration to the national or provincial languages. Whereas Gandhi's insistence on indigenous languages was an offshoot of his insistence on everything swadeshi in order to secure national unity and identity; Lenin realised that the various nationalities comprising the old Russian empire could be persuaded to remain in the Soviet Union only if cultural autonomy was ensured to them, at least in theory. A Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the nature of language regards language as a social phenomenon which is determined by the material base. Carried to its extreme this view led to Marr's doctrine of the superstructural character and class nature of language, each economic era and each class having its own peculiar language, the final world language emerging in the period of world communism being a new international language. Such an interpretation ran counter to the hegemony of Russian, especially during the Stalin regime. Linguistic theory, therefore, had to be suitably modified in order to keep pace with actual practice.

Stalin inherited much from the Marxist-Leninist school, but to this legacy he added his own innovations and modifications as and when necessary. In discussing Stalin's view on the nature of society, individual and knowledge, as well as his attitude towards languages and language policies, mention will be made only of the areas where he differed from or added to the Marxist Leninist doctrine, in so far as these innovations have relevance for this study.

2. Ibid. p.237.

Stalin's Innovations in Marxist-Leninist Ideology

The Marxist-Leninist heritage to Stalinism is often eclipsed by Stalin's policies and practices which, at times, appear inconsistent and even contradictory to the principles of Marxism-Leninism. In the period of "de-Stalinization following Stalin's death, the main distinctions alleged between Leninism and Stalinism were the "personality cult" as practiced in honour of Stalin, glorification of the Russian past to win support for the regime, the violent purges within the party, and the infrequency of Party congresses culminating in the personal dictatorship and the cult of the despot which issued from the so-called "dictatorship of the proletariat."[1]

Stalin, however, cannot be regarded as a complete innovator. Working within the framework of Marxism-Leninism, he introduced changes and modifications in theory as and when demanded by his practical policies. Significant among these policies were the forcible collectivization of agriculture in 1929-34 and resumption of rapid industrialization of the country in the economic field; introduction of universal education upto the age of fourteen, revival of general education at the secondary level, and the introduction of a complicated scheme of social stratification, in the sphere of social innovation; and on the political plane the reintroduction by the 1936 Constitution of universal and equal franchise, direct election and secret ballot. Finally, in the cultural sphere, the autonomy granted to the nationalities under Lenin was made subservient to great Russian Chauvinism to strengthen the regime in an era of "capitalistic encirclement".[2]

It has been argued by some commentators on the Soviet Union, that Stalin's theory must be seen against this background of his practical policies.[3] Stalin maintained that his theory was merely an elaboration of orthodox

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1. Rashatar, J.S.: "A Concise History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (New York, F.A. Praeger, 1959) pp. 213-218.

2. See, Utechin, S.V.: Russian Political Thought. Op.cit. pp.233-238.

3. Ibid. p.239.

Marxism-Leninism and its further development in new historical circumstances. This development took place in his lectures at a Party school entitled Problems of Leninism (1924), at speeches at Party congresses and conferences, in his report on the new Constitution in 1936 and in various notes and letters. The 1936 Constitution and the book History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) (1938), are considered among the most important texts of Stalinist political theory.

By official fiat Stalin proclaimed, in 1936, the liquidation of "exploiting" classes in the Soviet Union, and claimed that the construction of socialism had been in the main completed with the country having entered the final stage of transition to communism.[1] This required a modification of the earlier thesis that socialism could be established in the Soviet Union only through further revolutionary activity and the establishment of socialist regimes in Western Europe. Though in April 1924 in his Problems of Leninism Stalin had declared that the "final victory of socialism" could not be achieved in one country, but would require the "victory of the revolution in at least several countries", by December 17, 1924, he had modified his position to indicate that socialism could be achieved in one country. The slogan "Socialism in one country", first adopted at the Fourteenth Party Conference in April, 1925,[2] came at a time when the revolutionary tide in Europe was ebbing and capitalism was apparently becoming stabilized.

Stalin, however, continued to believe in the permanence of world revolution and did not consider the construction of socialism in the Soviet Union as the "complete and final victory." He warned:

> "We do not live on an island. We live in a capitalistic encirclement. This circumstance that we are building

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1. Reshetar, J.S.: A Concise History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
2. Op.cit. p.214.
2. Ibid. p.216.

> Consequently, so long as we remain in the capitalistic encirclement, so long as the proletariat has not won at least in a series of countries, we cannot consider our victory as final . . . For this reason, in order to win definitely, it is necessary that we strive for the replacement of the present capitalistic encirclement by the socialist encirclement, that we strive for the victory of the proletariat in at least a few more countries. . . That is why we view the victory of socialism in our country not as an end in itself, not as something self-sufficient, but as an aid, as a means, as a path to the victory of the proletarian revolution in other countries.[1]

The threat of "capitalistic encirclement" also served as a justification for the increasing power of the state in the Soviet Union. During the 1930s Stalin explained that "capitalistic encirclement" required that the Soviet state be strengthened in order to protect the new communist society from its international class enemies. He also pointed out that as the remnants of the old capitalist classes became fewer in number, they became more desperate in their attempts to sabotage socialist construction and to overthrow the Soviet regime. They would not succeed, but to ensure that, it was necessary to exercise extreme vigilance and to have an efficient and powerful security

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1. Stalin, J.: Works. Vol.8 (Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1955). p.262 f.

service. In other words, the State had to be strengthened in order to ferret out its enemies and destroy them. Thus, contrary to the traditional Marxist-Leninist view that the state would "wither away" under full communism, Stalin maintained that if "capitalist encirclement" continued to exist even after the completion of communism in the Soviet Union, the state would not only remain, but would become stronger and more powerful.

Regarding the Party Structure, Stalin inherited from Lenin the centralist, antifactional conception of the Party. Moreover, he claimed that since there was complete moral and political unity among Soviet citizens, there was no need for any other party but the Communist Party, which was a voluntary association of the most active and politically conscious citizens.[1] Stalin argued that the Communist Party was the leading core of all organisations of the working people, both public and state, and as such, its power must grow in the period of transition when the various functions of the state, losing their political character, are transferred to the various public organisations. Without the general guidance of the Community Party, he asserted, it would be impossible to successfully bring about the transition from socialism to communism.

According to orthodox Marxism, the state belongs to the realm of the superstructure, which in turn, is a mere reflection of the underlying economic 'base'. The rapidly increasing power of the state under Stalin required a modification of the original Marxist thesis, leading to a rehabilitation of the superstructure. Signs of a shift in theory were evident as early as 1917 when Lenin recognised the important role of ideology in political activity. Stalin produced the necessary reformulation in 1938:

> "As regards the significance of social ideas, theories, views and political institutions, as regards their role in history, historical materialism, far from denying them, stresses the

1. Utechin, S.V.: Russian Political Thought. Op.cit. p.240.

[illegible] important role of these factors in the life of society, [illegible] This, in fact, is the case in its history."[1] Although, according to Stalin, the [illegible] superstructure is generated by the base, it then turns out to be a "most active force which contributes vigorously [illegible] to the formation and consolidation of its base, takes all [illegible] steps to assist the new order to drive out the old base and its [illegible] and the former classes into the dust and liquidate them."[2] and to glorify the regime.

Stalin went on to distinguish between old social ideas which "hamper the development, the progress of society", and new "advanced" ideas which "facilitate the development, the progress of society" and have "tremendous organising, mobilising and transforming value."[3] This dynamic role assigned to the superstructure by Stalin represented a considerable departure from the original Marxist theory. [illegible]

Stalin's rehabilitation of the superstructure was not his only departure from Marx's determinism. Coupled with it was his introduction of a dynamic, purposive, driving attitude of mind in place of the original deterministic one. Here Marx's own aphorism that "the philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it"[4], provided the necessary theoretical background. The Communist decisions to industrialise the Soviet Union and to collectivise its agriculture, taken in the 1920s, involved a rigorous mobilisation not only of manpower and natural resources, but of thought itself, in order to serve the end of "building socialism" in the country. In his theory explaining Stalinism as a system of political thought and practice, R. Redlich claims[5] that at the basis of [illegible]

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1. Stalin, J.: Problems of Leninism (Moscow, 1953) p.725 f.
2. Stalin, J.: "On Marxism in Linguistics" Pravda (Moscow, June 20, 1950) p.3.
3. Cited in Conquest, R.(ed.): The Politics of Ideas in the U.S.S.R., Op.cit. p.16.
4. Marx, K. and Engels, F.: Selected Works, Vol.2. Op.cit. p.367.
5. See, Utechin, S.V.: Russian Political Thought. Op.cit. p.241.

Stalinism lies a hierarchy of values in which power occupies the highest place. This, in itself, is nothing new. What, however, distinguishes Stalinism is its attempt not only to achieve a high degree of control over most aspects of people's behaviour, but also to dominate their minds. Consequently, during this period, the social sciences, including economics, philosophy, psychology, education, literature and even history, underwent considerable changes in order to bring intellectual life and thought in line with communist policies and to glorify the regime.

In his attempts to control the minds of Soviet citizens, Stalin, like his predecessor, conceived of education as an indispensable political weapon and a matter of deepest concern to the Party. "Education", said Stalin, "is a weapon whose effect depends on who holds it in his hands and who is struck with it."[1] And, in the hands of the Communist Party, it would seem, education would aid in attaining the goals of the regime. The implementation of compulsory general education from 1930 onwards can be seen to have a dual aim: replacing the old intellectual elite, largely hostile to the Communist regime, by a new one brought up under this regime; and raising the educational level, and thereby the efficiency of the population in order to provide the trained 'cadres' needed by the introduction of the first five-year plan.

The urgent need to train the greatest number of specialists in the shortest possible time led to an abolition of a polytechnical principle since it was felt that the craftsmanship acquired in school workshops equipped with primitive tools and machinery bore no relation to the skills required in a modern factory. Rather than teach obsolete manual skills it was preferable to give the students sounder theoretical grounding in elementary sciences. A resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU, dated September 5, 1931, pointed out that:

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1. Quoted in Counts, G.S.: The Challenge of Soviet Education (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1957) p.47.

"... the fundamental shortcoming of our schools at the present moment is the failure of school instruction to provide a sufficient volume of general knowledge and to solve satisfactorily the problem of preparing truly literate people for entrance to technicums and university, i.e. people well acquainted with the elements of knowledge (physics, chemistry, mathematics, their native language, geography, etc.). As a consequence, the polytechnisation of the school is often formal in character and fails to prepare children capable of becoming fully developed builders of socialism, able to combine theory and practice and master techniques."[1]

The 1931 resolution, therefore, reintroduced regular timetables and specified exactly what subjects were to be taught; a year later (August 25, 1932) the curriculum was further and more precisely delineated, and in 1933, standardised 'stable' textbooks were adopted in order to impart the requisite minimum of information to an expanding school population in an efficient way.[2]

Efforts to raise standards of knowledge progressed together with attempts to imbue children with a communist outlook on life and developing the concept of collectivism at school and in the pioneer organisations. It was hoped that in these pioneer organisations the young would form habits and sentiments of corporate living that would persist through life. Children were expected to develop a complex of conditioned reflexes so that certain activities would become habitual, and certain attitudes to particular situations automatic. A repetitive use of the same slogans and quotations from the works of Lenin and Stalin were expected to channel thought in a particular direction by forming a set behaviour pattern and thereby relieving the individual of the

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1. See, Koutaissoff, E.: "Soviet Education and The New Man" Op.cit. p.114.
2. Ibid. p.113.

effort of formulating his own thoughts.[1] Since these formulations were repeated in the several languages of the U.S.S.R., it was hoped that eventually all peoples of the Soviet Union would come to think in similar, standardised terms.

The partial return to the old patterns of secondary education in the 1930s, prompted by the need of trained cadres during the period of industrialisation, led to a renewed emphasis on the necessity of teaching foreign languages in the institutions of secondary and higher education.[2]

The 1930s also saw the revival of Russian chauvinism and the consequent stress on Russian language teaching in schools. The Seventeenth Congress in June 1934 witnessed the turning point in Stalin's nationality policy. Prior to 1934 he had condemned Russian chauvinism and at the Sixteenth Congress of the Party, on June 28, 1930, maintained the encouragement of national cultures as consonant with Marxist concepts. A national culture under the Dictatorship of the Proletariat is "a culture socialist in content and national in form, the aim of which is to educate the masses in the spirit of internationalism and to consolidate the Dictatorship of the Proletariat."[3] Stalin, at that time, claimed that the expansion and maturation of national cultures must be permitted "in order to create the conditions necessary for their fusion into a single, common culture with a single common language."[4] After 1934, however, Stalin denounced local non-Russian nationalism as "bourgeois nationalism" at the same time, revealing an orientation towards Russian nationalism. The great efforts needed for building "socialism in one country" in a period of "capitalist encirclement" called for a revival of patriotic sentiment and national superiority in place of the 1917 ideology of

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1. See, Koutaissoff, E.: "Soviet Education and The New Man" op.cit. p.132.
2. Sovetskaya Pedagogika No.3 (Moscow, Akademiya Pedagogicheskikh Nauk SSSR, March 1950) p.3.
3. Stalin, J.: Marxism and The National and Colonial Question (London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1947) p.260.
4. Ibid. p.261.

"proletarian internationalism". In the multinational context of the Soviet state, Soviet patriotism came to be identified with the numerically dominant group of the U.S.S.R. and took the form of Russian nationalism. Similarly, in the absence of a "Soviet" language, critics of the U.S.S.R. allege, it was the Russian language which was glorified, and it was implied that it was in Russian alone, of all the national languages of the U.S.S.R., that Soviet culture and science have found their formal expression.[1] In fact, some Soviet writers, like David Zaslavsky have gone to the extent of assigning Russian a prominent role as the future world language under Socialism.[2]

Despite this, the Russian language had remained basically the same as before the October Soviet Russian patriotism of the 1930s and the glorification of the Russian national language were incompatible with Marr's refusal to treat any language as a national heritage and his theory of the class nature of language. Though Marr's concept of language as part of the superstructure, and his denial of a "pure national language" were utilised by the regime against non-Russian "bourgeois nationalism", they applied to "Great-Russian chauvinism" as much as to non-Russian nationalism. Hence it became necessary for the regime to rationalise Marr's theories with regard to the Russian language, and later to bring linguistic theory in line with the Soviet practice of Russian domination in the school curriculum and in administration. The lag between theory and practice was finally corrected by Stalin in his articles on the subject in Pravda during the summer of 1950.[3]

Stalin's "resolution" of the linguistic controversy called for an ostentatious revision of all linguistic problems. Denouncing Marr as a vulgariser of Marxism,[4] Stalin declared that language was not created by any single class, but by all society and was a national means of communication. In support

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1. Kucera, J.: "Soviet Nationality Policy: The Linguistic Controversy" op. cit. p.25.
2. Zaslavsky, D.: Literaturnia Gazeta (Moscow, January 1, 1949).
3. For an English translation of the relevant articles in the discussion. See Simmons, E.J.(ed.) The Soviet Linguistic Controversy. Op. cit.
4. Stalin, J.: "On Several Problems of Linguistics" Pravda (Moscow, July 4, 1950) p.3.

of his argument he pointed out that the language of the Russian nation has remained basically the same as it was in the time of Pushkin, and that it has served as a common national language for all classes of the successive feudal, capitalist and socialist societies.[1]

Stalin also rejected Marr's notion that language belongs to the superstructure. He pointed out that with the liquidation of the capitalist base and the construction of a new socialist base in Russia, the capitalist superstructure had been replaced by a new superstructure corresponding to the socialist base. Despite this, the Russian language had remained basically the same as before the October revolution, because language exists "to serve society as a whole in the capacity of a means of communication for people, to be common to the members of a society and one and the same for the society, serving the members of the society equally, regardless of their class position."[2] Moreover, whereas the superstructure is the product of a given epoch and is therefore eliminated with the elimination of the given base, language "is the product of a great many epochs, during which it assumes shape, grows rich and develops, is polished. Hence a language lives incomparably longer than any base and any superstructure."[3]

In Stalin's view,

> "Language is generated not by one base or another, by the old base or the new within a given society, but by the entire historic development of society and the history of the bases over the centuries. It is created not by any one class but by the whole society, by all classes of society, by the efforts of hundreds of generations. It is created not to meet the needs of any one class but of the whole society, the needs of all classes in society. This is precisely why it is

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1. Stalin, J.: "On Marxism in Linguistics", Pravda (Moscow, June 20, 1950) p.3.
2. Ibid., p.3.
3. Ibid.: p.3.; "Replies to Comrades" Pravda (Moscow, August 2, 1950) p.2.

created as the language of the whole people, as a society's single language, common to all members of the society."[1] Stalin's pronouncement, therefore, provided the necessary theoretical justification for the increasing supremacy of Russian. Without a language understood by all members of society, Stalin pointed out, it was impossible to ensure the very existence of social production.

Finally, Stalin refuted Marr's claim that the development of language takes place through abrupt and fundamental breaks. Instead of the destruction of an existing language and the creation of a new one, language change takes place through a gradual accumulation of the elements of the new quality and by the gradual dying away of the elements of the old quality.[2] Unlike the superstructure, language is directly connected with man's productive activity, and therefore the vocabulary, being most sensitive to change, changes constantly. However, the basic word stock is preserved and the fundamental elements of the grammatical system remain for a long time.

In place of Marr's doctrine that the international language of world communism would be some new language not existing at present, Stalin put forward two different formulas, one for the epoch before the world-wide victory of Socialism, and one for the epoch after the world-wide victory of Socialism and insisted that since the two different formulas corresponded to two different epochs of society's development, both were correct and applicable to their particular epoch.[3]

Stalin's pamphlet "On Marxism in Linguistics" related to the formula of the hybridisation of languages prior to world-wide socialism, when the exploiting classes are still dominant, national isolation and mutual distrust

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1. Stalin, J.: "On Marxism in Linguistics" Pravda. Op.cit. p.3.
2. Ibid. p.3.
3. Stalin, J.: "Replies to Comrades" Pravda (Moscow, August 2, 1950) p.2.

are reinforced by state differences and there is no national equality. When "there are not yet conditions for the peaceful and friendly cooperation of nations and languages", there is an assimilation of some languages and victory of others in the struggle for domination. Under these conditions, Stalin claimed that the hybridisation of languages results not in the formation of a new language but in the triumph of one of these languages and the defeat of others.[1]

On the other hand, Stalin claimed that his speech at the Sixteenth Party Congress regarding the fusion of languages into one general language referred to the era following world-wide socialism when world imperialism, the exploiting classes, national isolation, distrust and inequality would have been abolished. Under these circumstances the assimilation of languages would be replaced by their mutual enrichment. Out of the "hundreds of national languages", as a result of long economic, political and cultural cooperation between nations, "will be sifted, at the beginning, the richest, most unified zonal languages, which will later coalesce into one general international language," which will be "a new language, which has imbibed the best elements of the national and zonal languages."[2] For the present, however, when two languages are in close contact, he asserted, one emerges as the victor while the other dies off.

Stalin's repudiation of Marr's linguistic theory, through articles in the Pravda in 1950 came almost two decades after the Soviet language policy had shifted towards a greater stress on the Russian language and the fusion of non-Russian languages as witnessed in the 1930s. This time lag between theory and practice may be explained by the Marxist-Leninist principle that in matters of ideology onlythe highest authority can establish a new "line". The Party and its elite leadership group were to be the main source of ideology. Hence,

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1. Stalin, J.: "Replies to Comrades" Pravda. Op.cit. p.2.
2. Ibid. p.2.

while language policy changed in the 1930s, linguistic theory did not catch up with the changes until Stalin's declarations in 1950. Theory, therefore, during the Stalin era, appears to have been developed to justify what had been implemented in actual practice. The fact that even a man of Stalin's power, recognised the importance of theory or ideology in influencing human minds, is an indication of the important role values, attitudes and ideas, if internalised, play in shaping human conduct.

CHAPTER VIII

FEDERALISM: CASES OF INDIA AND THE U.S.S.R.

Political change in societies with stable cultural patterns have been identified as a major source of language problems in India and the U.S.S.R. However, it has been observed that following political changes that have changed the political structures or institutions of the two countries, these policies are dictated primarily within the political pattern of a country. An examination here of the new political structures of India and the U.S.S.R. is expected to substantiate the observation that it is the peculiarity of each political pattern that largely determines the nature of the policies devised, as also their outcome. While **SECTION B** of this study, on apparently similar problems through different policy solutions, that is equally, if not more significant is the fact that similar policy objectives may be adopted by two societies with different results. It is the aim of this chapter to examine the similarities and differences in the political structures of India and the U.S.S.R. to the extent to which they influence the formulation, adoption and implementation of their respective language policies.

THE INSTITUTIONAL PATTERNS

The notion of 'political structure' brings to mind related concepts of 'government', 'state', 'parliament', 'cabinet', 'political parties', and the like. A description of these formal institutions only, though necessary, is not enough, since a concentration on the formal structures only could result in a mere static description of the political pattern. For an accurate representation of the dynamic process of politics it is necessary to supplement a purely structural study by an analysis of how the political system actually works, i.e., how its various input as well as output functions are actually performed.[1]

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1. Almond, G.: 'A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics', In Almond, G. and Coleman, J. (eds.) The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1960) pp. 7-8.

CHAPTER VIII

THE POLITICAL STRUCTURES OF INDIA AND THE U.S.S.R.

Political changes in societies with static cultural patterns have been identified as a major source of language problems in India and the U.S.S.R. Moreover, it has been observed that following political change what have changed are the political structures or institutions of the two countries. Since policies are debated primarily within the political pattern of a country, an examination here of the new political structures of India and the U.S.S.R. is expected to substantiate the observation that it is the peculiarity of each political pattern that largely determines the nature of the policies designed, as also their outcome. Attempts may be made to solve similar, or apparently similar problems through different policy solutions. What is equally, if not more significant is the fact that similar policy solutions may be adopted by two countries with different results. It is the aim of this chapter to examine the similarities and differences in the political structures of India and the U.S.S.R. to the extent to which they influence the formulation, adoption and implementation of their respective language policies.

The mention of "political structures" brings to mind related concepts of 'government', 'state', 'parliament', 'cabinet', 'political parties', and the like. A description of these formal institutions only, though necessary, is not enough, since a concentration on the formal structures only could result in a mere static description of the political pattern. For an accurate representation of the dynamic process of politics it is necessary to supplement a purely structural study by an analysis of how the political system actually works, i.e., how its various input as well as output functions are actually performed.[1]

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1. Almond, G.: "A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics", in Almond, G. and Coleman, J. (eds.) The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1960) pp. 7-17.

as well as A description of the formal structures, as defined by statutory enactments such as the Constitution of the land, is important because it defines the role or activity expected of the various bodies forming the system. Their role performance or actual conduct may, however, be quite different. Hence for a dynamic study of a political system, and its effective comparison with other political systems, Almond advocates a functional rather than a purely structural approach to the comparative study of political systems.[1]

Before proceeding further, it is desirable, to reiterate here that for the purpose of this study, the term "political system" is used to cover both the political norms or cultures and the political institutions or structures. It is with the latter that this chapter is concerned. Though such a distinction is, perhaps, implicit in the Almond and Coleman approach, their discussion is concerned largely with political structures and it seems at times the term 'political system' is used synonymously with 'political structures', a distinction being drawn at the same time between the formal governmental structures and all other structures in their political aspects. When mention is made of the political system in the Almond and Coleman context, therefore reference is mainly to the political structures of the system.

Function For Almond and Coleman, a political system is distinguished from other social systems by the use of "legitimate physical compulsion", and includes all the interactions "which affect the use or the threat of use of physical coercion"[2]. Consequently, within "political system" are to be included not just the structures based on law, like parliaments, cabinets and courts, or just the formally organised units like political parties, interest groups and media of communication, but all the structures in their political aspects, including undifferentiated structures like kinship and lineage, status and caste groups,

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1. Almond, G.: "A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics", in Almond, G. and Coleman, J.(eds.) The Politics of the Developing Areas. Op.cit. pp. 12-17.

2. Ibid. p.7.

as well as anomic phenomena like riots, street demonstrations and the like. There is, however, the existence of a boundary between the political system and other social systems, though the boundary-maintenance between society and polity differs from political system to political system.

Two important characteristics of all political systems identified by Almond and Coleman, and relevant to the present study are: (1) the universality of political structure, and (2) the universality of the political functions.

Rejecting the "state and non-state" classification, Almond and Coleman assert that in any society which maintains internal and external order, there is a "political structure" - i.e., legitimate patterns of interaction by means of which this order is maintained.[1] In certain primitive, traditional societies the political structure may be less apparent and intermittent as when the articulative, aggregative, communicative, rule-making and rule-application functions may overlap without formal partitions between them. But this does not preclude the possibility that the society has a political structure. Moreover, if cognizance is taken only of the specialised, visible structure and the functions performed by this structure, the study falls into the danger of being restrictive and limited. Whereas the legislative and administrative functions may be obvious, certain other equally important functions like the articulative, aggregative and communicative functions may be performed, diffusely or intermittently within the society. This is, however, not to deny that these functions are performed and that there are structures which perform them.

For a more useful comparison of political systems, therefore, a functional approach has to be adopted. Almond and Coleman hold that the same functions are performed in all political systems, the difference being in the kind of structures which perform them and the frequencies with which they are

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1. Almond, G.: "A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics", in Almond, G. and Coleman, J. (eds.) The Politics of the Developing Areas. Op.cit. p.11.

performed. Comparisons may, therefore, be made according to the frequency of the performance of the functions, the kind of structures performing them, and the style of their performance.

After surveying the available literature in political science which would help in formulating functional categories,[1] Almond and Coleman present their own functional categories, which, they claim, "were developed for the purpose of comparing political systems as whole systems."[2] These functional categories, largely used in this chapter as a framework for comparing the political structures of India and the U.S.S.R., are as follows:

A. Input Functions (or political functions)
1. Political socialisation and recruitment
2. Interest articulation
3. Interest aggregation
4. Political communication

B. Output Functions (or governmental functions)
5. Rule-making
6. Rule-application
7. Rule adjudication

These functional categories will be used here, first, to compare the governmental structure, or in other words, the legal or "official" framework of the two political systems and define the formal activity and functions expected of each constituent structure. In the second place, it is hoped, these categories will help to study how, and by what structures, the various political functions are performed, within and outside the formal governmental structure. Such a study could highlight the role of certain structures and institutions outside the formal setup and illustrate how various political functions are

1. Almond, G.: "A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics", in Almond, G. and Coleman, J. (eds.) The Politics of the Developing Areas. Op. cit. pp. 13-17.
2. Ibid. p. 16.

actually performed. The actual working of the structures may be inconsistent with the political theory as expressed in the Constitution or legislative enactments. A simultaneous study of the statutory and the non-statutory structures would not only give a whole picture, but, by revealing the discrepancies, if any, between theory and practice show the peculiar or indigenous characteristics of the respective political systems which could have an influence over the language policy-making in each country.

A related result expected from a comparative study of the political structures of India and the U.S.S.R. is the ability to ascertain how far the political patterns of the two countries make for convergence/diversity of policies derived from their respective value systems.

The Statutory or Formal Governmental Structures of India and the U.S.S.R.

The Nature of the Governmental Structure: A description and comparison of the formal organisation of the political patterns of India and the U.S.S.R., as laid down by their respective Constitutions, can be taken as the starting point of this chapter. It deals chiefly with the political theory governing the structure of the political institutional pattern and its expected operation. Since a functional approach to the comparison of government structure is adopted, the various institutions entrusted, in Almond's and Coleman's terms, with the "output functions" of rule-making, rule application and rule adjudication will be examined. In traditional, structural terms these are the functions, respectively, of the legislative, executive and judicial organs of the government.

The formal governmental structure can be described in the words of Professor Morris-Jones as the 'ordering framework'[1], meaning, thereby, " a system in which the constituent elements, including especially government, operate according to rules which they are not able unilaterally to prescribe."[2]

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1. Morris-Jones, W.H.: The Government and Politics of India (London, Hutchinson and Company Ltd., 1964) p.191.
2. Ibid., p.191.

The machinery of government designed by the Constitution of India, seeks to approximate closely the British model. However, as Morris-Jones warns, one should not assume that "institutions with familiar names are necessarily performing wholly familiar functions."[1] As will be seen later, Indian political institutions operate in a unique political environment.

Constitutionally, however, India like Britain, is a parliamentary democracy. But unlike Britain, the Constitution has built a federal system into the parliamentary structure in order to cope with the great size and diversity of the country. The federal Constitution of India embodies a dual government consisting of a federal or central government at New Delhi, and the governments of the federal states. These, as reorganised upto February 1972, number twenty-one states and nine union territories.

The respective areas of authority of the central and state governments are laid down in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution which consists of three lists - the Union, the State and the Concurrent, both the centre and the states having power over the third. Subjects like land legislation, health, welfare and education are left in the hands of the state governments; whereas foreign affairs, defence, posts and telegraphs, transport, currency and generally subjects of national concern, together with residual powers are the domain of the Centre. Certain Constitutional provisions bestowing extraordinary powers on the Centre raise the question whether India is really a federation, or as has been sometimes pointed out, a "quasi-federation."[2] A strong centre is a distinctive characteristic of the Indian federation, but this does not necessarily preclude the fact that it is a federation.

Moreover, India is an example of an administrative, rather than a contractual, federation.[3] In other words, it is a federation imposed from above,

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1. Morris-Jones, W.H.: Parliament in India (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957) p.2.
2. Joshi, G.N.: The Constitution of India (London, Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 3rd edition, 1954) p.32.
3. Palmer, N.D.: The Indian Political System, (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1961) p.95.

not from below. The different States of the Indian Union are administrative divisions created largely as a result of social and political pressures, main regional demands for reorganizing State boundaries corresponding with the main language divisions of the country. These States were not pre-existing units voluntarily brought together after 1947, and at no time in Indian history were, what are at present called "linguistic groups", self-contained political units.

In contrast, the U.S.S.R. is a "staatesbund" or a federation of the pre-existing units, formed on the basis of "a voluntary union of equal Soviet Socialist Republics."[1] After the October Revolution, various nationality groups, freed from the Tsarist yoke, "voluntarily" joined the union to form what is today known as the U.S.S.R. Statutorily, a federal structure characterises the organisation of the Soviet State, with powers being divided between a federal government at Moscow and republican governments in each of the fifteen Union Republics. Soviet federalism seeks to integrate the separate nations and areas into a single "all union" state and economic order, while giving an element of autonomy to the individual nations.

According to the formal federal structure, the U.S.S.R. is composed of fifteen Union Republics, each with its own Constitution[2] and the legal right freely to secede from the Union,[3] a right not enjoyed by the States of the Indian Union because of the different nature of the Indian federation. Since the fifteen Union Republics do not cover all the various nationalities residing within the U.S.S.R., some Union Republics include Autonomous Republics (in all twenty), Autonomous Regions (in all eight) and National Areas (in all ten), each based on the existence of a homogenous national group and varying in status.[4] The significance of the federal units is to give some authority and territorial integrity to a fairly well-defined national grouping.

1. The Constitution of the U.S.S.R. (Moscow, 1936) Article 13.
2. Ibid. Article 16.
3. Ibid. Article 17.
4. U.S.S.R. Administrative Sub-divisions. (Moscow; Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1970) pamphlet.

The detailed powers of the All-Union and Union Republican governments are defined in the Constitution.[1] The chief areas of power of the All-Union government are foreign relations, defense, currency, external trade, state budget and determination of the national-economic plans of the U.S.S.R. With the exception of the last condition, the formal constitutional powers of the All-Union government in the U.S.S.R. are similar to those of the Central government in India. The sovereignty of the Union Republics is limited in areas allocated to the All-Union Government. Outside of these areas, each Union Republic "exercises state authority independently."

A federal Constitution not only lays down the respective areas of power held by the central and state governments, but also distributes Union and State functions between the different organs of the Union and State governments. Thus the Union and State governments within their delimited spheres function side by side. As there is a division of power under a federal system, it is sometimes assumed that there is also a complete separation of powers between the various organs of government. This is not true. As an authority on Indian Constitutional law has pointed out, the distribution of powers between the different departments both in the Union and States is based on the theory of the separation of functions and not on the doctrine of the separation of powers.[2] In the Constitution there is no complete separation between the legislature and the executive, and the responsibility of the executive to the legislature is a matter of statutory provision.

According to the political theory of division of powers and separation of functions, the legislature is the rule-making body, the executive the rule applying and the judiciary the rule adjudicating. The formal structure and functions of each of these organs of government are laid down in the respective Constitutions of India and the U.S.S.R.

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1. See, Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R.
2. Joshi, G.N.: The Constitution of India. Op.cit. p.38.

The Legislature and its Functions in India and the U.S.S.R.: The legislative or rule-making function is entrusted by the Indian Constitution to the Union Parliament and the various State Assemblies; and by the Soviet Constitution to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. and the Soviets of the various republics, provinces, districts and local areas. In India the Union Parliament and most of the State Assemblies are bicameral, whereas in the U.S.S.R. only the Supreme Soviet is bicameral, all other Soviets comprising of one house only.

The Union Parliament of India consists of two houses - the Lok Sabha (House of the People) and the Rajya Sabha (Council of States). Whereas the lower house is directly elected on the basis of adult suffrage for five years, the Rajya Sabha is (except for twelve members nominated by the President for special knowledge) indirectly elected on the proportional representation basis by the state legislatures. Nevertheless, the Rajya Sabha is more often justified in terms of 'Second thoughts' rather than 'States rights'[1], since it provides additional debating opportunities for which there is occasionally need. The powers of the two houses are similar in relation to ordinary legislation, but money bills can be introduced only in the Lok Sabha, and any changes suggested by the Rajya Sabha must be made within fourteen days, and can be rejected by the Lok Sabha. In fact, the Rajya Sabha is far less influential than the Lok Sabha and since, as pointed out by Morris-Jones, it is "composed of men similar to those who sit in the House of the People, the Council has, not surprisingly, failed to evolve a distinct role for itself."[2]

In the U.S.S.R. elections to the Soviets is direct, the representatives to the bicameral Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. being elected both on the basis of density of population and by national areas. Thus while the Soviet of the Union is elected according to density of population, with one deputy per some 300,000 inhabitants; the Soviet of Nationalities is formed by representatives

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1. Morris-Jones, W.H.: The Government and Politics of India. Op.cit. p.193.
2. Morris-Jones, W.H.: Parliament in India. Op.cit. p. 257.

of the different federal units, each Union Republic sending thirty-two delegates, an Autonomous Republic eleven, an Autonomous Region five and a National area one: giving a total of 750. Thus all peoples who number more than a handful and who can claim to be of unique ethnic stock have representation, but in quantity graduated according to population. The two chambers of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. have equal rights and equal powers to initiate legislation, a law being considered adopted if passed by both Chambers of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. by a simple majority vote in each.

A significant power in the hands of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. is over "the consolidated State budget of the U.S.S.R."[1] The Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. annually adopts a budget for the entire Union and apportions it to the Union Republics, the latter having no source of revenue subject to its own control. This, it might be assumed, would considerably restrict the scope of local decision-making. Nevertheless, an official Soviet book on their parliaments proclaims: "The establishment of the Soviets, organs of popular rule, gave the people the real possibility of administering political, economic and social affairs. Soviet society gave birth to Socialist democracy which is the broadest most representative and just democracy known to man."[2]

The Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., at a joint sitting, formally elects a Presidium, headed by the President to make policy decisions in the form of legislation during intervals between its meetings.[3] Since these intervals tend to be of six to eight months' duration, the Presidium's decrees, later approved by the Supreme Soviet, are quite numerous.

An important feature in the working of the central legislatures of India and the U.S.S.R., but not laid down by their respective Constitutions,

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1. The Constitution of the U.S.S.R. Article 14.
2. Saifulin, M. (ed.&tr.) The Soviet Parliament (Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1967) p.7.
3. The Constitution of the U.S.S.R. Article 48.

is the committee system. These committees are expected to obtain certain and searching examination of government policy and its administration.

Under arrangements made for the organization of the Supreme Soviet after the 1937 elections, the standing committees, formed by members of the Soviet and established in both chambers, functioned to discuss the budget, new legislation, foreign affairs, and credentials of the deputies.[1] Since 1951 the work of the standing committees has noticeably increased and with it their numbers In August 1966 the first session of the seventh Supreme Soviet adopted a decision to increase the number of standing committees and organise them in line with the major economic, administrative, social and cultural spheres, and with certain aspects of Supreme Soviet work.[2] Each committee prepares its conclusions on issues put before the Supreme Soviet or may, on its own initiative draw up bills and study other questions concerned with Supreme Soviet business. All standing committees are responsible to their respective chamber and accountable to it, while their work is coordinated by the Supreme Soviet Presidium.

The smooth passage through the House of a particular issue, and its unanimous approval are credited, by official Soviet sources, to the work of the standing committees where the issue is initially discussed and prepared, not only by the deputies, but also by specialists on particular topics who are drawn into their work, before it is presented to the session.[3] The committees of the Soviets are looked upon by Soviet authorities as the focus of the attempt at the democratisation of the Soviets; and their existence and activity grounds for mitigating the off-repeated accusation of anti-Soviet critics that the Soviets exist merely to ratify party proposals and publicise them throughout the length and breadth of the country. The committees, it is

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1. Hazard, J.N.: The Soviet System of Government (New Delhi, Sterling Publishers, 1971) p.46.

2. Chkhikvadze, V.M.: The Soviet Form of Popular Government (Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1972) p.113.

3. Ibid.

conceded, are becoming forums for discussion and perfection of plans and performance in economic and cultural fields, and of discussion for legislative proposals. They are not, however, places for voting contests, as the decisions are based on consensus and are always unanimous.[1]

In 1967 the committee system reached the Republic Supreme Soviets when they were organized after the new elections.

In India, the standing committees, introduced into the Central Legislative Assembly in 1922, have no statutory backing today. Formally abolished by the Nehru government in 1952 for having "no meaning" and proving of "little use in recent years"[2], various kinds of committees continue to discharge much of the day-to-day work of the Lok Sabha. These committees can be classified into three groups: (1) general committees concerned primarily with the organization and powers of the House, such as the Committee on Rules, the Business Advisory Committee, and the Committee on Government Assurances; (2) legislative committees, chiefly select committees appointed for the consideration of particular bills and committees on petitions, resolutions, and subordinate legislation; and (3) the finance committees, notably the powerful Committees on Public Accounts and on Estimates.

Members of the Public Accounts Committee and Estimates Committee are elected from the houses on the system of proportional representation by means of a single transferable vote. These two committees are charged with examining the financial accounts of the government, the one prior to, the other after expenditure. They serve, as does Parliament itself, as a channel for grievances. In fact, Morris-Jones even considers them to be a suitable "substitute for a real Opposition." He asserts that "in an underdeveloped country - in which there is a wide measure of agreement not only on goals but also on methods - this kind of arrangement may be more suitable."[3]

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1. Hazard, J.N.: The Soviet System of Government. Op.cit. p.47.
2. Morris-Jones, W.H.: Parliament in India. Op.cit. p.310.
3. Ibid., pp. 307-308.

The official position is that advisory committees are inconsistent with true representative government since historically they were consulted before bills were introduced. This procedure would be untenable under a fully conceived parliamentary government, so it was felt that the whole system should be abolished. Some members, however, insist that the standing committees are invaluable for educating new members as well as being helpful to the minister concerned.[1] Moreover, the reports of the Committees can have a great educative value both inside the House and outside, by helping to build up a layer of informed public opinion which is needed to bridge the gap between the rulers and the ruled.

Constitutionally, therefore, supreme legislative power is entrusted in both India and the U.S.S.R. in a series of parliaments or soviets operating at both the central and state levels. However, whereas in India direct elections are restricted to the Lower House, whose members are elected on a population basis; the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. claims to be representative of the various nationalities as well who elect their deputies to the Council of Nationalities. Such an arrangement is expected to represent and secure the interests of the different nationalities in the highest decision-making body in the state.

Direct elections by secret ballot, universal adult suffrage, legislation by majority vote and a system of standing committees to discuss and advise on legislation give the legislative structures of India and the U.S.S.R. the statutory form of parliamentary democracies.

The Executive and its Functions in India and the U.S.S.R.: The basic principle of the Indian Constitution is that the executive power of the Union is co-extensive with its legislative competence. The executive power of the Union extends (a) to the matters with respect to which Parliament has power to make

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1. Palmer, N.D. and Tinker, I.: "Decision Making in the Indian Parliament", in Park, R.L. and Tinker, I. (eds.) Leadership and Political Institutions in India (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1959) p.123.

laws, and (b) to the exercise of such rights, authority and jurisdiction as are exercisable by the Government of India by virtue of any treaty or agreement.

Constitutionally, the will of the legislature, Union or State, is supreme over the executive, that is, the body which simply carries out the law when made, in the jurisdiction of the subject matter conceded to each division. Not only is this supremacy recognized, but by a certain arrangement of the machinery of government the will of the law making body is made to affect and control sympathetically the will of the executive in the administration of public affairs and the administrative knowledge of the executive is utilised to the full in the work of legislation.

One form of control of the Indian Parliament and the State legislatures over the executive is in the latter's appointment. The organisation and regulation of the executive is mostly in the hands of the Parliament and the state legislatures, which fix the number of Ministers and control the appointment and removal of all officers in the public service. The executive head of the Union, the President, is elected for a period of five years, by an electoral college composed of the elected members of both Houses of Parliament and the elected members of the State Assemblies.

The executive power and authority of the Union are vested in the President,[1] and are to be exercised by him, aided and advised by a Council of Ministers collectively responsible to the House of the People.[2] Responsible government, both in the Union and the states is a matter of statutory provision, and is another indication of the supremacy of the legislature and the executive. The ultimate responsibility of the executive to the electorate through the legislature is clearly established in relation to the Union government as well as to each State government. The legislature represents and is directly

1. The Constitution of India (1950). Article 53, Clause 1.
2. Ibid. Article 75.

responsible to the electorate. The Council of Ministers, composed of members of the legislature, hold their position by virtue of and contingently upon the retention of the confidence of the legislature and are, therefore, practically responsible to the legislature. Thus, theoretically, there is the preponderance of the legislature.

Besides the President, who is the de jure executive head, the Union executive consists of a Council of Ministers, headed by the Prime Minister, to aid and advise the President in the exercise of his functions. The Prime Minister is appointed by the President, and the other Ministers are appointed by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister. Besides Cabinet Ministers, there are Ministers of State (often described as of Cabinet rank) and deputy ministers. These together form the Council of Ministers which is collectively responsible to the Lok Sabha. A Minister who for any period of six consecutive months is not a member of either House of Parliament ceases to be a Minister at the expiration of that period.

To keep continuous touch between the Cabinet and the President the Constitution imposes a duty on the Prime Minister to keep the President informed regarding the administrative affairs of the Union and proposals for legislation.[1] If the President happens not to agree with the Council of Ministers on any matter, he may try to persuade the Ministers, but if he does not succeed he has to accept the advice of the Council of Ministers.

The successful practical working of a system of responsible Government requires the existence of a competent and independent Civil Service staffed by persons capable of giving to successive Ministers advice based on long administrative experience, but required to carry out the policy upon which the Government eventually decide. India inherited an elaborate and well-organized administrative structure headed by the Indian Civil Service, whose successor

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1. The Constitution of India (1950) Article 78.

after independence has been the Indian Administrative Service. Its efficiency depends largely on a continuous inflow of competent men of the right type, and conditions of service which ensure security of tenure and salary and regularity of promotion. As such, detailed provisions with regard to recruitment and conditions of service are not included in the Constitution, but left to be regulated by Acts of the appropriate legislatures. The Constitution, however, has provided for the establishment of independent Public Service Commissions (for the Union and for each State) to conduct examinations and recruit personnel to the administrative services.

Theoretically, an executive structure similar to the parliamentary executive system of India is found in the U.S.S.R., where, "the highest executive and administrative organ of the state power" is the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.[1] This is a large body, since Ministers are in charge not only of the government of the country but also of its entire economy.

Whereas in India the members of the Council of Ministers are appointed by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister, who, by convention, is the leader of the majority party in Parliament, thereby leaving little real choice in the hands of the President and through him of the legislature which elects him; in the U.S.S.R. the Council of Ministers is appointed by the Supreme Soviet at a joint sitting of the two Chambers[2], and unlike its Indian counterpart, its members do not necessarily have to be members of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. They are however, like the Indian executive, responsible and accountable to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., or, in the intervals between sessions of the Supreme Soviet, to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.

There are in the U.S.S.R., two types of Ministry -All-Union and Union-Republican. (In addition there are Republican Ministries which are directly

1. The Constitution of the U.S.S.R. Article 64.
2. Ibid. Article 56.

under the Republican governments). The former operate throughout the country as a whole and direct the most important branches of industry, such as the aircraft industry, civil aviation, foreign trade, merchant marine and railways, either directly or through bodies appointed by it.[1] The Union-Republican ministries, on the other hand, operate through corresponding ministries in the Union Republics and thereby come under the dual subordination of their republican as well as the All-Union Supreme Soviet; such are ministries of agriculture, building materials, culture, education and home trade.[2] Apart from the Ministries, there are several state committees directly subordinate to the Council of Ministers, such as the Committees for Labour and Wages, Planning Prices, Science and Engineering, Construction, Economic Relations with Foreign Countries and Vocational and Technical Education.[3]

With respect to those branches of the administration within its competence, that is, branches of the administration and economy which come within the jurisdiction of the U.S.S.R., the Council of Ministers has the right "to suspend the decisions and orders of the Council of Ministers of the Union Republics and to annul orders and instructions of the Ministers of the U.S.S.R. . . ."[4] The Ministries and other committees carry out the day to day policy.

The Judiciary and its Functions in India and the U.S.S.R.: Judicial power is an indispensable element in government and in the administration of laws, hence if a federal government is to work effectively, it must have its own judicature to exercise its judicial power. Further, a federation postulates an agreement and a distribution of the legislative, financial and executive powers between

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1. The Constitution of the U.S.S.R. Articles 75 and 77.
2. Ibid. Articles 76 and 78.
3. Ibid. Article 70.
4. Ibid. Article 69.

the federation and the federating units, each having to function within its demarcated and delimited spheres. As a result, disputes as regards the interpretation of the Constitution and the respective rights of the federation and the units are inevitable. Hence it is an essential feature of a federal polity that there should be a judicial body independent both of the federal legislature and executive and of the governments of the units, and whose duty it is to interpret the Constitution. Moreover, the Constitution guarantees certain rights of citizens and prescribes remedies against the interference with their exercise and enjoyment through the judiciary, which is constantly called upon to determine the validity of legislation and of executive action with reference to the provisions relating to the rights of the citizens. The judiciary thus acts at once as the interpreter and guardian of the Constitution, besides ensuring for the citizens a degree of independence from arbitrary treatment by the government.

The Indian Constitution provides for a strong, integrated judicial system. Unlike some federal judicial arrangements, those of India ensure a single system of courts from the subordinate and district courts through the High Courts in the states to the Supreme Court which consists of a Chief Justice and such other judges as authorised by Parliament. Their independence is guaranteed in several ways. The Chief Justice and other judges are appointed by the President of India, "after consultation with such of the Judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts in the States as the President may deem necessary," and the Chief Justice "shall always be consulted" in the case of appointments of other members of the highest court. Tenure is fixed (sixty-five for the Supreme Court, sixty for High Courts) and removal is only possible by resolution of both houses of parliament on grounds of proved misbehaviour or incapacity.[1] Qualifications, salaries (the actual sums of money, charged on the Consolidated Fund and therefore not subject to a legislature vote), allowances,

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1. The Constitution of India, Article 124, Clauses 1-5.

privileges and immunities are all set out in the Constitution and Schedules.[1]

The Supreme Court has three main kinds of jurisdiction: original, appellate, and advisory. Its original jurisdiction extends to any dispute (1) between the Government of India and one or more States; (2) between the Government of India and any State or States on one side, and one or more States on the other; and (3) between two or more States.[2] Its appellate jurisdiction extends to three types of cases, namely constitutional, civil and criminal. In these types of cases, under certain conditions, appeals may be made from any High Court to the Supreme Court.[3] The President may refer a question of public importance to the Court for its consideration, and the Court, if it so chooses, may submit an advisory opinion to the President.[4]

Contrary to the independence enjoyed by the judiciary in India, in the Soviet Union, the Marxist and Bolshevik conception of law as the political arm of the state militates against the development of courts as independent adjudicators. According to Marxist theory, law is not an 'independent' body of rules and the judiciary is not a group of men in any way independent of the ruling class. Laws, or the rules of society, are made by the ruling class and are the expression of it. Enforcement is in the interests of the ruling class. Justice, therefore, is class justice.[5] Law, as the political arm of the ruling class (the party) has a political role, and in cases of conflict with party policy is subordinate to it.[6] A modern statement of Soviet theory is: "Soviet law is a system of rules established by the state to promote the consolidation of the social order which helps society advance towards communism."[7] Soviet

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1. The Constitution of India. Article 125, Clauses 1 and 2.
2. Ibid. Article 131.
3. Ibid. Articles 132, 133 and 134.
4. Ibid. Article 143.
5. Lane, D.: Politics and Society in the U.S.S.R. (London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1970) p.158.
6. Vyshinski, A.: Sudoustroistvo V SSSR (Judicial System of the U.S.S.R.) (Moscow, 1935) p.32.
7. Fundamentals of Soviet Law (Moscow, n.d.) p.20.

legislation, being "an expression of the people's will", and designed "to promote the fulfillment of the grand programme of communist construction", the adjudicating role of the Soviet courts and law is very weak, whereas their rule enforcement role is strong. According to Article 113 of the Soviet Constitution, the "Supreme supervisory power to ensure the strict observance of the law by all Ministries and institutions subordinated to them, as well as by officials and citizens of the U.S.S.R. generally, is vested in the Procurator General of the U.S.S.R."

The jurisdiction of the courts and the police in the Soviet Union is very wide. Berman points out that in the U.S.S.R. law "was for those areas of Soviet life where the political factor was stabilised."[1] Where it was not, the KGB or secret police, particularly during the Stalin regime, arrested, tried, imprisoned and executed suspects. The KGB is responsible for preventing all major crimes against the state (espionage, ideological subversion and serious economic crimes) and for external intelligence.

The U.S.S.R., nevertheless, has an elaborate judicial structure. There is a Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R., and a Supreme Court in each Union Republic, besides the Courts of the Territories, Provinces, Autonomous Republics, Autonomous Provinces and Areas.[2] The Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. is the highest judicial organ and is charged with supervision of the judicial activities of all the judicial organs of the U.S.S.R. as well as of the judicial organs of the Union Republics.[3]

The Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. is elected by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. and those of the Union and Autonomous Republics by their respective Supreme Soviets.[4] At the base of the system are the People's Courts

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1. Berman, H.J.: Justice in the U.S.S.R. (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1963) p.66.
2. The Constitution of the U.S.S.R. Article 102.
3. Ibid. Article 104.
4. Ibid. Articles 103, 106 and 107.

having a professional judge and two lay assessors who are directly elected by universal suffrage for a two-year period.[1] Except for the People's Courts, which have first-instance jurisdiction only, all courts have both appellate jurisdiction and jurisdiction at first instance. The Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. is a final court of appeal and resolves conflict between lower judicial organs.

Structurally the Soviet judiciary does not differ significantly from the judicial pattern in any federation. What is unique, however, is that nowhere does the Soviet Constitution declare the independence of the judiciary nor does it stipulate any provisions to that effect. Unlike the Indian Supreme Court, which besides having appellate jurisdiction is also a guardian and interpreter of the Constitution in the case of centre-state conflicts; the Supreme Court of the Soviet Union appears not to have been entrusted with any such tasks since all Soviet laws are presumed to "help towards the advance of communism," thereby leaving no room for conflict.

A further difference between the role of law in the Soviet Union and India is the pre-trial investigation of the alleged crime in the former, which tends to diminish the importance of the court itself. This has led to the assertion that the court becomes "little more than a rubber stamp."[2] The lack of tradition of the presumption of innocence and the absence of a relatively autonomous legal profession tend to strengthen the 'enforcement' elements of the judicial structure at the expense of its function of adjudication.

The formal governmental structures of India and the U.S.S.R., as prescribed by the respective Constitutions, and described in the preceding pages, can be graphically depicted as follows:

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1. The Constitution of the U.S.S.R. Article 109.
2. Schapiro, L.: "Law and Legality in the U.S.S.R." in Problems of Communism Vol. 14, No.2 (Washington, D.C., U.S. Information Agency, March-April 1965) p.5.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA



GOVERNMENT OF THE U.S.S.R.



For the purposes of this chapter, a description of the governmental apparatus has been largely confined to the Central or Union government structures, the justification, apart from practical considerations of space, being two-fold: (1) the corresponding government structures at the State or Republic level are more or less duplicates of their counterparts at the centre; and (2) since this chapter deals chiefly with official language policies, the latter, being of national importance, are primarily the domain of the central government.

However, a description of the governmental structures only, though comprehensive, fails to reflect the dynamic character of a living, functioning political system. Constitutional provisions are concerned with how the formal structures should work, and the latter are related to a theoretical rather than to the actual state of the system. If only a description of the formal structures is taken as the basis for understanding the political pattern of a country, then the subsequent observation of their actual working may present certain inconsistencies. Moreover, the actual working of the system may bring to light several non-statutory structures which perform political functions. Criticisms of a particular political system are often the result of this divergence between the formal structures and function, as described in the Constitution, and their actual working.

Thus, critics of the Soviet system of government have variously characterised it as being totalitarian, highly centralised, dictatorial, or the rule of the party. While conceding that "it is possible that the party leaders govern in the interests of the proletarian and peasant masses", Raymond Aron insists that "the regime is not one in which the proletariat itself is in power. . ."[1]

Moreover, it has been pointed out that the system of Soviets,

1. Aron, R.: Democracy and Totalitarianism (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968) p.206.

designed to provide a democratic participation of the masses in the decision-making process, does not, in practice, allow for the public airing of fundamental discontent and for the articulation of alternative policy. Political opposition is not institutionalised in the U.S.S.R., and political conflict, endemic in any society, is ignored in the Soviet description of Soviet society. It is alleged that no fundamental criticisms of policy are offered at the Sessions of the Supreme Soviet, which, consequently, represent the end of a political process rather than the initiation of one.[1]

There is some truth in the statement of Western writers that Soviet government is highly centralised. The Soviet federal system gives to the Republics relatively few powers. No important aspects of policy are left to the Republics independently of the All-Union government. What makes the All-Union government really powerful vis-a-vis the Republics is its control of the budget; the necessity for common technical standards in social services throughout the whole society; the growth of a large complex economy which makes all its parts interdependent; and the highly centralised Communist Party.

This brings us to an oft-repeated accusation that the Soviets are a mere façade behind which the Communist Party of the Soviet Union wields real political power. It appears that the Supreme Soviet and the lesser legislative bodies in the Soviet Union do not in fact legislate. They approve and confirm decisions made by higher party authorities.[2] Compared to the strong theoretical position of the Soviets, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is mentioned only once in the Constitution, and then too, its structure and role are not described. Critics of the U.S.S.R., nevertheless, point out that the power of the party is far more pervasive and important than the official constitutional

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1. Lane, D.: Politics and Society in the U.S.S.R. Op.cit. p.164.
2. Hoges, J.L. (ed.) Man, State and Society in the Soviet Union (London, Pall Mall P. 1972) p.215.

view suggests. According to a Western writer on the Community Party, "behind the formal organs of government . . . stands the real source of both legislative and executive power, the party."[1]

To get a more complete picture of the Soviet political system it therefore seems necessary to examine the structure and functions of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), and to see what part it plays in performing these governmental functions as well as political functions of political recruitment, interest articulation and aggregation, and political communication.

In the case of India the general opinion seems to be that "the functions of rule-making, rule application and rule adjudication are in reality performed by those institutions of government specified in its Constitution as having responsibility for the performance of those functions."[2] However, in a parliamentary system, neat boundaries between the executive and the legislature are impracticable, and the balance between the two is a matter of political practice.

The question is often asked, how much part does the Indian Parliament really play in decision-making? In theory, the Parliament is the central institution, and subject to ultimate popular control, is the major agency for decision making. But in actual practice, owing to the working of the parliamentary system in India, the preponderance of the legislature means to a very large extent the preponderance of the cabinet. Major policy decisions appear to be made by the Prime Minister and his colleagues, and by them more likely as members of the dominant political party, than as members of Parliament. Such a situation would not be different from the one found in other parliamentary democracies if the Indian Parliament really played a dominant role in the

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1. Schapiro, L.: The Government and Politics of the Soviet Union. (London, Hutchinson, 2nd edition, 1965) p.118.
2. Weiner, M.: "The Politics of South Asia" in Almond, G.A. and Coleman, J.S. (eds.) The Politics of the Developing Areas, op.cit. p.238.

political life of the country or if a really effective opposition, capable of providing an alternative government, existed in India.

The real power wielded by the Prime Minister and his Cabinet in India has made the President only the de jure head of the executive, while the de facto executive is the Council of Ministers. Theoretically the Council of Ministers is to aid and advise the President, but, at the same time, the President has to act on the advice of the Council of Ministers. The President has thus been made a formal or Constitutional head of the executive while the real powers are vested in the Cabinet. The latter, enjoying as it does, a majority in the legislature, concentrates in itself the virtual control of both legislative and executive functions, and as the Ministers constituting the Cabinet are presumably agreed on fundamentals and act on the principle of collective responsibility, the most important questions of policy are mostly formulated by them.

If the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, belonging to the dominant political party of India since independence - the Congress, are the great decision-making agency in India, how does their rule differ from that of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union? The answer seems to lie in a series of related factors: the peculiarities in the party systems of the two countries; the ideology, structure and functions of the two ruling parties; and the agencies involved in the political functions of recruitment, interest articulation and aggregation and communication.

Party Systems in India and the U.S.S.R.

While both the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Congress Party of India play a dominant role in their respective countries, the CPSU, unlike the Congress, is also the only political party in the Soviet Union.[3]

Lenin's justification for the hegemony of one party over the working class was based on his interpretation of Marx's sociological theory of class. The working

3. Hazard, J.N.: The Government and Politics of India, Op.cit. p.151.

class, being unified socially and having a homogeneous political interest in the abolition of the capitalists, needed a single united party devoted to the promotion of the revolution. A politically fragmented working class organised in numerous socialist or nationalist parties could only weaken and might even thwart its revolutionary potential. Therefore, a single party, composed of workers from all trades and nationalities was essential.[1]

After the overthrow of the capitalists and in the post-revolution epoch, the official Soviet view upheld the continuation of a single party on the grounds of the social and political homogeneity of socialist society. As there is no fundamental conflict between social groups then, it follows, there is no need for competitive political elections and political parties resting on separate group interests. Since 1917, therefore, the CPSU has become the authoritative source of values and enjoys a monopoly of political organisation. It was given a special role in the 1936 Constitution which regards it as the "vanguard of the working people in their struggle to build communist society and is the leading core of all organisations of the working people, both government and non-government."[2]

No such constitutional recognition is enjoyed by the Congress Party of India. Here, in theory, a multi-party system prevails. However, since independence, the Congress party has been dominant both at the Centre and in most of the States, so that India has been characterised as a "one-party" or "dominant-party" state. The lop-sided dominance of the Congress, which provided the much needed political stability in the years following independence, has thus far prevented a healthy party system from emerging. Committed as it is to constitutional and democratic procedures, the Congress has made no effort to liquidate any political groups forcibly. However, the integrative nature of the Congress, coupled with the identification of the party with government[3]

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1. Lane, D.: Politics and Society in the U.S.S.R. Op.cit. p.12.
2. The Constitution of the U.S.S.R. Article 126.
3. Morris-Jones, W.H.: The Government and Politics of India. Op.cit. p.151.

in a country where universal suffrage was introduced at a time when a large part of the population was not politically conscious, have contributed to a large extent to the party's popularity and strength. The illiterate villager tends to see the competition not as between parties to become government, but between government and others, and so, through fear or favour, gives his vote to government.

Nevertheless, various parties have mushroomed in great profusion in the years since independence. Most of the major parties like the Praja Socialist Party and even the Communist Party of India originated within the Indian National Congress. The major parties at the national level are mostly ideologically oriented and include the Congress, the Praja Socialist Party, the Hindu-communal Jan Sangh and the Swatantra Party. Most of the other parties operate mainly at the state level and are mostly local or regional groupings with a small membership and little organisation. Most of these parties are based on particularistic - traditional loyalties which hold a great attraction for the voter. Politically the most profitable loyalties to exploit are those based on caste, regional and linguistic lines. Thus, besides a strong central ruling party, there exist competitive parties which, if incapable of providing active opposition, can at least make the work of the Congress more difficult in Parliament.

In actual fact, the weakness of the non-Congress political parties in India is not so much a total weakness, as one arising out of their own multiplicity.[1] As election figures show, the weakness of the other parties is not in terms of electoral votes, but in the number of seats won. The figures for the successive general elections since 1952 are as follows:[2]

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1. Weiner, M.: "The Politics of South Asia" in Almond, G.A. and Coleman, J.S.(ed.): The Politics of the Developing Areas, Op. cit. p.188.
2. Reports of the Election Commission for 1952-1967 figures and Hartmann, H.: Political Parties in India (Meerut, Meenakshi Prakashan, 1971) p.XIV. for the 1971 mid-term election figures.

YEAR	% OF SEATS WON BY CONGRESS	% OF VOTES POLLED BY CONGRESS
1952	75	45
1957	75.1	47.78
1962	73.2	44.07
1967	54.5	41.02
1971 (Congress R) (mid-term elections)	68	43.06

Though the percentage of seats won by the Congress show a gradual decline since 1952, the Congress nevertheless, enjoys a workable majority in the Lok Sabha. What has been of significance, however, in the field of linguistic policy making is the composition of the Congress parliamentary party. A few examples would illustrate this point.

The changes brought about in the composition of the Congress parliamentary party after the third general elections of 1962 affected the subsequent course of language politics in India. The 1962 elections revealed a loss of strength of the Hindi group within the party. While the representation from the non-Hindi States of Gujarat, West Bengal, Orissa, Madras and Maharashtra rose from 100 to 124,[1] the representation from the Hindi regions dropped from 186 to 150. In addition, the opposition inside the Hindi states registered larger gains, so that the Hindi region was, in a way, "threatened with the possibility of five years of uncertain . . . government."[1] In the Hindi areas there was a more direct identification between the Hindi and the Hindu platforms as Congress leadership faced an increasing challenge from the Hindu communalist and the linguistically parochial political parties. This identification of interests did not help to brighten the image of Hindi as the official language. Section 3 of the Official Language Act, 1963 permitting that English 'may' continue to be used falls into perspective against this political background which shows a weakened Hindi faction in Parliament, and the need for compromise.

1. Weiner, M.: "India's Third General Elections" in Asia Survey 2, No.3 (May 1962) p.5.

The fourth general elections of 1967 introduced several unexpected changes in the composition of the decision-making authority in India. As a result of this election, the over-whelming dominance of the Congress party was drastically curtailed both in the Lok Sabha and the State Assemblies. The Congress Party, of course, retained a workable majority in the Lok Sabha, but it lost control over more than half the States. In the Lok Sabha the representation from the Hindi areas continued the trend of decline which had started in 1962. Out of a total of 211 seats in the Hindi areas, the Congress won only 120 seats in 1967.[1] The rest of the seats were mostly captured by Hindu extremists belonging to the Jan Sangh and the Samyukta Socialist Party. So far as the non-Hindi areas were concerned, the landslide victory of the Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (DMK) in the Madras (now Tamilnad) State Assembly was spectacular. All along the DMK has favoured an anti-Hindi policy and supported the claims of English as the official language. Outside Madras, Kerala and West Bengal, however, the performance of the Congress Party in the non-Hindi areas in respect of State Assemblies was relatively better as compared to the Hindi areas.

After the 1967 elections it was evident that the non-Hindi forces in the Congress Parliamentary Party and outside it in the Lok Sabha and the State Assemblies, assumed a relatively greater importance than was before. In this context, when the language issue came up before Parliament, the Party's within composition was considerably changed. The newly founded Union government, depending on a slender majority, was more sensitive to the language demands of the opposition and of its constituents than before. This was the crucial time when the draft bill for the Official Languages (Amendment) Act came up before the Lok Sabha, incorporating the assurances given to the South in 1965. Without much opposition the Bill was adopted ensuring that English 'shall' be

1. Report on the Fourth General Elections in India. Vol.2, Part I. (New Delhi, Government of India, 1967).

continued as an associate official language.

It was mentioned earlier that a distinct characteristic of the Congress, and one which weakens the position of the other parties, is its integrative or aggregative nature. This can be explained with reference to the historic origins of the party. Likewise, the hegemony of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is a result of a complex of historical circumstances, its theoretical basis derived from Marxist political theory as developed by Lenin and Stalin. A comparison of the origins and organization of the Congress and the CPSU could reveal significant differences between the two; differences which could be found to play an important role in the respective party's interaction with the governmental structure.

The Origins and Organization of the Congress Party of India and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: Originating in 1885, the Indian National Congress began as a small, narrowly based interest group primarily concerned with the interests of a small Westernized middle class and aiming "to influence the Government within the existing constitution."[1] After the first World War, however, this small middle-class group became the basis for a mass movement reaching into the districts, provinces, towns and villages. It now represented the nation as a whole rather than any particular interest, and became a national movement, no longer content with influencing the Government "within the existing constitution."

Diverse views and opinions within the movement had, however, to be reconciled if the latter was to remain truly comprehensive and national. Consequently, the organization sought to develop a program which represented the aggregated interests within the movement. The aggregative character of the Congress has proved, till this day, to be a source of great strength, enabling

1. Moreland, W.H. and Chatterjee, A.C.: A Short History of India. (London, 1953) p.427.

the Congress to effectively retain control of the central government and of virtually all of the states.

Most nationalist movements are ideologically eclectic; Congress, no exception, has been able to make good use of this for maintaining its political supremacy. Because of the diversity of interests represented in the Congress, and the resultant broad common programme - a secular, democratic state, dedicated to economic development and national unity - it is difficult for anyone outside Congress to voice opinions which will not be echoed by some members of the Party.

Nevertheless, this same diversity of groups, interests and orientations has also been the source of much ambiguity and indefiniteness on the question of certain crucial issues. In its attempt to please all groups, the Party often fails to offer a single-minded direction for solving pressing problems. The language provisions of the Party could serve to illustrate this shortcoming.

The Congress Party itself, in the post-independence period, did not have a language policy which enjoyed the support of all its members. Hence, within the Party there was an opposition as strong as, or may be stronger than the opposition from other parties. While men like Nehru and G.B. Pant were in favour of a go-slow policy in regard to replacing English by Hindi; the champions of Hindi like Govind Das and P.D. Tandon insisted on the inviolability of the fifteen-year deadline laid by the Constitution for changing over to Hindi. The resulting factions within the Congress parliamentary party led Nehru to reiterate that decision on the official language issue must be arrived at by general consensus of opinion.[1]

Like the Congress in India, the CPSU has played the leading role in the process of political change in Russia. While seeking, overtly, to represent

1. National Herald (Lucknow, January 17 and 18, 1958).

the interests of all oppressed sections of society, the theoretical basis and dominant ideology of the Party have their roots in Marxism-Leninism.

Marx's theory of the party was developed by Lenin under Russian conditions in the early twentieth century. For the Russian working class to develop into a revolutionary body and achieve political power, Lenin maintained that the necessary leadership had to be provided by a revolutionary party with disciplined and dedicated leaders and members. In Lenin's view, resolute action against the proletariat's class enemies called for a party based on 'absolute centralism' and the 'strictest discipline'. To provide decisive political leadership the party had to be monolithic: that is, unified and centralised in its organisational structure, its members bound by strict discipline, its pronouncements being definitive, representing, in theory if not in practice, the unanimous voice of the party.[1]

Though control of day-to-day policy and strict discipline were important, the leaders of the Communist party found it necessary to provide a mechanism through which the rank-and-file members appear to have the opportunity to choose their own leaders and to influence policy. The need for firm central control and the desirability of democratic participation were reconciled in the doctrine of "democratic centralism". This doctrine, providing the guiding principle of the formalorganisational structure of the party, signifies:

i. election of all leading party bodies, from the lowest to the highest;

ii. periodical reports of party bodies to their party organisations and to hhigher bodies;

iii. strict party discipline and subordination of the minority to the majority;

iv. the decisions of higher bodies are obligatory for lower bodies.[2]

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1. See, Lenin, V.I.: "What is to be Done?" in Collected Works, Vol.5 (English edition, 1961) Op.cit. pp.451-467.

2. Statutes of the CPSU (Moscow, Pravda 1961) Paragraph 19. English translation in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press Vol.13, No.47 (The Ohio State University, the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, 1961) pp.3-8.

The CPSU embraces the Communist Parties of the Union republics all of which, except the RSFSR, have their own Republican Communist Party. At the bottom of the party hierarchy are the Basic or primary organisations of the party, formed at the place of work of members - factories, state or collective farms, schools, armed forces; or place of residence - in villages or on housing estates. These primary organisations annually elect a committee known as a 'bureau' (or executive) and a secretary who serve as its chief officers. The primary organisations elect delegates to area, town or district Conferences; which in turn elect delegates to Regional Conferences (except in the RSFSR). The Regional Conferences elect to the Republican Congresses which, together with the Regional Conferences of the RSFSR, elect to the All-Union Congress of the CPSU, the Party's supreme body. Each of the formal authoritative bodies elect a secretariat which administers departments concerned with specific questions. These bureaux are of crucial importance for they provide information and policy recommendations for the Politbureau and the Central Committee of the CPSU.

The process of election formally takes place at all levels of the organisation. The All-Union Congress of the CPSU elects the Central Committee, which in turn elects the Politbureau (known as the Party Presidium between October 1952 and April 1966), the Secretary General and his deputies, and the Party Control Commission. The party statutes vest considerable powers in the hands of the Central Committee which,

> "directs the activities of the party, the local bodies, selects and appoints leading officials, directs the work of central government bodies and public organisations of working people through the party groups in them, sets up various party organs, institutions and enterprises and directs their activities, appoints the editors of the central newspapers and journals operating under its control and distributes the funds of the party budget and controls its execution."[1]

1. Statutes of the CPSU. Op.cit. Paragraph 35.

The Secretary General, heading the administration, is in a strong position to influence and guide policy implementation. The Secretariat, which he controls, is responsible to the Central Committee for directing "current work, chiefly the selection of cadres and the verification of the fulfillment of party decisions."[1] This gives the Secretariat considerable de facto power over the Party.

Though the elective process at all levels of the Party's structure gives it the semblance of a democratic organization, a careful perusal of the Party Statutes reveals various checks and counterweights to balance its democratic elements. One measure of control is inherent in the very nature of the Party hierarchy. There are no direct elections of top Communist Party officials with the result that the rank-and-file can influence only the choice of their committee and of their delegate to the next higher Party conference. By their committee they are insulated even from the selection of the party secretary, who in practice controls the destiny of a primary Party organization. The indirect system of election in the Party, therefore, makes control of the higher bodies by lower ones difficult.

A second measure of control lies in the nominating and electing procedure within the Party. Nominations are prepared by the first secretary at the level of the primary Party organization and by the executive bureau at higher levels. These individuals, can, and usually do, assure their own election by placing only their own name on the ballot.[2]

Moreover, the influence of party members over decision making in the Party is held to be very small when compared to that of the Party elite and the Secretariat. While the Party statutes give every party member the

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1. Statutes of the CPSU. Op.cit. Paragraph 38.
2. Hazard, J.N.: The Soviet System of Government. Op.cit. p.18.

formal right to express his opinion within the group to which he belongs, they ensure that the expression of opinion will never result in the adoption of a policy, prior to its consideration by the highest officers of the Communist Party, by declaring that members shall not be permitted to form a voting bloc, or a "faction", within the organisation to which they belong.[1] This ensures that no minority will become unmanageable in the Party. It is largely the higher organs of the Party and the Secretariat who are able to determine to a large extent the content of policy, its timing and implementation, and are able to bring pressure to promote or expel personnel - they perform the aggregation function and thereby play a dominating role in forming party policy. Centralised finance, a diffuse membership banned from forming factions and with emphasis on strict discipline from the top downwards, strengthens the power of the full-time Secretariat. Instead of the party structure articulating the collective views of its total membership, it is the full-time party Secretariat which plays a decisive role both in aggregating and in articulating general policy goals.

The structure of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union can be summarised in the following chart:



1. Statutes of the CPSU. Op.cit. Paragraph 26.

STRUCTURE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION



SOURCE: Lane, D.: Politics and Society in the U.S.S.R. Op.cit. p.130.

In India the only political group approximating the CPSU as a truly all-India organisation is the Congress Party.[1] Its lowest organisational unit is the local committee in a village or town or city ward. Over these are the District Congress Committees in larger sub-divisions of the States, and the Pradesh (State) Congress Committees. The central party apparatus the All-India Congress Committee (AICC) is elected by the Provincial Congress Committees which elect one-eight of their number to form the All-India Congress Committee. The President of the Congress is elected by the AICC for two years.

The Working Committee, a smaller body which meets more frequently than the AICC, is the executive branch of the AICC and the most important agency in the Congress structure. Most of the top leaders of the Party are members of the Working Committee. It is composed of the President of the Congress and twenty members, ten of whom are nominated by the President from the members of the AICC and the other ten elected by the AICC. Very often it includes important members of the Cabinet. The basic policies of the Congress, and therefore of the country, are usually formulated in the Working Committee, and after approval or ratification by the AICC, become official Party policy. This has led the Working Committee to be regarded as "not only the executive of the Congress but. . . . a kind of shadow cabinet."[2] Because of the Congress dominance in Parliament, the major decisions appear to be taken not so much on the floor of the Lok Sabha as in the closed meetings of the Congress Parliamentary Party; the decisions invariably reflecting the more basic decisions made by the Prime Minister with the support of the Working Committee and the AICC.[3]

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1. Palmer, N.D.: The Indian Political System. Op.cit. p.189.
2. Ibid. P.191.
3. See, Moraes, F.: India Today (New York, Macmillan, Co., 1960) p.163.

This raises the question of the relationship between Congress as party and Congress as government. Many top leaders of the Party are also members of the Congress Parliamentary Party, and while a Prime Minister of Nehru's calibre and charismatic appeal was at the helm of affairs, he was India's supreme decision-maker, but whether as Party leader or as Prime Minister, it is difficult to say. In fact, between 1951 and 1955 he played the dual role of party President and Prime Minister, and the successive Congress Presidents after 1955 have been willing to concentrate on party-building leadership and leave government alone.

The organisation of the Congress Party of India may be summarised in the following chart:

STRUCTURE OF THE CONGRESS PARTY OF INDIA



Though Congress continues to dominate the Indian political scene, the 1967 general elections have shown the loss of Congress seats both in Parliament and in the State Assemblies; and 1969 brought a split within the ranks of the Congress Party itself. Whatever the technical issues involved in the split, it illustrates the functioning of a democratic mechanism where groups differing in political philosophies are free to form their own political parties and contest elections. Differences in ideology and opinions are tackled through the ballot and not by a process of physical elimination so common during the Stalin regime in the Soviet Union.

Membership procedures too of the Congress and the CPSU vary, the differences reflecting to a certain extent the nature of the respective parties. There are two categories of Congress membership - "active" and "primary". Membership is open to all, an active member, according to the Party Constitution, being obliged to "wear khadi, be a teetotaller, oppose untouchability, favour equality of opportunity, believe in intercommunal unity, perform 'constructive' activity, pay Rs.25 annually and enrol another twenty-five primary members for Congress." Anyone who accepts the objectives of the Congress and who pays Re.1 annually as membership fee may become a 'primary' member.

Membership of the CPSU is a much more tightly-controlled affair. Theoretically, membership is open to "any citizen of the Soviet Union who accepts the Programme and Rules of the Party, takes an active part in communist construction, works in one of the party organisations, carries out all party decisions and pays membership dues."[1] However, according to the rules in force, a person wishing to join the Party should be recommended for membership by three Party members of at least five years' standing. The new member is first admitted as 'candidate' for membership, the period of probation lasting for a year. An applicant can be admitted only if two-thirds of the Party primary

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1. Statutes of the CPSU. Op.cit. Paragraph 1.

to which he applies vote in his favour, and his acceptance as candidate or full member must then be confirmed by the Party committee of the higher echelon, that is, the appropriate town or district committee. These restriction are presumably intended to preserve the 'elite' character of the Party which must maintain high standards of ideological purity, devotion to the cause of communism, and qualities of leadership among its members.

Membership of the CPSU may be divided into three categories of Party personnel. At the top are the full-time,,paid professional functionnaries - often referred to as the apparatchiki. They include the secretaries and other Party executives from the national to the local level. A second category of Party members includes those individuals who occupy key positions in governmental, economic, cultural or professional organisations that are distinct from the Party structure. Party membership is an essential pre-condition for appointment to certain important posts in the State bureaucracy, the military forces, and scientific institutions, enumerated in a special list known as the nomenklatura.[1] It is through these individuals that the party maintains indirect control over all fields while maintaining in power a hierarchy of Soviets composed of both Party and non-Party members elected by universal suffrage.[2] Finally, at the base are the rank-and-file Party members who hold no high Party, state or public office, but are the link between the Party and the masses.

In a multiparty system minority groups can, and usually do, form their own political parties, and through the channel of parliamentary democracy seek to influence the decision-making process. In the single-party system of the Soviet Union the various nationalities have no institutional scope for representing their interests in the process of decision-making except through the channel of the CPSU. Within the Party, however, group organisation on the

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1. Koutaissoff, E.: The Soviet Union (London, Ernest Benn Ltd., 1971) p.32.

basis of ethnic origin has been opposed from the outset. Lenin insisted that the party was not to be a federation of ethnically organised groups, and that concept of "internationalism" of the working class was to replace that of the "nationalism" of the ethnic units. This is of significance when the interests of the various heterogeneous units have to be protected while devising policies for the Union. Moreover, within the Party as a whole, the various nationalities are unequally represented. According to recent estimates the percentage of Party members is highest among Georgians (6.5 percent of the population), Armenians (6.1 percent) and Russians (5.8 percent); and lowest among Moldavians (1.7 percent), Lithuanians (2.4 percent) and Tadshiks (2.9 percent)[1]. The actual numbers would perhaps show an even greater difference since the Russians numbered, in 1965, approximately 122 million, whereas the Moldavians, Lithuanians and Tadshiks numbered only 1.4 million, 2.5 million and 1.7 million respectively[2].

The CPSU, thus, is a carefully chosen, highly centralised organisation controlling various aspects of Soviet life, the higher organs within the CPSU, its Central Committee and the Secretariat being the main de facto decision-makers in the country. The all-pervading influence of the Party can be seen from the overlapping of personnel of the leading political bodies - the Politbureau, Council of Ministers, Supreme Soviet and its Presidium. Members of the Politbureau are also in the Council of Ministers, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Supreme Soviet. Only in the Politbureau (apart from the Central Committee of the CPSU) is there interlocking of party, ministerial and parliamentary elites. Moreover, party members hold a leading position in the various Soviets. In 1970, 72.3 percent of delegates to the Supreme Soviet and all of the members of the Council of Ministers and the Presidium were party members. It would seem, therefore, that the Party, by virtue of its organisation, plays a leading, if not necessarily an omnipotent

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1. Rigby, T.H.: Communist Party Membership in the U.S.S.R. 1917-1967 (Princeton, N.J. Princeton University Press, 1968) pp. 378, 386.

2. U.S.S.R. Administrative Sub-divisions (Pamphlet) (Moscow n.d.).

role.

These facts, in themselves are insufficient to justify an anti-Soviet criticism that Soviet rule is the rule of the Party, or the autocracy of the elite. A similar position of dominance, though now being increasingly challenged, has been enjoyed by the Congress Party in India. The Party has enjoyed a majority in Parliament for over two and a half decades, and top leaders are shared by the Party organisation and its parliamentary wing. Here too, it may be alleged, justifiably or not, that policies are largely the decisions of Party leaders. The point being made here is that formal descriptions of the organisation and membership of the party by themselves fail to give an adequate picture of the role of the Party in society and its relationship vis-a-vis the government. A different kind of information, over and above that of the formal structure is needed. This calls for an examination of the political process and a comparison of how the political functions of recruitment, interest articulation and aggregation and political communication are carried out in the two societies. The following section, therefore, will compare how and by what agencies the input functions of the political system of India and the U.S.S.R. are performed.

The Political Processes in India and the U.S.S.R.

Observation of the actual working of the Soviet political system has led many Western writers to assert that the Party's role is as important if not more than that of the government structure. An analysis of the political processes could serve to substantiate or refute this claim. Political process may be defined as the struggle of individuals and groups to make authoritative decisions for all of society or to influence those decisions. Such a study in the case of India could illustrate the extent of power wielded by the Congress and the challenge it faces from other groups within the framework of a parliamentary democracy. The performance of the four important functions in the political process, following Almond's and Coleman's categorisation, will be compared in

the case of the two countries.

Political Socialization and Recruitment: The function of political socialization is expected to produce the basic attitudes in society towards the political system, its various roles and public policy. It begins with the formation of political ideas in the family, continues through the education system and includes political conditioning in various societal institutions. All political systems according to Almond and Coleman, "tend to perpetuate their cultures and structures through time, , , mainly by means of the socializing influences of the primary and secondary structures. . . of the society."[1] Political socialization, therefore, is "the process of induction into the political culture", its end product being a set of attitudes toward the political system, its various roles and role incumbents. It also includes a knowledge of values affecting, and feelings toward the inputs of demands and claims into the system, and its authoritative outputs.[2] A study of the political culture and political socialization function can, therefore, give an understanding of one of the essential conditions which affect the way in which the various roles of the political system are performed, and the kinds of inputs and outputs which these roles produce.

If, through the political socialization function political systems tend to perpetuate their cultures, a crucial question in India is, which 'culture' does the political system wish to perpetuate? In India today, there are various political parties and interest groups which appear to operate in accordance with values contrary to the government's policies of economic development, national unity and modernization. Moreover, Western impact, industrial and commercial growth and the development of an education system have led to changes in the social structure and the emergence of new social

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1. Almond, G.A. and Coleman, J.S.: The Politics of the Developing Areas. Op.cit. p.27.
2. Ibid. p.28.

classes. A major problem arising in India is to induct the masses of the people into the acceptance of the values of the Westernised elites. Among the various attempts made by the government to socialise people into new roles may be included schools and adult literacy programmes, community development programmes, speeches by ministers and party leaders, congress-sponsored trade unions, student groups and constructive work organisations. Through these various channels attempts are made to change attitudes and behaviour. The success of these efforts depends on a multitude of factors, not the least important being the influence of the primary socialising institutions such as the family and the caste group.

Further, within the ranks of the Congress Party itself, there has been a gradual change in the quality of Congress leadership. Whereas the earliest political leadership came from within the urbanised, educated, westernized elements within the country; with the development of the Congress into a mass movement there emerged a second layer of politicians, less educated and less westernised, whose ties to the Hindu tradition are far stronger than that of the English-speaking national leadership. The values of this new class of leaders are generally closer to that of the villager, among their chief slogans of propaganda being the banning of cow-slaughter, support of Hindi as the national language (in Hindi areas) and rurally oriented notions of economic development.

With the introduction of universal suffrage and the spread of education and new ideas, the rural areas are increasingly becoming politically conscious, and this can predictably lead to thegrowth in importance of the vernacular-speaking, less Westernised politician. As the power of the rural elite grows, their influence over the political socialisation of the masses and the resultant values could run contrary to the attempts of the government in this direction.

This conflict in values appears to be largely absent in the Soviet

Union where the dominant ideology of Marxism-Leninism is a monopoly of the Communist Party and is expected to ensure conformity of the masses to the will of the Party elite. The Soviet value system stresses "communist morality", a communist attitude towards labour, and an intellectual understanding of the Marxist-Leninist theory of of social dynamics including a "scientific world outlook." The CPSU provides the main structure through which the Soviet political system perpetuates its political culture as derived from Marxism-Leninism. The New Programme of the CPSU (1961)[1], though modified by subsequent pronouncements, is an example of Soviet official ideology as presented by the Party.

An illustration of the kind of values the Party articulates regarding the role of the State and Party, and the changes taking places in the official ideology of Soviet Marxism since the October Revolution, is found in the Programme. In Marxist theory, the abolition of capitalism and the advent of communism leads to the 'withering away' of the State. This has undergone considerable modification in the official ideology in order to justify the ever-growing powers of the State. Thus, though certain aspects of administration have been taken over by 'voluntary institutions', the form of government apparatus advocated by Khruschev was that of "the state of the entire people, expressing the interests and will of the people as a whole."[2] It was only with the 'triumph and consolidation' of socialism in the world arena would the state become unnecessary.

The values articulated by the CPSU also serve to restrict the range of policy decisions: for example, the abolition of collective farms, a return to a 'free enterprise' economy, freedom of religious and anti-communist propaganda are all precluded on ideological grounds. It is open to question whether, and to what extent, official ideology is really taken cognisance of

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1. The Programme of the CPSU (1961). Reprinted in Soviet Booklet No.83. (Moscow, 1961).
2. Ibid. p.68.

by Soviet citizens; but the fact remains that whether they are socialised into the political process through the party machinery or through voluntary bodies, trade unions, the Young Communist League (Komsomol), and the education system, the political values imbibed by them, as well as ideas about the structure and role of the state conform to the official ideology as interpreted by the CPSU. Alfred G. Meyer has pointed out, Soviet citizens do talk the language of Pravda editorials[1]; and the conflict in values apparent in India is, if not absent, at least latent and officially discouraged. The comprehensiveness of the Soviet effort, therefore, to transform and control an entire people's political outlook and to reshape human personality, is, perhaps, unique.

The political recruitment function can be seen as a continuation of the general political socialisation function. It recruits members of the society out of particular subcultures-religious communities, statuses, classes, ethnic communities and the like - and inducts them into the specialised roles of the political system.

In India political recruitment, as well as role definition and the institutions by means of which individuals are socialised into new roles, have undergone changes since independence. Who is recruited, the criteria of recruitment, and the channels through which recruitment occurs, have also changed. The emergence of new social classes and the development of business classes have been largely responsible for this change. The rise of a vernacular-speaking, rurally-oriented political group has already been mentioned. The western-educated urbanised class no longer provides the sole group for political recruitment. Together with this, there is a shift in the geographic centres of political recruitment. While political party workers and leaders used to come almost exclusively from the areas which had felt the greatest

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1. Meyer, A.G.: "The Functions of Ideology in the Soviet Political System" in Soviet Studies, Vol.18, no.3 (1966) p.276.

British impact, increasingly politicians are being recruited from the 'hinterland'. The strength of Congress Party in Bombay, where it had its earliest support seems to be declining, its centre having now shifted to Uttar Pradesh.

The political recruitment function in India has been largely performed by the Congress, first as a national movement and later as the ruling party. However, the motives of those entering party politics have undergone a change. In the days of the national movement people joined for reasons of power, prestige, patriotism, and rarely for material gain. The post-independence period and the transformation of the Congress from a national movement into the ruling party appears to have attracted several political opportunists and careerists. Congress was soon joined by several businessmen, landlords and others for whom political participation was only one of their many activities and who now felt that party membership would be to their advantage.

Various other political parties, besides the Congress, also perform the political recruitment function, though, perhaps, not to the same extent. The younger generation of modern India increasingly frustrated by unemployment and a degree-oriented education system, is being increasingly attracted to extremist politics. The Communist party of India largely draws its recruits from the student groups and the unemployed. The high urban unemployment rates in Bengal and Kerala have been partially responsible for the growth of left-wing parties in the larger cities of those two States.

Then there are the various communal parties like the Hindu Jan Sangh, the DMK in Tamil Nad and the Shiv Sena in Maharashtra. Their recruits are largely from particular communities since these parties have been set up to promote the interests of particular linguistic, religious or communal groups.

Interest groups like trade unions, peasant associations, and the like, are rarely sources of political recruits themselves since they are largely controlled by political parties in India. Weiner points out that in India

"mass" organizations "are channels in which political recruits work, not channels from which they are recruited, except temporarily for demonstrations and civil-disobedience campaigns."[1] An important exception is the student group which continues to provide political recruits. Their education, dismal job prospects, rural ties, and idealism make students an important target for recruitment by political parties.

The style of political recruitment in India is based primarily on ascriptive criteria, rather than on performance criteria. Kinship, caste or religious affiliation, family connections and status qualities affect recruitment more often than educational levels, performance in examination or records of achievement. Similarly, particularistic criteria appear to be applied more explicitly and generally than universalistic criteria. Though, theoretically, social and political roles are open to everybody fulfilling certain general requirements, it always proves helpful to belong to the 'right' family, religious or informal group and have the 'right' friends and acquaintances.

Ascriptive and particularistic criteria also appear to dominate the style of political recruitment in the Soviet Union. This is especially so in the case of Soviet (Parliamentary) and trade union elective posts where specific work techniques are not very relevant, and personal and 'political' considerations may be taken more into account.[2] In these areas of recruitment, therefore, Party oversight and nomination are most important and the Party here performs the political recruitment also. The elite group of party 'apparatchiki' - government officials, industrial managers, professional leaders - is recruited largely by means of a system of nomination by higher Party committees to all important government, managerial and professional posts.

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1. Weiner, M.: "The Politics of South Asia" in Almond G.A. & Coleman, J.S. (eds.) The Politics of the Developing Areas. Op.cit. p.230.

2. Lane, D.: Politics and Society in the U.S.S.R. Op.cit. p.224.

For ministerial and specific industrial posts however, performance and universalistic criteria are most important and appointments are therefore, made on functional grounds because it is in the interests of both Party and ministry to select the most efficient person.

Recruitment and placement of personnal in the highest decision-making posts in the U.S.S.R., however, remains the prerogative of the CPSU. This appears to be the accepted function of the Party, because even officially, when Kosygin put his list of ministers to the Supreme Soviet for its considerations he reported that its composition had been approved by the Party's Central Committee.[1]

The political recruitment role of the CPSU is not unlike that of the ruling party in India, but in the case of the former party pull and membership are necessary for a much wider range of jobs than is the case in India. Party bureaus exercise control of recruitment to all the leading positions: heads of enterprises, editors, government deputies, industrial managers, and professional leaders.

In local government recruitments, the party plays a most important role. The party controls the Soviets through factions of its members which influence the appointment of the leading officials of the Soviets like the Chairman, the Vice-Chairman and the Secretary.[2] Local government elections too are nominated by the Party. While nominations can be made by any public organisation, no candidate can receive the approval of the electoral committees without party approval. Moreover, the Party also controls the other agencies which nominate candidates. Election of the party-approved candidates is ensured because though in theory elections are by universal suffrage and secret ballot, in actual practice for the voter there is no choice of candidates since there

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1. Report of Proceedings of First Session of Seventh Supreme Soviet, in Soviet News (London, Soviet Embassy, 5 August, 1966) p.64.
2. Churchward, L.: "Soviet Local Government Today" in Soviet Studies Vol.17, No.4 (April 1966) pp.443-444.

is only one name on the ballot paper. In practice, therefore, the central party organisations are able to decide "the social and political. . . composition of the Soviets."[1]

The functions of political socialisation and recruitment in the U.S.S.R. therefore are largely in the hands of the CPSU. In India while these functions are primarily performed by the Congress, there are various other social and political groups, not to mention the diverse political parties, competing with the Congress in the performance of these functions.

Interest Articulation: Through the interest articulation function, various groups communicate the political demands of the public - or at least some sections of the public - to those who formulate public policy. In the absence of such articulated interests in a society and of a government aware of and responsive to public demands, the government would be a democracy in name only. The function of interest articulation, therefore, is of crucial importance, every political system having some way of articulating interests, claims, demands for political action. Differences arise in the particular structures which perform the articulation function and on the style of their performance, and it is these differences which determine the character of the boundary between polity and society as well as the nature of a state. The presence of 'non-party' interest groups is considered a distinguishing characteristic of a democratic society, whereas in a totalitarian or autocratic society, the proportion of groups outside of party control is believed to be small.

In the Soviet Union, where there are restraints on the formal organisation of political groups, it does not entail the absence of what H.G. Skilling calls an 'informal group' or an 'interest grouping'.[2] In fact, Skilling has pointed out that in analysing Soviet society group interest or

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1. Churchward, L.: "Soviet Local Government Today", Op.cit. p.451.
2. Skilling, H.G.: "Interest Groups in Soviet Politics" (Duplicated Paper) p.21. Cited in Lane, D. Politics and Society in the U.S.S.R. Op.cit. p.233.

group conflict cannot be excluded.[1] There are to be found in the U.S.S.R. interest groups which "on the basis of one or more shared attitudes" make claims on other groups "through or upon any of the institutions of government."[2] A group becomes an interest group or a pressure group when it makes a claim on the political system or articulates an interest, without seeking legitimate power for itself.

To facilitate a comparison of the structures performing the interest articulation function under different political systems Almond and Coleman identify four main types of structures which may be involved. These are: (1) institutional interest groups, (2) non-associational interest groups, (3) anomic interest groups, and (4) associational interest groups.[3]

Institutional groups are organisations which perform other social or political functions but which, as corporate bodies or through groups within them, may articulate their own interests or represent the interests of groups in the society. Such institutional interest groups may be found within the legislature, the bureaucracy, the army or the political executives. Some examples of the institutional interest groups in the U.S.S.R. are the local soviets, the Komsomol, the trade Unions or the Academy of Sciences.

The discussions following the proposal of education reforms in 1958 illustrate the role of the Soviets and the regional groupings in the political process. The reforms proposed by the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers presented a choice in the study of the language of the Republic and Russian in the non-Russian Republics, thereby presenting a threat to the non-Russian speaking nationalities. Dissent was expressed in the Supreme Soviet and some republics like the Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaidshan and the

1. Skilling,H.G.: "Interest Groups and Communist Politics" in World Politics no.18 (Princeton,N.J., Center of International Studies, 1966) pp.441-2, 446-7.
2. Truman,B.D.: The Governmental Process (New York, A.A. Knopf,1951) pp.33, 37. Cited in Skilling,H.G.: "Interest Groups and Communist Politics" Op.cit.p.450.
3. Almond, G.A. and Coleman,J.S.: The Politics of the Developing Areas. Op.cit. p.33.

Baltic States vigorously championed their rights and the obligation they had to teach the indigenous language. The upshot of this pressurising was that the recommendations were left out of the all-union law, each republic being left free to decide the issue for itself. Though the will of the Centre prevailed in the end, this example illustrates the fact that "regional interests were articulated within the framework of the federal system."[1] Moreover, the fact that the local Party leaderships showed resistance, resulting in the purging of the Azerbaidzhan and Latvian Party organisations,[2] are stray incidents which nevertheless reveal that the Party sometimes articulates interests on a regional basis.

The Party apparatus, according to T.H. Rigby, acts as an information gathering and processing machine.[3] In fact Z. Brzezinski points out that the enlarged Central Committee plenums under Khrushchev "provided a consultative forum, where policies could be debated, views articulated and even some contradictory interests resolved."[4] At the lower levels of the party, Ralf Dahrendorf characterised the role of party groups as a medium of interest articulation as follows:

> ". . . the party organisation and its varied affiliations serve as a gigantic institute of opinion research which, through meetings and 'discussions', tries to explore the 'wishes and feelings of the people'."[5]

The articulation of interests in an institution closely intertwined with the bureaucratic apparatus can be seen from a study of the groups within the Academy of Sciences which articulated an interest during Khrushchev's

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1. Lane, D.: Politics and Society in the U.S.S.R. Op.cit. p.246.
2. Conquest, R.: Russia After Khrushchev (London, Pall Mall Press, 1965) p.208.
3. Rigby, T.H.: Communist Party Membership in the U.S.S.R., 1917-1967. Op.cit. p.40.
4. Brzezinski, Z.K.: Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics (New York, Praeger, 1967) p.119.
5. Dahrendorf, R.: Class and Class Conflict in an Industrial Society (London, (Routledge and Kegal Paul, 1959) pp.312-313.

proposed reorganisation of this body.[1] Here too, interests were articulated within the framework of party control. As Graham concludes:

> "The reforms of the Academy illustrate that the leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union rely on the expert opinion of specialists making decisions related to specific sectors of cultural and economic activity. . . Within the framework of strict political control by the party, the Soviet Union has devised a workable, but constantly evolving system for the inclusion of scientific advice in the process of making governmental decisions."[2]

Institutional interest groups like the military and the administrative services are relatively unimportant in India. Because of their long tradition of being non-political, so long as the central government is strong, these institutions are likely to remain the instruments of government. But if the centre becomes weak and ineffectual, the army and the administrative services, both potential political forces, may play a more active role. In the Soviet instance, according to a recent account by Michel Tatu,[3] the army, the police, the 'steel eaters' (supporters of heavy industry), the party apparatchiki and the economic administrators form the most important institutional interest groups involved in the struggle for power in order to protect or further their individual interests. Thus, Tatu points out, though "the party's grip over the population is as firm as ever, . . . the machinery of power now tends to split into separate entities (major state administrators, "steel-eaters", army, police, regional groupings)."[4]

The more influential interest groups, especially in the case of

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1. See, Graham, L.R.: "Reorganisation of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences" in Juviler, P.H. and Morton, H.W. (eds.) Soviet Policy-Making (London, Pall Mall Press, 1967) pp.135-62.
2. Ibid. pp.155-159.
3. Tatu, M.: Power in the Kremlin: From Khrushchev's Decline to Collective Leadership (London, Collins 1969).
4. Ibid. p.527.

India, are the various associational interest groups. They represent the more specialised structures of interest articulation - trade unions, organisations of businessmen or industrialists, ethnic associations, civil groups, and the like. They are organised for the explicit purpose of representing the interests of a particular group, and transmitting their demands to other political structures such as political parties, legislatures and bureaucracies. Two main kinds of interests are expressed and organised by the associational interest groups in India: functionally specific economic interests, such as those of landlords, peasants, trade unions and businessmen; and more diffuse interests organised around traditional loyalties to caste, tribe, language, culture, religion and community.

As Weiner points out, the development of these interest groups and the role which they play in the political process in India have been affected by the traditional attitudes towards authority, the legacy of the nationalist movement and the post-independence government policies aimed at creating national unity and planned economic development.[1] The emphasis placed upon subservience to authority in India and upon the notion of living according to duty or dharma and resignation to one's role has had the political consequence in the reluctance of workers and peasants to organise into groups to challenge authority. Even where they do organise, these groups hesitate to deal with authority directly, but instead turn to outsiders for leadership. Apart from the rural gentry which acted as intermediaries between workers and those in authority, the comprehensive nature of the national movement also provided leadership to the various workers and peasants associations, trade unions and student organisations which it integrated in order to put substantial pressure on the British. Later when the nationalist movement gave place to political

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1. Weiner, M.: "Interest Groups in Indian Politics" in Varma, B.N. (ed.) Contemporary India. (New York, Asia Publishing House, 1964) p.99.

parties, these interest groups became wings of political parties rather than autonomous bodies. Since independence, trade unions and peasant associations have continued as instruments of political parties. The Congress is the party most effectively entrenched among the peasantry.

Occupational or economic interest groups also are largely under the control of political parties, which use them more for political purposes than as instruments of class struggle. Demands of the occupational interest groups on the political system often exceed the available resources with the result that a government, committed to rapid economic development, comes to look upon such interest groups as possible threats to the rational use of resources and seeks to control and dominate them, since, being committed to democracy, it cannot eliminate them.

India has four national trade union federations each controlled by the Congress, the Communists, the Socialists and the Marxist-Left Parties. Peasant associations in India are also under the control of these parties.

Interests organized around traditional loyalties to caste, language, religion, community and the like are important forces in India. Of these, regional - linguistic - ethnic groups have been the most important. Various regional and linguistic groups have been highly articulate in their demands either for greater autonomy in a federal system or, in some instances, for complete independence. Such demands could threaten India's national unity. However, since these groups have their own leadership and are backed by strong local sentiment they are less under government's direct control than are the economic interest groups. These community interest groups include the Scheduled Castes Federation and the Harijan Sevak Sangh of the untouchables, the Jharkhand Party of tribals, the Sikh Akali Dal for the Sikh community, the Naga Peoples Convention of Naga tribesmen and the various language associations which have considerably influenced the formulation of the language policy in India. The latter will be considered in some detail here.

The relatively diffuse language communities of India emerged in the 19th century as organised political associations which mobilised language groups for social and political objectives. Through organised efforts these associations have attempted to influence the legislative structure through the Congress Party as long as the latter enjoyed overwhelming dominance, and later through other parties as well. Within the Hindi area, the Nagari Pracharini Sabha, established in Benares in 1893, worked for the literary and political promotion of Hindi in the Devanagari script and advocated a return to Sanskritisation for developing and enriching Hindi. Another Hindi association, established to popularise Hindi, was the Hindi Sahitya Sammelan, whose membership included such Congressmen as P.D. Tandon and Govind Das. Their pro-Hindi bias defeated the original purpose of the Sammelan which was to popularise Hindi on a national scale. It was largely through the pressure exerted by the Hindi group both within and outside the Constituent Assembly that the Hindi bloc in the Assembly won by a narrow margin of 78 as against 77 votes cast for Hindustani as the official language of the Indian Union.[1] Since then the Hindi associations have continued to influence the legislative process with regard to language bills.

Associational interest groups in the U.S.S.R. are difficult to identify but considered mostly to compose of the professional and technical groups; whereas occupational groups like the peasantry, the white-collar and manual workers, as well as various minority groups are only partially organised,[2] and have little opportunity for interest articulation, except informally and intermittently. Lane classifies these as "amorphous social groupings."

Technical and managerial interest groups in the U.S.S.R. are less well-organised than the institutional interest groups. Opinions differ regarding their

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1. Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol.1, No.2; Vol.8, No.3; Vol.9, Nos.32, 33 and 34 (New Delhi, Government of India, 1946-1950).

2. Lane, D.: Politics and Society in the U.S.S.R. Op.cit. p.235.

role and importance in Soviet politics, and in the absence of adequate information in the crucial areas of group interest articulation it is difficult to say how effective they are as an interest group. Probably the best study of managerial politics in contemporary Soviet Union is that of Jeremy Azrael[1] who concludes: "So far as one can judge on the basis of the available evidence, they (the managers) have never emerged as a formally organised 'faction', but they do seem occasionally to have developed a common political strategy for the purpose of influencing public policy in a predetermined direction."[2] If the influence of the managerial groups is open to doubt, that of the peasants and workers in the U.S.S.R. is vague and indirect, whatever influence they exert being through the channels of the local party organisations. The articulation of interests through the party has been described in Fainsod's study of Smolensk during the interwar period.[3] He shows that while local Secretaries played an important role in transmitting political instructions received from the centre, the process also worked the other way: "There were also times when the Obkom secretary had to be a middleman or broker, mediating between the rock-bottom needs of his constituents and the niggardly resources which the centre made available to meet them."[4] The fact that these demands had to be channelised through the party mechanism highlights the lack of independent associations on the lines found in India. In the case of the latter, it is in fact the potential power of these associations which makes them useful tools of political parties. In the U.S.S.R. it is the Party which articulates the interests of groups of potential influence like the Soviets, the industrial managers, Komsomol and trade-union leaders, cultural-educational groups and the police. As pointed out by Stewart, party secretaries are the

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1. Azrael, J.: Managerial Power and Soviet Politics (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1966).
2. Ibid. p.8.
3. Fainsod, M.: Smolensk Under Soviet Rule (London, Macmillan, 1958).
4. Ibid. p.76.

key men in the interest articulation process in the Soviet Union.[1] Even when regional and national interests are articulated, as during the education reform of 1958, it is through the local party organisations as can be seen from the purges which followed in Republican parties of Azerbaidzhan and Latvia for "causing bewilderment in the completely clear language question."

However, an article by Schwartz and Keech[2] attempts to illustrate that under some circumstances social groups can influence policy formulation in the Soviet Union. Using the Educational Reform Act of 1958 as an exemplary case, they show how and through what process groups can affect policy outcomes. The authors attribute the observable disparity between Khrushchev's September proposal and the December law regarding continuous secondary full-time education to the opposition to the reform from four different societal groups: the teachers and administrators identified with the ten-year school; higher educational and scientific personnel; parents; and factory managers. The authors concede that important conflict is on the top leadership level, but point out that in a dispute over policy alternatives which involves numerous problem-solving considerations, numerous groups have recognised expertise about what problems are in their own area. These groups, therefore, are mobilised once the dispute remains unresolved at the top. This expertise, in the opinion of Schwartz and Keech, provides a channel through which groups in the Soviet Union may influence policy when higher powers seek their judgement.

If institutional interest groups are placed at one end of the continuum of organised interest articulation, the anomic movement would seem to be at the other end. Anomic interest groups are more or less spontaneous breakthroughs into the political system from the society, such as riots and demonstrations. The

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1. Stewart, P.D.: Political Power in the Soviet Union (Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1968) p.200.

2. Schwartz, J.J., and Keech, W.R.: "Group Influence and the Policy Process in The Soviet Union" in The American Political Science Review, Vol.62, No.3 (September, 1968) pp.840-51.

lack of effective organisation of voluntary interest associations tends to increase the role of anomic interests.[1]

India has had its share of mob violence. Riots in Bombay over the maintenance of a multilingual State, caste riots in Madras and frequent violence in West Bengal on economic issues are instances of anomic group interests. However, completely anomic and spontaneous outbursts have been rare in India where acts of mass violence have usually involved organised groups. These demonstrations are generally aimed at expressing grievances and shaping specific government policies. An unorganised mob, by itself, does not overthrow government. But it is this combination of organisation and anomaly that makes the potential for violence so great in India.

Anomic interest groups in the U.S.S.R. are generally unincorporated or estranged groups who have a strong antipathy to the Soviet regime, with the result that the latter attempts to isolate and eliminate such groups. Estranged groups advocate policies which the political elites consider harmful to the integrity of the regime. The activity of such groups is, therefore, usually ignored in the Soviet press and they campaign outside recognised channels by demonstrating, and by appeals in the foreign press. To articulate their demands into political outputs these groups organise public demonstrations to demand 'rights' or concessions from the regime. The political elites respond to these demands either by making concessions or by suppression.

An example of such behaviour can be found in the Ukrain which has actively defended its language and culture against any attempts at Russification. Students were especially active, after Khrushchev's ouster, in voicing opposition to Russification. An informal meeting at Kiev University formed an organisation, The Society to Aid the Dissemination of Ukrainian Culture. According to reports from a writer on the Ukrain, their meeting on April 27,

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1. Winer, M.: "The Politics of South Asia" Op.cit. p.215.

1965 was dispersed by the KGB and many students were arrested and terrorized.[1] The point to note here is that certain groups, although Constitutionally guaranteed the right of freedom of assembly, mass meetings and demonstrations[2], are forcibly restrained if their values are perceived to be hostile to those of the elites.

The persistence of anomic movements in a country indicates that more discontent exists than has thus far been articulated, or allowed to be articulated through organised groups. Anomaly thus represents a power potential which could be used by organised groups as in India; or a threat to the stability of the regime, and therefore to be suppressed as in the U.S.S.R.

In the U.S.S.R. communication between and organisation of interest groups are subject to greater constraints than in India where the political ideology sustains free bargaining by autonomous groups in politics. Therefore, the group political process in Soviet society is more muted, latent, informal and less organised than in India. Interest articulation is conducted within the bureaucratic structure or through the all-pervading CPSU. In the final analysis, all organisations are creations of the Party, and having their core in the Party's primary organisation, function as transmission belts for the Party. The national movement heritage coupled with a relatively undeveloped form of associational life based on various forms of vocational, religious and culture specialisation explain to a large extent the control of various interest groups by the political parties in India. Though organised interest groups may serve as an impediment to the government's policy of economic development and national unity, the commitment to democracy in India cannot eliminate organised voluntary interest groups. Moreover the strength of the regional-linguistic-ethnic groups as found in India appears to be considerably latent if not weakened in the U.S.S.R. where sanctions against 'disloyal' oppositions may be severe -

1. Kolasky, J.: Education in Soviet Morning (Ontario, Peter Martin Associates Ltd., 1968) p.196.
2. Constitution of the U.S.S.R. Article 125.

involving loss of office, deportation, imprisonment, or even (during the Stalin era) death. Further, any attempt at organization or aggregation of interests or issues into alternative policy is likely to result in sanctions[1] since it is perceived as a challenge to the authority of the Communist Party.

It is, therefore, relevant to examine how and by what agencies, the various interests which are articulated, are aggregated by the political systems of India and the U.S.S.R.

Interest Aggregation: The interests articulated by the interest groups of the polity have to be aggregated in the political system. Aggregation may be accomplished by means of the formulation of general policies in which various interests are combined, accomodated, or otherwise taken care of, or by means of the recruitment of political personnel, more or less committed to a particular pattern of policy.[2] Thus, the functions of articulation, aggregation, rule-making and recruitment tend to overlap, the degree of overlapping varying from one political system to another.

Although, as pointed out by Almond and Coleman, the aggregation function may be performed within all of the subsystems of the political system - the legislative bodies, executives, bureaucracies, party systems and interest groups; the party system is "the distinctively modern structure of political aggregation. . . (which) in the modern, developed, democratic political system "regulates" or gives order to the performance of the aggregate function by the other structures."[3]

In the single-party system of the U.S.S.R. where interests and demands are articulated and transmitted largely through the Party structure and there there is a penetration of the social structure by the Party, interest aggregation is performed primarily within the Party structure. Though overt

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1. Lane, D.: Politics and Society in the U.S.S.R. Op.cit. p.236.
2. Almond, G.A. and Coleman, J.S.: The Politics of the Developing Areas. Op.cit. pp.38-39.
3. Ibid. p.40.

interest articulation in the U.S.S.R. may be permissible only at the lowest level of individual complaints against the lower-echelon authorities, it would be incorrect to say that the CPSU precludes interest articulation and aggregation outside its domain. As was seen in the previous pages interest groups do exist which aggregate interests into alternative policies or advocate political personnel changes. What is perhaps nearer the truth is that in the U.S.S.R. "the output of authoritative policy is not paralled by, but only somewhat mitigated by, the input of demands and alternative policies."[1] While crediting the CPSU with performing most of the interest articulation and aggregation function, it is at the same time necessary to be wary of the input functions performed by other groups in order to avoid what Almond and Coleman rightly call, any "misleading polarisations".

Within the one-party system of the U.S.S.R., however, the body which plays an important role in aggregation is the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU. It is, however, difficult to get a clear and precise picture of the process of decision-making within the Central Committee and its Secretariat, both by virtue of the general secrecy surrounding the political process and by the emphasis placed on party unity. Nevertheless, it is generally believed by Western writers that the Secretariat is dominant in the party. As Schapiro observed in 1952, a feature of the party was "the predominance within the party of the apparatus of officials and secretaries who formed a small minority of around three percent. By virtue of the authority which they had acquired in the course of years, . . . these officials could dominate elections, discussions and decisions inside all party organisations throughout the country."[2]

The Central Committee of the CPSU is found to provide a forum for

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1. Almond, G.A. and Coleman, J.S.: The Politics of the Developing Areas. Op. cit. p.41.
2. Schapiro, L.: The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (London, Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1960) p.548.

the voicing of various interests, which is essential for effective decision-making. However, its size (in 1966 there were 195 full members and 165 candidates) and the shortness of its duration as a deliberating body (it usually has about 2 or 3 sessions a year, each lasting not more than a week) make it a less important instrument in the aggregation process.

It is here that the Politbureau of the CPSU comes into the picture. A smaller body than the Secretariat, it is a crucial organ in the Party apparatus for the aggregation of policy decisions and the final resolution of factional differences. Conflicts there may be resolved either by the exclusion of the opposing group (as in the case of the 'anti-party' group of Malenkov, Kaganovich and Molotov, whose opposition to Khrushchev's policies in 1957, led to the election of a new Party Presidium and Secretariat), or by compromise. The Party leadership, in turn, has to contrive policies which do not alienate the social and political interests of the regime. Khrushchev's "violation of collective leadership" it is alleged, was the cause of his downfall. As a Soviet commentator put it:

> "There had been many discussions and disagreements with Khrushchev in the Presidium, which finally felt that his methods had exceeded all possible limits and had become an obstacle."[1]

If, in the absence of an official ideology which provides room for group discussions and the lack of open institutional channels to resolve fundamental disagreements, interest aggregation in the U.S.S.R. seems to be a challenging task; the integrative nature of the ruling party in India makes an effective aggregation of all interests extremely difficult, if not impossible.

The one dominant party system arose in India as a result of signi-

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1. Report of British Communist Party Visit to Moscow, cited by Churchward, L.G. Contemporary Soviety Government (London, Routledge and Kegal Paul, 1968). p.287.

ficant interest groups, associational and non-associational, joining the nationalist movement around a common program of national independence. In the period following independence, the nationalist party continued as the greatly dominant party, opposed in elections by relatively small left-wing or traditionalist and particularist movements. However, the scope and area of influence of a ruling party is wider than that of the nationalist movement, policy decisions on a complex set of issues being constantly called for. The task of aggregating several highly dissimilar interests (traditionalist, secularist, socialist conservative, and so forth) included in the party presents a grave problem to the Congress. To maintain the cohesion of the party and avoid divisive issues, decisions are postponed, and policy proposals take the form of "diffuse programs selected more for their unifying symbolism than for their effective coping with demands emanating from the society or the various political elites."[1] The lack of a definite language policy of the Congress and the 'on-the-fence' character of the various official language provisions are a case in point.

Nonetheless, since independence the Congress Party leadership has sought to aggregate the diverse interests as best it can. This is because, though formally the party system of India is a free one, the possibility of a coherent loyal opposition is lacking. Most of the non-Congress parties in India are ideological, particularistic, or communal parties, which, unlike the Congress, are hardly subjected to the pressures of various interests. The ideological emphasis of the national opposition parties plus their distance from power, makes them unlikely pressure group targets. The position of power enjoyed by the Congress since independence means that those who wish to influence government policy have to turn to the Congress. Within the Congress Party interest aggregation takes place in the Congress Working Committee and the Cabinet. For example, when the government was faced with the demands of various linguistic

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1. Almond, G.A. and Coleman, J.S.: The Politics of the Developing Areas. Op.cit. p.41.

groups for linguistic provinces, the decision as to how India's States should be reorganised was left to the Congress Working Committee. Moreover, the "six-point formula" of the Congress on the language issue was the work of a Congress Committee meeting in June 1965; and the proposal to amend the Official Language Act so as to retain the status of English as official language was made in a resolution of the Working Committee. Within the Congress Party, therefore, the Working Committee plays an important role in interest aggregation.

The growth of functionally specific associational interest groups and the development of a loyal, coherent opposition are essential for effective interest aggregation through the party system. In India the boundaries between party, legislature and bureaucracy are poorly maintained, and there is a fusion of the aggregation, rule-making and rule-application functions. Unless the political system is modernised to allow for greater voluntary associational interests, and an effective, loyal opposition there is the danger of the dominant non-authoritarian party turning into an authoritarian party completely penetrating the social structure and articulating and aggregating interests through the party apparatus.

Political Communications: The fourth and final function listed in the output functions of the political structure by Almond and Coleman is that of political communication. In their view, "in the modern political system differentiated media of communication have arisen which have developed a vocational ethics of "neutral" or objective communication. This ethics requires that the dissemination of information ought to be separated from the other political functions such as interest articulation, aggregation and recruitment."[1] An analysis of the performance of the communication function, therefore, is essential in characterising a political system. An autonomous system of communication not

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1. Almond, G.A. and Coleman, J.S.: The Politics of the Developing Areas, Op.cit. pp. 45-46.

only makes explicit the latent interests in the society, but also controls by publicity the covert communications in the bureaucracy, the interest groups and political parties. Autonomy in the media of communication makes possible "a free flow of information from the society to the polity, and, in the polity from political structure to political structure."[1]

It might be argued that the crucial control in the Soviet political system, apart from coercion, is the monopoly of the media of communication by the State. The Soviet Constitution guarantees the right to free speech and the right to a free press[2], but with a qualification. Article 125 declares that the right of free speech is granted "in accordance with the interests of the toilers and for the purpose of strengthening the socialist structure" of the U.S.S.R. The Criminal Code states that it is for the courts to determine whether speech is contrary to the interests of the toilers and whether it is exercised with the intention of harming the Soviet state.

Limitation upon the Constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press is even more clearly defined by Soviet law and regulation. Because of the Constitutional ban on the employment of labour by a private individual for any commercial purpose (Articles 4 and 9 prohibit the exploitation of human labour), no private individual may own a printing establishment in which labour is employed. In consequence, operation of a mass-circulation daily paper or even of a less frequent periodical is impossible, unless it were to be by a cooperative association of printers. But even this is forbidden, because the licensing instructions under which private enterprise without employed labour may be conducted, within limits, excludes specifically the operation of any reproductive apparatus.[3] The citizen, therefore, may not use the printed word to spread

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1. Almond, G.A. and Coleman, J.S.: The Politics of the Developing Areas. Op.cit. pp. 45-46.
2. The Constitution of the U.S.S.R. Article 125.
3. Hazard, J.N.: The Soviet System of Government. Op.cit. p.57.

his ideas, except through channels provided by the State. These are the state publishing houses which have been censored under a law requiring submission to a central censorship office prior to publication of all matter prepared for publication.

General political pronouncements, 'propaganda' and political education are the most important elements of party activity. Propaganda, aiming at the dissemination of the ideological or political aspects of any important political decision may be through publicly-attended lectures, or the mass media. The major Party newspaper, Pravda had, in 1969, a circulation of eight and a half million copies a day.[1] Among other widely read Party newspapers are the agricultural publication Selskaya Zhizn, the women's magazine Rabotnitsa, the bi-monthly Kommunist, and the Partiinaya Zhizh, concerned with matters relating to Party activities. Apart from the publications run directly by the Party as its 'organs', all forms of mass-communication media are under the indirect control of the Party owing to the vigilance of Party members who sit on the editorial boards of all publishing houses, printing organisations, broadcasting and television stations.[2]

State control of the media of communication in the U.S.S.R. serves to direct the inflow of information to a single political structure, and limit the outflow of communication to the purposes of the Communist elite. Thus, only the Party elite has the necessary information on the basis of which it can calculate, devise strategies, control and eliminate anomic potentialities. The information available to other political structures within the system, which would secure them independence of function, is effectively controlled by the Party. Recognising the important principle that effective political action must be based on rational calculation, which in turn requires information, the CPSU concentrates

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1. Koutaissoff, E.: The Soviet Union. Op.cit. p.45.
2. Ibid. p.45.

all mass media of communication in its hands, thereby not only crippling the effective power of other political structures but also ensuring against any propaganda contrary to its interests or ideology.

Political communication in India is performed independent of state control, the various mass media of communication being relatively more objective and neutral than in the U.S.S.R. However, problems of a different nature arise in the transitional political system of India.

Traditional basis of communication in India, like the network of trade and commerce, family and caste relationships, and religious festivals and pilgrimages, all based largely on personal relationships, have not been destroyed by the introduction of a mass communication system. Rather, a new network has been introduced which greatly expands the physical area of communication. The popularity and extent of use of modern media of mass communication, however, are commensurate with the technological and economic development of a country. Consequently, in a developing country like India where the basic problems of food and shelter remain largely unsolved, the radio or television is indeed a luxury. Moreover, unlike the audio-visual media, the circulation of newspapers and magazines presupposes a certain level of literacy as yet non-existent in India. India, therefore, is undergoing an intermediate stage with some people communicating exclusively through a limited network and others largely through the mass communication network. Because of the heterogeneous character of mass communication in India, the government has difficulty in getting information from the rural areas and assessing the social costs of its policies. Then too, there is a cultural, linguistic and ideological gap between the communication content of the literate modern sector of the Indian city and the illiterate traditional sectors. This gap widens further between the urban and rural sectors.

A second problem arises in India as a result of the development of an intermediary network based on the provincial languages. The break between the

English-speaking elites and the vernacular-speaking elites has also resulted in a dichotomy in the communication systems. Almost every major language has its own vernacular press, and the Tamils, Bengalis, Maharashtrians, and Hindi-speaking peoples have their own language films.

Development and increasing use of the regional languages in itself could be a desirable policy, and was pursued in the U.S.S.R. also where the Tenth Congress of the CPSU in 1921 put forward the task of assisting the non-Russian peoples to develop press, schools, theatres and cultural institutions using their native language.[1] The problem arises when the growth of vernacular networks of communication lead to a growth in regional loyalties at the expense of national ones. The effective control of the content of communication both in the Russian and non-Russian languages by the State in the U.S.S.R. greatly reduces the risk of provincial newspapers fostering regional loyalties, and regional networks are related to the national communication network.

Where discontinuity in the communication network exists as in India, there are two channels open for the national politician to reach the electorate. One is through the mass rally - speeches, public meetings and the like, whenever and wherever possible. The other is through the party organization. Here the nation-wide organisation of the Congress Party plays an important role by covering an extensive area as found in India, as intensively as possible. The party, organised around village units, districts, provinces and on a national level, provides a network not only for vote-getting, but also for a nation-wide communication. The local Congress worker plays the dual role of communicating new values of development and national unity from the national to the local level, and also of communicating news from the local areas to the district and provincial levels. The various non-Congress parties of India could perform the same function through their party organizations, but because of their limited

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1. Resolutions of the C.P.S.U. Pt. I. (Moscow, Seventh edition, 1954) p.559.

area of functioning, the Congress and the national leadership of India probably have a better "feel" of the public's pulse than any other party.

Nevertheless, various other interest groups and political parties tend to have control over the specialised media of communication, like the newspapers, which usually tend to be the organs of these groups. The government employs the mass media and operates its own media as well. The most important among these is the All India Radio which is the monopoly broadcasting organisation operated by the Government of India. As a result the flow of output of messages from the authoritative government structures tends to be far larger than the input of messages from the society. Much important information regarding the needs of the base and periphery of the society never gets explicated, and cannot therefore be fully taken account of by other elements in the political system.

A neutral, unrestricted and two-way flow of communication is essential for the operation and cohesion of a political system.

Conclusion: The official language policy of India, as laid down by the Official Languages (Amendment) Act of 1967, is essentially in the nature of a compromise between the conflicting demands generated in the country. Some critics of the Indian government, both within and outside the country, however, fail to appreciate the importance of pluralistic solutions in the Indian context, when they insist on a single policy solution enforced by the authority of the State. Such arguments seem to assume that language planning implies essentially a technical assignment, and its success could be assured if only the political authority of the State were to exert its maximum efforts to achieve the desired objectives. But, whereas an authoritarian model of decision-making could, perhaps, yield monistic solutions, to advocate the same for India is to overlook completely its particular political culture and decision-making structures.

A comparison of the political structures and functions of India and the U.S.S.R. in the preceding pages has shown significant differences in the

structural patterns and in the performance of political functions in the two countries. These differences reflect the particular nature of their respective political patterns and their influence over policy-making and implementation.

Outside the Soviet Union, the Soviet political system has been variously characterised as "totalitarian", "authoritarian", "dictatorial" and as the "rule" of a monistic party structure or the state bureaucracy. An official ideology; a single mass party; a system of terroristic police control; the monopoly of control of all effective means of mass communication in the hands of the party; a central control and direction of the entire economy; and a near-monopoly of control in the hands of the party of all means of effective armed combat, have been the main justifications for the oft-repeated criticism of the U.S.S.R. as being "totalitarian."[1]

Nevertheless, inspite of the all-pervasive influence of the Communist Party, the industrialisation of Soviet society has created a different kind of socio-economic structure in which new groups have arisen. Of particular interest here are the industrial ministries which, on account of their specialist technical expertise hold a strong bargaining position against purely 'political' interests like those of the party secretaries. The ministries possess their own chain of command and in the articulation of their interests and in the carrying out of their plans they are probably highly independent of party control. Whereas the party tends to be concerned with who a person is and with his (political) qualities; the ministries place greater stress on what a person does, or, on his performance capabilities. This provides for a fundamental role conflict in party-state relations.

Voluntary associations articulating their particular interests, like the language associations in India, are relatively weak and largely under Party control in the Soviet Union. The professional strata, cherishing their

1. Friedrich, C.J. and Brzezinski, Z.K.: Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy. (New York, Praeger, 1956) pp.9-10.

professional code and interests, though forming an important interest group, are found to be less autonomous of party control than the ministries and therefore less able to assert their own interests. The weakest group ties are found among the regional groups and nationalities which neither have a party organisation of their own, the Communist party allowing for no ethnic representation within its ranks; nor do they have at their disposal the kind of institutional machinery to make their claims known like that provided by the representative system of government in India. In the case of the latter, the effective pressure exerted by both the Hindi and the non-Hindi groups on the Indian parliament, both through the Congress and the opposition parties, in deciding the Official Language Policy of the country have already been noted.

A fundamental difference between the Soviet Union and India lies in the structural characteristics of their respective political systems. As a state socialist political system, the U.S.S.R. differs from India with its system of parliamentary democracy and representative government. The Soviet state has a larger share of public ownership and a wider range of social control, there are no formal checks and balances between political institutions, and social group interests are restricted in the ways they may be articulated.

In India, the supremacy of the legislature as the rule-making body is recognised. If, in actual practice, policy-making functions are performed largely within the Congress high-command, it is due to the dominant role played by the party and the nature of its leadership. The power and role of the Indian parliament tends to fluctuate with the strength of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, whereas, at the height of his power Nehru was all-in-all in Parliament, during her early days as Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi found herself faced with a powerful institution in the same parliament. Moreover, the dominant role of the Congress depends on its Parliamentary strength. The Congress is not superior to the government as a whole, and an unconditional adoption of its policies is not assumed. Parliamentary institutions in India serve, at least, as a deterrent

to the unconditional wielding of power by the ruling party, if not as the actual rule-making institutions.

On the other hand, the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. has little real power, its duty being to carry out party policy. At each level party activists check on the governmental apparatus to ensure proper implementation of policy. The Government thus serves as "the legitimising Constitutional structure through which Party directives are enacted."[1] As a rule most important members of the Party hold the important government posts, there by assuring the Party control of the governmental hierarchy.

A further distinction lies in the operation of the federal form of government in India and the U.S.S.R. In theory both are federal, with the power of the Centre and the units demarcated by their respective Constitutions. In actual practice, the highly centralised state and party structure in the U.S.S.R. provides for the downward filtration of the policies devised by the Central Committee of the CPSU to the local party organisations. It was mentioned earlier that India is classified by some political scientists as being "quasi-federal". Because of their belief that the unitary elements of the Constitution largely overwhelmed the federal provisions, some observers conclude that the most important decisions for the nation are formulated exclusively by the Union Government. This view tends to underestimate the growing importance of the politics conducted at the state level and the increasingly important role that the state governments have been assuming in national politics. The Chief Ministers' Conference, a common forum of all the chief ministers, deserves a special mention as providing an organised institutional representation to regional consciousness.[2] Moreover, within the spheres allocated to it,

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1. Rubinstein, A.Z.: Communist Political Systems (New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966) p.106.
2. Das Gupta, J.: Language Conflict and National Development (Bombay, Oxford University Press, 1970) p.283.

the State governments are free to make and implement policies without central control. For instance, the implementation of the three-language policy in education by the State governments shows considerable discrepancies, education, Constitutionally being a state subject. Where there is a uniformity of policy it is more a result of Congress governments being in power in the majority of states, than a question of Central coercion. Finally, the emphasis, in India, on arriving at a consensus on essential issues, prevents a policy, though enjoying a majority support, from being adopted, if one or more groups are intensely against it. Thus, the nature of the federal system in India, as well as its political culture prevent majority decisions from being imposed on minority groups.

The Indian political system generates a considerable controversy and various groups are found to exert influence over both the executive and legislative organs of the state. Moreover, the competitive party system of India provides considerable check over the otherwise dominant Congress party in Parliament. While the 1962 general elections diminished the influence of the Hindi groups on the Union government, the 1967 general elections altered the configuration of power which existed in the States and at the Union level. Not only did the strength of the Hindi leaders inside the Congress party deplete further, but the Congress majority in the Lok Sabha and in some of the Hindi States also suffered a setback. The Congress, relying on a slender majority was forced to adopt a policy of compromise, and had to make adjustments with stable non-Congress governments, especially the Communist government in Kerala and the DMK in Tamilnad.

No such sudden change in the configuration of powers, especially at the Union level, is possible in the U.S.S.R., for two main reasons. Firstly, elections to the party hierarchy are indirect, the public as such being unable to control directly the various party secretaries. A system of multiple and indirect elections, coupled with selective membership and carefully reviewed

promotions, insulates Party leaders against "any sudden disenfranchising grass-roots revolts."[1] Changes in leadership are wrought at the top, and the effects filter downward in the Party pyramid. In the second place, where elections are direct by universal suffrage and secret ballot, as in the case of the Soviets, the existence of a single candidate at elections ensures, generally, the election of the Party nominee and does not encourage vigorous political activity on the part of deputies. Moreover, the part-time nature of elected deputies makes their interest articulation role less effective than it otherwise might be.

Interest aggregation also appears to be less effective in the U.S.S.R. than in India. The process of reconciling divergent views within the CPSU may be deterred by the notion that there is one policy, divined by the leaders of the CPSU and, therefore, a full discussion of the many-sided aspects of policy quite unnecessary. In fact, a reappraisal of policy by a participant may be construed as questioning the authority of the Party. The integrative character, on the other hand, of the Congress in India seeks to aggregate the various diverse interests represented in its ranks with the result that policy decisions are often a long time in the making and sometimes vague in their attempts to accommodate all groups. The group structure of modern society and the demands engendered by it require the reconciliation of diverse interests. It is believed by some that the distinctive character of 'totalitarian systems' is to "suppress demands coming from their societies" and to be "unresponsive to demands coming from the international environment."[2] However, in any society, demands which threaten its integrity are suppressed or suppression is attempted. The difference therefore lies in the degree of suppression of demands on the system, attempted in the U.S.S.R. and in the liberal democratic societies.

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1. Rubinstein, A.Z.: Communist Political Systems. Op.cit. p.106.
2. Almond, G.A. and Powell, G.B.: Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1966) p.28.

The respective party systems of India and the U.S.S.R. present another difference in their political setup. Though the Congress party in India has been dominant since independence, the political culture in India allows for the existence of other political parties. An account should therefore be taken of these in any study of the Indian political system, if not because they wield substantial political power, at least for their "nuisance value". There is, as yet, no organised, loyal opposition party in India. Nonetheless, the various non-Congress parties may, collectively, serve to curb Congress domination in the legislative structures.

The presence of a single party is a distinction the U.S.S.R. does not share with India. Moreover, communist ideology and the goals of a classless, stateless society too are its unique characteristics. Soviet ideology justifies the party's attempt to control, direct and organise social life. In Marxist-Leninist theory it is only the party which can be politically legitimate. The party, in turn, retains its power by virtue of normative controls, the official Soviet ideology being the monopoly of the party. The Soviet value system supports and justifies the party, and the party in turn is the sole interpreter of official ideology. This two-way process ensures that the official policies of the party are in line with the official ideology. Thus, the CPSU articulates an ideology to which social and economic life should conform, shapes the structure of the political system, and the form in which inputs should be made. An important characteristic therefore, of the Soviet system is, in Almond's and Powell's terms, its stronger distributive capability: the boundaries between society and polity are weak, and the party is able to exert its power in most areas of social life.

Perhaps the most significant difference between the political systems of India and the U.S.S.R., from the point of view of this study, is the absence of conflict in Soviet ideology and the absence of formally constituted channels to resolve any conflict. The question was raised in Chapter Two of this study

whether linguistic conflict has caused disunity in India and the U.S.S.R. An examination of events in the two countries seemed to show that whereas in India "linguism" has been a major source of conflict and agitation since independence, in the U.S.S.R. no such serious opposition in the form of hostility to Russian as the official language or demands for autonomy on linguistic basis was evident. To conclude from this that conflict exists in India but not in the U.S.S.R. would be a little too hasty. A study of their respective political systems reveals that in the Indian setting while there are to be found formally constituted channels of expressing and resolving conflict; the ideological rigidity of Soviet society has precluded the development of a social theory which both recognises conflict and which suggests mechanisms for its resolution.

Linguistic diversity has always existed in India. This diversity, however, became a source of conflict when language loyalty was used as a valuable source by the modernised political strata. In an atmosphere of representative institutions, language functions more as a political role-sign for mobilisation than as a symbol of primordial loyalty. A complex of political motivation is found to underlie the mobilisation of language groups in India to gain clearly political objectives. Language politics in India, have initiated large numbers of people in organisational modes of participation. Often, the bargaining of interests and the negotiation of demands have resulted in conflicts, but these conflicts have led to a convergence of interests.

In the U.S.S.R., in the absence of an institutionalised system of political conflict, political conflict, far from disappearing, becomes latent, more bitter, and creates resentment among managerial, professional and intellectual groups. There is also a resultant strengthening of party position because, as Lane points out, the fact that institutional and group rivalries are not recognised and institutionalised, means, that almost everything becomes politicised.[1]

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1. Lane, D.: Politics and Society in the U.S.S.R. Op.cit. p.259.

To sum up, the CPSU has considerable powers in political mobilisation, recruitment and placement. In fact, the Party "legitimizes the nation's highest political leadership."[1] Moreover, the party plays an important role in input articulation, and the final aggregation process occurs in the Politbureau of the CPSU. Through its manipulation of the media of communication the Party mobilises public opinion and generates mass support for communist mores and policies. Finally, by means of the strategic location of Party personnel in positions of importance at every level of Soviet society, the Party maintains an extensive system of control to ensure the observance of Party and State rules and regulations throughout Soviet society. This is certainly more power than the "dominant", "all-powerful" Congress party in India can ever hope to wield under the present political setup of the country.

These differences in the political structures and their functioning in the two countries serve to explain the monistic, universally implemented language policies of the U.S.S.R., as against the pluralistic, compromising nature of the repeatedly modified and less readily implemented policy solutions in India.

1. Hodgee, J.L.(ed.): Man, State and Society in the Soviet Union. (London, Pall Mall Press, 1972) p.72.

CHAPTER IX

DECISION-MAKING IN EDUCATION

IN INDIA AND THE U.S.S.R.

Whereas an analysis of a country's political institutions illustrates the role of political factors in determining the official language policy; the second major aspect of a language policy, namely language in education is debated and determined largely within the educational system. Therefore an examination of the latter is essential in order to understand particular policies regarding the medium of instruction and the language or languages of study. Within the educational system, it has been observed that it is the nature of educational control which influences the language policies in education and determines their outcome. Consequently, in this chapter it is proposed to examine the nature of, and the agencies - national and local - involved in, the process of decision-making in education in India and the Soviet Union.

An examination of the politics of educational control involves a study of the distribution of power between the Union and the federating units in the field of educational decision-making. Locating the area of control over each educational system is expected to throw light on whether national or regional and local factors play a dominant role in the choice of language in education. The prevailing language policy in education of each country could be found to depend on who controls its educational system.

The nature of educational control in each instance would depend, among other things, on the aims, both declared and implicit, of a particular system of education, coupled with the extent to which education is regarded as a political tool of the government for furthering its goals.

This chapter begins by identifying the general aims of education, together with the particular aims of language teaching in India and the U.S.S.R.

It then proceeds to examine the provisions made for achieving the goals in the form of control over the decision-making and finance of education.

The Aims of Education

Educational systems, functioning in a particular socio-politico-economic context influence and are influenced by the general goals of the society in which they operate. Attempts, therefore, to formulate educational aims and policies without taking into cognisance the developments in other institutions of the societal configuration are unlikely to be successful. From the available literature, three broad aims of education can be identified in India and the U.S.S.R. - universal literacy, economic development and national unity.

The educational systems inherited by the new governments of India and the U.S.S.R. were found to be inadequate in both scope and content. In the first place, they did not extend to all areas of the population with the result that literacy rates in both societies were rather low. While the level of literacy in Russia before the revolution was not much above 30 percent[1], the first post-independence census of India in 1951 showed the literacy rate as 16.6 percent[2] of the population. One of the prime aims of the formal systems of education in both countries, therefore, was the attainment of universal literacy.

The aim of universal literacy is prompted by several considerations. According to the democratic argument put forward by the Indian government, literacy is an end in itself. Democracy is based on the respect for the individual, and the primary purpose of education is claimed to be the provision of the widest opportunity to the individual to develop his potentialities to the full. National development, it is believed, can be attained only through individual development. The U.S.S.R. too claims to be democratic, but here, apart from the human rights argument, the practical necessity of building a

1. Grant, N.: Soviet Education (England, Penguin, 1968) p.18.
2. Report of the Education Commission 1964-66 (New Delhi, Government of India, Ministry of Education, 1966) p.423.

Soviet society calls for a system of mass education. The schools are geared to meet, both directly and indirectly, the demands for an energetic propagation of Communist ideas. Apart from providing a channel for the transmission of a "communist world outlook", the educational system by providing literacy, facilitates the dissemination of propaganda through the written word. Whether the aims of universal literacy have been idealistic or utilitarian, in the field of language policies they have led to a recognition of, and a stress on the importance of using the vernaculars as media instruction to achieve rapid literacy.[1] On psycho-social grounds it has been observed that quick and effective learning is ensured if it is imparted through the mother tongue of the child.[2] Successive committees and commissions in India have, as a result, repeatedly recommended the mother tongue as best suited for imparting education, particularly at the primary stage. Similarly, apart from the considerations of Lenin's nationality policy, the practical purpose of swiftly eradicating literacy has been the prime reason behind the Soviet provision for education through the native language of the pupils.

Apart from providing universal literacy, the educational systems of India and the U.S.S.R. are called upon to provide cadres of trained manpower, in the form of specialists as well as technicians without which the national committment to rapid industrialisation and economic development cannot be realised. The content of education, therefore, has to be broadened to include, apart from general education, the imparting of scientific and technical training. The great stress on science and technology in the school and university curriculum, however, puts a premium on the knowledge of English in India and Russian in the U.S.S.R., primarily on practical grounds of their providing access to a wider range of scientific knowledge.[3] The retention of English at the

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1. See, Chapter IV, p.129.
2. UNESCO: The Use of Vernacular Languages in Education (Paris, Unesco, 1953) p.11.
3. See, Chapter IV, The Use of Vernacular Languages in Education (Paris, Unesco, 1953) p.11.

secondary and especially the tertiary level in India is justified on the grounds of English serving as a "library language" and providing access to international information.

'Finally, in the opinion of the Parliamentary Committee on Education in India, a national system of education, apart from providing adequate opportunity to every child to develop his personality, accelerating national development, and emphasising science and technology, must "make the rising generation conscious of the fundamental unity of the country in the midst of her rich diversity."[1] One of the factors making for national unity is believed to be a common language understood and used throughout the country. For various reasons discussed elsewhere[2] the choice has fallen on Hindi, whose inclusion in the school curriculum has therefore appeared imperative. For similar reasons it is thought necessary for Hindi speakers to learn another Indian language and thus arises the oft-quoted three-language formula at the secondary level of education in India.

Apart from the aims of universal literacy and economic growth common to both India and the U.S.S.R., a third aim, namely, the inculcation of socialist attitudes, is more or less unique to the Soviet Union - more or less, because all societies, as Lane points out[3], inculcate some political values. What distinguishes the Soviet Union, perhaps, is the fact that the educational system is overtly used as an agent of the political and has played an important role in the inculcation of socialist values.[4] The educational system in the U.S.S.R., therefore, is geared towards providing not only formal learning and scientific and technical training, but also inculcating in the children the moral, social and political ideas necessary for the building of a new kind of society -

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1. Report of the Committee of Members of Parliament on Education, 1967. (New Delhi, Government of India, Ministry of Education, 1967) p.1.
2. See, Chapter III. pp.86-87.
3. Lane, D.: Politics and Society in the U.S.S.R. (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970) p. 487.
4. See, Chapter VII, p.317.

a communist society.

In a policy statement in November 1958, the Central Committee of the Communist Party emphasizing the question of attitudes, stated:

> "Upbringing must inculcate in the school children a love of knowledge and of work, and respect for people who work; it must shape the communist world outlook of the pupils and rear them in the spirit of communist morality and of boundless loyalty to the country and the people, and in the spirit of proletarian internationalism."[1]

Similarly, the Minister of Higher Education in the U.S.S.R., V.P. Yelyutin, echoed the official point of view when he stated, in 1959:

> "The role of Soviet education is to assist in the building of a communist society, in shaping the materialist world outlook of the students, equipping them with a good grounding in the different fields of knowledge and preparing them for socially useful work."[2]

According to the Soviet authorities, education must function according to the needs of society, and since theirs is by definition a socialist society moving towards communism, the communist view point must be put over, directly and indirectly, at every stage of education and reinforced by other media of communication outside the schools. Positive political commitment, rather than mere passive acquiescence appears to be the goal of Soviety society. Hence, as Azrael points out, the educational system is a major agency involved in the process of political socialisation[3], and the creation of the New Soviet Man.

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1. Strengthening the Ties of the School with Life, and Further Developing the System of Public Education. Theses of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, 1958. (Moscow, November, 1958), Section 20. Published in English as Bringing the Soviet Schools Still Closer to Life. Soviet Booklet No.44 (London, December, 1958).

2. Yelyutin, V.P.: Higher Education in the U.S.S.R. (Moscow, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1959) p.41.

3. Azrael, J.R.: "Education and Political Development in the Soviet Union" in Nogee, J.L. (ed.) Man, State & Society in the Soviet Union (London, Pall Mall, 1972) p.318.

Apart from giving the child an opportunity to develop all his potentialities and making him a productive worker, Soviet educationalists, in addition, aim at shaping him into a good citizen of his communist homeland. This faith in the power of education stems from the Soviet belief that environmental factors are decisive in the evolution of man and the development of his personality.

It is this emphasis on political training and this political direction of the Soviet educational system which gives it its special character and largely determines its form. The administrative setup of the Soviet educational system, as it exists in practice, can be distinguished from the pattern found in India in terms of this definite political role expected of education in the Soviet Union.

Educational Administration in India and the U.S.S.R.

The administrative theory underlying the control of a formal system of education often reflects the prevailing value system as well as the organisational structure of its parent society. It was seen in the previous chapter that the Soviet Union is subject to a duality in administration and control. While the formal governmental structure provides a parliamentary framework for Soviet society, there exists also the Communist Party apparatus which duplicates the governmental structure at almost every stage. This duality of administration and control can be discovered in the structure of the Soviet system of education as well.

Moreover, a high degree of centralisation of the decision-making powers was found to characterise the Soviet political system. The administrative setup of the Soviet educational system provides a good example of such centralised control and supervision based on the conviction that education provides an indispensable political weapon in the process of building a communist society and shaping the New Soviet Man. A distinguishing feature of Soviet education, therefore, is the extent of tight control exercised by the

central authorities and the degree of uniformity enforced throughout the vast territory of the U.S.S.R. The urgency of achieving rapid universal literacy; the need for mobilisation of all resources; the recognition of a close connection between professional man-power training and national economic planning; and the officially recognised aim of the Soviet educational system as serving the needs, political and otherwise of Soviet society, as interpreted by the Communist Party, are the chief arguments advanced in favour of a rigid control of the educational system in the hands of the central authorities.

In the federal structure of India, with powers divided between the Centre and the States, there is an ongoing controversy regarding the relative merits of central and state control over education, with some people advocating the middle view of leaving education in the concurrent list.

In the following pages the formal provisions for educational administration in India and the U.S.S.R. are examined and the structures and functions of the agencies, both within and outside the formal organisation, involved in the process of decision-making at the central and regional levels are described.

The Constitutional Basis of Educational Administration: The Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India classified the areas of legislation reserved to the Union and state governments into the Union, State and Concurrent Lists. According to item 11 of List II - the State List, education including universities, subject to certain exceptions, is the domain of the state governments. The exceptions are in the case of institutions of national importance, such as the universities of Benares, Aligarh, Delhi and Visva-Bharati; scientific and research institutes like the five Indian Institutes of Technology; and in the field of co-ordination and determination of standards in institutions for higher education or research and scientific and technical institutions, all of which are assigned to the Union Government.[1] Finally, the vocational and technical training of labour is a subject in the concurrent list[2], over which

1. The Constitution of India (1950) Seventh Schedule, List I, Items 63, 64, 65 and 66.
2. Ibid. List III item 25.

both the Union and the State Governments have the power to legislate.

The Soviet Constitution does not contain any comparable lists dividing power between the Centre and the Republics. Article 14 lists the areas of jurisdiction reserved to the Union government, while Article 15 lays down that the Sovereignty of the Union Republics "is limited only in the spheres defined in Article 14 of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R."[1] Among the subjects listed in Article 14, paragraph 'r' of this Article contains a direct reference to the authority of the Union in the "determination of the basic principles in the sphere of education. . . "

Education, according to the Soviet Constitution, is a fundamental right of its citizens. Article 121 of Chapter X on the Fundamental Rights and Duties of the Citizens States: "Citizens of the U.S.S.R. have the right to education."[2] The magnitude of the task of providing universal education in the years immediately following independence precluded the Indian Constitution-makers from providing education as a fundamental right of the citizens. However, under the Directive Principles of State Policy, Article 41 lays down that "The State shall, within the limits of its economic capacity and development, make effective provisions for securing the right. . . to education. . ."; while Article 45 mentions that "the State shall endeavour to provide, within a period of ten years from the commencement of this Constitution, for free and compulsory education for all children until they complete the age of fourteen years."

While it is the duty of the State to endeavour to provide compulsory education, in recognition of the multinational character of Indian society, the Constitution guarantees to all minorities based on religion or language the "right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice."[3]

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1. The Constitution of the U.S.S.R. (1936) Articles 14 and 15.
2. Ibid. Article 121.
3. The Constitution of India (1950) Article 30(1).

It further guarantees that, in granting aid to educational institutions, the State shall not "discriminate against any educational institution on the ground that it is under the management of a minority, whether based on religion or language."[1]

There are, therefore, to be found in India today a wide range of educational institutions. The broadest division of these is into Recognised and Unrecognised institutions. The first type of institutions are those in which the courses of study followed are those which are recognised or prescribed by the Department of Public Instruction or by the Education Board or by the University; they are open to inspection; and their pupils are eligible for admission to all public examinations held by the Board or the University. All other institutions are classified as Unrecognised. Recognised institutions are either publicly managed or privately managed. The former are under the direct management of the government or of a local or municipal board. Private institutions are managed by societies or individuals and may be aided or unaided. An aided institution is one which receives a subsidy from the government or from a local or municipal board. Unaided institutions are financed solely from fees, endowments and subscriptions.

In contrast, there is no private sector of education in the U.S.S.R., the entire system of public education being directed and administered by government departments.

It would, however, be erroneous to classify education systems as wholly centralised or wholly decentralised. As Holmes points out, following the analysis provided by Talcott Parsons in Administrative Theory in Education[2], there will, in all probability, be some kind of formal organisation concerned with the control of education at each of several levels; namely national,

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1. The Constitution of India (1950) Article 30(2).
2. Parsons, T.: "Some Ingredients of a General Theory of Formal Organisation" in Halpin, A.W.(ed.) Administrative Theory in Education. (Chicago, University Mid West Administration Center, 1958).

regional, local, and inside individual institutions.[1] Thus, though Constitutionally education in India continues to be the prime responsibility of the state governments, agencies for its administration may be found at each of the three levels, namely central, state and local. Similarly, in the U.S.S.R. while education is the domain of the Union, channels for educational administration are provided at Union, Republican and local levels, making for an element of decentralisation. The agencies established at each of these levels therefore need to be identified.

Educational Administration at the National Level: The agencies concerned with the development of education at the national level in India are the Ministry of Education, the University Grants Commission and the National Council of Educational Research and Training (NCERT)[2]. The Union Minister of Education, who is usually of cabinet rank, plays an important role in formulating the general policies in education. Administration of policy is in the hands of the Secretary to the Government of India who is the administrative head of the Ministry and the principal adviser to the Minister on all matters of policy and administration. Officially, he is designated as 'Educational Adviser to the Government of India and Secretary to the Ministry of Education'.

Since April 1964 following the abolition of separate Ministries of Education and Science, the Ministry of Education is functioning through the following five bureaus: (1) School Education; (2) Higher Education; (3) Language, Literature and Fine Arts; (4) Scholarships; and (5) Planning and ancilliary educational services.[3] Each bureau is under a joint secretary or a joint educational adviser to whom are attached divisional heads for the major subjects.

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1. Holmes, B.: Problems in Education. A Comparative Approach. (London, Routledge, and Kegan Paul, 1965) p.158.
2. Report of the Education Commission 1964-66. Op.cit. p. 453.
3. The Times of India (Bombay, April 6, 1964).

The Union Ministry of Education is further helped by a number of advisory bodies, the most important amongst these being: (1) the Central Advisory Board of Education; (2) the All-India Council for Technical Education; (3) University Grants Commission; (4) All-India Council for Elementary Education; (5) Central Social Welfare Board; (6) National Board of Basic Education; (7) Central Board of Sanskrit; (8) National Board of Audio-Visual Education; (9) National Council for Women's Education; and (10) National Council for Rural Higher Education.

The Central Advisory Board of Education (CABE) is a statutory body and the main pivot of activities of the Union Ministry. It is important to note, however, that the decisions of the CABE are not binding on the States since the latter are free agents accepting the Centre's suggestions voluntarily. But, the NCERT, composed of the Union Minister for Education and all State Education Ministers is, in the opinion of the Education Commission, "uniquely suited" for conducting extension work with the State Educational Departments, and providing the principal technical agency at the national level for the improvement of school education.[1]

The Central Government in India has a very limited control over school education, but nevertheless plays a very important role as a co-ordinating, advisory, and informative agency, apart from discharing the several educational responsibilities specifically vested in it by the Constitution.[2]

In recent years, with the adoption of the technique of Five-Year Plans and the creation of the Planning Commission (on 15 March, 1950), there has been an increasing trend towards centralisation in educational policy-making in India. The Planning Commission lays down broad policy proposals with the help of various central and state authorities. Proposals regarding educational

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1. Report of the Education Commission, 1964-66. Op.cit. p.455.
2. See, Constitution of India, Seventh Schedule, List I, entries, 63, 64, 65 and 66 and List III, entry 25.

planning are submitted to it at the State level by the education departments and universities and at the national level by the Union Ministry of Education and the University Grants Commission. Advisory bodies like the CABE advise on the formulation of the plans which are then discussed by a working group comprising of the representatives of the Union Education Ministry, the Planning Commission and the State education authorities. Responsibility for implementation, nevertheless, lies in the case of the States with the education authorities of each State and in the case of the Centre with the Union Ministry of Education.

Careful planning and coordination in education as in other branches of national life is a characteristic feature of Soviet society. All aspects of Soviet education are planned in detail in order to integrate them closely with the needs of a planned economy. The general objectives of educational planning are set out, in the U.S.S.R., by the U.S.S.R. State Planning Commission (Gosplan) on the basis of the programme of the CPSU, the directives of the Central Committee of the Party and the decisions of the Council of Ministers. Educational Planning is handed by the following three subsections of Gosplan's department for culture and education: (1) of education, which plans the development of all types of schools of general education and pre-school establishments; (2) for the training and re-assignment of specialists, concerned with planning development in the fields of higher and secondary specialised education; and (3) of labour, productivity, wages and labour resources, which plans the training of skilled workers in the vocational-technical schools.[1]

Though education in the U.S.S.R. is centrally planned, there is no single ministry responsible for the entire educational system of the U.S.S.R. At the national level educational administration is effected through three channels:

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1. Tomiak, J.J.: The Soviet Union. (Newton Abbot, David and Charles, 1972) pp. 51-52.

(1) pre-school education, general education and the development of the pedagogical sciences in the country are under the Ministry of Education of the U.S.S.R.;

(2) Secondary specialised and higher education are under the Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialised Education of the U.S.S.R.;

(3) Vocational-technical education is under the State Committee of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. for Vocational-Technical Education.

Prior to 1966 pre-school and general school education was administered by the Ministries of Education of the Union and autonomous republics. In 1966 the Union-republican Ministry of Education of the U.S.S.R. was set up because of the need for a greater synchronisation and coordination of the educational programmes of the various republics.[1] The Ministry's Scientific Council on Methods of Teaching considers and decides the issues concerning changes in school curricula, textbooks, teaching aids and teaching methods, all of which are centrally determined thus making for a high degree of uniformity throughout the country.

Educational research is the domain of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences (Akademiya Pedagogicheskikh Nauk). Founded on 6th October 1943 as the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences of the RSFSR, it became, after the creation of the Ministry of Education of the U.S.S.R. in 1966, the Academy of the Pedagogical Sciences of the U.S.S.R. The fundamental aim of the Academy is "a thorough examination of the problems of education and educational development from the scientific point of view, the promotion of training of scientific personnel in pedagogic sciences, and the dissemination of pedagogic knowledge among the people."[2]

The Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialised Education of the

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1. On the Main Trends in the Field of Education in the U.S.S.R. in 1966-1970. (Moscow, Ministry of Education of the U.S.S.R., 1970) p.25.
2. Tomiak, J.J.: The Soviet Union. Op.cit. p.43.

U.S.S.R. exercises overall supervision of all the higher education establishments which include the universities and the polytechnic and specialised institutes as well as the secondary specialised education establishments. The Ministry is particularly responsible for the establishment of conditions for the admission of students and the recruitment of the teaching staff; preparation and approval of curricula; organisation of the instruction; and publication of a large proportion of the textbooks used.[1] It was decided in 1966 that the Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialised Education of the U.S.S.R. should inspect higher education establishments in the country. A number of universities and major institutes of higher education were, therefore, placed under the Ministry's direct control, other institutes being left to carry on under the republican Ministries of Higher and Secondary Specialised Education or other ministries.[2] Finally, the State Committee of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers for Vocational-Technical Education controls and guides the work of all vocational-technical schools in the country. It works out standard curricula for each trade or specialisation and it determines the number of students to be trained in each field, in close co-operation with the State planning authorities.[3]

Educational administration in the U.S.S.R., therefore, is highly centralised in the hands of the Union-Republican Ministries of Education, and Higher and Secondary Specialised Education, which work through the corresponding ministries at the republican level. The pattern of administration is hence duplicated, with some variations, at the level of the Union and Autonomous Republics.

Educational Administration at the Regional Level: Education being a State subject in India, the administrative pattern found at this level is of signi-

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1. Moshko, K. et al: Educational Planning in the U.S.S.R. (Paris, UNESCO, 1968) p.233.
2. Public Education in the Soviet Union in 1966/67. (Moscow, Ministry of Education of the U.S.S.R., 1967) p.18.
3. Tomsik, J.J.: The Soviet Union. Op.cit. pp.46-47.

ficance.[1] Since 1921, education in India has been a provincial subject under the direct control of an elected Education Minister responsible to the State legislature. The Constitution of India has not deviated from that pattern and education at all stages, with the exception of advanced research and technical education, still remains a state subject.

The state governments in India are fully autonomous with regard to their educational programmes except those for which they receive grants-in-aid from the centre. The administrative machinery of a state in the field of education consists of the Minister of Education, the Secretary for Education, the Director of Education, a corps of inspectors, and the usual personnel of a State department. The State Education Departments are the principal agency to prepare and implement educational plans. The Minister of Education, responsible to the state legislature, controls educational policy and directs its execution. Whereas the Director of Education is the permanent head of the department and is the technical adviser to the Minister; the Secretary for Education is generally an administrative officer-in-charge of the administrative and financial aspects of a policy.

The State Education Departments administer every branch of education, but certain forms of technical education are under the technical departments concerned. The Director of Education is assisted by the inspectorate which generally forms a hierarchy with divisional offices and district offices in each state.

The state governments either share their power with, or delegate a part of it to the universities as regards higher education and to local boards as regards primary education and instruction through the mother tongue. There are also some statutory bodies in each state, such as the Boards of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education, which control and conduct High School and Higher

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1. Report of the Education Commission, 1964-66. Op.cit. p.456.

Secondary examinations in certain areas. Determination of curricula, choice of textbooks and prescription of teaching methods are generally undertaken at this level, with the result that they may be found to vary considerably from one state of India to another.

To a limited extent, "operative"[1] decentralisation of educational administration is found in the U.S.S.R., derived, perhaps, from the need to take special local conditions into account in order to better realise centrally determined objectives. Such a decentralisation, however, is almost exclusively administrative in character.

Each Union Republic has its own Republic Ministry of Education and its Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialised Education. In addition, the twenty Autonomous Republics have their own Ministries of Education (but not of Higher Education). The Ministries of Education of the Union and Autonomous Republics are in charge of the network of pre-school institutions, schools, pedagogic schools and out-of-school educational establishments in their areas. They are concerned chiefly with the administration of educational decisions passed from the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Education. Most of the details for the translation of policy into action are worked out by the Union Ministry, in conjunction with the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, and are passed on to the Republic ministries for implementation. The ministries of the Union Republics make such changes as local conditions demand, but this is with the approval of the central authorities.

Though officially there are such channels as the Supreme Soviets and the Council of Ministers of the constituent republics, in practice policy statements issued jointly by the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministries on behalf of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet and the Central Committee of the Communist Party serve as direct instructions to the Union Republics for implementation. Consequently,

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1. Anreal, J.R.: "Education and Political Development in the Soviet Union." Op. cit. p.318.

the laws and practice in the various Union Republics are found to be in conformity with one another.[1] Syllabuses, teaching methods, techniques and textbooks are all prescribed by the Ministry of Education of the U.S.S.R. leaving little room for local initiative. Some variations do exist, such as the use of the language of the republic as medium of instruction, or different textbooks for the treatment of local history, but such differences exist with the knowledge and sanction of the central authorities. The basic curriculum and the basic aims of education remain uniform throughout.

A major factor responsible for the high degree of centralisation of Soviet educational administration is the all-pervading influence of the Communist Party. State power lies, in theory, with the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., and when not in session, the Council of Ministers exercises powers on its behalf. This in turn is effectively controlled by the central organs of the CPSU which, as seen in the previous chapter, is the real source of power in education as in other things. The hierarchial, centralised structure of the Party makes it a matter of minor importance whether the education ministries are centralised or not. Major decisions of policy, then, are made by the central Party organs, often after trying out the ideas in debates in the Press or discussions at meetings. Party decisions are then placed before the Supreme Soviet for ratification - a theoretically necessary but purely formal step - and become law. On the basis of the laws thus made the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. issues rules and regulations to the appropriate ministries for their implementation. The Department of Schools of the Party Central Committee supervises the functioning of the entire system, and each link of the latter is subject to tight control by local Party organs.[2] The following diagram shows the position

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1. Dorokhova, G.S.: Gosudarstvennoe upravlenie narodnym obrazovaniem v SSSR (National Control of Education in the U.S.S.R.) (Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1965) p.14.

2. See, Bereday, G.Z.F. and Pennar, J.: The Politics of Soviet Education (New York, Praeger, 1960), Chapter 3, for a discussion of Party control over schools.

of the CPSU in the administrative structure of Soviet education, and the source and directions of policy decisions in education in the Soviet Union:



There appears, therefore, to be a considerable gap between the theory and practice of educational administration in the U.S.S.R. - a gap, no doubt,

difficult to ascertain and measure, but one which nevertheless shows that policy-making in education in the U.S.S.R. is not only centralised in the sense of central control vis-a-vis local autonomy, but also that within the government, power is concentrated singularly in the hands of the Communist Party.

Educational Administration at the Local Level: Opinion is divided with regard to the role of the local authorities in education in India. While one view holds that local bodies should be vested with adequate authority to administer education, at least at the primary level; the opposing view holds that local authorities should not be placed in charge of educational institutions. So far there has been no effective integration of these two different traditions, with the result that a uniform national policy (or, in some cases, even a uniform State policy) has been unable to evolve. In the urban areas, the municipalities have been associated with education in some States, while in the rural areas, panchayati raj institutions have been introduced and placed in charge of education. Authority over education has been delegated to the block level in some States and to the district level in some others. The systems of administration and grant-in-aid also show similar variations.[1]

Thus, at the local level of administration in India there are the District, Municipal and Cantonment Boards, as well as Town Area Committees and Janapada Sabhas. In the majority of States today, control over primary education has passed almost entirely to local boards, which function through their school boards, support and manage their own schools, and recognise and aid private schools. They even draw up their own schemes for the expansion of primary education and maintain their own supervisory and administrative staff.

In the hierarchial structure of educational administration in the U.S.S.R., instructions from the ministerial level are passed on to regional,

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1. The Report of the Education Commission, 1964-66. Op.cit. p.448.

provincial and city departments of education, then to district departments, and finally to school directors and teachers. The district and municipal departments of education control the work of the pre-school institutions and schools. They also maintain their own staff of inspectors of schools and are responsible to the executive committees of local Soviets. However, the local education authorities are concerned primarily with the execution of policy and not its formulation.

Closely allied to the system of educational administration is the consideration of educational finance, which has significant implications on the question of policy implementation in education.

In contrast to Educational Finance in India and the U.S.S.R., in the U.S.S.R. is the state budget, chiefly at the union, republican and local levels. It is

The successful implementation of an educational policy would depend only to a very limited extent upon the amount in the system which is supplied by considerably on the source and amount of funds available for education. the contributions of the three, co-operative, trade union and other public

enterprises and organizations. The finances for education in the U.S.S.R. are

Sources of Educational Finance: A multi-source system of finance has grown in India and education is now financed by the Central Government, State Governments and local authorities, and through fees and 'other' sources which include endowments, donations and other voluntary contributions from the public. In general, education at the primary and secondary level is financed by State Governments, local bodies and private organisations; and at the tertiary level by private organisations, and by the state and central governments. The respective percent contribution of the total expenditure by each agency for the year 1965-66 was:[1]

SOURCE	PER CENT
Government Funds	71.2
Local Authorities	6.3
Fees	15.3
Other Sources	7.2

1. The Report of the Education Commission, 1964-66. Op.cit. pp. 471-472.

The State Governments, in addition to maintaining their own institutions give grants-in-aid according to fixed rules to local boards and private bodies. Besides government grants, the local boards make provision for 'education' in their budget, while the private bodies depend on fees, endowments and subscriptions. There are, therefore, three categories of institutions in India, depending on their source of finance: (1) government schools, financed completely from the budgetary allocations of the state and central governments; (2) government-aided schools, which receive grants from the government and are at the same time dependent on 'other' sources; and (3) private schools which have their own source of income and are therefore financially independent of the government.

In contrast, the main source of educational finance in the U.S.S.R. is the state budget, chiefly at the Union, republican and local levels. It is only to a very limited extent that education in the Soviet Union is dependent on the contributions of the State, co-operative, trade union and other public enterprises and organisations. The finances for education in the U.S.S.R. are thus drawn in the main, therefore, from two sources: direct allocation in the budget for education and contributions for educational work by collective farms, plan factories, cooperatives and trade unions. There are no private institutions, as in India, which are maintained wholly by fees, endowments and donations. The relative proportions in terms of absolute figures and as percentage of the total are as follows:

SOURCE	ABSOLUTE FIGURES in 1964[1] (in millions of roubles)	PER CENT
Union budget	622	5.3
Republican budget	3,277	27.9
Local budget	6,984	59.6
Receipts from parents	690	5.8
Social Security	112	.9
Trade Unions	14	.22
State economic organisations	27	.3
Total	11,726	100

1. Noskko, K., Monosson, E., Zhanin, V. and Severtsev, V.: Educational Planning in the U.S.S.R. (Paris, Unesco, 1968) p.164.

From these figures it may be seen that well over 90 per cent of the expenditure on education in the U.S.S.R. comes from the State budget.

In the case of schools of general education the budgetary appropriations are calculated by the district, city or regional departments of education and by the Ministries of Education of the autonomous and Union republics on the basis of estimates of expenditure forwarded annually by all educational establishments and submitted to the Ministries of Finance of the corresponding republics.

After the State budget has been approved by the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers and the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., the expenditure estimates for each educational establishment are approved at the appropriate levels.

Thus, so far as the financing authority is concerned, it is the same for all schools, each institute sending its budget estimates to the next higher authority, the total estimates forming the basis for the budget of the Ministry of the Republic. This high degree of centralisation of the basic financing of educational institutions, and a single state budget providing a major portion of the funds make for a basic equality of educational provision throughout the country. Since therrelative proportion of expenses from other sources are minor, constituting in 1964, for example, only 7.2 percent of all expenditure[1], the likelihood of centrally determined policies failing to be implemented on the grounds of inadequate finance is minimal.

In India, on the other hand, since the source of funds varies, there is also a corresponding disparity in the amount of funds at the disposal of each institution. Private schools, generally charging high fees, are usually better staffed and well-equipped. Students coming to these institutions are drawn largely from urban middle and upper middle class professional families. As a result, there is a great demand for and emphasis placed on English

1. Koshko, K., Monosson, E., Zhamin, V. and Severtsev, V.: Educational Planning in the U.S.S.R. Op.cit. p.164.

education in these institutions, and generally only lip-service is paid to the teaching of Hindi and the regional language. In government and aided schools where policy implementation is usually more rigid, there is to be found a lack of adequate resources to attract good teachers and provide suitable equipment. Moreover, financial independence from the government places upon private schools no particular obligation to implement government policies thereby providing a wider scope for local initiative and experimentation.

What are the implications of the different systems of educational decision-making of India and the U.S.S.R. for their respective language policies in education?

Both countries have adopted for official and administrative use, a single language - Hindi in India and Russian in the U.S.S.R. - out of the multitude of languages within their boundaries. The success of an official language policy depends, among other things, upon the number of non-speakers of that language who know and use it with a reasonable amount of fluency. It, therefore, devolves on the educational system of a particular country to ensure a working knowledge of the language among its students. It would, therefore, follow that a study of Hindi in India and of Russian in the U.S.S.R. would be an essential feature of their respective school curriculums. Such a concentrated effort to learn the official language would depend, however, on who controls the educational system at each level.

In India, the main function of the Union Ministry of Education is to plan, guide and coordinate educational reconstruction, but not to dictate policies to the states. This is significant as far as the teaching of Hindi goes because though it is the duty of the Central government in India to develop and promote the official language, it does not have the power to make the study of Hindi obligatory in schools throughout the country. This lack of central control over the educational policies of the States is reflected

nowhere better than in Tamil Nad where one of the first steps the DMK Government took, on coming to power in 1967, was to abolish the compulsory study of Hindi in the schools within the State. Thus, the decentralisation of educational administration in India has led to considerable variations from state to state on the question of including a compulsory study of Hindi in the school curriculum. In the U.S.S.R., on the other hand, the curriculum for both the Russian and the non-Russian schools are laid down by the Ministry of Education of the U.S.S.R. for schools throughout the Soviet Union. A study of Russian language and literature holds a prominent place in these centrally determined curricula.[1]

As a result, in the Russian speaking republics a study of Russian begins from the first grade, whereas in the non-Russian language schools, Russian is to be introduced as the second language from Grade II. Similarly in the Russian language schools in the non-Russian republics, the language of the republics is to be studied from the second grade. Finally, the study of a foreign language is included in the cirriculum of all general schools from the fifth grade. A uniform pattern of a study of three languages can therefore be found throughout the Soviet Union.

In theory, at the secondary level in India also, a three-language formula is expected to operate, covering a study of the mother tongue, Hindi and English in the non-Hindi areas; and Hindi, English and a modern Indian language in the Hindi areas. However, the operation of the three-language formula both in the Hindi and non-Hindi states reveals the half-hearted manner in which the non-Hindi States have accepted the teaching of Hindi and the Hindi States of another modern Indian language. In the absence of sufficient motivation, the formula is respected more in form than in spirit.

The operation of the three-language formula in the non-Hindi State of Madras (Tamil Nad) provides a useful illustration. Before 1956, the study of

1. See, "Curriculum in a Secondary General Education School" in Public Education in the Soviet Union (Moscow, Ministry of Education of the U.S.S.R., 1968) p.102.

Hindi in the secondary schools of Madras was purely optional, and schools were permitted to open Hindi classes if they chose.[1] However, between 1959 and 1965, a serious effort was made to propagate the study of Hindi in Madras, the alternative to Hindi being "other than the Indian language offered as the first language", that is, other than either the regional language or the mother tongue as the case may be. This sincere attempt to introduce the teaching of Hindi can be attributed to the fact that the Congress party was in power in Madras during the crucial years, and preparations for a switch-over to Hindi as the official language of the Union by 1965 were under way. The actual implementation of this policy shows that educationists are as susceptible to local pressure as politicians because, as was pointed out, the students for the Secondary School Leaving Certificate examination were required "to obtain minimum passing marks in the regional language (or the mother tongue) and English (or any other European language) but the Part II language paper (Hindi or any other Indian language). . . (was not to be) considered for admission to college."[2] Thus there was hardly much difference between earlier practice of holding no examination in Hindi, and the new one which made a mockery of the examination by not considering the result. The haphazard way in which Hindi was learnt was taken as an excuse by the Madras government to do away with examinations in Hindi in the high schools of Madras.[3] If this was the situation during the Congress regime, committed generally to the principle of propagating Hindi, the victory of the DMK in Madras at the 1967 General elections sounded the death-knell of Hindi in the State, the DMK, from the beginning being committed to ousting Hindi from both the administrative and educational fields in Madras.

Similarly, the Hindi states too have not been found to implement the formula very religiously. The four Hindi States of Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya

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1. Statement made by Mr. C. Subramaniam, Education Minister of Madras, reported in The Times of India (Bombay, 9th July, 1954).
2. The Times of India (Bombay, 1st April, 1963).
3. Statement made by Mr.M. Bhaktavatsalam, Education Minister of Madras, reported in The Times of India (Bombay, 23rd February, 1963).

Pradesh and Rajasthan, it has been pointed out, have throughout managed to implement the three-language formula without including the study of any modern Indian language.[1] From the tabular statement of the application of the formula as given in the Seventh report of the Commissioner for Linguistic Minorities, though the third language for Hindi speakers in Bihar is any Modern Indian language other than the one, mother tongue or regional language, offered as the first language, since a large number of Bihar citizens returned Maithili (a dialect of Hindi) as their mother tongue, the choice of a third language for them very often fell on Hindi. In actual practice, therefore, very few Biharis, if at all, would have to study a modern Indian language as the third language. Thus the Hindi states have more or less effectively shut out the study of modern Indian languages from their secondary school curriculum. Moreover, the students of these states can manage with only two scripts, the Devanagri of Hindi and the Roman of English, whereas a student from South India, if he has to study Hindi, would have to learn three scripts.

A comparison of the existing language policies in education for India and the U.S.S.R. shows that whereas a high degree of uniformity prevails throughout the latter, the policy pattern in India is found to vary from state to state. It is not the purpose here to pass any value judgements on the policies themselves or to question their suitability. It may be quite possible that a particular policy has not been implemented by a state in India on psycho-social or economic grounds. The point to be made here is that one of the factors determining the successful implementation of policies in education is the nature of educational control. It is found that in two countries, with different pattern of educational administration, more or less similar policy solutions to similar though not identical problems, are successfully implemented where educational decision-making is centralised, while decentralised control makes for a

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1. Seventh Report of the Commissioner for Linguistic Minorities (New Delhi, Government of India, 1965) pp. 36, 175-76, 179.

differentiated pattern over the whole country.

This raises the important question whether education should be centralised in India in order to secure a uniform pattern throughout the country. The experience since independence has shown that for the lack of accquate authority at the Centre, national policies and the recommendations of many commissions and committees could not be satisfactorily implemented. There is today an ongoing debate in India regarding the role of the Central Government and the desirability or otherwise of including education in the Central or Concurrent list of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution in order to afford the Centre control over educational development through legislation. At the same time it is feared by some that the inclusion of education in the Concurrent list "may lead to undesirable centralisation and greater rigidity in a situation where the greatest need is for elasticity and freedom to experiment."[2] This fear stems partly from the belief that centralised systems of education are necessarily totalitarian and therefore undesirable. While it is possible to maintain that democratic systems ought to be decentralised, it does not necessarily follow that decentralisation of educational control will promote political democracy. Each system of educational administration, therefore needs to be decided within its particular social contexts and provides an entire field of research in itself. Before deciding whether education in India should be centralised or not the relationships existing between the administrative system and the societal configurations will need to be examined.

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1. Report of the Education Commission, 1964-66. Op.cit. p.453.

In this thesis an attempt has been made carefully and systematically to compare language problems and policies in two multilingual countries - India and the U.S.S.R. The originality of the thesis lies in its identification of a very correct and highly controversial problem, namely that of language, as underlying much of political change and instability in these plural societies in their diversity. Political change in the two countries have not only altered the expectations of the various groups for national autonomy, but also, by setting up representative institutions, provided an avenue for these latent claims to be translated into overt demands.

While attempts have been made to collect original information, the preceding pages have been an examination and analysis of these, both primary and secondary, of the most feasible policy solutions to the language problems in India. **PART IV** the preceding chapter in the field of language planning have also been examined, in the hope to show how the considered differing ideological and institutional criteria have tended to repeatedly evolve **THE FUTURE** courses.

The major conclusions made in this thesis are (i) although political groups have been mirrored in different epochs of the present century in the two countries under consideration, as a result, their political structures have undergone drastic changes, these multi political forms of cultures have been primarily due to change and (ii) the traditional cultural diversity in the two societies has persisted partially unchanged.

Correspondingly although here have been made by the governments of both countries to effect trends of national political unity through the use of a common language, most of the core ties preserving their cultural diversity. One of the aims of this study has been to examine how the policy of creating political unity through the adoption of a national language has been contested. Related to this central issue are questions of cultural language

In this thesis, an attempt has been made carefully and systematically to compare language problems and policies in two multilingual countries - India and the U.S.S.R. The originality of the thesis lies in its identification of a very current and highly controversial problem, namely that of language, as arising out of political changes within more or less static patterns of cultural diversity. Political changes in the two countries have not only raised the expectations of the various groups for cultural autonomy, but also, by setting up representative governments, provided an avenue for these latent desires to be translated into overt demands.

Little attempt has been made to collect original information. The preceding pages have been an accumulation and analysis of views, both governmental and non-governmental, on the most feasible policy solutions to the language problems in India. For comparative purposes, Soviet attempts in the field of language planning have also been examined, the aim being to see how two countries, differing on ideological and institutional grounds have tackled an apparently similar problem, and with what success.

The major assertions made in this thesis are: (a) significant political changes have been witnessed in different decades of the present century by the two countries under consideration. As a result, their political structures have undergone change, whereas their political norms or cultures have been relatively slow to change; and (b) the traditional cultural diversity in the two countries has remained practically unchanged.

Consequently, attempts have been made by the governments of both countries to allocate values of national political unity through the use of a common language, while at the same time retaining their cultural diversity. One of the aims of this study has been to examine how far the policy of creating national unity through the adoption of a national language has been successful. Related to this central issue are questions of official language,

link language and language in education. On the basis of the available information and its analysis in the preceding pages, some general trends in policy-making may be outlined for the forseeable future in India.

It appears that, on the whole, language policies have been successful in the U.S.S.R.; whereas in India, not only have policy solutions undergone frequent changes, but any attempts at their implementation have resulted in conflict, tension and sporadic violence, detrimental at times to the very unity of the country. Three main factors are responsible for the dominance of Russian in the U.S.S.R. - numerical majority, socio-economic motivation, and strong support, at times with the use of force, from the State. All these three factors are absent in India as far as the case of Hindi is concerned. The numerical strength of Hindi is found to be diminishing;[1] socio-economic motivations for learning the language are almost non-existent among the non-Hindi speakers; and within the political climate of India, the government has been unwilling to apply force in support of its Hindi policy.

Whereas the statutory political structures of India and the U.S.S.R. are very similar, the actual working of the two systems varies.[2] It is, moreover, unlikely that in the near future the political systems of the two countries are will to undergo drastic changes. Consequently, it is also unlikely that their language policies will undergo any significant changes. If the Government of India were willing to use its authority to enforce its Hindi policy regardless of the repercussions, and if it were willing to use force to curb the resulting dissent, violence and protest, then only, in the absence of socio-economic motives, can Hindi hope to enjoy the position held by Russian in the U.S.S.R.

The hegemony of Russian in the Soviet Union also appears to be doubt-

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1. According to the 1961 Census 30.3% returned Hindi as their mother tongue, whereas the 1971 Census has shown this figure to have come down to 29.6%.
2. See Chapter VIII.

ful, in the absence of strong State support. The socio-economic motives for learning Russian are largely a result of State patronage, a knowledge of Russian being essential for higher education and subsequently for professional and political employment. Regarding the use of force, it is doubtful whether in the post-Stalin liberal era the Soviet State has been willing to use the same degree of authority to enforce Russian. In the absence of force, the position of Russian vis-a-vis the other languages needs to be re-examined. Following de-Stalinisation, the relatively liberal Khrushchev era witnessed opposition and strong protests to the 1958 school reform from the Ukrainian, Latvian, Lithuanian and Azerbaidshan republics.[1] If the State resists the use of force, will the socio-economic motives in themselves be enough to ensure the domination of Russian in the Soviet Union, is open to question. Moreover, it is doubtful whether this State-enforced dominance of Russian has really brought about any national unity in the U.S.S.R.

In India the issue is complicated by the lack of clear-cut distinctions between the terms national, official and common language. In so far as Hindi has been propagated as a national language to bring about national unity and serve as a badge of Indian nationhood, the policy has met with little success. Any attempt to implement the government's Hindi policy have engendered hostility and resulted in violence in the non-Hindi areas, who see in the dominance of Hindi the "imperialism" of the north.

However, the term 'official' language connotes a narrower meaning, and for the purposes of government and administration, an official language is for practical reasons, absolutely necessary. But such a language is for official purposes only, and that too at the higher levels of government and administration. So far English has served this purpose well and it is questionable whether abolishing this language from national life, on the grounds of

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1. See Chapter IV.

being a foreign language, is a wise proposition. Contrary to the hopes nurtured during the independence era, English has not disappeared from India. The relative merits and demerits of English therefore need to be re-examined in the light of events since 1947. It is true that English is a foreign language for India, but that consideration, in itself, should not justify its abolition. After all India has adopted British Parliamentary institutions, customs, manners and dress and they have not injured Indian pride. English so far has been the only language which has united India, at least at the political and academic levels. To attempt to wipe out this unifying potential of English through a legislative enactment is not only impossible, but unwise, as that would create a vacuum in national communication which Hindi, as yet, is unable to fill. Pragmatic considerations therefore call for a retention of English in the official spheres of the Union and this necessity has been rightly recognised by the Official Languages (Amendment) Act, 1967 which has accorded English the status of an Associate official language of India. English serves as a link with the past while providing at the same time a window on the future. If Hindi, a regional language of the North, is to be one of the official languages, the interests of the non-Hindi speakers in general and of the South in particular can be adequately represented through English. Adopting two official languages for a country of 550 million people is certainly not a luxury. However, it may be speculated whether with the continued use of English as the de facto official and the de jure associate official language, Hindi will ever emerge as the de facto official language of India, and with the passing of time, even its de jure status may be open to question.

Regarding the question of a link or common language for the country, English has served, and in the present circumstances, continues to serve as a link between the elite - political, social and academic, of India. With regard to the masses, with the linguistic reorganisation of states, the regional languages of each area are increasingly serving as a link between the elites and masses within each region. This linguistic reorganisation, which has

fostered a sense of regional loyalty and identity on the basis of a common language, has at the same time and by this very process, encouraged centrifugal tendencies by encouraging parochial loyalties. If the States of India had not been reorganised on linguistic criteria, much of the hostility to Hindi arising out of its being the regional language of particular states might not have arisen. Under the present setup however, regional languages serve to alienate one State of India from another, and by virtue of being used as a political role-sign[1] for mobilisation of language groups serve clearly political objectives.

The role of Hindi as a common language for India and a pan-Indian language of communication remains in the balance. So far a sort of colloquial Hindi, as patronised, for instance, by the Hindi cinema, is generally understood almost all over the country. If left to itself, this language could develop as the lingua franca of India. However, if official and semi-official attempts in the realm of developing Hindi continue in the direction they have so far taken, i.e. towards greater Sanskritization,[2] the resulting language will not only provoke animosity among non-Hindi speakers, but will also be alienated from the regional Hindi as now understood and spoken in the Hindi States of Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh.

A particular paradox to be noted in the field of language planning in India is that while the Centre has been constitutionally entrusted with the task of developing, enriching and promoting the spread of Hindi, education in India is a State subject, with the result[3] that the Centre can only advise and recommend, but not enforce policies. Thus no matter how thorough and sincere the efforts of the Centre to spread the knowledge of Hindi, till the States are ready and willing to adopt and implement this policy, it remains

1. Das Gupta, J.: Language Conflict and National Development (Bombay, Oxford University Press, 1970) p.265.
2. See Chapter V.
3. See Chapter IX.

a mere platitude on paper. This arrangement is significantly different from the highly centralised educational system of the U.S.S.R., where in spite of the presence of Republican Ministries of Education, the latter serve primarily to implement and administer policies formulated by the Central authorities in Moscow.[1] If education in India continues to be a State subject, it is extremely unlikely that the States, susceptible as they are to local and parochial pressures, will be willing to implement a uniform policy of language teaching. For a uniform All-India policy in education (if it is at all justified), the Constitution will have to be suitably modified to include education in the Central, or at least the Concurrent List.

The choice of a medium of instruction at the school level has been decided in favour of the mothertongue or regional language in India and the native tongue or republican language in the U.S.S.R. At the tertiary level, the choice of a medium needs to be reconsidered in the light of the specialised nature of knowledge imparted at this level and the differential stages in the development of various languages. In the U.S.S.R. the choice has been made in favour of Russian, while in India the claims of Hindi, English and the regional languages have been advanced over the years.[2] Adoption of the regional languages would not only mean andacademic compartmentalisation of the country, but endless duplication of books and materials. The choice, therefore, narrows down to Hindi or English as the media of tertiary education in India.

What language emerges as the final language of higher education in India, and what role is assigned to the study of Hindi and English in the school curriculum will depend, among other considerations, on which language emerges as the de facto and de jure official language of India. If the chances of Hindi being the de facto official language are remote, the motivation for non-Hindi students to learn Hindi will be minimal. A knowledge of Hindi has not been a

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1. See Chapter IX.
2. See Chapter IV.

pre-requisite for appointment to the administrative services[1] or for governmental or semi-governmental appointments. Learning Hindi, therefore, does not bestow any special advantages on non-Hindi students. Similarly, Hindi students hardly find it to their advantage to learn another Modern Indian language as required by the three-language formula. Lack of motivation coupled with the lack of central enforcement makes for an haphazard implementation of the formula as found in India today.

If both Hindi and English are to continue as the official languages of India, a more feasible policy in education would be to leave the choice of language study to the students themselves. This would not only relieve the excessive emphasis on language teaching as found in Indian schools today, but also allow the evolution of a more practical policy of language teaching. A similar choice between Russian and the Republic language was offered to parents by the Soviet school law of 1958. Whether this is a subtle form of Russification is debatable. A similar policy, if adopted in India would result in non-Hindi students opting for English. But whether Hindi students would choose Hindi or English is questionable. It is interesting to note that the majority of leaders who advocate the cause of Hindi from political platforms, in private-life send their own children to English-medium schools. If the choice were left to parents, it is possible that a majority of them might come out in favour of English.

Finally, the argument that for the rural child English does not hold much relevance applies equally to Hindi. Here the regional language plays a dominant role, and in the learning of a second language, both Hindi and English present more or less the same difficulties to a non-Hindi student. This is more so in the South whose languages belong to an altogether different group from the Aryan of Hindi[2].

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1. For the UPSC examination, though Hindi, English and the regional languages are optional media; there is a compulsory paper only in English, and only after recruitment is a course in Hindi obligatory.

2. See Chapter II.

Language as an issue in India has aroused strong emotions both among the rulers and the ruled. In the midst of this raging controversy, those looking for enlightment from foreign experience see in the Soviet Union a country which has "solved" its language problem. Monistic policy solutions are made and implemented in the U.S.S.R. without much opposition. This apparent lack of conflict in the U.S.S.R. has prompted some Indian leaders to argue for an authoritarian model of decision-making, combined with the criteria of amalgamation, especially during the initial years of nation-building in India. Indeed, some writers have blamed the democratic political system for preventing a smooth solving of the language problem. Such an allegation, however, ignores the possibility that democracy can provide an alternative model of integration based on a pluralistic decision-system. By its very nature, however, such a system is bound to generate controversy by facilitating communication within the various parts of the system and inviting diverse views through voluntary representation. Under these circumstances, it is almost impossible to adopt and implement a single policy solution for the whole country. Pluralistic policy solutions therefore appear to be the only possibility in the Indian context.

Within the limited scope of this study it is not possible to specify the ideal language policy solutions for India. This requires a thorough study of other factors, such as the social, economic and psychological. What the present study has attempted to show is that some of the ideological and institutional factors operating in the sphere of language planning in India preclude the emergence of a uniform solution accepted throughout the country. On the basis of the available information it has been possible to forecast the general trends of language planning in India as also to assess the outcome of existing policies. The validity of these observations, however, can only be determined in the light of future developments in India.

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